

Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions

By Fr. William Most

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"Foreword by Bertrand de Margerie, S.J."

Foreword

Father William G. Most gives us an example of intellectual fortitude as he reconsiders, after the attempts of so many great names of the past, the mystery of predestination.

He sees it contained in Scripture that there is a predestination to heaven, or to membership in the Church.

He reaches a beautiful understanding of this revealed truth by linking predestination with the analogy, also revealed, presenting God as Father. As in a human family, the father wants the good of all his children, and loves them, not on account of their merits, but because he is good, and does not disinherit any of them except for grave and persistent offenses, so the heavenly Father does not deprive any of his adopted children of his inheritance except in the case of a persevering rejection of his offer of salvation. He predestines gratuitously, and even, through extraordinary means, saves some of those who initially and during a long time resisted his graces. He predestines before any

provision of merits, but after the foresight of the lack of any ultimate resistance.

Despite the curious absence of the words "destiny," and "predestination" from the subject index of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (CCC), I think this important document of the Church's Magisterium has gone in the same direction as Fr. Most in its *explicit* treatment of the topic.

Exposing the plan of God (1, 50, 235, 257), the CC states (600), "*When God establishes his eternal plan of "predestination" he includes in it each person's free response to his grace.*"

In their fight against temptations of presumption and of despair, Christians exercise the virtue of hope, expecting God's help in attaining their personal salvation and the forgiveness of their sins. "Despair is contrary to God's goodness, to his justice, for the Lord is faithful to his promises and to his mercy (2090-2092).

Death brings to a conclusion man's temporal pilgrimage, "the time of grace and mercy which God offers man so as to work out his earthly life in keeping with the divine plan and to decide his ultimate destiny."

The working out of our earthly lives is exercised very specially in the prayer of petition to the Mother of God asking her to intercede for us "*now* and at the hour of our death" (which might come *now*). We should, moreover, "entrust ourselves to St. Joseph the patron of a happy death" as his own death was in the society of Jesus and Mary (CCC 1013-1014).

In his work as a biblical scholar and as a Catholic theologian, Fr. Most has shed some beautiful light on the mystery of personal predestination inside the collective predestination of the People of God.

Bertrand de Margerie, S. J.

"Preface to original Latin edition; note on revised English edition"

PREFACE TO THE LATIN EDITION

It is with both regret and joy that I send this book to the press. The joy needs no explanation. The reason for regret is this: in writing this, it was necessary to argue as forcefully as I could against many views that I know are dear to many friends of mine, both among the Thomists and among the Molinists. So I sincerely ask their pardon: I would have much preferred not to have to write against their views.

I want to explain to my friends of the older Thomist school that it was not from reading the books of their opponents that I arrived at my position. Many years ago, I sincerely thought I agreed with Father Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, on this matter. But it was from studying his books, not from Molinist works, that I came to see that I could not adhere to his opinion, because it leaves no room for a sincere salvific will, even though he wanted to leave room for it.

Similarly, I hope my Molinist friends will believe me when I say that it was not from reading the books of Thomists that I came to hold that the form of Molinism held by most Molinists today does not leave room for the salvific will. I came to this view chiefly from studying the outstanding work of Father Beraza, SJ, and from many personal letters that I exchanged with a certain prominent Molinist.

When I first came to see that I had to give up the view of Garrigou-Lagrange, I did not at once see what other view I could hold. But not long afterwards—not from my ability or merits, but from the divine goodness—the new solution proposed in this book came into my mind. My first thought was to merely write a periodical article to present it, but it soon became evident that an article would not be enough. For, from the outset, I realized the need of adhering most strictly to sound theological method. That required a diligent investigation of all places in the sources of revelation that bear on the problem, in the light of all declarations of the Magisterium of the Church. After that, some metaphysical considerations needed to be added. Since so many Sources had to be studied with so much care, an article was obviously insufficient.

After writing the first version of this book which, though much shorter than the present edition, contained the complete solution, it was a source of great encouragement to find that some outstanding Thomists, working independently, had already come to very similar conclusions. For I happened to read the commentary on the first section of the Summa by Father F. Muñiz, OP, in the edition of the Bibliotheca de Autores Cristianos. I was practically astounded to read his words: "That negative reprobation before prevision of sins seems to us to be, from every point of view, incompatible with the universal salvific will of God." The solution that he, and Father Marín-Sola, OP, proposed, although not entirely the same as that at which I had already arrived independently, was sufficiently similar, as we shall see later, to make me rejoice that such outstanding Thomists held such a view. After this, I again received a great joy in reading the splendid book by Dom Mark Pontifex, OSB, *Freedom and Providence*, in which I again found a very similar view, identical in the main points. Similarly, I was greatly encouraged by the brilliant article "Notre liberté devant Dieu," by Father Philippe de la Trinité, OCD, who is rightly considered to be one of the outstanding theologians of our times. He had come to practically the same conclusions too.

But, in view of the great difficulty of the matter, it seemed good, before publication, to seek the critical judgment of many theologians. I therefore sent nearly 500 privately lithographed copies to many theologians whom I happened to know, both in Europe and in the United States, and in other lands as well. About a hundred replied. Many of them liked my position substantially; many did not. These excellent scholars who replied were a great help—some because they

by their approval gave needed encouragement, others because they gave positive suggestions for improvement, still others because they raised objections.

By the goodness of Divine Providence, those who replied belonged to many and diverse schools of theology. That is, replies came from Thomists, Molinists, Scotists, Syncretists, and others. Among them were dogmatic theologians, exegetes, and patrologists. Perhaps the reader may wonder which schools liked, and which disliked my position. Actually, the division did not follow school lines. Instead, there were both Thomists and Molinists among those who liked it; and, conversely, both Thomists and Molinists among those who did not like it. However, one principle of division appeared in many, though not all cases: those who did not like it seemed to want to solve the entire problem by metaphysics; those who liked it seemed to want to start with the sources of revelation and the Magisterium, and only after that to add metaphysical considerations.

Most valuable of all were the objections. In writing this edition, I tried to answer absolutely all objections that were sent in these letters. Some are answered at the ends of chapters, in the form of explicit replies to objections; other objections are answered in the body of the chapters.

So I most sincerely thank these many good friends who gave such great help, and ask that we pray for one another, so that we all may finally come to see the Truth itself directly, not through the mirror.

Wm. G. Most

March 7, 1963

A NOTE ON THE revised ENGLISH EDITION

This treatise was first published in Latin in 1963. The original English translation was made by the author and published in 1971. No position was changed, but chapter 4 was expanded, and additional topics were taken up in it. The present English edition has been revised, and new considerations have been added in a few places.

All translations of quoted passages are by the author of the book, except those from Scripture. Scripture quotes are taken from the Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition, unless otherwise noted (e.g., Phil 2:13 and 2 Cor 3:5, which are the author's translation). Quotes from J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston's edition of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* are their translation.

The author is greatly indebted to Christopher V. Mirus, who showed remarkable understanding and keen theological penetration in helping to prepare this revised edition.

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Foreword by Bertrand de Margerie, S.J.

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INTRODUCTION

I. Brief sketch of the solution

The chief dilemma on predestination can be solved, by strict theological method. Many have not solved it because they used philosophical method, and because of an erroneous interpretation of Romans 8-9 (§§1-4). Sketch of solution (§5)

II. The opinions of the principal schools

The older Thomists (§§6-7); the Molinists (§§8-9)

PART ONE: RESEARCH IN THE SOURCES OF REVELATION

CHAPTER I: Explicit texts of Sacred Scripture

The best exegetes of all schools teach today that St. Paul in Rom 8-9 did not teach predestination of individuals to glory, but (in 8:28ss) he explained the plans of God for Christians as a group, and gave (chapter 9) the principles on the election of a people as the chosen people in both Testaments (§§10-13); that is, Paul speaks of the external economy (vocation to the Church) not of the internal economy (predestination to glory) (§14); it is not permitted to transfer the principles of external economy to internal, for they are opposite (§§15-16); vocation to the Church is not infrustrable (§17); in no other places does Scripture speak explicitly of predestination to glory (§18). Conclusions (§19). Objection from Acts 13:48 (§20).

CHAPTER II: Explicit texts of the Magisterium of the Church

The Councils of Orange, Quiersy and Valence certainly exclude antecedent positive reprobation, and say that predestination is decreed differently from reprobation. So probably both should not be before, nor both after prevision of merits (§§21-23).

CHAPTER III: The purpose of creation

Scripture teaches that God made all things for Himself but also that the manifestation of glory and communication of good to creatures are inseparable (§§24-26); Vatican I teaches the same (§§27-31); manifestation and communication are also inseparable in regard to individuals, so that God deserts no one for the order of the universe (§§32-36); St. Thomas teaches the same (§§36-38); and does not hold that God deserts some for the order of the universe (§39): so negative antecedent reprobation is excluded.

CHAPTER IV: The nature of the redemption

In the OT God redeemed His people in freeing them from Egypt, and made them His people by the covenant. By the covenant, God became as it were the kinsman of His people, united in life with them. Out of intense love God wanted to bind Himself by a bilateral covenant, to favor them (§41); He bound Himself to prove His love, so as to reassure them, and move them to respond, so that He might give the more (§§43-43a); the new covenant as foretold by Jeremiah, and described by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and other NT writings, is parallel to the old: in both God binds Himself on conditional human

obedience to a law. The obedience of the new covenant is basically Christ's, to which that of His members is joined (§42); on the most basic level, in both covenants, human obedience does not move the Father: the fundamental reason for the grant of favor is His spontaneous love, which leads Him to bind Himself, and thereby to have a superadded reason in the covenant (§44); in the new covenant, the Father bound Himself by infinite objective titles (§45) to establish an infinite treasury (§46) and to distribute it (§47). He provided infinite titles for each individual man (§48). Conclusions: If someone fails to receive a rich abundance, the reason cannot be on God's part, for He bound Himself by infinite titles, even after original sin: the reason for failure is man's resistance. So there is no reprobation before foreseen demerits (§49). Objections: On gratuity of predestination and perseverance (§50) and on mere permission of ruin (§51).

CHAPTER V: The universal salvific will

Implicitly revealed in OT (§52); explicitly in NT (§53); Select Fathers (§54). This will is sincere, since it is a part of the love of God (to love is to will good to someone), and its force is the same as the force of God's love, which is measured by the infinite titles established at such pain in the Passion. Therefore God shows He sets no limits (short of miracles) which He will not pass to save: man sets limits by resistance (§§55-56). This appears also in the Father analogy (§57); and is confirmed by reason (§58). Conclusion: Negative reprobation before foreseen demerits contradicts the salvific will (§59). Objections: On mere permission (§60); from omnipotence (§61); from original sin (§62); from case of unbaptized infants (§63); from problem of pagans (§§64-69); from human weakness (§§70-72); from the good of the universe (§73).

CHAPTER VI: Official teaching on the Sacred Heart and Immaculate Heart

Christ's Heart is fully human. But no human heart deserts those it loves with no fault of theirs: so there is no reprobation before foreseen demerits (§74); and the actual distribution of graces depends on the desire of the Heart of Mary, Mother of all: but no mother deserts her children through no fault of theirs, so they fall into failure, to be able to punish (§75). Objection on anthropomorphism (§76).

CHAPTER VII: The power of man for good and for evil, and the dependence of man on God

Scripture teaches that we depend entirely on God, but yet can determine whether and when we will do evil (§§77-78); the condition for reception of all graces is Pauline faith (§§79-80); in filling this condition, we depend on God inasmuch as faith is a positive good; but we can of ourselves resist grace, and can non-resist in the first stage of the process (merely doing nothing, without an act of will); in the second stage, on condition of this non-resistance, grace moves us to positive assent in such a way that we are both moved by grace and

move ourselves by the power received from it (§§81-86); even sinners, unless hardened, can non-resist in the sense (§87). The Greek Fathers (§§88-97) and the Latin Fathers (§§98-103) and Orange and Trent (§§104-109) teach the same. The Councils add that grace alone makes the beginning, but that in the positive consent, we also act (§§110-111) and teach that we can resist all ordinary graces in the internal economy (§§112-113). St. Thomas teaches the same (§§114-115). Scripture and St. Thomas teach that God can always move infrustrably (§116); but that God does this only in extraordinary providence (§§117-125). Scholion on hardness (§§126-127). Conclusions (§128). Objections: From the Thomists' theory of sufficient and efficacious grace (§§129-132); from St. Thomas' commentary on Hebrews (§§133-138); on making grace efficacious by consent (§139); from 1 Cor 4:7 (§140); from the efficacy of the divine will (§141); from divine government (§142); from predilection (§143); from "dependence" of God (§144).

CHAPTER VIII: The virtue of hope, and final perseverance

Scripture teaches that God has bound Himself to give the graces needed in every temptation, and that hope is firm (§§145-47). St. Paul, on the basis of the Covenant, explicitly promises to all the offering of grace by which they actually can persevere (§§148-50) but this internal grace is not regularly infrustrable (§151). Trent teaches that the uncertainty in hope is wholly from man's side: from God's side hope is certain (§152). The gift of perseverance includes an internal frustrable grace and, if need be, a special providence of the time of death: the latter is given to those who do not make themselves incurable (§153). Conclusion: If anyone does not persevere, the defect is his alone, and not from God, who offers the means to all: there is no reprobation before foreseen demerits (§154). Objection from Trent (§155).

CHAPTER IX: The special promises of Christ

Eternal life is promised to those who leave either parents, or wives, or homes, or fields (§156) and to those who receive the Eucharist (§157): these promises would be empty if there were reprobation before foreseen demerits. Christ ordered us to forgive without end: If He reprobated before foreseen demerits, the disciples would be above the Master (§§158-59). Objections: On mere desertion (§160); God owes nothing (§161); a condition in Christ's promise (§162).

CHAPTER X: The obligation of striving for perfection

God could not oblige all to strive for perfection and still desert some so that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them to be saved, not to say, to be perfect (§§163-165). Objection on remote offering of grace (§166).

CHAPTER XI: The conformity of the human will with the will of God

The more one grows spiritually, the more his will is conformed to God's will, and the more he wants all to be saved. If God did not sincerely

want all saved, the more a man grew, the more deformed his will would be from the will of God (§§167-169).

CHAPTER XII: The ordinary teaching of the Church, and the faith of the people

All preachers, from all schools, preach in the same way: they do not know reprobation before foreseen demerits, e.g., they never preach, nor do the faithful believe, that Christ is the good shepherd for some only, so that He deliberately would desert others so they would perish so He could have some to punish (§170); popular books on theology, from all schools, teach the same (§§171-72). The same unanimity is found in the writings of the Saints (§§173-77). Conclusion: Reprobation before foreseen demerits is contrary to the faith of the preaching and believing Church (§§178-79). Objection (§180).

Conclusions from Part One

PART TWO: PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

General preliminary notes

CHAPTER XIII: The teaching of the Fathers on predestination

Criteria in interpreting the Fathers: revelation was clarified gradually (§183), so care is needed in inserting distinctions in the Fathers (§184). The Fathers thought they were giving the fundamental reason for reprobation: hence they did not speak only of order of execution (§§185-186); nor only of glory considered separately (§187). Conclusion on inserting distinctions (§188). The nature of the human condition according to the Fathers (§189). Not knowing the distinction of the two economies, they gave the same rules for both (§§190-192). The Greek Fathers (§§193-202) and the Latin Fathers (§§203-205) taught there is no reprobation before foreseen demerits; except for St. Augustine, who taught the *massa damnata* theory, out of an erroneous interpretation of Rom 9 (§§206-08), but still wrote many things implying the same view as the other Fathers (§§209-212). From St. Augustine, we should keep predestination before foreseen merits, but reject things founded on misinterpretation of Rom 9. From the other Fathers, we should keep the rejection of reprobation before foreseen demerits (§213).

CHAPTER XIV: The opinions of St. Thomas

Because of his fidelity to theological method (§§214-15), St. Thomas in CG 3.159 ff. found the essential elements of the true solution, even though he still, in some passages of other works, held the theory of the *massa damnata*. He held rightly: Man cannot of himself give positive consent to grace, but can impede, or not impede grace. Only those who impede are deprived of grace. All others receive it, even perseverance (§§216-20); but if a man is in the state of sin, he cannot abstain long from other sins and resistance, until he is healed (§§221-26). A man who resists the grace of conversion cannot be converted without a grace comparable to a miracle (§§227-30). Confirmation of our interpretation by the impossibility of other interpretations (§§231-32). St. Thomas' conclusions on predestination (§§233-34).

