‘That All Shall Be Saved’: An Introductory Review

Four years ago David Bentley Hart announced on Eclectic Orthodoxy that he subscribes to the doctrine of apokatastasis and hoped to write a book on the subject. I do not know if this was the first time he had ever publicly shared his views on the subject—though one can find intimations of his universalist convictions going as far back as The Beauty of the Infinite (2004)—but it was news to me. The revelation quickly spread through Twitter, Facebook, and the theological world. Few scholars generate the kind of buzz that Hart does. And so we waited … eagerly … impatiently … anticipatorily. Two years later his translation of the New Testament appeared, with a controversial postscript that assured us that the aionion punishment of Matthew 25:46 should not be rendered “eternal.” We continued to wait. Finally, the long watch is over. The 2015 announcement has become Yale University Press reality: That All Shall Be Saved. It is an important book, though not in the way some have been hoping. Hart has not given us the definitive treatise on apoka­tastasis. You will not find detailed exegesis of the hell passages in the New Testament nor extended discussion of the Church’s dogmatic statements that (on the surface) condemn the greater hope. That All Shall Be Saved is important in the way The Doors of the Sea was important when it was published in 2005—that is, as a timely, and at times quite personal, reflection on a critical topic, replete with incisive theological and metaphysical insights and astringent polemic. It will bring apokatastasis back to ecumenical center stage. This doesn’t mean that universal­ism has lacked contemporary defenders. Over the past twenty years Thomas Talbott has been its most important and influential exponent. He is a sophisticated analytic philosopher, but unfortunately has not received the hearing in ecumenical circles he deserves. As a result the greater hope has continued to be seen as a fringe phenomenon. Hart, on the other hand, presents a different profile: Christian neoplatonist, student of the Church Fathers, respected philosophical theologian, pugilistic defender of the catholic faith, translator of the New Testament, Orthodox churchman. His theological heroes are Sts Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor. Hart is a formida­ble thinker with deep roots in the tradition.

That All Shall Be Saved is a brilliant piece of rhetoric. Despite disclaimers that he does not expect his book to change many minds, Hart clearly intends to convince us, intellectually and affectively, that apokatastasis is the only proper conclusion to the gospel story of Jesus Christ:

If Christianity is in any way true, Christians dare not doubt the salvation of all … [A]ny understanding of what God has accomplished in Christ that does not include the assurance of a final apokatastasis in which all things created are redeemed and joined to God is ultimately incoherent and unworthy of rational faith. (p. 66)

Hart could hardly have phrased his thesis any more sharply. Clearly this is an issue about which he feels deeply and passionately. As he writes in the concluding chapter:

I have been asked more than once in the last years whether, if I were to become convinced that Christian adherence absolutely requires a belief in a hell of eternal torment, this would constitute in my mind proof that Christianity should be dismissed as a self-evidently morally obtuse and logically incoherent faith. And, as it happens, it would. As I say, for me it is a matter of conscience, which is after all only a name for the natural will’s aboriginal and constant orientation toward the Good when that orientation expresses itself in our conscious motives. As such, conscience must not abide by the rule of the majority. Placed in the balance over against its dictates, the authority of a dominant tradition or of a reigning opinion has no weight whatever. And my conscience forbids assent to a picture of reality that I regard as morally corrupt, contrary to justice, perverse, inexcusably cruel, deeply irrational, and essentially wicked. (p. 208)

Confronted by such an emphatic moral stance, we readers have no choice but to attend seriously to the arguments presented in That All Shall Be Saved. The task of the theolo­gian is to explicate the faith of the Church. He or she creatively engages the ecumenical tradition, acknowledging the diversity of legitimate opinions within it. There are, after all, different possible solutions to any particular theological puzzle. Doctrines are always open to new reformulations. The theologian may believe that he has presented a sound, perhaps even the best, interpretation; but he also knows that others of equal or greater competence may disagree. He fully expects critical responses. “Hopefully my arguments will contribute to the Church’s ongoing elaboration of doctrine. Maybe I’ll even get footnoted.” But when the theologian declares that the gospel of Jesus Christ is at stake, he has raised the stakes to an infinitely higher level. He has cut off our retreat to mere iteration of the tradition. We have no choice but to think with him and interrogate afresh the revealed sources of the faith.

If we believe that eternal perdition is a divinely revealed truth, dogmatically defined by ecumenical council and magisterial pronouncement, we are going to find it difficult to generate the kind of sympathy necessary to read That All Shall Be Saved. It is no easy task for a believer to assess a claim that a churchly teaching is wrong. Yet, Hart tells us, the gospel is at stake. Might it just be possible that eternal damnation violates the grammar of faith? I offer this counsel: temporarily bracket your belief in the tradi­tional doctrine. Hear Hart out. Follow closely his reasoning. Test his conclusions. If his key arguments should prove probative, then we must conclude that the traditional doctrine of hell is not irreform­­able teaching. The Church cannot dogmatize falsehood.

From the beginning, the Church of the Apostles has proclaimed a message of transcendent good news:

In its dawn, the gospel was a proclamation of a divine victory that had been won over death and sin, and over the spiritual powers of rebellion against God that dwell on high, and here below, and under the earth. It announced itself truly as the “good tidings” of a campaign of divine rescue on the part of a loving God, who by the sending of his Son into the world, and even into the kingdom of death, had liberated his creatures from slavery to a false and merciless master, and had opened a way into the Kingdom of Heaven, in which all of creation would be glorified by the direct presence of God … It was, above all, a joyous proclama­tion, and a call to a lost people to find their true home at last, in their Father’s house. It did not initially make its appeal to human hearts by forcing them to revert to some childish or bestial cruelty latent in their natures; rather, it sought to awaken them to a new form of life, one whose premise was charity. Nor was it a religion offering only a psycho­logical salve for individual anxieties regarding personal salvation. It was a summons to a new and corporate way of life, salvation by entry into a community of love. Hope in heaven and fear of hell were ever present, but also sublimely inchoate, and susceptible of elaboration in any number of conceptual shapes. Nothing as yet was fixed except the certainty that Jesus was now Lord of all things, and would ultimately yield all things up to the Father so that God might be all in all. (pp. 205-206)