Confirmation from other passages (§235). The source followed in the Summa (§§236-39). Conclusions on St. Thomas: No reprobation before foreseen demerits; predestination either before foreseen merits but after foreseen absence of grave resistance, or after foreseen merits (§240). Objections (§241).

CHAPTER XV: The controversies de auxiliis

I. The opinion of Bañez

Bañez does not interpret St. Thomas correctly (§§244-45).

II. The opinion of Molina

Molina seems to say that predestination, within the present order, is after foreseen merits, but still is gratuitous since whether a man actually consents to graces depends entirely on the order chosen by God (§§246-49). Aquaviva imposed an interpretation of Molina in which grace is efficacious in *actu primo* out of divine predilection. Not all Molinists hold this (§§250-52). The need of special benevolence for salvation implies a denial of the salvific will (§253). Predefinition of graces in *actu primo* implies the same (§§254-57). Freedom is at least attenuated in the reprobation through choice of orders (§258). Predefinition of graces in *actu secundo* does not of itself contradict a salvific will (§260). Reprobation through choice of orders contradicts the actual revealed strength of the salvific will (§§261-65). Conclusions (§266). Objections: from Mt 11:21 (§267); from the external economy (§268); from inequality of graces (§269); that this is not the best world (§270); from the case of Ivan born in Russia (§271).

III. The Congregation de auxiliis

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CHAPTER XVI: The teaching of St. Francis de Sales

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CHAPTER XVII: Solution of the problem from the sources of revelation

I. Preliminary sketch of recent opinions

Since many ancient obstacles have been removed, we can hope for a solution today (§279). The opinion of Marín-Sola and Muñoz (§§280-81); of Philippe de la Trinité (§282); of Dom Mark Pontifex (§283); of Msgr. Journet (§283).

II. Solution from the revealed Father analogy

Just as in a human family, the father wants all his children to turn out well, and loves and cares for them not because of their merits but out of his own goodness, and disinherits no son except for grave and persistent offenses, so the heavenly Father wants all his children to be saved (salvific will) and disinherits no one from the eternal inheritance except for grave and persistent offenses; He saves the others neither because of nor after considering merits (which are not seen in the theological moment in which He predestines) but because He from the

start wanted to do this, out of His love which started by its own power, and continues by its own power, and in its course predestines all who do not gravely and persistently resist graces (§§284-89) so that predestination is gratuitous (§290). Ontologically, the condition of predestination is nothing in man, for non-resistance is non-being, though logically there is a condition in the divine mind (§291). Corollary for the spiritual life (§291a). Resistance needs to be grave and persistent, so as to counterbalance the effects of a salvific will that established infinite objective titles for each individual (§292). Yet it is necessary to watch (§293). By extraordinary means He saves some even though they resist grace persistently, probably chiefly those for whom others offer merits (§294).

III. Solution through other passages of revelation

The essential elements can be had also in the revelation of the salvific will (§295) and of the purpose of creation (§296). The solution is partly hinted at in Rom 6:23 (§297), and in philosophy (§298). Scholion on predestination after foreseen merits (§299). Conclusions: No reprobation except after and because of foreseen grave and persistent resistance; predestination before foreseen merits but after foreseen absence of grave and persistent resistance (§300). Objections: Consent and non-resistance are the same (§301); from theological series in which merits must be foreseen (§302); from perseverance (§303); from defectibility (§304); from the Covenant and the Last Judgment (§305); from anthropomorphism (§306).

General conclusions from part two

PART THREE: THE WAY IN WHICH GRACE IS EFFICACIOUS

CHAPTER XVIII: How does grace produce its effects

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II. The system of the older Thomists

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III. The Molinistic systems

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IV. The system of the Augustinians

Presentation of the system (§330). Difficulties (§331).

V. The Syncretistic systems

Presentation of the systems (§332). Difficulties (§333).

VI. The system of Marín-Sola and Muñiz

Presentation of the system (§334). Difficulties (§335).

VII. The teaching of the sources of revelation

Man of himself cannot do any positive salutary good, but he can determine whether and when he does evil, inasmuch as he can resist or do nothing against grace. At the start of a salutary act, grace alone works; in the consent, man cooperates (§336). So grace makes the start by moving the mind to see a good and the will to complacency in it; then man either resists or does not. If he does not, grace continues, and man becomes active, cooperating in consenting and in the outward act (§§337-39).

VIII. The opinion of St. Thomas

A. General principles: The same as those of revelation (§340-41).

B. The solution: In the first logical moment, grace alone operates, so that the mind of man sees a good specified in itself, and the will takes an indeliberate complacency. Then man can impede or not impede (§342); if he does not impede, the second moment follows in which man under grace becomes active and cooperates in making positive consent (§343).

C. Detailed study of the various elements of the solution: In the first moment, since God moves the will as author of nature so that the movement is the man's movement, the man can cease from his movement without a further divine movement: he can drop out of act. This begins to remove the good specification. Then God will move man's will to order the intellect to cease attention to moral goodness, and then will move to resistance, and to sin (§§344-45). Non-resistance is an ontological zero, doing nothing against grace in the first logical moment, without any act of the will moving itself: it is morally neither good nor bad (§§346-48); even a positive decision to do nothing, if within first moment, would probably be indifferent (§349); the good specification is in the grace itself (§350). Every grace is intrinsically efficacious (§351). There are not two graces, sufficient and efficacious (§352). In every grace there is a true motion or premotion that is physical (§353).

D. There is an infrustrable grace (§354), but it is given only extraordinarily (§355). Transcendence alone accounts for it (§356). Frustrable motions that are vehement relative to the recipient are extraordinary (§357).

E. Confirmation from other passages of St. Thomas: He has two series of texts (§§358-60).

IX. Added confirmations from Fathers, Doctors, and Theologians

Fathers (§§362-63); Doctors (§§364-65); Theologians (§§366-68).

X. Conclusions

XI. Objections

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(§379); an impedible motion would do nothing (§380); an impedible motion is indifferent (§381); liberty can coexist with infrustrable motions (§383); man cannot prepare for grace (§383); God refuses as He wills (§384).

PART FOUR: DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER XIX: The opinions of the principal schools

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Molinists refuse to apply transcendence to infrustrable motions, but do apply it to foreknowledge; the older Thomists do the converse (§§385-86); many forget that even though divine causality is needed for being, it is not needed for non-beings as such, including the evil specification of resistance, and non-resistance; and that causality can be a prerequisite for the existence of beings without being the sole means of foreknowledge (§§387-89); importance of strict method (§§390-93).

II. The opinions of the principal schools

Older Thomism: exposition of system (§394); difficulties (§395). Molinism: exposition of system (§396); difficulties (§397). Scotism: exposition of system (§398); difficulties (§399). System of Marín-Sola and Muñiz: exposition (§400); difficulties (§401).

CHAPTER XX: The teaching of Sacred Scripture on foreknowledge

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CHAPTER XXI: The teaching of Tradition on divine foreknowledge

I. Preliminary observations on the views of some pagan philosophers

The errors of Aristotle (§406) and Plotinus (§407) show the weakness of human reasoning in this matter (§408).

II. Note on a principle of interpretation of some Patristic texts

The connection between their views on predestination and on foreknowledge (§409).

III. The tradition of the Greek and Latin Fathers, the Latin Doctors, and theologians and philosophers before St. Thomas

Without one dissenting voice, the Greek Fathers who wrote on this matter (§§410-24) and the Latin Fathers (§§425-28), including St. Augustine (§§429-37) and the later Doctors and scholastics before St. Thomas teach, speaking as witnesses of revelation, that God can foreknow by His transcendent intellect without the use of decrees as means of knowledge; a few spoke also of foreknowledge of beings (not of non-beings, such as non-resistance and evil specification of resistance) through causality (§§438-56). Conclusions (§457).

CHAPTER XXII: The opinion of St. Thomas on divine foreknowledge

Like earlier witnesses of tradition, St. Thomas has several texts on divine causality, comparing God's knowledge to that of an artisan (§458), but, like previous tradition, he does not thereby exclude foreknowledge through the transcendent intellect, without the use of decrees as means of knowing (§§459-62). This interpretation is confirmed and proved by his *ex professo* treatments of foreknowledge

(§463) in which he always solves the problem in only one way: recourse to eternity, which is not a medium of knowledge, but a condition of knowability: the transcendent intellect is considered able to know whatever is present. He considers only two alternatives: proximate causes (rejected), and eternity (accepted) (§§464-68). The third alternative, knowledge by the older Thomists' system of infrustrable decrees is not accepted since he rejects their system in general (§469), and since he always has recourse to eternity (§470) and never to decrees, not even in ST I.14.13 (§§471-72) nor in 1 Sent. 38.1.5 (§473). Confirmation from his summaries on foreknowledge (§474), from his way of answering objections (§475), and from his way of speaking of the transcendence of the divine will (§476) and from interpretations of early Thomists before Bañez (§477). Conclusions (§§478-79).

CHAPTER XXIII: Synthesis of conclusions on divine foreknowledge

I. Foreknowledge of futures

God foresees the first effects of the divine motion in the creature through causality, since the motion is physical, and foresees also through His transcendent intellect (§481); He foresees the resistance of creatures, because He knows, within the present of eternity, that He is no longer causing the effects in man: He knows the same through His transcendent intellect: in neither way is He passive (§482); He knows non-resistance in the same two ways (§483). He knows the positive determination of the creature both through His causality and through His transcendent intellect: in both ways without passivity (§484). No truth is logically prior to God's knowledge, though the negative determination (which is non-being) is prior (§§485-86). God's knowledge does not grow (§487).

II. Foreknowledge of futuribles

Scripture shows that God knows the futuribles, but does not explain how (§488). This knowledge cannot be explained by a system of infrustrable decrees, but through the transcendent intellect (§489). The Aristotelian principle that future contingents as future are unknowable seems to prove too much, for it would prove God cannot know the futuribles (§§490-91). Perhaps this is why St. Thomas was silent on futuribles (§§492-93). Relation of futuribles to divine causality (§494). Scholion on recourse to eternity (§§495-98). Objections: Dilemma: God either determines or is determined (§499); nothing is present in eternity except by causality (§500); from *De veritate* 3.6 (§501).

PART FIVE: SYNTHESIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ENTIRE INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER XXIV

EPILOGUE

APPENDIX I: *The order of the universe*

St. Thomas has two series of texts: The first: Seems to consider the individual man as only a part of the whole, whom God does not care for

if it does not the good of the whole; the second: The greatest created perfection is in salvation (§508). Principal texts of first series (§509); of second series (§510). The seeming discrepancy is very large (§511). It is explained in part by the fact that St. Thomas used two fonts: Aristotelian doctrine, which knows nothing of Christian finality, and Christian doctrine (§512); it is also explained partly by the distinctions he makes or supposes: about the class of good (§513) about the first and the ultimate perfection (§514) and about extensive vs. intensive likeness (§515). Synthesis of the thought of St. Thomas (§§516-22). The "necessity" of reprobates (§§523-30). Affections: From CG 2.46 (§531); From ST I.23.5 ad 3 (§532); from ST I.48.2 ad 3 (§533); from CG 1:96 (§534); God does everything for His glory (§535).

APPENDIX II: *The universal salvific will and subjective redemption*

The salvation of pagans and their relationship to the Church (§§535a-542). On the reduction of culpability for sin (§543).

Scriptural Index

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Index of Popes, Councils, Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and other Authors

INTRODUCTION

I. A Brief Sketch of the Solution¹ of the Problem of Predestination.

1. A great battle within the Catholic Church has raged for the past three hundred years on the subject of predestination. Briefly, the question is this: Before predestining (that is, decreeing to save a certain man) or reprobating (that is, decreeing not to save him), does God look at the merits and demerits of the man?

The chief opponents in the debate have been the older Thomists who hold that God decides both predestination and reprobation *before*² considering merits and demerits, and the Molinists, who teach that He decides both *after*³ considering merits and demerits.

Most theologians of both major warring camps have taken it for granted that both predestination and reprobation must be decreed at the same stage of the process, that is, both must be *before*, or both must be *after* consideration of merits and demerits. The reason is, they say, that if a man is not predestined, he is reprobated, and if he is not reprobated, he is predestined.

A great dilemma has resulted: If both are decreed *before* consideration of merits and demerits, then, as the Molinists say, it is impossible for God to say that He sincerely wants all men to be saved, and yet to reject some without even looking at any demerits of theirs. But, if both are decreed *after* consideration of merits and demerits, then, according to the older Thomists, there is a vicious circle, since, they say, merits are an effect of predestination.

The dilemma can be solved, but only on one condition: We must in everything follow strictest theological method with perfect fidelity.

Now no one debates what strict theological method is. All concede what St. Thomas teaches:⁴ ". . . to *argue from authority* is especially proper to this science, because its beginnings come through revelation."

Yet, as a matter of fact, some who sincerely intend to follow St. Thomas are actually, without realizing it, trying to deduce the whole solution from metaphysics. For they do not start with revelation, but with a metaphysical analysis of a free human act or of the way in which God knows the future.

Actually, then, they are following a method more philosophical than theological. Such a deviation has been one of the chief reasons for the impasse in this controversy. For correct method is indispensable in each field of study. A striking example is seen in the field of the natural sciences. For many centuries "scientists" tried to work in science by philosophical methods. Now philosophical method is excellent in philosophy, but very poor in science. It is not surprising that their labours brought but little fruit. It was only when true scientific method was used in science that the magnificent progress of recent times began.

Similarly, the problem of predestination is a theological problem. Centuries of sad experience has proved that philosophical method cannot solve it.

Furthermore, it would be incorrect method for a theologian to say that he will give the prime weight to arguments from revelation, but then actually to turn first to metaphysical procedures. For in such a process there will be great danger that when he finally does take up the sources of revelation, he will have at least a subconscious reluctance against all interpretations of revelation that do not accord with the opinion he has previously formed through metaphysics.

Of course, we do not deny the great value of metaphysics: we shall use it plentifully in the course of this book-*but only in its proper place*.

To be fair to these theologians whose method we have criticized, we ought to add that they were severely hampered by a formerly current misinterpretation of certain passages of Scripture, especially Romans 8:28-9:24 and 1 Cor 4:7. These misinterpretations seemed to fit with their metaphysical conclusions. Today we know that these interpretations of Scripture were all erroneous for they are rejected with unanimity by all good exegetes of all schools, as we shall soon see in chapter 1.

2. A theologian who follows strict theological method will first examine, under the guidance of the teachings of the Magisterium of the Church, all passages in revelation that treat the question either directly or indirectly. He will try to work out the solution from each passage separately. A good comparison would be this: **Let us imagine that**

this theologian is standing on the circumference of a circle. From each of two or more points on the circumference, he tries to draw a line that will reach the center of the circle, that is, the true solution. If he has done his work well, all lines will come to a focus in the center.

But what will a good theologian do if not all the lines seem to focus? First, he will recheck his work for possible errors. But what should he do if he finds no error? If he is following theological rather than philosophical method, he will not try to make one line focus with another line. Rather he will say: "Now we are in theology, in lofty divine matters. It is not strange if mysteries appear. Therefore, even though I cannot see how to reconcile two lines, yet I must hold both truths." And so, he will confess simply that he cannot go further.

3. St. Thomas followed this sound method. It is not necessary to merely make a vague general supposition that he did so: we can readily point to the precise places in revelation from which he explicitly tried to project his lines. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, he explicitly drew one line from Romans 8:28-9:24. The second line was projected from the words of St. Paul in 1 Timothy 2:4. He did this explicitly in *Contra gentiles* 3.159.

But these lines did not seem to him to agree completely with each other and to come to one focus. For, from the Epistle to the Romans it seemed that God deserts many men because of original sin, before any consideration of the foreseen personal demerits of those same men. Yet, on the contrary, it was clear from the Epistle to Timothy that God said, even after original sin, that He wants all men to be saved.

What then did St. Thomas do? He rejected neither line, even though he could not see how to reconcile the two. He only wrote a bit less clearly than usual when he was approaching the center of the circle from each of the two starting points. Thus, in his commentary on Romans although that line seemed to say that the most basic reason for the eternal ruin of the lost is God's desertion of them after original sin, yet St. Thomas (without denying original sin) again and again attributed the ruin of Pharaoh (spoken of in Rom 9) to the *personal* sins of Pharaoh. Similarly, he was less clear in drawing out the conclusions implied in his interpretation of 1 Tm 2:4.