And yet the Church came to believe that she must conclude the gospel narrative with an eschatological division between the blessed and the damned. To the liberating promise must be appended the terrifying threat of interminable suffering. As the Synod of Constantinople declared in A.D. 543: “If anyone says or holds that the punishment of demons and impious human beings is temporary and that it will have an end at some time, and that there will be a restoration of demons and impious human beings, let him be anathema.” How the eternality of hell came to be the teaching of the Church must be left to the historians. Hart’s concern is to remind us of the profound theological implications of the doctrine: if we teach that everlasting perdition is the possible final end of most, many, some, or even just one human being, then we must logically concede that God intends this infernal doom. The divine goodness is thus called into radical question:

The eternal perdition—the eternal suffering—of any soul would be an abominable tragedy, and therefore a profound natural evil; this much is quite clearly stated by scripture, in asserting that God “intends all human beings to be saved and to come to a full knowledge of truth” (1 Timothy 2:4). A natural evil, however, becomes a moral evil precisely to the degree that it is the positive intention, even if only conditionally, of a rational will. God could not, then, directly intend a soul’s ultimate destruction, or even intend that a soul bring about its own destruction, without positively willing the evil as an evil end; such a result could not possibly be comprised within the ends purposed by a truly good will (in any sense of the word “good” intelligible to us). Yet, if both the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and that of eternal damnation are true, that very evil is indeed already comprised within the positive intentions and dispositions of God. (pp. 81-82)

The logic is startling, compelling, horrifying. We rarely think God’s free creation of the cosmos and everlasting damnation together, yet sound theology requires that we must. No matter how we understand damnation, whether as direct retributive punishment of sins or as self-determined alienation from the Good, it inescapably belongs to God’s pretemporal willing and act. God need not have brought the world into being from out of nothing, yet he did, hell and all—at least so the traditional doctrine teaches.

What then, we might well ask, does this make of the story of salvation—of its cost? What would any damned soul be, after all, as enfolded within the eternal will of God, other than a price settled upon by God with his own power, an oblation willingly exchanged for a finite benefit—the lamb slain from the foundation of the world? And is hell not then the innermost secret of heaven, its sacrificial heart? And what then is God’s moral nature, inasmuch as the moral character of any intended final cause must include within its calculus what one is willing to sacrifice. (p. 83)

Our discomfort grows. Surely there must be a way to absolve our heavenly Father of respon­sibility. Perhaps we might think of the creation of the world as a gamble of sorts. God takes a risk. He permits human beings to defeat his good intentions for them. As C. S. Lewis states: “In creating beings with free will, omnipotence from the outset submits to the possibility of such defeat.” Hell, therefore, is an unfortunate but necessary conse­quence of our freely chosen disobedience. Yet is this formulation morally coherent? Let us suppose that God has granted human beings godlike autonomy, and let us further suppose that

God created simply on the chance that humanity might sin, and on the chance that a certain number of incorrigibly wicked souls might plunge themselves into the fiery abyss forever. This still means, that, morally, he has purchased the revelation of his power in creation by the same horrendous price—even if, in the end no one at all should happen to be damned. The logic is irresistible. God creates. The die is cast. Alea iacta est. But then again, as Mallarmé says, “Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard” (A throw of the dice will never abolish the hazard): for what is hazarded has already been surrendered, entirely, no matter how the dice may fall. The outcome of the aleatory venture may be intentionally indeterminate, but the wager itself is an irrevocable intentional decision, wherein every possible cost has already been accepted: the irrecuperable expenditure has been offered even if, happily, it is never actually lost, and so the moral nature of the act is the same in either case. To venture the life of your child for some other end is, morally, already to have killed your child, even if at the last moment Artemis or Heracles or the Angel of the LORD should stay your hand. And so, the revelation of God’s glory in creatures would still always be dependent upon that evil, or that venture beyond good and evil, even if at the last no one should perish. Creation could never then be called “good” in an unconditional sense; nor God the “Good as such,” no matter what conditional goods he might accomplish in creating. (pp. 85-86; emphasis Hart)

Here lies the core of Hart’s gravamen: if the doctrine of everlasting hell is true, then this means that the Holy Trinity eternally wills evil; yet that is impossible—it contradicts the paschal love revealed in Jesus Christ. The God who is absolute Goodness does not gamble. He wills only the good of his children and would never put at risk their eternal happiness. In the words of St Isaac the Syrian:

It is not the way of the compassionate Maker to create rational beings in order to deliver them over mercilessly to unending affliction in punishment for things of which He knew even before they were fashioned, aware how they would turn out when He created them—and whom nonetheless He created. All the more since the fore-planning of evil and the taking of vengeance are characteristics of the passions of created beings, and do not belong to the Creator. (II.39.6)

In the weeks and months to come, Eclectic Orthodoxy will be publishing several reviews of That All Shall Be Saved by theologians and philosophers. We shall see how they respond to the challenge David Bentley Hart has put before us.

(Go to Tom Talbott’s review)

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71 Responses to ‘That All Shall Be Saved’: An Introductory Review

  1. Thomas says:

    With the caveat that I don’t yet have my copy, this statement seems odd for an avowed critic of “monopolytheism” to make:

    > God could not, then, directly intend a soul’s ultimate destruction, or even intend that a soul bring about its own destruction, without positively willing the evil as an evil end; such a result could not possibly be comprised within the ends purposed by a truly good will (in any sense of the word “good” intelligible to us). Yet, if both the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and that of eternal damnation are true, that very evil is indeed already comprised within the positive intentions and dispositions of God.

    I’d be curious to see if there is a more extended argument concerning these “positive intentions and dispositions of God”. For classical theists, God does not have particular intentional acts, nor is his central act of being directed to the world.

    Different schools of thought differ, of course, on exactly how this is articulated. But the general theme is that when we say things about God (“God wills the salvation of all”, “God wills the punishment of some”), the basis of those statements is something in the thing in relation to God.

    For instance, we say “God created the world” because the world’s existence depends upon God. There’s nothing new in God by virtue of that proposition being true.

    Likewise, when we speak of God willing something in the world, God gains nothing over what he would have had had he not willed something in the world. Instead, someone like St. Thomas will say that God willing the world is grounded in the world’s orientation toward God as its final end. It doesn’t mean that God has some desire or want that needs to be satisfied.

    Hopefully my scepticism will be overcome by the argument. In my view, though, approaches based on the intrinsic finality of the world provide a stronger ground for universalism than approaches that threaten to compromise the absolute nature of God.

    Liked by 1 person

    • Robertson Gramling says:

      Considerations of God’s absoluteness and impossibility are well taken. But I don’t quite get the concern with speaking of God’s intentions here. Scripture is replete with talk of God faithfulness towards creation and Israel, the faithful etc. The good shepherd goes out to find the lost sheep. Of course, in all the cases in questions, God is not fulfilling some unactualized perfection of his nature but ensuring that his creatures properly partake in the goodness that he has intended for them. And all too true, that this involves creations intrinsic orientation to God. But as the parable makes clear this also can involve a kind of positive Divine inbreaking. How else can we possibly speak of the Incarnation? Or, more broadly, mercy and forgiveness? It’s the Christian—and to some extent Platonic—insight that creation exists as a sort of excess rooted in divine generosity which, again, stands in contrast to a Hegelian or Schellingian account of creation as God’s self completion.

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      • Thomas says:

        Scripture also speaks of God as though he is in time and has emotions. Yet no traditional theologian would advance an argument premised on the fact that “no one stays angry forever.”

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        • Robertson Gramling says:

          True, but that’s not quite what we’re talking about. I don’t want to give the impression that one just reads scripture in isolation from philosophical outlook, or that philosophy shouldn’t brought to bear in our exegesis. It’s just that I don’t think the particular case in question is a division between naive folksy readers of scripture and serious traditional theologians. Aquinas’ (and many of the Fathers before him) position that God’s wrath doesn’t entail a change in him but bespeaks how the sinful May experience God, I find cogent enough. The Divine love is unchanging and steadfast. But, though you think Divine impasibility is at issue in this case as well, I simply don’t. To speak of God’s will that all should be saved, or his desire for our blessedness doesn’t violate that grammar. In creating and then redeeming his creatures, God is always aiming at at giving beings other than himself a share in the blessedness he possesses. It seems to me, by definition, this does not involve God coming into some unrealized perfection because he can only extend to creatures this share in blessedness—and positively will it—because He is already perfectly blessed. I simply bring up scripture because God’s enduring faithfulness in the face of sin is pretty much THE ultimate story of scripture. And, though God’s faithfulness necessarily includes bringing humanity to the final end of their ultimate orientation, to speak of his faithfulness is not only to speak of creations orientation. In fact, it speaks of the persistence of God in the face of our own misshapen sin-soaked orientation. Moreover, I take this intentional faithfulness (sorry, that’s a nice bit of redundancy) to be precisely rooted in the Divine impassibility—God’s unturning love. Btw I think the DBH speaks of God’s apatheia “In No Shadow of Turning” is pretty much consonant with what I’m saying , as are the views of the Church Fathers he explciates there—Cyril, in particular gets a lot of play there if I recall correctly.

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    • Robert Fortuin says:

      I take it to be, Thomas, that the acceptance of the principle that “effect is like its cause,” denotes that both God’s nature (i.e. moral character) and creation’s fulfillment are necessarily intertwined. The argument then rests not mere on one or the other.

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  2. Dennis Jensen Christians should be thankful God has given his Church such a gifted theologian as D. B. Hart. His words draw us to contemplate and confront and struggle with the deepest issues of our faith as few of us have done before. When the struggle is over, we are so much stronger for it and clearer in our grasp of the deep mystery of God’s goodness and greatness. Thanks to Al Kimel’s beautiful essay, many of us now know that “That All shall be Saved” is a book we must read. It’s a book we will definitely savor. And, Al, I very greatly doubt that any other reviews you post will match your own.

    Liked by 1 person

  3. Pardon my skepticism that the Church, promised to be led into all truth, could get such an important teaching wrong for 2000 years. Modernists aught be taught by their Fathers and submit to the fact that God does not have to meet our ill-formed sensibilities in order to True.

    Liked by 4 people

    • This assumes that being led into all truth happened in the past and is now an irreformable deposit to which we all must bow. I’m more of the view that Christ leading his church into all truth is an ongoing and living reality where we can embrace the enduring truths of the faith (e.g. the Creed) without being forced to bow to or reduplicate the errors of our forebearers. As holy as these men are, in this life they were far from fallible.

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      • Ah, the perpetual discovery of new truths which contradict past truths. I serve a God that is not the author of confusion.

        Liked by 3 people

        • Jeremy Suess says:

          Which is why there are so many denominations, and even folks within Catholicism can’t agree with one another, nor within Orthodoxy, and nor within the Anglican community. Everything is not crystal clear. I believe spiritual warfare is in large part to blame. It would be so nice if everything were so nice and straightforward, like a cookie cutter, but it’s not. But God is good, what’s true, is true, even if we perceive through a glass darkly. “The path of the righteous is like the first light of dawn, shining every brighter until the first light o day”. Proverbs 4:18. “The Spirit will lead us into all truth.” John 16:13. As Iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another. Not everyone has ears to hear. “Israel” means one who strives with God. That is the journey we are on, the church universal – the living and the dead, of a communal striving, wrestling, listening to the voice of the Spirit, with one another.

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        • Robert Fortuin says:

          I don’t think Jedidiah calls for new truth but rather for clarification and explication of the faith affirmed . Clarifications may be controversial, take the hypostatic union for instance, and rise to the level of ‘discovery of new truths’ only by dissent. You will then have to make a case as to why universalism is to be rejected, not merely claim novelty.

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          • It’s obviously not novel (see the quote from St. Augustine contra the stance I posted as a comment), but rejected. Authoritatively. Even if you suppose that it was not authoritatively rejected by legitimate authority, the vast majority of Fathers and teachers of the faith throughout two thousand years of Christianity have held to the eternal punishment of the wicked. As St. Augustine says in the same chapter I quoted earlier, “This is not a matter of feeling, but of fact.”

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          • Becominghinged,

            Just because of my own time constraints I can’t spill a lot of ink here. That said, while you are right in saying that eternal damnation became the majority position of the church post Nicaea II. You are demonstrably wrong that the majority of the fathers held to this position. Especially in the East, and even after Nicaea II it remained an important distinctive in the Syrian church and among several others right up to Eruginia in the Carolingian period in the West.