4. Today, however, as we have said, exegetes of all schools teach a different interpretation of the passage from the Epistle to the Romans. As a result, we are able to know clearly that which was hidden in the days of St. Thomas, namely: St. Paul, in Romans 8-9, was not speaking about the infallible predestination of *individuals to eternal glory*, but about the plans of God for the call of *peoples to be members of the Church*, in the Old or New Testament, in the full sense⁵, and about the divine plans for those who already are members of the Church in the full sense.

So today, since the obstacles that arose from the erroneous interpretations of the Epistle to the Romans (and a few other passages in St. Paul) have been removed, and since the Church, benefiting from the cumulative light which the Holy Spirit has now sent throughout so many centuries, teaches many truths more clearly, especially the salvific will of God, we can easily and without obscurity complete that line which St. Thomas wanted to draw, and actually almost did draw, to the center. For he found almost the entire solution because he followed strict theological method so faithfully.

St. Thomas does not deserve criticism because he was not able to remove those obscurities, for the impressive weight of the prestige of St. Augustine made St. Thomas think it necessary to accept St. Augustine's interpretation.⁶

Therefore we can reach the true solution if we follow the example and the principles of St. Thomas and if we use his remarkable discoveries. However, we will work to the solution not only with the help of St. Thomas, but also, or rather principally, from the various passages of Scripture and the Fathers, following the official interpretations of the Magisterium of the Church.

5. In brief, the solution will be as follows. There are three logical stages in the process of predestination:

- 1) The universal salvific will, which is sincere and extremely strong.
- 2) The reprobation of all whom God foresees will gravely and persistently resist grace: *Reprobation after and because of foreseen demerits.*
- 3) Predestination of all others, in whom God does not foresee grave and persistent resistance.⁷ This decree of predestination is a continuation and positive carrying out of the initial universal salvific will. The cause of this decree is not human merits-up to this stage, God has not looked at human merits, for, in the logical series at which God looks, merits are neither a cause nor a condition-the sole cause of this decree of predestination is the goodness and generosity of the Father who from the beginning wanted to save all and, at this point, actually decrees the salvation of all who do not resist gravely and persistently. No positive condition needs to be placed by man in order that God may predestine, because the strong universal salvific will continues in its course by its own force. A grave condition would have to be placed by man *to interrupt* the course of this will, but, precisely because this will continues in its course by its own force, nothing is required from man that it may continue, and at the proper point, decree predestination. For without predestination, that salvation which God willed from the beginning and still wills to confer could not be had: *Predestination before consideration of merits.*

If someone prefers, he could invert the order of the second and third stages. We will explain more fully in chapter 17 how to do this.

What does this explanation of predestination imply in regard to the debates on the way in which grace is efficacious? The solution we have sketched does not restrict us to just one possible solution on the question of the efficacy of grace. It merely marks out an area (rather ample) within which the solution must be found. In chapter 18 we shall explain a simple solution, which at least seems to be that of St. Thomas.

But we must proceed in good order and with sound method. We will investigate both predestination and the way in which grace is efficacious. In each subject, we will first study, as theological method requires, all passages in revelation that directly or even indirectly refer to our question. After that we will gather and explain more fully the conclusions from all passages. Finally, we will add metaphysical considerations.

So we turn first to the task of investigating the sources of revelation. We will do this under the light of the declaration of the Magisterium of the Church. We will use not only solemn definitions, but also the words of the Ordinary Magisterium, e.g., Encyclicals. For we must not forget what Pope Pius XII taught in the Encyclical, *Humani generis*:

Nor must one think that the things which are taught in Encyclical Letters do not of themselves demand assent, on the pretext that in them the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their teaching authority. For these things are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, in regard to which it is also correct to say: "He who heareth you heareth Me." For the most part the things that are propounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already belong to Catholic doctrine. But if the Supreme Pontiffs, in their *acta* deliberately pass judgment on a matter previously controverted, it is plain to all that, by the mind and will of the same Pontiffs, that question can no longer be considered open to free discussion among theologians.⁸

II. The Opinions of the Principal Schools of Theologians

In investigating the sources of revelation, we will speak chiefly on the positive side, i.e., we wish to see chiefly what the sources actually teach about our question. But it will be very useful also to see what the sources *exclude*, of the points proposed in previous solutions.

Hence it is very important to have a very precise notion of what the principal schools teach on this matter. This is especially necessary because not all theologians always present all parts of their views with all desired clarity.

It will be sufficient for the present to examine the opinions of the two principal schools. Afterwards, in the course of this book, we will see also the more recent opinions.

When we speak without qualification of *Thomists* in this book, we refer to those who follow the *older* interpretation of St. Thomas, e.g., R. Garrigou-Lagrange, OP. In so naming them, we are following current

usage, and do not mean to concede that they really have found the true opinion of St. Thomas on all matters. They sincerely try to do so, and really do so in many things. However, as we shall see, they have not understood him correctly on some important points.

We shall take up the more recent Thomistic interpretation separately. Similarly, not all those who are called *Molinists* really follow Molina in everything. In fact, many of them readily admit that they differ from him on certain important points.

6. The opinion of the older Thomists:

1) *Predestination and reprobation*: They hold that God decrees predestination before consideration of merits. In regard to reprobation, they make a distinction between:

a) *Negative reprobation*: which,⁹ "is the will to permit a fault which actually will not be forgiven; . . . this negative reprobation comes *before the prevision of these demerits* that will not be forgiven. Without this divine permission, the demerits would not be infallibly foreseen as going to occur."

b) *Positive reprobation*: which,¹⁰ "is the will to inflict damnation for the fault. It comes after prevision of demerits. . . ."

Certain Thomists add that negative reprobation is¹¹ "a positive exclusion from glory as from a benefit that is not due. This was the view of Alvarez, the theologians of Salamanca, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Contenson." Others, with Garrigou-Lagrange, do not wish to consider negative reprobation as a positive exclusion, but prefer to consider it as the will of permitting a fault that will not be forgiven, as we saw above.

2) *The reason for negative reprobation*: Garrigou-Lagrange says:¹² "In regard to negative reprobation . . . since original sin is the same in all the predestined and in the reprobate, it cannot be the cause, in the reprobate for the permission of sins that will not be remitted. . . . This is the opinion of the theologians of Salamanca, Alvarez, John of St. Thomas." Rather, he himself holds:¹³ "So the reason for negative reprobation, absolutely considered, is this: the manifestation of divine goodness by way of justice. . . ."

3) *The distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace*: The reason why sins and positive reprobation infallibly follow after negative reprobation is found in the explanation of the distinction and distribution of sufficient and efficacious graces. For there is¹⁴ "a twofold internal actual grace. One is *efficacious of itself*, and gives the good act itself; the other is *inefficacious, but really sufficient*, giving the *ability* to perform a good act, either proximately, or at least remotely." By efficacious grace God "directly and infallibly moves a human will to choose. . . . The efficacy of grace comes . . . properly and formally from a predetermining physical premotion."

4) *For what does sufficient grace suffice?* It is true, as we have seen that sufficient grace really gives "the *ability* to perform a good act." So

it suffices for that *ability*. But it does not suffice for salvation, nor even for *actually* performing a good act:¹⁵ "Sufficient grace is certainly not of itself sufficient for salvation, because it cannot produce any acts by itself." Now the fundamental reason for this assertion is:¹⁶ ". . . efficacious grace . . . is required as the *application* of the power to action, not as the power, or part of the power. . . ." St. Thomas himself explains the need of the *application* by a comparison:¹⁷ ". . . an artisan . . . applying the power of a natural thing to some action is said to be the cause of that action, just as a cook [is said to be] the cause of cooking, which is [done] through fire." In other words, just as fire in itself really has the ability or power to cook food, yet never will cook food unless the cook *applies* the fire to the food; similarly, through sufficient grace a man really has the *power* or *ability* to perform a good action, yet will not perform it unless God gives also the *application*, that is, efficacious grace.

Hence, if we ask: "*Can* a man perform a good act with sufficient grace?" the answer requires a distinction:

- a) *He can* perform it in one sense: He has the *ability* or *power*.
- b) *He cannot* perform it in another sense: He still lacks the *application*. And without the application, it is *impossible* that a good act be produced, just as it is impossible for fire to cook food unless it is applied to the food.

5) *How is the application or efficacious grace obtained?* To reply, we must make a distinction. For we could speak either of what is required on man's side or on God's side:

a) *On man's side:*

1) Efficacious grace is given if a man does not resist sufficient grace:¹⁸ ". . . no one who has the use of reason is deprived of the efficacious grace required for salvation except for having, by his own fault, resisted a sufficient grace. . . ." But yet:¹⁹ ". . . efficacious grace is required that a man may not fail [to cooperate with] sufficient grace, that is, that he may not resist." Now the reason why efficacious grace is required for not resisting is this:²⁰ ". . . not to resist grace is already some good." But to do good, application is required: hence, the same impossibility as before still remains. Therefore, the Thomists say in one sense, that a man²¹ "although he has the *ability* not to resist [sufficient grace], nevertheless actually resists" if he does not also receive efficacious grace, because sufficient grace confers only the *ability* of not resisting, and does not add the *application* of that ability; but, in another sense, they say that man is not able not to resist because he cannot provide the *application*: ". . . [man] *cannot*, of himself alone, refrain from placing an obstacle [to

sufficient grace] since this [not placing an obstacle] is good."

2) Efficacious grace will be given if a man prays properly. In regard to prayer, they say:²² "If a man would not resist the sufficient grace to pray, he would receive the efficacious grace to pray. . . ." But, in regard to not resisting the sufficient grace to pray, it is still true, according to the Thomists: ". . . efficacious grace is required that a man may not fail [to cooperate with] sufficient grace, that is, that he may not resist."

b) *On God's side*: God's reason for refusing the application, efficacious grace can be even an inculpable defect in man:²³ "Because of this defective consideration [of the rule of morality in the intellect, before the will acts] . . . which is not yet sinful . . . God can deny efficacious grace to a man."

Therefore on his side, man cannot obtain efficacious grace, because efficacious grace is not given to those who resist sufficient grace, but, in order that he may not resist, efficacious grace is required. On God's side, efficacious grace is often denied without any moral fault on the part of man.

6) *Divine foreknowledge*: It is obvious that God can foresee by means of His grant or refusal of these graces. For if He gives only a sufficient grace, man infallibly sins:²⁴ "To fail or to resist sufficient grace is not to consent to it, that is, to sin at least by a sin of omission." Man sins *infallibly*, because,²⁵ "although a man [having only sufficient grace] can perform the act only defectively [because he cannot add the application needed for a good act], and although if God moves the man, it is inconceivable that the man will not be moved to act [because the divine motion is *physical*] . . . [nevertheless] God moves [the man who does a bad action] to that which is physical . . . in that action, . . ." that is to the *exercise* of the act. Now if a will that is not able to rise to produce the good application is moved physically, a bad decision, sin, is produced infallibly and infrustrably.

If however God gives an efficacious grace, since God physically moves the man's will to good, man always does good under it.

Obviously, by His decree to give such or such a grace, God infallibly knows what a man will do.

7) *Human freedom*: Man remains free even though God moves him physically and infallibly or infrustrably. For the will of God is transcendent.

It is obvious that this freedom is not an *autonomous* freedom, since the first decision, from which all else follows infrustrably, as we have seen, is made by God alone before any consideration of human conditions. For before the divine decree to give sufficient or efficacious grace, there will be neither good nor bad in man. (We could call this freedom *secondary* freedom).

8) *The principle of predilection*: This principle underlies the whole opinion of the Thomists, both in regard to predestination and reprobation, and in regard to sufficient and efficacious grace.²⁶ ". . . this principle of predilection is revealed in these words of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians, 4:7: "'For who distinguisheth thee?'"²⁷ Therefore:²⁸ "*According to the above mentioned words of St. Paul, the distinction of one man from another ultimately must be found not on the side of the human will, but in God who distinguishes one from another by His grace.*" Therefore the distinction between the elect and the reprobate ultimately does not depend on the things that men do. Rather, God, before any consideration of merits or demerits, absolutely and infustrably determines the eternal lot of each man. Otherwise, it could²⁹ "happen that out of two men, equally loved and helped by God, in the same circumstances, one would be converted and the other not. And someone, without being more loved and helped by God, would become better than another by a salutary act, easy or difficult, initial or final."

9) *Metaphysical foundations*:³⁰ ". . . this principle of predilection, in the philosophical order, is a corollary of the principle of causality. . . ." That is, all good, and all being come from God alone. In performing a good act a man must pass from potency to act. But a man cannot cause himself to pass from potency to act. Therefore, this takes place only when and if God so wills. So a man acts well when God wills: otherwise, a man is metaphysically incapable of doing anything but falling. It follows that there is nothing in a man according to which he could "distinguish himself." Therefore, the predestination or reprobation of each man does not depend ultimately on his actions, but solely on God, who "distinguishes" one man from another. Besides, if these things were not true in no way could God foresee the free actions of a man.

7. Summary of the older Thomistic opinion: Before any consideration of the merits and demerits of men, God determines the eternal lot of each man. Man is completely incapable of "distinguishing himself." If God decrees to save him, He sends efficacious graces which will move him to freely and infallibly do good. If God does not decree to save him, He does not send him efficacious graces (at least, not to such an extent as to save him) but He sends only sufficient graces. These graces give the ability to do good, but do not give the application. For the application, efficacious grace is required. Without the application, a good act is metaphysically impossible. The application is given to those who do not resist sufficient grace. But efficacious grace is required not to resist. Efficacious grace is required because not to resist is good. Man has the ability of not resisting, but he does not have the application of the ability of not resisting. This application is given only to those who do not resist. Therefore, man has the ability for both the good work for which a sufficient grace is given,

and the ability not to resist that grace. But in both instances, application is required, and application is given only to those who do not resist. On God's part, efficacious grace is denied as God wills; for He can deny it, even without moral fault on the part of a man, because of an inculpable inadvertence in man.

8. The opinion of the Molinists: It is not easy to be entirely certain of what Molina himself held on some points, and further important Molinists readily admit that they do not intend to follow Molina on all matters. However, in general, the Molinists hold the following:

1) *Predestination and reprobation:* All Molinists hold that,³¹ "predestination considered in its totality, or adequately is . . . gratuitous, that is, the divine decision to predestine, considered as efficaciously determining as a whole the entire order guiding and moving a rational creature to its ultimate ends is conceived entirely gratuitously and freely by God, and not as it were in consideration of some natural work." However, Molinists generally distinguish predestination considered *in its totality* from predestination to glory considered *separately*, that is,³² "when it [predestination] is considered as affecting one particular effect . . . glory."

In regard to predestination to glory considered separately³³ "more commonly the Jesuit theologians, along with [some] others . . . hold . . . that it is [decreed] after consideration of merits." However, many other Jesuits, among whom are Suarez, and St. Robert Bellarmine, hold³⁴ "that predestination or election to glory is entirely gratuitous, and [is decreed] before consideration of merits. . . ." In regard to this disagreement, I. M. Dalmau, SJ, says,³⁵ "The authors on both sides agree in the essential lines. The differences among those who hold the same opinion do not directly concern this question, but other questions more or less related to it. The chief difference between Thomists and Molinists is in the explanation of the efficacy of grace. . . ."

In regard to reprobation: the theologians who hold predestination before consideration of merits, in general also hold negative reprobation before consideration of demerits, in a sense similar to that which we explained above in speaking of the Thomists. The theologians who hold that predestination to glory, considered separately, is decreed after consideration of merits, hold that there is no reprobation, positive or negative, before consideration of demerits.

2) *Distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace:*³⁶ "Molinists say that sufficient grace confers the power to act in such a way that nothing needs to be added to it so that it can produce a salutary act. Hence, if such an act is omitted, the omission depends only on human freedom, and not on the lack of any principle of action. Hence [sufficient grace] gives the complete and ready sufficiency not only for the ability to act, but also for the act [itself]."