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          • Grant says:

            Jedidiahpaschall is quite right in saying becominghinged is wrong that a majority of the Fathers held the position of eternal torment, particularly as he says in the East (but it was not never entirely absent from the Latin West, even through the 2nd millennium AD), and this blog post gives a number of quotes from various Fathers and saints affirming universal salvation, and mentions others that were sympatheic to it (such as St Maximus the Confessor) .

            You can read it here:

            http://www.patristics.co/patristic-universalism/

            As you can see the writer themselves (not a universalist, at least at the time of writing the article) that allegedly both St Basil, St Jerome and St Augustine mentioned that during there were large numbers of orthodox (not heterodox or heretical Christians) at that time that were held a version of the universal salvation view,. St Basil in De Asceticis says ‘the mass of men say there is to be an end to punishment and to those who are punished’, St Augustine saying. ‘there are very many in our day, who though not denying the Holy Scriptures, do not believe in endless torments,’ or St Jerome ‘I know that most persons understand by the story of Nineveh and its king, the ultimate forgiveness of the devil and all rational creatures’ (there are all there in the blog). This indicates that for a long time universalism was a significant view in the Church (possibly even a majority view in many places) and it planned a major part in St Gregory of Nyssa’s very defense of Catholic Orthodoxy vs Arians (key arguments don’t work without it). It also touches on the Fifth Ecumenical council that the Council did not condemn universalism (and if you peruse this blog you will find that even if the attached fifteen anathemas are still accepted they do not condemn universalism of the one that St Origen himself, or St Gregory of Nyssa, St Issac of Ninevah and so on held and advocated, but a particular kind advocated by 6th century Origenists).

            It is simply not the case that the Church has universally understood the Dogma of Last Things to be clearly and without question eternal torment with some lost forever. There have always been from the beginnings (in the Orthodox and Catholic Church) those who have held the three doctrines of eternal torment, annihilationism and universal restoration. And universal restoration once held wide-ranging support both among Fathers of the Church and Christians in general (and possibly might have been even the majority view). Then over time for various reasons, political ones playing significant part, the view changed to eternal torment being the majority view.

            And majority numbers don’t determine the truth, neither universalism when it had wide-ranging and possibly majority support for the early centuries, nor eternal torment now that it has enjoyed centuries of majority support. If that were the case the Arianism for a time would have had majority support (and today if you aren’t Catholic you are in this position, which is every Orthodox Church Eastern, Oriental, Holy Assyrian Church of the East and every Protestant denomination and group, and even among Catholics, particularity now there are strong divisions where one would not want to get into a position where majority determines truth).

            As St Maximus is said to have said when told that Rome would soon join the Monothelite heresy:

            ‘But what will you do,” inquired the envoys, “when the Romans are united to the Byzantines? Yesterday, indeed, two delegates arrived from Rome and tomorrow, the Lord’s day, they will communicate the Holy Mysteries with the Patriarch. ”

            The Saint replied, “Even if the whole universe holds communion with the Patriarch, I will not communicate with him. For I know from the writings of the holy Apostle Paul: the Holy Spirit declares that even the angels would be anathema if they should begin to preach another Gospel, introducing some new teaching.”‘

            Simply being, majority doesn’t determine truth neither then, or during the time when universalism held large sway, nor now, when eternal torment holds wide sway of opinion.

            Liked by 4 people

        • Actually, both Augustine and Basil in the late 4th century seem to think apokatastasis was very popular in their day.

          Liked by 1 person

  4. “God’s sentence will be pronounced on the wicked, both angels and men. Can we suppose that it will hold for angels but not for men? Yes; but, only if men’s imaginings have more weight than God’s words! Since this is quite impossible, all those who desire to escape eternal punishment should desist from arguing against God and should rather bow in obedience, while yet there is time, to the command of God.” St. Augustine, The City of God, Book 21, Chapter 23

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    • Thomas says:

      > It may therefore be correctly affirmed, that such infants as quit the body without being baptized will be involved in the mildest condemnation of all. That person, therefore, greatly deceives both himself and others, who teaches that they will not be involved in condemnation; whereas the apostle says: “Judgment from one offense to condemnation,” Romans 5:16 and again a little after: “By the offense of one upon all persons to condemnation.” Romans 5:18

      – Augustine, De pecc. mer. 1.16.21

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  5. I am surprised that two prominent Catholic theologians strongly endorsed the book: Robert Louis Wilken and Paul Griffiths. The former’s endorsement implies that he adheres to apokatastasis. Does anyone know if RLW has explicitly accepted the doctrine?

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    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      I believe that Wilken was David’s PhD advisor at the University of Virginia. I would be surprised, however, if he has explicitly accepted apokatastasis, even if he finds David’s thesis compelling. But I have no info about any of that.

      Liked by 1 person

  6. Revd Dr Thomas Renz says:

    Does DB Hart equate “eternal perdition” with “eternal suffering”? Surely the latter is only a subset of the former, as annihilationism knows “eternal perdition” without “eternal suffering.” Your citation assumes that eternal perdition/suffering is a tragic evil. Does DB Hart consider this self-evident or does he argue for this position earlier in the book?

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    • Iain Lovejoy says:

      “Your citation assumes that eternal perdition/suffering is a tragic evil.”
      As opposed to what, a fun family entertainment? If you don’t think a fellow human being suffering eternal torment is a bad thing, there is something seriously wrong with your moral compass.

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    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      Dr Renz, Hart does discuss annihilationism in the book, but for the most part when he speaks of eternal damnation/perdition, he is referring to a condition of everlasting and irreversible torment. He believes that such a condition is an evil and presents arguments for this belief, similar to those he advanced in “God, Creation, and Evil.”

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    • Revd Dr Thomas Renz says:

      Thanks for the link. I was thinking of the picture painted in CS Lewis’ The Great Divorce. I do not see this as a portrait of a situation that is obviously evil.