But the Molinists differ among themselves in explaining efficacious grace:

- a) Most Molinists teach that efficacious grace is such *in actu primo*, that is, they say that: ³⁷"Even before . . . God foresees the free determination of the human will as absolutely going to occur, that grace already has an infallible connection with a salutary act. This infallible connection is threefold:
 - 1) *Objective*: From the fact that that [human] consent will be given if that grace, although it is not intrinsically predetermining, is given.
 - 2) *Cognoscitive*: From *scientia media*³⁸ by which God knows that that consent of the will will be given if this grace is given.
 - 3) *Affective*: From an *absolute* divine decree which (as the Congruists say) prearranges that consent which will take place from the giving of this grace, which is foreseen as efficacious, or (as the Molinists say) which prearranges this grace, which is foreseen through *scientia media* as going to be effective if given in these circumstances etc., [and which is given] from a benevolent intention [on the part of God] that that consent actually be given under this grace."
 - b) A few Molinists have held that grace is efficacious only *in actu secundo*, ³⁹that is, it is efficacious "because it obtains its effect through the use of free will. . . ."
- 3) *Predilection*:
- a) A system in which grace is efficacious *in actu primo*, ⁴⁰"in whatsoever way it is conceived, shows an absolute divine will which is a true predilection for this particular man." For God in this system, ⁴¹"deliberately . . . selects such means [graces], and confers them in such a manner and at such a time that He foresees they will infallibly be effective, [for] He would employ other graces, if He had foreseen these would be ineffective."
 - b) In a system in which graces are efficacious only *in actu secundo*, not *in actu primo*, this predilection is not present.
- 4) *Divine foreknowledge*: All Molinists hold that God can foreknow the acts that a man will freely perform, or which he would perform in certain conditions without the use of divine decrees as means of foreknowledge: ⁴²". . . we hold that the reason why God certainly knows which alternative of any group of alternatives that depend on a free created will will take place, is not the determination of the divine will bending and determining the free created will, but that it is the free decision [on the part of God] by which He decided to create this free will in this or that order of things and circumstances; but [we hold that] this decision is not the only [reason why God foreknows] but [that the reason is] this divine decision together with His understanding, in His essence, of any free created will whatsoever, by His natural

knowledge; by which knowledge He knows with certitude before that created will makes its decision, what that particular will would do, in its freedom, in the supposition and condition that He would create it, and place it in that particular order of things. . . ."

9. Summary of the Molinistic opinion: By means of *scientia media*, God knows what this particular man would do with these graces, in these circumstances etc. According to those Molinists who hold that efficacious graces are such *in actu primo*, God chooses, for those men for whom he has predilection or special benevolence, graces with which He knows they will perform good acts. He would employ other graces if the first graces He considered would not be foreseen to be effective. Therefore these men perform good actions. After foreseeing their merits, God predestines them to the glory of Heaven. But for other men, for whom God does not have predilection or special benevolence, God does not act thus. So these do not perform good actions (at least, not to such an extent as to be saved). After foreseeing their demerits, God reprobates them.

According to those Molinists who hold that efficacious graces are such only *in actu secundo*, God first chooses the order of things in which He will place each man. He does this before considering the merits and demerits of men. Then He sends to them various graces, but does not choose them in the manner described above. After foreseeing the merits of those who actually perform good acts, God predestines them to the glory of Heaven. After foreseeing the demerits of the others, God reprobates them.

END NOTES

1 Note in Context:

Of course, we are not trying to remove all mystery.

2 Note in Context:

The older Thomists distinguish between negative reprobation, which they say is decreed before consideration of demerits and positive reprobation, which they place after consideration of demerits: cf. §6.

3 Note in Context:

The Molinists hold that the divine decision on the complete process of predestination as a whole is taken before consideration of merits and demerits. It is only predestination to glory, considered separately, that they would place after consideration of merits: cf. §8.

4 Note in Context:

ST I 1.8 ad 2.

5 Note in Context:

Vatican II teaches that baptised Protestants have an imperfect membership (Decree on Ecumenism I.3. Council, Daybook Third Session NCWC, Washington, 1965, p. 344): ". . . all who have been justified by faith in baptism are members of Christ's body. . . ." We shall try to show, in §48, that even unbaptized persons in the state of grace have an imperfect membership, in a still lesser degree.

6 Note in Context:

Cf. the interpretations of all the Fathers, in chapter 13 below.

7 Note in Context:

The absence of resistance of which we speak is not a positive decision or act of the will made under the form of explicitly making a decision to abstain from sin. Rather, it is the mere absence of an evil decision, without any act of the will in the first part of the process in which grace begins to move a man. This will be explained more fully below in §§82 and 344-350.

8 Note in Context:

AAS 42.568.

9 Note in Context:

R. Garrigou-Lagrance, OP, *De Deo uno*, Desclee de Brouwer Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 532. Emphasis added.

10 Note in Context:

Ibid.

11 Note in Context:

Ibid., pp. 532-533.

12 Note in Context:

Ibid., p. 551.

13 Note in Context:

Ibid., p. 544.

14 Note in Context:

Garrigou-Lagrance, *De gratia*, Marietti, Taurini, 1947, pp. 152, 204, 205 (emphasis his).

15 Note in Context:

F.L.B. Cunningham, OP, (Editor), *The Christian Life*, Priory Press, Dubuque, 1959, p. 292.

16 Note in Context:

John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, *De Gratia*, Quebec 1954: Disp. 24, art. 13, reply to arg. 4. § 1221.

17 Note in Context:

CG 3.67.

18 Note in Context:

Garrigou-Lagrance, *Perfection chretienne et contemplation*, Editions de La Vie Spirituelle, Saint-Maximin. 1923, p. 96.

19 Note in Context:

Garrigou-Lagrance, *De gratia*, pp. 179-180. The words cited are from an objection but Garrigou-Lagrance says on this objection (p. 180): "I concede the major; I concede the minor. . . ."

20 Note in Context:

Ibid., p. 190 (emphasis his).

21 Note in Context:

Ibid., p. 190 and p. 62 note 2 (emphasis mine).

22 Note in Context:

Garrigou-Lagrance, *De Deo uno*, p. 431.

- 23 Note in Context:
P. Lumbreras, *De gratia, Angelicum, Romae*, 1946, p. 96.
- 24 Note in Context:
Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia*, p. 179. The words cited above are from an objection, but Garrigou-Lagrange says on this objection (p. 180): "I concede the major; I concede the minor. . . ."
- 25 Note in Context:
John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Disp. 24, art. 3, reply to arg.7, §1243.
- 26 Note in Context:
Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Deo uno*, p. 525.
- 27 Note in Context:
This quote is taken from the Rheims-Douay translation of the Latin Vulgate. The RSV would be: "For who sees anything different in you?"
- 28 Note in Context:
Ibid., p. 363 (emphasis mine).
- 29 Note in Context:
Ibid., p. 525.
- 30 Note in Context:
Ibid.
- 31 Note in Context:
I.M. Dalmau, S.I., "De Deo uno," in: *Sacrae Theologiae Summa, B.A.C., Matriti*, 1952, II. I, §247.
- 32 Note in Context:
Ibid., §236.
- 33 Note in Context:
Ibid., §253.
- 34 Note in Context:
Ibid.
- 35 Note in Context:
Ibid., §254.
- 36 Note in Context:
S. Gonzalez, S.I. "De gratia," in: *Sacrae Theologiae Summa, B.A.C., Matriti*, 1953 III, III, §294.
- 37 Note in Context:
Ibid. §326 (emphasis his).
- 38 Note in Context:
Cf. our further treatment of the Molinist system below, §§396-397.
- 39 B. Beraza, S.I, *Tractatus de gratia Christi*, Bilbao, 1939, p. 595 (citing the decree of 1616 by Father Aquaviva, General of the Jesuits, who ordered Jesuits not to teach the view that grace is efficacious in actu secundo).
- 40 Gonzalez, §326.10.c.
- 41 From the decree of Father Aquaviva: cf. note 38 above (emphasis by Beraza).
- 42 L. Molina, S.I., *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis. . . .*, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 50, *Parisiis*, 1876, p. 302.

Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation

Ch. 1: *Explicit texts of Sacred Scripture*

I. From the Epistle to the Romans

10. *The sacred text,*

Rom 8:28-30: "We know that in everything God works for good with those who love him, who are called according to his purpose. For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren. And those whom he predestined he also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified."

Rom 9:11-23 (passim): ". . . though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad, in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of his call, she was told, 'The elder will serve the younger.' As it is written, 'Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated'. . . . For he says to Moses, 'I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. . . . For the scripture says to Pharaoh, 'I have raised you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you. . . . So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills. . . . Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use?'"

11. *Exegesis of Rom 8:28-31:*¹ The best exegetes of all schools within the Church, and also the best outside the Church, agree on many points of great importance in interpreting these verses.

First, all teach that St. Paul in these verses is speaking about *all* Christians, that is, *all* Christians are predestined in the Pauline sense. Hence they teach that St. Paul in these verses does not distinguish Christians into two classes, into the predestined and reprobate. The eminent Dominican exegete, Père Lagrange, notes that St. Augustine attempted to introduce that distinction into this passage, and comments:² "That opinion, so full of consequences, *isolated* in ancient times, and *rejected* by modern authors (Cornely, Prat, Lipsius, Sanday-Headlam, Julicher, Zahn, Lietzmann), *has no foundation in the text and is contrary to the whole context*. St. Paul speaks to all Christians, and does not dream of distinguishing them into two classes: those who are called according to a design of predestination, and those who are called without being predestined. The distinction between those called and those chosen, such as it is given in the Gospel (Mt 20:16; 22:14), does not coincide with the terms used by Paul. In his mind, *kletos*, "one who is called," refers to one who has answered the call; he has been

called effectively (Cornely, Prat). All Christians are called in that sense. He would not reassure them by saying: certain ones among you are predestined." Similarly, in his commentary on verse 30:³ "We have already noted that here Paul does not make two classes among Christians: those who are predestined, and those who are not. His purpose is to *encourage all the faithful*. On the part of God, the call to faith and justification are an assured pledge of salvation; it is not God who will fail the faithful. The chain of divine acts conducts them to salvation, because *Paul supposes that a Christian will not divest himself of his goodness. . . . Or rather; Paul does not think of the particular destiny of each Christian in the designs of God, but of the designs of God for Christianity*; those who are in his mind are the faithful *as a group*, those who have answered his call. . . . As far as individuals are concerned, it is for them to live according to the Spirit, etc., for Paul does not hide the fact that they can fall back under the regime of the flesh."

Precisely the same explanation is found in the excellent commentary of J. Huby, SJ.⁴

Therefore, since St. Paul is not here speaking of the place of the *individual* in the plans of God, nor of infallible predestination to Heaven, it does not make much difference for our question whether we say that St. Paul is speaking of predestination before or after prevision of merits. As Lagrange notes so well, if St. Paul really were speaking of the predestination of the individual to Heaven and said that some Christians, without any consideration of their dispositions whatsoever, were *not* predestined, he would not strengthen the hope of all by saying to them: *Some* of you are predestined. But, as Lagrange also says, St. Paul's purpose in this passage is to strengthen the hope of *all* the faithful. Huby, then, is quite right in saying:⁵ ". . . in an exhortation in which the Apostle wishes to arouse a firm hope in the hearts of all Christians, would he really encourage them if he said: 'All have confidence, because *some* among you are predestined?' As someone has said: 'It is impossible to argue with less logic.'"

As to men who do not enter into the Church in the full sense, St. Paul simply does not speak of them in the verses we are considering. Elsewhere in the same Epistle, especially in 2:12-16, he makes clear that at least some of them are actually saved.

12. Exegesis of Rom 9:11-23: According to St. Augustine, this passage teaches predestination to Heaven, or reprobation to hell, before any consideration of human merits and demerits. Out of his interpretation, St. Augustine formed the following theory: As a result of original sin, all men are part of the potter's clay (v. 21), that is, they form one "damned and damnable mass." If God rescues some, this is out of mere mercy. If He deserts others in the same damned mass, it is mere justice.

All exegetes today reject this interpretation. As Huby points out,⁶ it is altogether arbitrary to say that the "clay" in v. 21 stands for the human race, corrupted by original sin, because in the whole of chapter 9 there is not even a remote allusion to original sin. Lagrange makes a keen observation:⁷ "At least the potter does not blame the vessels which he has made for ignoble uses." Hence, if God really had made certain men for ignoble roles, He should not blame and condemn these men for being such.

Actually, St. Paul was only making a comparison, or, as Lagrange says,⁸ "a simple parable." St. Paul wishes to teach that God has the right to assign men to various places in the *external order of this world*-which is quite different and distinct from the *internal order of eternal salvation or ruin!* That is, God makes some to be kings, others physicians, others laborers, etc. And similarly, He brings some into the Church in the full sense, and not others. But these assignments by no means fix the eternal lot of a man. Later in this chapter we shall examine what relation does exist between a man's eternal lot and his place in the external order of this world.

Even St. Augustine himself, in many works, as we shall see later,⁹ says many things that at least seem to presuppose a view that differs from the *massa damnata* theory.

St. Thomas, in his commentary on Romans, followed the interpretation of St. Augustine. However, he seems to feel ill at ease with the harshness of that interpretation. For if he were simply following out the implication of that interpretation, he could and should say that Pharaoh and the other reprobates were first of all deserted¹⁰ by God in the "damned mass." He would say that God did this because of original sin, to display His justice. As a result of this desertion, the reprobate infallibly fall into personal sins. Because of original and personal sins, they will be damned.

But St. Thomas did not speak this way. Rather, over and over again he harps on *personal sins*:¹¹ ". . . because of the sins which they have from themselves, not from God . . . because of the evil things which you did . . . because of their own merits they were worthy to be devoured at once . . . as far as He is concerned, [God] interiorly urges a man on to good . . . but the bad man perverts this divine motion according to the malice of his heart. . . ."

13. Today the best exegetes of all schools either openly reject the interpretation of St. Augustine or pass it by in silence and propose another instead. To quote Père Lagrange again:¹² "And so the question which Paul treats directly is not at all that of predestination and reprobation [to eternal lots] but merely the call of the Gentiles to the grace of Christianity, in contrast to the infidelity of the Jews." And similarly:¹³ "Prat says quite well: The precise point of the question is not: 'Why is this particular man predestined to the glory of Heaven and another given over to damnation?' nor: 'Why, as a matter of fact, is this

man saved and that man lost?' nor even: 'Why is this individual rather than another called to the faith?' I would add that it is not even this: 'Why [in general] are there elect and reprobates?'"

A. M. Dubarle, OP, the eminent Professor of Sacred Scripture at Le Saulchoir, says exactly the same:¹⁴ "When he exalts, as he does, divine grace acting without any consideration of works, the Apostle is not speaking of the sentence which will fix the lot of each man on the last day but of the call to a privileged condition, the possession of the Christian faith. . . . It is in this perspective that one must understand the election and the hardening spoken of in chapter 9 of Romans." Huby speaks similarly:¹⁵ "The question, then, is not about the predestination of individuals to eternal salvation, nor even to the faith that prepares for it but about the entry of a nation into the Church. And let us note also, to remain within the strict limits of the question proposed by St. Paul, that to enter into Christianity is not at all the same as being saved: in certain conditions, salvation is possible outside of explicit adherence to Christianity, and, on the other hand, not everyone who enters Christianity is necessarily saved."

In other words, there are two questions, which we must not confuse: (1) According to what principles does God predestine individuals to heaven? (2) According to what principles does God predestine nations to belong to the chosen people in the Old Testament, or to be in the Church in the full¹⁶ sense in the New Testament?

As to the first question, all exegetes agree that St. Paul does not really treat it in the entire Epistle to the Romans-or rather, in no Epistle does he treat it.

But in chapter 9 of Romans, St. Paul does give an answer to the second question. He says that God does not predestine nations to this privileged position according to merits: that the descendants of Jacob rather than those of Esau became the chosen people was "not because of works but because of his call."¹⁷ Only indirectly does St. Paul bring in individuals, such as Pharaoh, Esau, and Jacob insofar as they are related to the question of nations. Hence, God said to Moses: "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy." That is, I will do as I wish in the matter of the mercy shown in the call to membership in the chosen people.

When Scripture says to Pharaoh, "I have raised you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you," it does not mean that Pharaoh was created for damnation. As Lagrange points out,¹⁸ the word "raised up" in Scripture does not mean "brought into existence," but rather it means "to give a role in history, to send on the stage": for Pharaoh was evil by his own free will. God did not make him such. But God does bring good out of evil. Hence, He willed to make use of the evil quality which Pharaoh had of his own accord; in defeating Pharaoh, God displayed divine power in favor of the chosen people in Egypt. Hence, God is compared to a potter, who out of the same clay, that is, our

common human nature, assigns various roles in the *external order* to various men. Not that God wants certain men to be evil and to act wickedly-but, since these men are by their own will going to be wicked anyway, God makes use of their malice for good purposes, and draws good out of evil.