      Liked by 1 person

    • Revd Dr Thomas Renz says:

      Iain, I wonder what you make of the following:

      “And whoever causes one of these little ones who have faith to falter, it is better for him to have the millstone of the kind turned by an ass hung about his neck and to be thrown into the sea. And if your hand causes you to falter, cut it off. It is good for you to enter into life maimed rather than having two hands to go away into the vale of Hinnom, into the inextinguishable fire ‘where their worm does not die and their fire is not quenched.’ And if your foot causes you to falter, cut it off. It is good for you to enter into life limping rather than having both feet to be cast into the vale of Hinnom ‘where their worm does not die and their fire is not quenched.’ And if your eye causes you to falter, fling it away. It is good for you to enter one-eyed into the kingdom of God rather than having two eyes to be cast into the vale of Hinnom, ‘where their worm does not die and their fire is not quenched.’”

      To enter into life “maimed”, “limping” or “one-eyed” – or even to be drowned – is described by our Lord and Saviour as “good” at least in the sense of being better than its alternative. Would you consider the alternative to be irreal (non-existent)? This would seem to me an implausible reading. Would you describe the alternative as “evil”? And would this imply that God does evil, even if only for a limited time? Or would you say that the suffering of which Jesus speaks with a citation from the book of Isaiah is time-limited and for this reason not evil? Would this imply that the end (salvation and restoration) justifies the means (torment)?

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      • Iain Lovejoy says:

        It’s perfectly possible to believe that some suffering is necessary or inevitable for whatever reason (indeed you can’t really believe in a good God in the face of suffering unless you do). One may even have a stab at saying eternal suffering might be somehow necessary or inevitable (albeit that DBH would say that it is not, which is part of his argument). What has to be obvious, unless you are a moral monster, is that the suffering of torment for eternity of a person is of itself a tragedy and a bad thing to happen, even if you hold that for some reason it is nevertheless inevitable or required. This should not be something open to dispute or necessary to be proven.

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      • Revd Dr Thomas Renz says:

        As I pointed out above, “the suffering of torment for eternity” is one of two or three versions of eternal perdition. It seems to me that If you believe (a) that the only alternative to the doctrine of apokatastais is eternal conscious suffering, and (b) that eternal conscious suffering is self-evidently a moral evil, then you hardly need to bother with DB Hart’s book. If the equation of eternal suffering with eternal torment and with this being “a tragedy and a bad thing” and hence a moral evil is assumed from the start, there is no argument and no need for an argument.

        I am not defending a doctrine of eternal conscious torment; I am exploring what assumptions are made. If is is the quality of permanence rather than anything else that turns suffering into a moral evil, it is presumably because the means do not have an end that is beneficial to the individual concerned?

        Liked by 1 person

        • Iain Lovejoy says:

          You originally said “tragic evil”, not “moral evil”, which are two different things. A bad thing to happen which is an unfortunate necessity is still a bad thing, and still a tragedy, but allowing it to happen to avoid something somehow worse, or as necessary for some greater good may not then be morally evil. In your original comment, however, you seemed to be suggesting someone suffering eternal torment might not be undesirable in itself.

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      • Revd Dr Thomas Renz says:

        On reflection, the lack of benefit to the individual sufferer is not usually considered sufficient to render an act or event evil. If someone gives their life to save others, we may speak of the event having had tragic consequences for the person concerned but we would not usually call the event itself tragic and we would not speak of it as a moral evil.

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        • Iain Lovejoy says:

          I started writing my earlier comment before you wrote this, and got back to it afterwards without noticing you had added some more. The point that needs to be distinguished is between an infliction or permission of suffering as being a moral evil (I.e. a bad thing to do) and suffering as being an “evil” in the non-ethical sense (I.e. an unfortunate thing to happen).
          A think anyone who heard of a person losing their life in saving others would consider the event itself tragic, as it obviously being better by far that nobody dies at all. (Is a mother drowning saving her son from a flood not tragic, even if not also noble?) If you are forced to deny that people suffering and dying is a tragedy at all to defend a theology then the theology is undermining of morality and itself evil.
          That is not to say, however, that the infliction or at the very least permission of suffering is necessarily always morally wrong. An example would be killing or injuring someone to prevent them hurting or killing someone else: I would say this was not morally wrong, but was still a tragedy for the aggressor concerned that their sin made their suffering necessary. (A pacifist might disagree on the morality, but then they would say permitting the victim to be killed or injured rather than use force would be moral – and of course a tragedy – so the point remains.)
          The key thing is that if you are going to argue for eternal torment (or annihilation, or even a temporary Gehenna for that matter) you need to explain why such a thing is necessary or inevitable before you can defend it as morally good: you can’t just wave it away as perfectly fine without any explanation being required.

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      • Revd Dr Thomas Renz says:

        This may be about our definition of terms. In my vocabulary “evil” is a moral category and therefore a narrower term than “bad” which can be used for a range of unfortunate and undesirable events. I would use “tragic” in both a broader sense in which it overlaps with “disastrous” and a specific sense as relating to tragedy (a drama with a plot in which the main character is brought to ruin or great sorrow). Tragic events also happen in stories with a happy resolution which are therefore not “tragedies”.

        The specific event of a mother drowning is tragic. The story of a mother drowning while saving her son from a flood is likely (told as) a tragedy. The story of a son saved by his mother who drowns in the process may be (told as) a tragedy or not. If there is a happy resolution for the main character (the son) in this story, the mother’s drowning is tragic but the overall story is not. This is what I was trying to suggest even if not very well.

        We can agree that eternal torment or annihilation is tragic for the person concerned. (I would be less inclined to speak of temporary suffering in Gehenna as tragic but I can see that in a sense it is, while maybe in another sense it is not.)

        I am not defending eternal torment or even annihilation as morally good. I am exploring and questioning whether it is necessarily evil (morally evil), just because it is bad and tragic for the persons directly concerned.

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        • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

          Your comment got caught by the spam filter Thomas. I have no idea why. This happens occasionally. Anyway, I just discovered it this morning and liberated it.