St. Paul says these things in reply to the question he himself proposed: Why are not the Jews, as a nation, in the Church in the New Testament? The first answer he gives is this: God does not assign nations to the Church according to merits. But later St. Paul adds:¹⁹ "God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew. . . . For the gifts and the call of God are irrevocable." So it is not that God has rejected the Jews, but they have rejected Him:²⁰ "they were broken off because of their unbelief." Yet, because, as St. Paul said, the call of God still remains for them, for it is "irrevocable":²¹ "if they do not persist in their unbelief, [they] will be grafted in, for God has the power to graft them in again" into the salutary tree from which they cut themselves off. It is clear that Père Lagrange is quite right, then, in saying of the Jews:²² ". . . nothing shows that their fall was the effect of reprobation." For the Jews rejected God: He did not reject them.

14. The two economies: It is obvious, then, that there are two economies, that is, spheres or orders: (1) *The internal economy*, in which there is the question of the eternal lot of individual men, that is, whether they will go to heaven or hell. (2) *The external economy*, in which there is the question of the position a nation or man has in the external order i.e., whether a nation will belong to the chosen people of the Old Testament, or to the Church of the New Testament (in the full sense).

In chapter 9 of Romans, St. Paul is not speaking of the internal economy, but of the assignment of nations in the external economy. He says that assignment is not made because of merits.

As we have already said, St. Paul is not speaking, in this passage, of individuals. However, if even nations cannot merit to be called into the Church, it seems that individuals cannot either. For if individuals could, then if all, or at least most, individuals in a certain nation merited to be called, by that very fact the nation would merit to be called. But this would contradict the teaching of St. Paul. Hence we must say that even individuals are not assigned to membership in the Church on account of merits.

However, the fact that St. Paul says God does not assign places in the external economy because of merits does not mean that God acts without any reasonable consideration: that would be contrary to Wisdom. So it is legitimate to make speculations as to the divinely chosen principles in this matter.²³ Perhaps God, in assigning places in which there are greater or lesser external means of grace, acts, at least in general, according to the needs and relative weakness of various souls. In fact, that *general* divine policy revealed through St.

Paul does not prevent God from *at times* taking even merits into consideration, as He did in the case of Cornelius the Centurion:²⁴ "Cornelius . . . your prayers and your alms have ascended as a memorial before God. And now send men to Joppa, and bring one Simon who is called Peter. . . ."

15. *The relation between the two economies:* No one will deny that there is a relation between the two economies in that those who are in the Church in the full sense have better, more abundant external means of grace. Nor will anyone deny the truth of what Dubarle says:²⁵ ". . . this [the place assigned in the external economy] does not predetermine the eternal lot reserved to each one in view of his conduct."

But when the older Thomists, who once thought they had an explicit revelation of their theory of negative reprobation in this passage of St. Paul, hear that St. Paul really is not talking about the eternal fates of individuals, they often try to rehabilitate their proof by saying that in this passage St. Paul gives principles which can be applied to the internal economy of eternal salvation. With such a tendency in view, Père Lagrange said:²⁶ "One thinks naturally of the eternal lot of individuals and transposes terms and applies the principles of Paul to the salvation of individuals. God calls [men] to justification gratuitously, but those who are not called, will not reach the glory of heaven, so that those who are not called, go to eternal ruin. [However] the conclusions that one could obtain by such a train of thought lose sight of the exegesis of the text. . . . One cannot apply indiscriminately to eternal predestination and reprobation that which is said about the call to the grace of Christianity . . . one should not understand what is said about one's action in history, of the eternal moral destiny of an individual. . . . One should not cease repeating . . . that according to Paul, man is really the cause of his reprobation by his sins. . . ." Thus Lagrange teaches emphatically that St. Paul knows nothing of reprobation before consideration of demerits. Therefore, the application of principles that the Thomists wish to make is invalid. Lagrange adds:²⁷ "Paul is replying to the pretensions of the Jews. He is not drawing a great picture of the role of the elect and the damned in the divine plan. He teaches the gratuitous call of the Jews first and later of the faithful, and of the resistance to the designs of God as they enter into His plan."

16. The fundamental reason why the proposed applications are illegitimate is that there are many, even basic differences between the two economies. First of all the predestination of which St. Paul speaks does not infallibly bring a man to heaven. For, as Lagrange notes,²⁸ ". . . there are some who are called to grace who do not continue [in it]," while, on the other hand, some gentiles can be saved.

But the most fundamental reason why the application is illegitimate is this: God has freely decided upon different fundamental principles for

the two economies. These principles are quite incompatible with one another. In the external economy, it is a rule that "he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills." For example, after one sin, God rejected Saul, so that his line should not rule the chosen people. But David, who had committed greater sins (murder and adultery) received mercy: he was not removed from the kingship²⁹ but rather, God promised to make firm his throne forever and David became the ancestor of Christ. In contrast, even before Esau was born, God said, "Esau I hated."

Thus in the external economy, mercy (the grant of a favored position) is given and denied independently of merits, so that mercy is not shown to all.

In the internal economy however, the rule is quite different:³⁰ "The Lord is good to all: and his compassion is over all that he has made." And again:³¹ "The compassion of man is for his neighbor, but the compassion of the Lord is for all living beings." Or:³² "For thou lovest all things that exist, and hast loathing for none of the things which thou hast made." For God³³ "desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Now if God were to reject a man from eternal salvation as He rejected Esau, that is, before considering anything that the man would or would not do, and were to do it in such a way that, as the older Thomists say³⁴ the rejected man could not "distinguish himself" in regard to being reprobated or not: then he could not simultaneously say sincerely that He willed all men-including those reprobated-to be saved. Actually, as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, God's desire for the salvation of all is so vehement that He bound Himself by a New and eternal Covenant in the blood of His Son to give graces to all that are in proportion to infinite objective titles or claims established at such great cost (the Cross) for each individual man.

So in one economy, God does not have mercy on all; but in the other, His mercy is universal. In one economy, even before a man has sinned, He may say: "Esau I hated," but in the other: you have "loathing for none of the things which thou hast made," for God "desires all men to be saved." Therefore, since the principles of the two economies are not only different, but incompatible, it is illegitimate to infer that the principles of divine action in one economy are the same as in the other economy, in which God has freely decreed to act differently, and has revealed that fact in Sacred Scripture.

17. Is the divine call to membership in the Church infrustrable?

Before trying to answer this question, we need to note that we are not asking about extraordinary cases, such as the conversion of St. Paul. Rather, we wish to know if, in ordinary providence, the divine motion that brings a man into the Church is such that it either forestalls or overcomes all human resistance.

The Epistle to the Romans provides much light on the question. For, since, as all agree, the divine movement which is given to men is not

such as to prevent them from falling away from the faith through their own fault it is at least highly probable that the divine movement that led them to the Church (if they were adults at the time) was of the same kind. For it does not seem to harmonize with Wisdom to give an infrustrable motion to bring a man into the Church, and afterwards to change the character of that motion: the reason for the change could not be found. On the contrary, St. Paul explicitly teaches that,³⁵ "the *gifts* and the *call* of God are irrevocable." So if God had called a man into the Church infrustrably, that is, by a motion that would forestall or overcome all human resistance, then, since His gifts and call are irrevocable, He would have continued such a motion.

The complete divine plan in regard to membership in the Church would seem, therefore, to be somewhat as follows: God really wills all men to be saved, and He also wants all to be members of the Church in the full sense, so that they may have the fuller means of grace. But, as a result of human weakness, it is the inevitable that there be differences, and many will be born in places where they have few or no sacraments.³⁶ Therefore, unless God were to multiply miracles to an immense degree, it will be necessary to assign many humans to places with few if any sacraments. To those in such places, God does send many graces, for, as Pope Pius XII taught, it is certain that,³⁷ "the heavenly Father . . . will at all times send down upon all men a rich abundance of divine graces." In assigning men to places in which they will have the proximate opportunity³⁸ of entering the Church, God does not let merits be the controlling principle. He acts according to other principles. Probably, He considers the needs, the resistance to grace, and the relative weakness of individuals. He gives the faith and entrance into the Church in the full sense to all who receive the proximate opportunity of entry and who do not resist the graces offered. However, if they resist, at least ordinarily, God will not move them against their resistance.

II. From other parts of Sacred Scripture

18. The "measure of grace": Some theologians have interpreted certain texts to mean that God so limits the graces given to some men that as a matter of fact these men could not be saved. The principal texts cited in this sense are: Ephesians 4:7: "But grace was given to each of us according to the measure of Christ's gift," and Romans 12:3: ". . . each according to the measure of faith which God has assigned him."

Actually, as the context shows, in these texts St. Paul is not talking about actual and habitual graces that make a man holy within the internal economy, but about charismatic graces of the external economy. Thus, right after the words quoted from Romans, we read: "For as in one body we have many members, and all the members do not have the same function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ. . . . Having gifts that differ according to the grace given to us,

let us use them: if prophecy, in proportion to our faith; if service, in our serving; he who teaches, in his teaching. . . ." Similarly, in the epistle to the Ephesians, we read, immediately after the text cited above: "Therefore it is said, 'When he ascended on high he led a host of captives, and he gave gifts to men'. . . . And his gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists."

So St. Paul by no means teaches that God gives graces sparingly. The measure of grace given to each man for salvation is "a rich abundance" as we saw above in the words of Pope Pius XII.³⁹

The "principle of predilection": As we saw in the introduction, Garrigou-Lagrange and many other theologians often cite 1 Cor 4:7 to prove their views on predestination: "Who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?"

Actually, as the context shows, St. Paul is by no means speaking of predestination to eternal glory. He is speaking of the pride of the Corinthians who thought they had been chosen to be in the Church as a result of their good qualities, and who sought added honor and distinctions from belonging to factions within the Church, attached to Apollos, Cephas, or Paul. St. Paul rebukes their pride: "Who distinguisheth thee?" That is: You do not have wisdom, virtue, or other special qualities so that you could rightly boast that you were called into the Church, or into a special group in the Church, on account of them. God does not choose men for the Church according to *merits*. And besides: What have you that you did not receive? Whatever good qualities you have are from God, not from yourself: so you cannot boast.

It is illegitimate to transfer these words of St. Paul to the internal economy, because St. Paul is speaking about the external economy, and, as we have seen, the principles of the two economies are not only different but incompatible. Furthermore, if St. Paul meant these words in the sense supposed by Garrigou-Lagrange, he would contradict what he says in 2 Cor 6:1: ". . . we entreat you not to accept the grace of God in vain." But if, as Garrigou-Lagrange holds, a man could not really determine whether he receives the grace of God in vain or not (for if he could, he would "distinguish himself"), then the exhortation of St. Paul would not be only vain, but a mockery.

So St. Paul does, in 1 Cor 4:7, say that a man cannot "distinguish himself" in one sense, that is, he says that in the external economy it does not depend on a man's merits whether or not he is chosen by God to be a member of the Church in the full sense. But in 2 Cor 6:1, St. Paul makes clear that in another sense a man can "distinguish himself" namely, in the sense that it does depend on man whether or not he receives the grace of God in vain or not.

From the words of Christ at the Last Supper:⁴⁰ "You did not choose me, but I chose you. . . ." Some have thought these words imply an

absolute predestination and reprobation, before any consideration of merits and demerits. But again, Christ is not speaking of predestination to eternal glory or eternal ruin. The context shows He is speaking to the Apostles. He says that He has chosen them for the Apostolate—a matter of the external economy—rather than that they chose Him.

From the Epistle to the Ephesians:⁴¹ ". . . even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and blameless before him. He destined us in love to be his sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will. . . ." Just as in the Epistle to the Romans, so also here, St. Paul is speaking of the vocation of men to the Church, that is, to a special place in the external economy, as the context shows. For the Apostle is speaking to *all* Ephesians who are in the Church, and he says to *all* that they are predestined. Now no one would say St. Paul revealed to all the Ephesians that all were predestined to eternal glory; but he can easily say that all are predestined to membership in the Church—a thing that is obvious from the fact that they are actually in the Church.

19. Conclusions from all texts:

1) Sacred Scripture never speaks explicitly of an infallible predestination to the glory of heaven or of infallible reprobation to eternal ruin. All explicit texts in which the word "predestine" is found refer to the external economy. Therefore the claim of the Thomists that their view of predestination is proved by explicit texts of Scripture is without foundation.

2) It is illegitimate to apply the principles of Romans 9 and other texts that speak of the external economy to the internal economy, because the principles that God has freely chosen in the two economies are not only different but incompatible. Therefore the claim of the older Thomists that their view of predestination is proved by an application of the principles of Romans 9 and similar texts is without foundation.

3) Even though in Romans 8:28-30 St. Paul is not speaking of the predestination of individuals, but of the plans of God for Christianity or for Christians as a group, yet, because, as Père Lagrange says, the purpose of St. Paul in Romans 8 was to strengthen the hope of all Christians, there is no room left for a negative reprobation before prevision of demerits. Rather, such a theory is implicitly excluded. For if that theory were true, the hope of Christians could not be firm, because if God wished to reprobate some before all consideration of human conditions, then no one would have the means of a *firm* hope that God might not treat him thus, and leave him with only means with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable that he be saved.⁴² But the truth is, according to St. Paul, as Père Lagrange says:⁴³ ". . . one should not cease repeating . . . that according to Paul, man is really the cause of his reprobation by his sins.

20. Objection: In Acts 13:48 we read: ". . . and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed." Therefore, predestination to the

Church coincides with predestination to eternal life, or to the glory of heaven.

Answer: If this were true, it would follow that no one who is not a member of the Church in the full sense could be saved. But the Church herself denies this, as is clear from the condemnation of the views of Father Leonard Feeney, SJ. Rather, the truth is that eternal life in the text cited is spoken of in the same sense as in the Gospel:⁴⁴ "And this is eternal life, that they know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." This knowledge is begun in this life, by knowing Jesus Christ in the Church, and is perfected in the beatific vision, to which the Church is intended to lead men.

Again, the objection would prove that all who are in the Church in the full sense are saved. But the Church herself has never taught that.

END NOTES

1 The Patristic interpretations will be given below, in chapter 13.

2 M.J. Lagrange, OP, *Saint Paul, Epître aux Romains*, Gabalda, Paris, 1931, p. 214 (emphasis his).

3 *Ibid.*, p. 217 (emphasis mine).

4 Joseph Huby, SJ, *Saint Paul, Epître aux Romains, Traduction et Commentaire, Verbum Salutis X*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1957.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 309. (Citing F. Prat, *La Théologie de Saint Paul*, Paris, 1949, I. p. 209).

6 Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 349.

7 *Op. cit.*, p. 238.

8 *Ibid.*

9 Cf. below §§ 209-12.

10 Cf. § 51 below.

11 *Commentarius in Romanos*, Cap. 9. Lect. II & III, 764, 781.

12 *Op. cit.*, pp. 246-47.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 248 (citing Prat I, p. 353ff.).

14 A. M. Dubarle, OP, *Le Peche originel dans l'Écriture*, Cerf, Paris, 1958, p. 181.

15 *Op. cit.*, p. 330.

16 We speak in this way since, as we saw above in note 15, there are many men who are saved because they have either imperfect membership in the Church, or in some way pertain to the Church.

17 Rom 9:11.

18 *Op. cit.*, p. 234.

19 Rom 11:2 & 29.

20 Rom 11:20.

21 Rom 11:23.

22 *Op. cit.*, p. 282.

23 Cf. below, §§ 541-542.

24 Acts 10:4-6.

25 *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

26 *Op. cit.*, p. 247 (emphasis mine).

27 *Op. cit.*, p. 248.

28 *Op. cit.*, p. 247.

29 Whether or not a man is king is also a question that pertains to the external economy. A fuller explanation will be given below, § 117.

30 Ps 145:9.

31 Sir 18:13.

32 Wis 11:24.

33 1 Tm 2:4.

34 Cf. § 6.8.

35 Rom 11:29.

36 A fuller speculation on this matter will be made below, §§541-542.

37 Haurietis aquas, AAS 48.337.

38 Proximate opportunity includes the absence of even subconscious obstacles that could effectively impede assent to faith. For it can easily happen that a man living among Catholics would inculpably reject the faith because from infancy he has been taught views against the Catholic faith and still, in good faith, retains these. For example, he may honestly believe that contraception and divorce are licit. He perceives that if he should enter the Catholic Church, he would be forced to avoid these. So he may have at least a subconscious resistance to the motives of credibility of the Catholic faith.