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  7. William says:

    It’s possible that this has been discussed on this blog before but I have missed it, but where would a view fit that suggests a “gehenna” that is not everlasting torture or torment or suffering but is rather a return to the status of Adam, the status of original creation without sin, yet without the addition of participation in God. When I read Maximus the Confessor’s comments on the topic, this is what appears to be described in a couple of key passages. When I read Ephrem the Syrian’s Hymns on Paradise, something like this also appears to be described. Such a view would seem to fit with the most literal translation of “apokatastasis” as a “restoration” but it also would acknowledge some form of distinction between the beatified and those who are not — which could be considered a type of “perdition” but it doesn’t leave us with an eternal torturer God. In my very very limited reading of modern authors on universalism I have not come across anyone describing something like this or giving a name to a view like this. (I’d offer some quotes but I think I’ve become tedious with quotes in another recent thread).

    Liked by 1 person

    • William, that’s interesting. Ramelli seems to say that John Eriugena held something similar to what you have described. In modern times, the thomist Jacques Maritain hoped for this kind of restoration as well.

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    • William says:

      Though I should add that what I’m describing wouldn’t exactly be exactly a return to “original” creation, since humanity will be resurrected and transformed.

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  8. Andrew says:

    Thank you for the review. I’m curious, does DBH quotes Saint Isaac or engage his thought at all?

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  9. Basem says:

    Thank you for this enlightening article Father! I am a big fan of David Bentley Hart and your blog!

    In my humble opinion, with no intention to offend, the condemnation of apokatastasis in the Fifth Ecumenical Council, and also of Origen of Alexandria 300 years after his death, was more for political, rather than theological, reasons! It was necessary for the State Church to have monopoly over salvation after half of Christendom separated out after the Fourth Ecumenical Council.

    Liked by 1 person

  10. Michael says:

    “Hart has not given us the definitive treatise on apoka­tastasis. You will not find detailed exegesis of the hell passages in the New Testament nor extended discussion of the Church’s dogmatic statements that (on the surface) condemn the greater hope.”

    I must confess that I am somewhat saddened to hear this. If a detailed examination of the hell passages will not be in this book, then where? If not from Hart, then whom? After all the talk of these passages and how often they are cited against universalism, I was looking forward to seeing what someone knowledgeable on the Greek and not determined to enforce popular opinion has to say about them. Or is such a detailed analysis to be saved for some future work?

    Liked by 1 person

    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      Somebody else will need to do the heavy biblical work. Hopefully Hart’s book will encourage some NT scholar to take up the task.

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      • Tamara says:

        Hart’s translation of the New Testament contains a “Concluding Scientific Postscript”, which includes the heading “Translating Certain Words — An Irregular Glossary”. The first word glossed is aionios; the second, gehenna; together they get several pages of treatment — pages 537-548. A dozenish pages is not a “heavy” treatment, I suppose, but it does give some insight on what Hart believes the New Testament says on this matter.

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      • I do think that to a degree Robin Parry’s Evangelical Universalist does lay out a great outline on how to deal with the question of universalism from a biblical standpoint. There’s probably room for several scholars. But, I am no longer of the opinion that exegesis alone is going to resolve the question one way or another. Metaphysical assumptions, how one reckons morality, and foundational theological presuppositions are all going to have a huge influence on how any scholar interprets the text of the NT.

        Liked by 4 people

  11. John H says:

    Michael,

    There is an extended discussion of both the “scriptural hell passages” and the Church’s dogmatic statements on universalism (Constantinople II as well as the first Origenist controversy involving St. Jerome) in The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis by Ilaria Ramelli. Unfortunately, Ramelli leaves many of the Greek and Latin excerpts from the Church Fathers untranslated in her work, so the book is definitely a tough read.

    Liked by 1 person

    • Michael says:

      I appreciate the suggestion, John H. However that book has a $300 price tag on both amazon and ebay, which is a shockingly steep price. Especially for one that you say leaves many important excerpts untranslated and is a “tough read.” Doesn’t even have an ebook option either. Hopefully there are other books/articles that tackle the subject…

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      • Grant says:

        You can get her more popular level book I am reading through now ‘a larger hope? Universal Salvation from Christian beginnings to Julian of Norwich’ that presents that work in a shorter, more popular level. It’s allot more affordable and easy to read (in which she translates all excepts). It exists with a second volume by Robin Parry following universalist thought into the 19th century (with a joint projected work of modern exponents, perhaps even our own Father Kimel 🙂 ).

        You can get both on amazon though only the second (Parry’s work) is available on kindle.

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  12. David Artman says:

    Great review, thanks! I believe this book by Hart will help us to have a very necessary conversation about the core of the gospel.

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  13. Fr Aidan Kimel says:

    For those interested in DBH’s appraisal of the annihilationist construal of damnation:

    Nor does the arithmetic change very much—at least, not nearly as much as one might hope—if one gives up on the idea of a hell of eternal torment and poses in its place a final “hell consisting in the ultimate annihilation of evildoers at the end of days. Admittedly, the latter idea is considerably more palatable than the former; and, for what it is worth, it also appears to accord somewhat better with the large majority of scriptural metaphors, the dominical metaphors in particular. But such an eventuality would still be an irreducible price exacted, a sacrifice eternally preserved in the economy of God’s Kingdom. The ultimate absence of a certain number of created rational natures would still be a kind of last end inscribed in God’s eternity, a measure of failure or loss forever preserved within the totality of the tale of divine victory. If what is lost is lost finally and absolutely, then whatever remains, however glorious, is the residue of an unresolved and no less ultimate tragedy, and so could constitute only a contingent and relative “happy ending.” Seen in that way, the lost are still the price that God has contracted from everlasting—whether by predestination or more permission—for the sake of his Kingdom; and so it remains a Kingdom founded upon both an original and a final sacrificial exclusion. In either case—eternal torment, eternal oblivion—creation and redemption are negotiations with evil, death, and suffering, and so never in an absolute sense God’s good working of all things. (pp. 86-87)

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  14. Ghost says:

    Hi Fr. Kimel, here’s a question (partially inspired by your Harry Potter meme).

    Assume someone (Voldemort) is responsible for someone’s death (Cedric Diggory), causing suffering to a third party (Cedric’s family). After death, Voldemort sees the evil of his ways, and is on his way towards rehabilitation. But what of Cedric’s parents who can’t find it in themselves to easily forgive Voldemort for cutting Cedric’s life short, and are further outraged by the injustice of Voldemort having made peace with his deeds and of them being asked to “be one” with him now? Just curious, is this addressed by David’s book?

    More seriously, assuming apokatastasis, not only should Hitler eventually come to accept his deeds were wrong, but his victims should also accept his rehabilitation and welcome him as a brother. Is this a harder thing to do for Hitler, or for his victims? Because I’m afraid it’s easier for him to recognize the monstruosity of his acts, and to denounce them, than it is for his victims, knowing the monstruosity of his actions, to accept him. Succintly, I’m afraid his salvation might be a delay in theirs. Do you think this concern is justified?

    Liked by 1 person

    • Iain Lovejoy says:

      Counterfactual: Let us assume Hitler has been instead consigned to eternal torment or annihilated. Could his victims be truly free from their sins and enter into bliss if they still bore in their hearts hatred and unforgivingness in their hearts for Hitler, and if they still could not let go of it to embrace instead the perfect love of God, who does forgive even these things? I can’t see, in reality, how the rehabilitation of Hitler (if in God’s time, and in accordance with God’s due justice) would actually therefore impact on his victim’s salvation in the problematic way you suggest.

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      • Ghost says:

        At least in the counterfactual case you mention, the victims’ attitude towards their tormentors would match the judgement rendered by God. So the woman who was kept in a basement for decades by a deranged rapist doesn’t need to feel remorse for *not* forgiving his deeds, when God himself doesn’t. I would completely understand if she never wants anything to do with him ever again, and experiences Heaven as a blissful departure from *all that*.

        As to what I consider problematic, it is this: I would find it strange if, after spending the last decades of her life being tormented by someone, her purgatorial condition after death gives her no respite from his torments, as she is now being asked to forgive him as a condition for furthering her salvation/theosis.

        God may view his acts with pity, as they represent a deep degradation of the Imago Dei, but should she have to do so also as a condition in order to attain bliss? Is she to be tormented by her completely understandable repulsion against him and his deeds?

        I’m not arguing against Apokatastasis, but I am confused about its implications.

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        • Grant says:

          That very fact witholds them from the full healing, freedom and peace of the age to come, of entering into the joy of the resurrection (indeed it’s logic is bound up in the very Lord’s pray, lack of forgiveness entraps and impedes grace in yourself) and the great Jubilee freeing from all debts, sins and holds of death.

          They themselves (or any of us) cannot be free until we are reconciled in Christ to those who have hurt us and we have hurt, only in and through that reconciliation and resurrection are things set and put to rights and true justice given (which is why mercy, forgiveness and true justice aren’t opposed but are the same thing, love in action). Only when the evil is faced, confronted, it’s effects on all healed, and true relationships that should of and will be are restored can anyone have justice and be free, and have the fulness if life. Otherwise they remain trapped by the evil that hurt them, forever dominated by death, denied healing and justice and true relationship coming out off having faced and overcome that evil in Christ of the true selves of those that hurt them with there own true selves.

          In the ultimate it is the only way be free and healed and to know the joys of heaven, to be ‘in Love Himself’. We see this even partially these days with forgiveness between a person hurt and those who hurt them, the freedom and healing it brings, you can see it in truth and reconciliation commissions (such as one held in South Africa). And what is partial and incomplete in this age will be fully possible and realized then, what is impossible with man, is possible with God.

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        • Robert Fortuin says:

          Ghost, some of the problems you mention may well arise from projecting current (i.e. deficient and disordered) psychological states and processes onto that of the after-life to come. Having found complete healing in and by God (a far remove from, let’s say, a therapy session), the victim is no longer wrought with pain and agony and thirst for pay-back, but being filled with divine and perfected love the victim, now truly free, rather seeks the healing of enemies. This seems to be a tenable position, if I understand the workings of God’s love aright.

          Liked by 1 person

        • Iain Lovejoy says:

          “she is now being asked to forgive him as a condition for furthering her salvation/theosis”
          No, no, no, a thousand times no! The whole point of universalism is that there are no “conditions” on salvation / theosis. The inability to forgive her abuser is part of the torment from which she needs to be relieved, so that she may be restored to wholeness in God. It is not a condition to be fulfilled for God to permit a person to be saved.

          Liked by 1 person

    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      I believe that all of us will be invited into the process of the healing of our victims, just as all who have injured us will also be invited into the process of our healing.

      Liked by 1 person

      • Ghost says:

        I understand where this is driving at. At the same time, I also understand why some people would want nothing better than to not have to deal with their tormentors, not wanting anything from them, especially healing. At least not for a long while.

        As one is invited to heal, the hurt person also needs to accept their help. I just hope that one is allowed to proceed and to get a “taste of Heaven” prior to them being ready to forgive those guilty of inflicting heinous pain on them.

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  15. The belief that some MUST be damned is contrary to the Gospel. However, I do not think it is necessarily inconsistent to be uncertain about whether all will or will not be saved. We humans do not know everything. Our arguments cannot perfectly represent or take into account the facts. I think uncertainty should rarely be attacked as wrong. Even if certainty is desirable, uncertainty is much better than the wrong kind of certainty – even if the object of the certainty is superficially correct.

    After all, what if it is a good for God to create creatures with the kind of freedom which allows them a choice between loving Him or hating Him forever? I do not think anyone KNOWS this is not the case, and if anyone DOES know that this is not the case, I am certain that person does not have a right to tell the rest of us that we are being untrue to the Gospel if we don’t know it too.

    Liked by 1 person

    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      Raina, a quote just for you from Hart’s book: “Anyone who hopes for the universal reconciliation of creatures with God must already believe that this would be the best possible ending to the Christian story.”

      Liked by 1 person

      • That quote is true enough.

        Mostly, what I’m trying to say is, I really think we need to be careful about trying to force everyone to see, know, or understand what one sees, knows, or understands. When this happens, I think the doctrines themselves lose their shape or meaning; when someone tries to force himself to know what another knows, but he has not yet come to know, he may fancy that he knows and understands that which the other knew, when in fact he does not not know and thinks he understands something very different, even if it sounds the same. I also think that it is harder for people to come to truly know, if they are trying to force themselves, or other people are trying to force them, to know before they are ready, before they know, before God has brought them to that point.

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        • Robert Fortuin says:

          Raina,

          invariably an awfully bitter harvest follows the omission of planting seeds

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          • Can you elaborate on what you mean? I don’t follow.