39 Cf. note 36 above.

40 Jn 15:16.

41 Eph 1:4-5.

42 The conclusion could not be evaded by saying that in negative reprobation God merely permits a man to ruin himself. For, according to the older Thomists, who hold this view (cf. §§ 6-7, esp. 6.8) a man cannot "distinguish himself"-not in regard to the distinction between being reprobated or not, nor in regard to doing or omitting evil. According to these Thomists, as we saw in §§ 6-7, God either gives a man efficacious grace, by which He moves the man infustrably to good, or He gives "sufficient" grace, which suffices only to confer the ability of acting, but does not suffice for really acting, since the application is still needed. Man however cannot obtain this application when he wills, for it is given only to those who do not resist. But to omit resistance, application is required. God, for His part can deny this application even without any fault on the part of the man: He may deny it for a mere inculpable inadvertence, according to these Thomists. Cf. the fuller explanation below: §§ 51, 118-19, 309-22.

43 Op. cit., p. 247. Cf. note 25 above.

44 Jn 17:3.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 2: Explicit texts of the Magisterium of the Church"

21. The explicit statements of the Magisterium on our question are very few, although many things have been said implicitly by the Magisterium, as we shall see in the following chapters.

The second council of Orange, held in 529 A.D., was not a general council. However, because of the special confirmation given it by Pope Boniface II, the canons of this council have the force of a solemn definition. In the epilogue of this council we read:¹ "We not only do not believe that any persons have been predestined by divine power to evil, but also, if there are any persons who wish to believe so great an evil, with all detestation, we say anathema to them."

The statement clearly rejects at least *positive* reprobation before consideration of demerits. However, it does not, at least not clearly, say anything about *negative* reprobation.

The council of Trent made a similar statement:² "If anyone says that the grace of justification comes only to those predestined to life, and that all the rest who are called, are really called, but do not receive

grace, since they are predestined to evil by divine power: let him be anathema."

22. Two particular councils are often cited in discussions of this matter, the council of Quiersy, held in 853 A.D., and the council of Valence, held in 855 A.D. Historically it is clear that these two councils were opposed to one another on certain matters. Some theologians today think the differences were not very great. It is difficult to judge the matter. However, the two councils at least seem to have practically the same thought on our question. The council of Quiersy taught:³ "Almighty God wills all men without exception, to be saved, even though not all are saved. The fact that some are saved is the gift of Him who saves: the fact that some are lost, is the merit of those who are lost."

The council of Valence taught:⁴ ". . . [the council] holds, in regard to divine predestination . . . that in election, the mercy of God precedes good merits [on the part of men]: but that in the damnation of those who are lost, evil merits precede the just judgment of God."

So these two councils at least seem to hold a difference between the manner of predestining and the manner of reprobating. For in predestining, the mercy of God comes before any good merits on the part of men, so that men are saved, fundamentally, by divine mercy. But in reprobating on the other hand, evil merits on the part of men come before the judgment, so that those who perish, perish through their own demerits.

(In chapter 15 we shall consider the intervention of the Magisterium in the Congregations *de Auxiliis*).

23. Conclusions:

1) Positive reprobation before prevision of demerits has certainly been condemned by the Magisterium.

2) Reprobates are certainly not deprived of all grace.

3) At least probably, the particular councils hold that the manner of predestining differs from the manner of reprobating. If they hold this, they probably would not approve an opinion which puts both predestination and reprobation *before* prevision of merits, nor an opinion which puts both *after*. Probably they would say that one should be before, and one after prevision of merits.

However, as we have said, the precise sense intended by the two particular councils is not entirely clear, especially because of their opposition to each other. Furthermore, whatever their intention may have been, the councils of Valence and Quiersy were only particular councils, and so lack definitive dogmatic weight.

END NOTES

1 DS 397 (DB 200).

2 DS 1567 (DB 827).

3 DS 623 (DB 318).

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 3: The purpose of creation"

It is of great importance to have a perfectly clear understanding of God's purpose in creating. For if anyone acts for some purpose, he must choose means that are suitable to attain his purpose. So, if we know the purpose of creation, we shall gain much valuable information about what means God would or would not choose.

24. God created for Himself: This fact is obvious from many statements of Scripture, e.g., in Romans 11:36 we read: "For from him and through him and *to him* are all things." And similarly in the Epistle to the Hebrews 2:10: "For it was fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist. . . ."

25. But God did not create for His own utility: Yet God did not create for His own advantage or as if He needed anything or hoped to gain anything. The book of Job says rightly:¹ "Can a man be profitable to God? . . . Surely he who is wise is profitable to himself. Or is it gain to him if you make your ways blameless?" St. Paul spoke in the same vein to the Athenians on the Areopagus:² "The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by man, nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he gives to all men life and breath and everything."

26. The relation between God's glory and the good of men: Beginning early in the Old Testament we find a remarkable hint of a close bond between God's glory and the communication of His goodness to men in the many texts on the *kabod Yahweh*, the glory of God. As S. Lyonnet, SJ says:³ "The 'glory of God' in the Old Testament designates God Himself inasmuch as He is present to His people and communicating Himself to them. . . ." For example, in Exodus 40:34 we read: "Then the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the Lord (*kabod Yahweh*) filled the tabernacle." The *kabod Yahweh* was a special visible *manifestation* of the glory and power of God which was at the same time the presence of God to *communicate* help to His people.

In the New Testament we find in many places a similar expression about the glory of God even in contexts where there is no longer any question of a special visible manifestation of the type found in the Old Testament. Thus Our Lord said to Martha at the tomb of Lazarus:⁴ ". . . if you would believe you would see the glory of God." In this passage, the words "glory of God" mean the *manifestation* of the power of God *to communicate life* to Lazarus. St. Paul speaks similarly in the Epistle to the Romans:⁵ ". . . Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father. . . ." And again:⁶ ". . . all have sinned

and have need of the glory of God." He could have said: All need the communication of the grace of God, but he preferred to say: They need the glory of God, so that the glory or manifestation of God and the communication of good things to men seem, in these passages, inseparable and almost identical.

We notice, of course, that the expression "glory of God" in the passages just cited from both Testaments is not used in the sense most commonly carried by those words. Most usually they mean the praise given to God by intelligent creatures, or, as St. Thomas expresses it,⁷ "clear knowledge with praise." In the passages cited above, we have a created manifestation of God's power and goodness that leads or should lead to praise by creatures.

Furthermore, the passages cited do not show that the glory of God and the good of creatures are *always* inseparable. But they do provide a certain hint in that direction.

However, the inseparability of the two is clearly shown in one of the most fundamental revelations of the Gospels. For Christ again and again referred to God as our *Father*. Now every father, *as such*, will glory for himself precisely through the good of his children—never through the ruin of his children. The glory of a good father *as a father* comes from the fact that his children turn out well.

The same revealed analogy enables us to see other facts about the relation between the glory of God and the good of men. For a human father wants his sons to honour him for two reasons: (1) Because the right objective order calls for that, i.e., out of love of righteousness and goodness. (2) So that it may be well with his children, for if they do not honor their father, by that very fact they are wicked, and so are indisposed to receive the benefits that the father wants to confer.

Similarly, our Father in heaven wants us to honor him: (1) Out of a love of righteousness and objective goodness: for the very nature of things requires that children should do this. (2) So that He may be able to give us His benefits, because, as St. Thomas explains:⁸ ". . . we show reverence and honor to God not for His advantage, but for our own, because, namely, in honoring and revering God, our soul is subjected to Him, and in this consists its perfection." St. Jerome speaks similarly:⁹ ". . . the Holy Spirit . . . is given to holy men that . . . they may be joined to God for the praise of His glory. Not that God needs the praise of anyone, but so that praising God may be beneficial to those who praise. . . ."

So we see an added confirmation of the fact that the glory of God and the good of men are inseparably bound together. We see also the generosity of God. For the reason why any good father, human or divine, gives love and benefits to his children is because he, the father, is good: not because the children are good. The children, then, cannot merit the *fundamental*,¹⁰ basic love of the father. But they can make

themselves unworthy and indisposed, so as to be incapable of receiving the benefits which the father wants to give.

27. The teaching of Vatican Council I on the generosity of God:

The first Vatican council defined that¹¹ "the world was made to the glory of God." To understand the precise sense intended by the council, we need to examine the acts of the council.

First, it is clear that the council did not want to define more than was necessary. For we read in the Report of the Committee on Faith:¹² ". . . in drawing up these canons, the Committee employed great diligence and care, first, so as not to say more than was necessary to say. . . ."

In line with this desire to limit its sense, the council distinguishes between two kinds of purpose, the *purpose of the maker* and the *purpose inherent in the nature of the thing made*. In technical language, these two are respectively, the *finis operantis* and the *finis operis*. The *finis operantis* is the goal which the maker freely selects and intends to accomplish; the *finis operis* is the end to which the very nature of the thing made directs it. (The difference will become clearer below from the concrete application to the purpose of creation.) Now we read in the annotations to the first schema:¹³ ". . . the *finis operis* is meant when, in the schema, it is said that the world was created to the glory of God." The same distinction is explicitly confirmed in the words of His Excellency, Bishop Vincent Gasser, president of the Committee on Faith¹⁴ ". . . the purpose of the created thing, and not [the purpose] of the creator, is meant when it is said in the canon, '. . . that the world was created to the glory of God. . . .'"

So we gather that the council did not intend to teach that God created for the purpose of acquiring glory (the *finis operantis*). For external glory, howsoever great, is a finite thing. No finite thing can really move God. But God did make a creature that was such that by its very nature it ought to give glory to God (*finis operis*) even though God Himself would gain nothing thereby.

28. It was important to make this distinction, because the council was refuting the error of George Hermes, who said that the Catholic Church teaches that God wanted to acquire external glory for Himself by creating. Hence we read in the Report of the Committee on Faith:¹⁵ "The second paragraph of this chapter is written . . . also against those who calumniate the Catholic Church on account of her teaching in which she says that the world was created to the glory of God, as if, namely, [the Church] represented God as eager for His own utility and His own advantage, as if, namely, the Church denied that the *finis operantis* was His own goodness, namely, that He might impart His goodness to creatures."

The second paragraph referred to above reads as follows:¹⁶ "This only true God . . . created creatures . . . not to increase His own happiness,

nor to acquire, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures. . . ."

29. So, from the words of the council it is clear that God did not create to acquire anything for Himself. For "the *finis operantis* was His own goodness, namely, that He might impart His goodness to creatures." This does not mean, however, that the communication of goodness *moved* God to create, for this communication of goodness is a finite thing, and no finite thing can move God. Rather, the goodness of God moved Him to communicate His goodness.

30. The teaching of the council on the relation between manifestation and communication: It is important to note the connection in the divine plan between the manifestation of God's perfections, and the communication of goodness to creatures. For the council said that God created, "to manifest His perfection *through* the goods which He imparts to creatures. . . ." Hence it is clear that God intends to manifest His perfection not in some other way, but precisely "*through the goods which He imparts to creatures. . . .*"

The same conclusion is obvious from another passage just cited from the council which said that "the *finis operantis* was His own goodness, namely, that He might impart His goodness to creatures."

Hence Bishop Gasser, president of the Committee on Faith, explained as follows why the Committee had rejected a certain emendation that had been proposed:¹⁷ "In this emendation it is proposed to add 'to communicate' after 'to manifest' in line 21; but the Committee did not approve this emendation, and the reason was that in the following words, 'through the goods which He imparts to creatures,' the same thought is contained as the author of this emendation proposed."

If we were trying to determine by the nature of things, or by metaphysical procedures, precisely in what way God intended to manifest His perfections, it would be at least difficult if not impossible to determine that way. But the way intended by God can be known with certitude through revelation, and the Magisterium of the Church, as we have seen, has taught us that, by free decision of God, the manifestation of the perfections of God and the communication of good things to creatures are inseparably bound together, since God wills that the manifestation take place *through the communication*.

The same teaching at least seems to be presupposed in the following words of Pius XII:¹⁸ "In doing all these things, [Christ] looks *solely* to the glory of the heavenly Father and to the ever growing adornment of men with sanctity." For the Pope seems to say that the glory of the Father and the good of men are so bound together in the works of Christ that they can be spoken of as the *one*, even the *sole* purpose [of those works].

31. It is quite obvious therefore that God never intends to acquire external glory by the ruin of men, by deserting¹⁹ men, so that He could have glory in the manifestation of vindictive justice by punishing men.

For God, as the council teaches, created to manifest His goodness not by the *deprivation* of good, but by the *communication* of good to creatures.²⁰

32. Communication to individuals: Some theologians say that even though God did not create in order to acquire anything for Himself, yet He wanted to produce a certain external effect because such an effect is the best. Now this effect, they say, is the whole order of the universe, which is the best, because it manifests all the perfections of God. God moreover, according to these theologians, is *not directly concerned with individuals*, but with *the whole*. And He wants, they say, to make manifestation and communication inseparable in regard to the whole, but not in regard to individuals. Hence, in their theory, God wants to desert certain men, so that they sin, so that He may have someone to punish, so as to be able to manifest vindictive justice, communicating such justice in this way. In fact, these theologians hold that God deserts more men than He saves.

Now we do not deny that there is an order of the universe, and that it is truly good (below in this chapter, and in the appendix, we shall treat it at length). But it is one thing to say that the order of the universe is good, and quite another thing to say that it is *necessary*-for those theologians use that word-to desert men so that they are damned for the "beauty" of such an order.

Most certainly, no trace of such an opinion can be found in the teaching of the first Vatican council. Neither can we find in the words of the council any remote trace of the distinction which these theologians propose, namely, that manifestation and communication are inseparable in regard to the whole universe, but not in regard to individual men, so that in many men-or rather in most men, according to them-manifestation is not only not inseparable from communication to men, but is actually *opposed* to it, and is inseparable from deprivation. If these theologians were right, the council should not have said simply, as it did, that God created to manifest His perfection through the good things He imparts to creatures-the council should have said that He created to manifest His perfection through the goods He imparts to the whole *by depriving* most men of eternal good.

More specifically, we can prove from Scripture and the Magisterium that God does not have such an attitude of will (an additional specially powerful proof will be given below in chapter 5):²¹

1) Our Lord Himself in the Gospel revealed that God cares for *individuals*:²² "What man of you, having a hundred sheep, if he has lost one of them, does not leave the ninety-nine in the wilderness, and go after the one which is lost, until he finds it? . . . So, it is not the will of my Father who is in heaven that *one* of these little ones should perish." Now if in the beginning, when He decided upon the purpose of creation, God had intended to desert²³ some for the order of the universe, then He could not sincerely say later that He wanted to seek

individual sinners lest they perish. Nor is the force of the argument weakened by saying that Christ spoke of the sheepfold which is the Church. Because both among those who are members of the Church in the full sense, and among those who are not, there are both reprobates and elect. If Christ, as God, had previously decided to desert the reprobate members so that they would perish, He could not later say sincerely that He was seeking the very same ones so that they would not perish. And most certainly, nowhere in revelation do we read that God deserts many sheep, so that they perish, so that He can show Himself just in punishing them-especially when the objectors say, as we have seen, that God deserts *most* men, in a weakness so extreme that it is metaphysically inconceivable²⁴ that they would not perish!

2) God has revealed to us that He is our Father. Now the glory of any good father, *as a father*, lies in the well-being of his children-never in their ruin. And what kind of glory would a father have who would want to punish forever those who perished out of such weakness that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them to act otherwise! What kind of glory would a father have who would do this not to just a few, but to most of his children! What kind of representation of the perfections of God would result from a world with so many, such atrocious sins in so many men! And who would say that in this way there would be produced the best representation of the perfections of God, so that God by primary preference would want this image rather than the salvation of many men. In the days of Noah, almost all men were wicked. If the distinction between good and bad men depended solely, in the first instance, on the determination of God providing for the good of the universe (for according to these theologians, a man cannot "distinguish himself"²⁵)-how could we explain why God *had* to make so atrocious an image?-For the objectors say, as we have seen, that it was necessary to reprobate for the sake of the order of the universe.