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          • Robert Fortuin says:

            Raina, I don’t see the use of force here. The message (seed) has to be told (planted) in order for it to be able to the heard (harvest).

            A certainty about uncertainty runs afoul the unconditional triumph of the Gospel.

            Liked by 1 person

          • Thank you for explaining.

            I have no problem with teaching apokatastasis (Christian universalism – it comes from the Greek to “restore to standing). I don’t *even* have a problem with teaching it as *most* consistent with the Christian Gospel. What I have a problem with is telling people who don’t know it, who can’t say, “I am confident that all shall be saved,” that they are being inconsistent to Jesus Christ. I’m not saying anything about ‘certainty about uncertainty,’ – only that all should not be expected to know everything revealed to one or to some. We should not make people feel bad, or feel like they are improperly Christian, because they aren’t comfortable saying, “I know that everyone will be saved.” I’m not saying that uncertainty about universal salvation is necessary.

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          • Robert Fortuin says:

            Raina,
            If it is the Gospel, aren’t we to proclaim it, unapologetically?
            But yes, I am not saying this includes coercion and cajoling people into agreement; so I commend your pastoral sensibility.

            In principle I don’t see a problem with someone making a cogent argument that a mere hope in the salvation of all is inconsistent with Scripture, inconsistent with the Christian faith in an all good, all powerful, and all loving God. And besides aren’t we all open to the charge that our faith is lacking, or are we so fragile that we can’t be challenged to grow in faith?

            That said – I do see an area which is obscured here, and which I think is giving rise to some misconceptions: namely what is meant by “knowledge” and “certainty”. I do think that regarding matters of faith the nature of knowledge and certainty is unlike that of observable facts. Knowledge and certainty of the existence of God, for instance, doesn’t have recourse to empirical facts and observations. Note I am not saying such is less true, or less important, or less certain, just that we have to take into account the type of knowledge and certainty which faith obtains. I am as certain about the presence of a computer screen in front of my face as I am certain about the existence of God. However, the certainty in each case is based on a knowledge of a different kind. Problems occur when conflating the types of knowledge.

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  16. thoughtful says:

    Ghost makes an excellent point. It may be that Voldemort or Hitler will have to gain forgiveness from each of his victims before he can experience conciliation with God.

    Liked by 1 person

    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      And conversely, each of Hitler’s victims must forgive him before they can achieve perfect union with God.

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  17. David Llewellyn Dodds says:

    Having not read the comments (yet), but having done a little word-search checking, I wonder:

    given the cited date of A.D. 543, what the history of non-Chalcedonians is on this (and can anyone recommend accounts of that)?;

    does he explicitly bring George MacDonald into his discussion (e.g., that pp. 205-06 quotation seems quite MacDonald-y to me, in various respects)?;

    with respect to “He permits human beings to defeat his good intentions for them” and the Lewis quotation, as this clearly seems so with respect to creaturely sin, is it in some sense a question of persistence in, or some kind of ‘finalization’ of, sin?

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  18. Tom Talbott says:

    To becominghinged:

    Thanks for pushing back against those of us who believe that a doctrine of universal reconciliation.is an unavoidable consequence of some clear New Testament teachings. If this is not what you believe, then it is important for you to argue for your point of view on this particular issue. But because I am rarely persuaded by arguments from consensus (even scientific consensus), I’m wondering whether you have any exegetical, theological, or philosophical arguments to offer in support of the “infernalist orthodoxy,” as David Bentley Hart calls it.

    Because you quote fairly extensively from St. Augustine, moreover, I’m also wondering how you would respond to the following quote from Hart, who writes that the late Augustine was “a towering genius whose inability to read Greek and consequent reliance on defective Latin translations turned out to be the single most consequential case of linguistic incompetence in Christian history” (p. 49). I know you won’t like such a remark. But I’m nonetheless curious how you would respond to it.

    Thanks again for your responses.

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  19. Renée says:

    I suppose I don’t see how eternal damnation brings in anything new to the idea that God, in freely willing creation, also allows and therefore wills, temporal evils such as the torture of a baby or something equally horrific. If He creates knowing that evils will occur, does He will these evils? And if so, is He then implicated? Ivan Karamasov.

    Off the top of my head, though, it does seem that without the apokatastasis, what we have is a situation where, ultimately, something will be left “outside of” God, which can’t be the case. I’m sure someone more versed in theology and philosophy can speak to this problem.

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    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      One of our reviewers will be focusing precisely on the question you raise, Renee. In my opinion, your question is the most difficult, addressing not just the apokatastasis position but Christianity itself.

      I do see a difference, though, between temporal horrific suffering and the eternal suffering of hell—the latter is irredeemable.

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      • Renée says:

        I look forward to the discussion. By the difficulty with Christianity itself, do you mean creation ex nihilo? Creation understood in a certain way, not as emanation, seems to me to raise the same kind of problem.

        An aside: Excuse the “Karamasov” misspelling.

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    • There is a qualitative difference (not just a quantitative one) between temporal, permitted evil on the one hand and final impenitence on the other. Temporal, permitted evil runs its course through the experiences of men whereby men know their contingency and dependence on God. In the end, according to most versions of restoration, evil will be reduced to its formal principle: nothing–lacking no metaphysical status whatsoever. The eschaton will reveal all things for what they are. Evil must be revealed for the ontological lack that it is. There is an infinite asymmetrical ontological difference between evil and good. Goodness and being are one; evil has no principle of being because it is no being.

      Final impenitence contradicts this basic principle. The greatest evil and source of all evil is impenitence. Final impenitence grants evil a permanent ontological grounding. The analogy of being would cease to hold. Creation would be irrevocably scarred by evil. Being and goodness would no longer be one but divorced by the permanence of evil ever rearing its ugliness, obstructing the other transcendental: beauty. All would not be well. Creation would not be good. Death would be alive. God would be coterminous with His new opposite: eternal evil.

      I do not know if the elimination of evil entails the apokatastasis that Hart proposes (there are other forms). But an eschaton which includes final impenitence cannot allow for God to say of His creation : It is good. If God cannot “delight in the death of the unrighteous,” how could He delight in the final impenitence of souls created in His Image and con-substantial with Him in His humanity? And if God cannot delight in His creation He cannot say: It is good.

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