3) St. Paul wrote, speaking of the redemption, that Christ²⁶ "loved *me*, and gave himself for *me*." Now this was not just a special privilege for St. Paul, that Christ died for him as if it were for him alone. For Pius XII authentically interprets this text saying:²⁷ "And actually, our divine Redeemer was nailed to the cross more by love than by the violence of the executioners; and His voluntary holocaust is the supreme gift that He imparted to *each individual man*, according to the terse statement of the Apostle: 'He loved me, and gave Himself up for me.'" Pope John XXIII reaffirmed the same teaching in a radio message given on December 23, 1959:²⁸ "The Son of God was made man, and His redemption looks not just to the collectivity, but also to each individual man. 'He loved me, and gave Himself for me.' Thus spoke St. Paul to the Galatians. And if God has loved man to such a point, it means that

man belongs to Him and that the human person must absolutely be respected."

4) In the same sense, Pius XII had written even earlier:²⁹ "In a natural body, the principle of unity unites the parts in such a way that the individual parts are completely lacking an individual subsistence; on the other hand, in the Mystical Body, the force of mutual union . . . joins the members in such a way to one another that the individual members enjoy completely their own personality. In addition, if we consider the mutual relationship of the whole and the individual members, in any living physical body, all the individual members are destined solely to the good of the whole; while any social association of men whatsoever, if we consider its ultimate end of usefulness, is finally directed to the advancement of all and of *each individual member* since they are persons." We recall that in the Mystical Body there are both elect and reprobate members. Yet, the whole Mystical Body is directed "to the advancement of all and of each individual member." Clearly, the Holy Father left no room for a notion that many men, members of this Body, are deserted for the "beauty" of the whole.

33. Furthermore, even if it were really necessary to manifest justice by punishing, it would not be necessary for God to desert men so as to have some to punish. For even if (as is actually the case, as we shall see later³⁰) God really gives to each individual a rich abundance of grace, and graces that are in every sense truly abundant, so that men can really "distinguish themselves"³¹ in regard to doing or not doing good, and in regard to whether or not they are to be reprobated even then, there still will be many reprobates who will be such solely through their own absolutely free decision.

34. The "necessity" of desertion: It is well to add a few words on the "necessity" of desertion of which the objectors speak. As they themselves readily admit, they are not referring to an *absolute necessity*, but only to a *hypothetical* necessity. That is, they say that God wills to manifest Himself fully, and that to do so fully, He must have creatures to punish, to display vindictive justice: in this hypothesis-not absolutely-they say that desertion before consideration of demerits is necessary.

Actually, even if we suppose that God wills to manifest Himself fully, it does not follow that *all* forms of manifestation are necessary. For, as St. Thomas says:³² "Since the divine goodness is infinite, there is an infinite [variety and number of] ways of participating in it. So, if, from the very fact that He wills His own goodness; He had to will [every different creature] that [could] participate in it, He would have to will an infinite [number and variety] of creatures, participating in His goodness in an infinite [variety] of ways. This is obviously false." So not every form of participation in the divine goodness has to exist: if it did, we would have to say that the very institution of the supernatural

order was necessary, so that God could manifest Himself *directly*. So the older Thomists need to prove not only that the manifestation of vindictive justice is necessary, but they must prove that it must be done by reprobation, and further, by reprobation before consideration of demerits. They surely have not proved this. And even if it were true that reprobates were required, most certainly, as we have seen, it would not follow that God would necessarily have to desert any creature, because without desertion there can be reprobates.

35. Actually, the theologians who hold that opinion about desertion for the good of the universe arrived at their view through defective methods:

1) They try to determine by metaphysical arguments that which God has *freely* decided to do. But, as St. Thomas teaches:³³ "Those things . . . that depend solely on the will of God . . . cannot be known to us except in so far as they are handed down in Sacred Scripture. . . ." God has freely chosen to manifest Himself through communication of good things to men. He could have chosen other means of manifestation. Yet, these theologians try to deduce by metaphysical means the way in which God wills to manifest Himself, and they teach a manner of manifestation which is different-and, in part, contrary-to the way which God has revealed that He has actually chosen. We have already given an answer to these theologians from the teachings of the Magisterium of the Church. Later³⁴ we shall answer them by metaphysical arguments. But even if we could not solve their objections by metaphysics, still, no arguments, metaphysical or other, can stand against the teaching of the Magisterium of the Church.

2) The objectors have also been led to their view by an erroneous interpretation of Romans 8:28-9:24. But this interpretation, as we have seen,³⁵ is now rightly abandoned, as false and lacking in foundation, by all good exegetes of all schools. When the foundation collapses, the superstructure must likewise fall.

36. The teaching of St. Thomas on the purpose of creation: In view of the principle that the Church constantly grows throughout the centuries, in her understanding and penetration of the original deposit of revelation, it is to be expected that, in general, the farther back in time a Father or Doctor of the Church lived, the less of explicit and express clarity of evolution we can expect to find in his works on given points. Yet, because of the really extraordinary lights that St. Thomas received, we find in him, on many points, light so clear and full as others reached only many centuries later. This is the case in the matter of the purpose of creation, for on this point, St. Thomas attained almost the same clarity as the first Vatican council.

First of all, St. Thomas explicitly teaches that God did not create to acquire anything for Himself:³⁶ ". . . it is not proper to the First Agent, who is solely active [and not passive or receptive] to act for the

acquisition of any goal; but He *intends solely to communicate His perfection*.

The Angelic Doctor gives the metaphysical reason why God does not act to acquire anything:³⁷ "God . . . who is the First Agent of all things, does not so act as to acquire anything by His action, but so as to freely give something by His action, because He is not in potency so as to acquire anything, but only in perfect act, from which He can give freely. Created things therefore are not ordered to God as to an end for which something is to be acquired but that by Him they may, in their own way, attain to Him, for He Himself is [their] end."

St. Thomas adds that the act of communicating good to creatures (which is a finite thing) does not move God to act. Rather, the divine goodness itself moves Him:³⁸ ". . . the communication of goodness is not the ultimate purpose, but the divine goodness itself, out of love of which God wishes to communicate it; for He does not act on account of His goodness as if wishing to get what He does not have, but as wishing to communicate what He does have: for He acts not out of seeking a goal [for Himself] but out of love of the goal."

37. Therefore, God acts out of the purest generosity:³⁹ ". . . He does not wish to communicate His goodness to anyone so that He may gain anything thereby, but because to communicate is proper to Him, as to the source of goodness. Now to give, not because of any advantage expected from the giving, but because of the very goodness and fittingness of giving, is an act of generosity, as is evident from [the words of] the philosopher, in Ethics IV. *God, therefore, is generous in the highest degree; and, as Avicenna says, only He can be called generous in the fullest sense; for everyone else who acts acquires some good from his action. . . .*"

Although external glory does not give any advantage to God, yet God does will His eternal glory, for two reasons: 1) Because the very nature of things and objective goodness requires that honor be given to God and 2) Because He wills good to us. Hence St. Thomas says:⁴⁰ ". . . we show reverence and honor to God *not for His sake*, who in Himself is full of glory, to which nothing can be added by a creature, *but for our sake*, namely, because in honoring and revering God, our soul is subjected to Him, and in this consists its perfection." And again:⁴¹ ". . . God seeks His glory not for His own sake, but for our sake." Cajetan, in his commentary on this passage of St. Thomas, says: ". . . the word 'for' is not understood to stand for the final cause: for God wills His glory and everything for Himself as the end of all things that are or could be created. But the 'for' indicates the one who receives the advantage. For *we are the ones for whose advantage God seeks His glory*." Now if God seeks even His own glory for our sake, that is, for our advantage, then, the glory of God and the good of man are bound together. In this sense St. Thomas also said:⁴² "He brought things into existence to communicate His goodness to creatures and to

manifest it through them." So Garrigou-Lagrange is right in concluding:⁴³ "God cannot will His external glory without willing thereby our good, and likewise, we cannot will our true happiness without seeking to glorify God."

Therefore, St. Thomas (even though he does not speak quite so clearly as the first Vatican council) does hold the same as that council, namely, that God wills to manifest Himself through the communication of good to creatures. As we shall see below from other passages,⁴⁴ St. Thomas holds this even as to communication to individuals, so that he implicitly rejects the opinion that God deserts men for the order of the universe.

38. Conclusion: From the first Vatican council and from St. Thomas and his commentators, we conclude that God chose to manifest Himself through communication rather than in some other way. He has bound together His glory and the good of men. So He cannot desert⁴⁵ men to promote His glory, because in this way the glory of God and the good of men would be opposed instead of joined. These conclusions apply also in regard to communication to individuals.

Note on the Teaching of St. Thomas on the Order of the Universe

39. The theologians who hold the desertion theory often say, as we have seen, that the greatest created good is the order of the universe, and add that God deserts many men-in fact, most men-for the good of the universe, so that He can manifest justice.

We have already refuted their theory in the body of this chapter, showing that their theory cannot coexist with Sacred Scripture, nor with the teachings of the Popes, nor with the teaching of the first Vatican council. We also gave a brief reply to their proposals from the teaching of St. Thomas on the purpose of creation.

But it is possible to show in many other ways also that such a desertion theory is not Thomistic. In the appendix of this book, the question will be examined in great detail, and all the principal texts of St. Thomas will be analyzed. Yet, it is worthwhile at this point to present briefly some of the principal considerations from St. Thomas:

1) St. Thomas explicitly rejects the desertion theory inasmuch as he teaches that, in such a way, the universe itself would be *less perfect*.⁴⁶ ". . . in regard to all evils in general, it is true that if [none of them] were permitted to be, the universe would be more imperfect, because there would not exist those natures that are such that they can fail-if these were taken away, the universe would be more imperfect, for not all degrees of goodness would be present . . . there are some evils that are such that if they did not exist, the universe would be more imperfect, namely those evils upon which follow a greater perfection than the perfection that is taken away, such as [is the case with] the corruption of elements which is followed by mixture and the nobler forms of mixed elements. *However there are certain evils such that if*

they did not exist, the universe would be more perfect, namely, those evils by which greater perfections are taken away than are acquired in another, as is chiefly the case in moral faults, which take from one grace and glory, and give to another the good of [seeming better by] comparison, or some characteristic of perfection [such that] even without it, the ultimate perfection could be had; just as one can come to eternal life without the act of patience in persecutions. Wherefore if no man had sinned, the whole human race would be better; because even though directly the salvation of one is occasioned by the fault of another, nevertheless, he could attain salvation without the fault [of the other]. Yet, neither the one nor the other [class of] evils of themselves make for the perfection, of the universe: because they are not causes of perfections, but occasions."

2) Likewise, the Angelic Doctor explicitly contradicts the view that the order of the universe is a greater good than salvation:⁴⁷ "In created things, *nothing* can be greater than the salvation of a rational creature." Even the glory of God is a created thing.

3) Again, St. Thomas denies that reprobates are needed for the order of the universe, because he teaches that many degrees of goodness can be had from the good, and, speaking of the state of innocence of our first parents, he says:⁴⁸ ". . . the cause of difference [of degrees of goodness in the state of innocence] could have come from the side of God-not that He would punish some and reward others but that He would exalt some more, others less, so that the beauty of order would shine the more in men." Now if the order of the universe by its very nature required that there be reprobates, it would have required them also during the time of the state of innocence. But, as we have seen, St. Thomas explicitly says they were not required at that time.

4) If the order of the universe really required reprobates, then there would be a conflict between the universal good and the particular good. But, St. Thomas says this does not exist:⁴⁹ "It is only in particular goods in which 'the corruption of the one is the generation of the other' that the evil of one can be the good for another. Nothing is taken away from the universal good by any particular good. . . ."

5) St. Thomas also says:⁵⁰ "he has no need of wicked man." But if the order of the universe really required reprobates, then wicked men really would be necessary, and God Himself, in order to fulfill this order, would depend not just on man, but on the very sins of men. Now in the moral principles about the indirect voluntary, it is required that the good effect should not be obtained through an evil means: otherwise, in willing the end, one will necessarily will also the evil means without which the end cannot be obtained. Similarly, if God from the very outset, before foreseeing the free decision of a man to commit sin, would will absolutely and unconditionally the glory of manifesting vindictive justice in punishing sin, He would do more than merely permit sin. For this absolute desire of such a glory which could

not be had without the *conditio sine qua non* of sin necessarily, by its very nature, entails the implicit desire that sin be committed. For it is one thing to rejoice over a good effect that flows from an evil effect *after the evil has come about* quite independently of the one who rejoices, and quite another thing to *desire in advance* a good effect which is impossible to have in any other way unless through sin. Even though the sin is only a *conditio sine qua non* and not strictly a means yet the effect cannot be desired *in advance* without having also an implicit desire for that *conditio sine qua non*.

Furthermore, as we shall see later,⁵¹ in the theory of the older Thomists, God actually is the chief author of sin. So there would be no manifestation of justice, but rather of injustice, if God would punish that of which He would be the chief author.

Actually, on the contrary, St. Thomas teaches that:⁵² ". . . *in no way* does God will the evil of moral fault, which deprives [a man] of the proper order towards the divine good." If God wills it *in no way*, He does not even will it indirectly as a condition for the manifestation of vindictive justice. For:⁵³ "The evil of punishment is contrary to the order of one part of the universe to another part . . . but the evil of moral fault is *contrary to the order of the whole universe* towards the ultimate end because a will in which there is the evil of moral fault is thereby directed away from the order [which leads] to the very ultimate end of the universe." Hence, even though Divine Providence can bring good out of evil, yet:⁵⁴ "man . . . should not rejoice over evils because good things are occasioned through them, through the action of Divine Providence; because [those evils] were not the cause of good, but rather *impediments to good*." This helps explain why St. Thomas said, as we saw above, that sins are⁵⁵ "evils such that if they did not exist, the universe would be more perfect" for by them "greater perfections are taken away than are acquired in another" so that without them "the ultimate perfection could be had." But if sins were a necessary prerequisite to the manifestation of justice, they should not be called "impediments," but rather, either means or at least, a *conditio sine qua non*.

6) Actually, St. Thomas explains why there are reprobates, not through the order of the universe, but in another way. He does this in many places, as we shall see later.⁵⁶ For the present, we might read just one passage:⁵⁷ "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition [he does not say: because of the order of the universe], because *they are unwilling* to receive the fruit of the incarnation within themselves. . . . For freedom of will, by which he can adhere or not adhere to the incarnate God, was not to be taken away from man, lest the good of man be forced, and so be rendered meritless and unpraiseworthy."

7) Even if we were to concede-for the sake of argument only-that the order of the universe really required reprobates, we would still add:

a) It still would not be proved that God would reprobate anyone before considering demerits. For, as we have said above, even if (as is actually the case) God gives men a really abundant supply of grace (and not only graces such that it would be metaphysically inconceivable that a man would really do good with them)⁵⁸ there will still be reprobates. For some will still, in full freedom, resist even abundant graces, and so will perish.

b) The order of the universe would not show precisely *which individuals* should be the ones to be reprobated. How then would God pick them out? If He picked them after consideration of demerits, the desertion theory would be shown false. But if He picked them before consideration of demerits, He would have no reason for deserting this man rather than that man, for the order of the universe, as we have said, does not indicate which ones should be deserted. Nor do the desertion theologians suggest what rational basis God could have. Therefore, God would have to act without reason, blindly. In speaking of original sin as a possible motive of negative reprobation, Garrigou-Lagrange said:⁵⁹ "Since original sin is the same in all the predestined and in the reprobate, it cannot be the cause, in the reprobate, for the permission of sins that will not be remitted."

We can argue in precisely the same way about the order of the universe: "Since the order of the universe has the same relation to all individuals, it cannot be the cause, in the reprobate, for the permission of sins that will not be remitted."

Nor could one say that God in His love of good order would provide reasons by His power. For the same difficulty would still remain: How, other than blindly, would He determine for whom to provide reasons or not?

c) If the order of the universe did require reprobates, it would not require a large number. For, according to the desertion theory, the order of the universe must represent the perfections of God. But among these, according to St. Thomas, mercy is the greatest:⁶⁰ "In itself indeed mercy is the greatest. . . . Hence it is said that to have mercy is proper to God; and in this His omnipotence is said to be most greatly manifested. . . ." So, the greatest perfection should have the greatest manifestation: therefore, according to the order of the universe, the majority should be saved. But, St. Thomas thinks the majority are lost.⁶¹ It is obvious, therefore, that the order of the universe cannot be, in the mind of St. Thomas, the cause that determines reprobation.

St. Thomas has also another helpful statement on the divine mercy:⁶² ". . . mercy is most greatly to be attributed to God: however, this is so in regard to the *effect*, not in regard to an *emotion*. . . . Someone is

said to be merciful . . . because he is affected and saddened by the misery of another as if it were his own misery. As a result, it follows that *he works to remove the misery of the other as if it were his own misery*: and this is the *effect of mercy*." Now no one is willing to be miserable so that a more beautiful representation may be had, but rather, he struggles to remove such misery. But, according to St. Thomas, God also works to remove the misery of men as if it were His own misery. Therefore He does not reprobate men for the "beauty" of a monstrous image.

Similarly, St. Thomas also says:⁶³ "The order of the universe seems to require that that which is more noble in things, should exceed the less noble in quantity or number. . . . Therefore it is proper that the more noble . . . be multiplied *as much as possible*." It is plain then, that the very order of the universe requires that the elect be more numerous than the reprobates "as much as possible." So the reason for the reprobation of the majority (for St. Thomas, as we have seen, does believe the majority are reprobated) cannot be found in that same order of the universe.

END NOTES

1 Jb 22:2-3.

2 Acts 17:24-25. Cf. the words of St. Augustine (De Civitate Dei 19.23.5. PL 41.654-655): "'He who sacrifices to the gods and not to the Lord alone shall be uprooted,' not that He needs anything from anyone, but because it is beneficial for us that we be His. For to Him it is chanted in the sacred letters of the Hebrews: 'I said to the Lord: You are my God, for you do not need my good things.'"

3 S. Lyonnet, SJ, "Notes au commentaire du Pere Huby," p. 574: Joseph Huby, SJ, Saint Paul, Epitre aux Romains, Traduction et Commentaire, Verbum Salutis X, Beauchesne, Paris, 1957, note 1 on p. 152.

4 Jn 11:40.

5 Rom 6:4.

6 Rom 3:23. This quote is taken from the Rheims-Douay translation of the Latin Vulgate. The RSV would be: ". . . all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God." Also cf. S. Lyonnet, SJ, De peccato et redemptione, Romae, 1960, II, p. 108.

7 ST I-II 23.c. Cf. § 526.

8 ST II-II 81.7.c.

9 In Eph 1, v. 14, Lib. 1, cap. 1. PL 26.487-88.

10 Of course, they can merit additions.

11 DS 3025 (DB 1805). Cf. the outstanding articles: Philip J. Donnelly, SJ, "St. Thomas and the Ultimate Purpose of Creation" in: Theological Studies II (1941) pp. 53-83: and "The Vatican Council and the End of Creation," *ibid.*, IV (1943) pp. 3-33.

12 Collectio Lacensis VII. 84 (Acta et Decreta Sacrosancti Oecumenici Concilii Vaticani cum permultis aliis documentis ad concilium eiusque historiam spectantibus— auctoribus Presbyteris, SJ, de Domo B.V.M. ad Laoum, Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1892.)

13 *Ibid.*, VI.540.

14 *Ibid.*, VIII.116.

15 *Ibid.*, VI.86 (emphasis mine).

16 DS 3002 (DB 1783). (Emphasis mine).

17 Collectio Lacensis VII.111.

18 Mediator Dei. AAS 39.527 (emphasis mine).

19 In the sense explained in § 7. Cf. footnote 41 on chapter 1 and §§ 51, 118-119, 309-322.

20 We do not deny that external glory can come through the manifestation of vindicative justice after men have sinned. But it is one thing if glory comes and is intended after it is seen that men are going to sin anyway of their own accord (presupposing sins which God in no sense whatsoever intends: cf. ST I 19.9). But it is quite another thing if God intended to desert men precisely so that He could have some to punish, so as to have glory through the manifestation of vindicative justice. For in this second way, God would intend to attain a good end through morally evil means: sins. Now among the moral rules for the double effect (indirect voluntary), it is required that the good effect that is desired must not come through a morally evil means. Otherwise, in desiring the good effect, a person would necessarily desire the sin also, for he who wills the end, wills the means. Nor would the difficulty be removed by saying that God merely permits but does not intend sins. For if He permitted them precisely so that He could have some one to punish, He would necessarily intend the sins themselves (even though indirectly) as means, or at least, as indispensable conditions for the attainment of the end He would desire. For a fuller explanation see §§ 310-322, 527.

21 A further, especially conclusive, proof will be given below in § 55.2.

22 Lk 15:4 and Mt 18:14.

23 Cf. § 51.

24 Cf. below, §§ 309-322.

25 Cf. § 6.8.

26 Gal 2:20.

27 Haurietis aquas. AAS 48.333.

28 Eccoci a Natale. AAS 52.28 (emphasis mine).

29 Mystici Corporis. AAS 35.221-22 (emphasis mine).

30 Cf. § 55.2.

31 Cf. § 6.4.

32 CG 1.81.

33 ST III.1.3.c.

34 Cf. § 39 and §§ 508-535.

35 In chapter 1.

36 ST I.44.4.c.

37 CG 3.18.

38 De potentia 3.15 ad 14.

39 CG 1.93.

40 ST II-II 81.7.c.

41 ST II-II 132.1 ad 1.

42 ST I 47.1.c.

43 Dieu, son existence et sa nature, Beauchesne, Paris 1923, 4th ed. p. 469, § 52B.

44 § 39.

45 Cf. §§ 7 and 51, and note 41 on chapter 1.

46 1 Sent d. 46, q.1, a.3, ad 6.

47 CG 4.55.

48 ST I 96.3 ad 3.

49 CG 1.89.

50 CG 3.162 (citing Sir 15:12).

51 Cf. §§ 310-322.

52 ST I 19.9.c.

53 De potentia 6.1 ad 8.

54 4 Sent d.17, q.2, a.4, q.1, ad 4.

55 Cf. note 46 above.

56 Cf. chapter 14.

57 CG 4.55. Cf. the explanation of this passage, in § 121.

58 Cf. § 7.

59 De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 551.

60 ST II-II 30.4.c. Cf. the opening prayer of the Mass for the 26th week in ordinary time: "O God, who show your omnipotence most greatly by sparing and having mercy. . . ."

61 ST I 23.7 ad 3.

62 ST I 21.3.c.

63 CG 2.92.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 4: The nature of the redemption"

In this chapter we do not propose to give an exhaustive or complete treatment of so large a topic, but merely to investigate those aspects of it that bear on our question.

40. General notion of redemption in Scripture: The Old Testament speaks of God as having redeemed His people inasmuch as He delivered them from the slavery of Egypt. Although that was a temporal slavery, yet, as time went on, it was more and more thought of as a type of the slavery of sin.¹

Now there were two elements in that redemption: (1) They were freed from slavery. (2) They were made the people of God. These two elements are most closely connected, because, in the covenant of Sinai, the people who were freed from Egypt became the "special possession" of God or the "purchased people."²

Therefore,³ "just as in the Old Testament, Israel was redeemed inasmuch as they became the possession of God Himself . . . so also in the New Testament, 'redemption' is identified with the 'remission of sins' . . . inasmuch as it joins man to God." So redemption is not a purely negative concept, but contains a positive aspect as well: man is not only liberated, but is liberated precisely inasmuch as He becomes the possession of God through a covenant. In the Old Testament, man became the possession of God through the covenant of Sinai; in the New Testament, through a new covenant.

As a result of the old covenant, as we can see in numerous texts of the Old Testament, the people of God thought that there existed between themselves and God a relation which was expressed by the Hebrew word *hesed*. In general usage, the word means:⁴ "*the dutiful love and benevolence of men among one another*, by which blood relatives, kinsmen, friends, those bound by pact etc. are prepared to help and please one another. . . ." Hence, because God⁵ "willed to be Father, King, Spouse to His chosen people, and joined Himself with that people in a mutual covenant of fidelity and love . . . *hesed, filial love, fidelity, devotedness* could be shown by [their] deeds . . . and, on the other hand, [there was] the *devotedness, kindness, mercy*, of God towards men (and especially towards the people related to Him) [and] the immense inclination to save and help." For God Himself saw fit to become as it were the Father of the family, in which all were bound to love, devotedness, and mutual help to one another from the very

nature of the family. In this feeling, the Psalmist could say:⁶ "For my father and mother have forsaken me, but the Lord will take me up." Similarly, God was willing to be called the *go'el* or redeemer of His people. For He Himself had said to Moses:⁷ "I am Yahweh, and I will bring you out from the work prison of Egypt . . . and I will redeem you with an outstretched arm. . . ." And similarly in second Isaiah:⁸ "Fear not . . . I will help you, says the Lord; your Redeemer is the Holy One of Israel." Now in the mind of the Hebrews, the *go'el* or redeemer was⁹ "that *next of kin* to whom the Mosaic law gave the right or enjoined the duty of redeeming his kinsmen and protecting them in all their rights." Hence, in the very ceremony of making the covenant, Moses¹⁰ "took the blood and threw it upon the people and said, 'Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord has made with you. . ..'" Now in Hebrew thought¹¹ "the life of the flesh is in the blood." Therefore, the sprinkling of blood signified the *union of life* of the people of Israel with God, who by virtue of the covenant itself became their next of kin and redeemer.

41. The Father bound Himself in the old covenant: Some exegetes have hesitated¹² to say that the old covenant was a *bilateral*¹³ *pact*. Strange to say, quite often the reasons for hesitation seem to have been of an *a priori* nature (which all admit is improper method in Scriptural studies). Thus some simply refuse to admit the possibility of any human cooperation in divine works; others seem to fear that a bilateral agreement would cause God to owe something to His creatures; still others fear this bilateral interpretation would contradict St. Paul.

As to these objections: The position that there can be no human cooperation is a Protestant view, and is not, of course, accepted by any Catholic. The second objection correctly observes that God cannot owe anything to a creature, but fails to notice that if God freely enters into such a pact, He will *owe it to Himself* to keep His pledged word. The result is in practice the same: God is bound. Finally, as to St. Paul, we will examine his thought in detail later on. For the present, we may note that Paul himself clearly considers Sinai as bilateral, for it is that very fact that raises for him a great problem, with which he wrestles in Gal 3:16-18.¹⁴

Some exegetes¹⁵ have also approached the problem by trying to find the literary model of the Sinai covenant in the Hittite vassal treaties. It is, at best, very doubtful if Sinai does follow that form. The studies of D. J. McCarthy, SJ,¹⁶ have shown that it is at least highly probable that it does not. But even if Sinai really should follow the Hittite pattern, we know that in at least some of those treaties, the Great King also took on an obligation, i.e., to maintain the vassal on his throne, on condition of the fidelity of the vassal.¹⁷

But when we turn to the Old Testament itself, it becomes clear that God did bind Himself. . . ." That is: First, the language of Exodus 19:5-6 is quite plain: "Now therefore if you will obey my voice and keep my

covenant, you shall be my own possession among all peoples. . . ." That is: If you do this, I will do that. . . . If you obey . . . you will be my favored people.

This same understanding of Sinai is shown in many places in the Old Testament. For example, in many of the Psalms, the word *hesed* (the word for the covenant bond) is used in parallelism with *sedaqa* (moral righteousness) e.g.,¹⁸ "Keep up your *hesed* toward your friends; your *sedaqa* to the upright of heart." Now since, by parallelism, both halves of the line have the same thought, we see that the sacred writer believes that God's exercise of *hesed* is also an exercise of *sedaqa*, that is, for Him to keep the covenant bond (*hesed*) is a matter of moral righteousness (*sedaqa*). If He did not keep it, He would be acting against moral righteousness. But that means that He has bound Himself.¹⁹ And, of course, His people are bound. So, with both bound, we have a bilateral pact.

Still more striking is the fact that not a few Old Testament passages put God and Israel in parallel positions. Thus, Deuteronomy 26:17-18 asserts-in a literal translation, for the usual published translations seem reluctant to bring out the full force-"You have caused²⁰ Yahweh today to say He will be a God to you . . . and Yahweh has caused you today to say you will be to Him a people, . . . and to keep all his commandments." Hence Psalm 62:12 says flatly: "And you, O Lord, have *hesed*, for you will pay a man according to his work." That is, the reason why God can be said to observe *hesed* is this: He pays a man according to that man's deeds.²¹

Again, several Old Testament writers, especially Hosea, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Isaiah,²² depict the relation between God and His people under the image of a marriage. As Father Stuhlmueller has so well observed (speaking of the words of Hosea):²³ "Marriage is a mutual contract, a two way agreement; what is true for one party, is true for the other. God dares to oblige Himself by such an agreement."

Finally, any possible doubt is removed by the fact that St. Paul himself, writing under divine inspiration, considers Sinai to be bilateral, as we saw above.²⁴

42. Why did God bind Himself?: It is obvious, and needs no proof, that God did not enter into the covenant in order to gain anything for Himself. As the book of Job says:²⁵ "Can a man be profitable to God? . . . Or is it gain to Him if you make your ways blameless?" Deuteronomy 7:7 gives us the basic reason: "It was not because you were more in number than any other people that the Lord set His love upon you and chose you. . . . But it is because the Lord loves you." But we should still ask a further question: Why did God's love choose to use the covenant form? We can surmise at least three reasons:

1) Human beings are rather apt to mistrust God saying: His ways are so far above ours: who can understand Him or know what He will do? Further, Israel came from a milieu in which men openly expressed their

mistrust of the gods.²⁶ So a covenant could obviously serve as a means of reassuring men, by telling them that at least under specified conditions they could be confident of His favor.

2) Even though God wanted to give His favors, that presupposed that men would be properly disposed to receive. The covenant could detail the needed dispositions for receiving.

3) Intense love tends to want to bind itself. Thus men bind themselves by vow to try to insure their perseverance in a course of life that pleases God. God's intense love could not doubt its own perseverance, but men could doubt it, as we have said. Hence God could will to bind Himself so as to reassure men in order to move them to respond to this proof of love. In responding, they become better disposed to receive, and so His love can give the more freely.

Actually, there are two levels on which one can ask why God made a covenant, and why, having made it, He carried out His part in it. (1) On the most basic level, the sole reason why He made and kept the covenant was simply His generous, spontaneous, unmerited and unmeritable love. But, since that love led Him to bind Himself, there was also (2) a superadded reason for His keeping His part in the covenant, namely, the fact that He had bound Himself, and so must keep His pledge.

43. The new covenant: The prophet Jeremiah had foretold that there would be a new covenant. Although his words, considered in their context, seem to refer primarily to the time after the return of the Jews from exile, yet, thanks to Vatican II, we are now certain that they also have in view the covenant to be established by Christ. For, after citing this prophecy, the Council says:²⁷ "Christ established this new covenant, that is, the new testament in His blood, calling together a people from Jews and gentiles, which would grow into unity not according to the flesh, but in the Spirit and would be a new People of God." God Himself had said, speaking through Jeremiah:²⁸ "I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Juda. Not according to the covenant I made with their fathers . . . for they broke my covenant, and I had to show myself their master²⁹ . . . but this is the covenant. . . . I will place my law within them and write it on their hearts: I will be their God, and they will be my people."

We notice that the prophecy says the new covenant will be different. The differences are obvious: the old covenant was broken, while the new will be eternal; the old law was written on stone, but in the new, the law is to be written in hearts.³⁰

But it is also obvious that the new is parallel to the old in the two essential aspects. For both covenants create a People of God; and in both, there is a law as a human condition, though in the new, the law is written in hearts by the Spirit, instead of being written outwardly on stone.

In the cenacle, Christ made this new covenant, as His words³¹ over the cup show:³² "For this is my blood of the new³³ covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins."

The nature³⁴ of this new covenant is especially clear in St. Paul. First, St. Paul tells us that a new people of God is created:³⁵ "We are the temple of the living God; as God said: I will live in them and move among them, and will be their God and they shall be my people." St. Paul further records that this new covenant was established in the cenacle:³⁶ "For I received from the Lord what I also delivered to you, that the Lord Jesus, on the night in when He was betrayed, took bread . . . and also the cup, saying: This cup is the new covenant in my blood."

Secondly, St. Paul brings out the human condition of obedience in the making of the new covenant. Just as the obedience of Israel conditioned the old, so the obedience of Christ established the new covenant, and thereby saved us:³⁷ "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous." And again, St. Paul says that we are³⁸ "justified by His blood, much more shall we be saved by him from the wrath of God."³⁹

St. Paul adds, however, that those who would come under the covenant with Christ must not only be members of Christ, but must be conformed to Him in all things, especially in His obedience. Speaking in the same vein as Jeremiah, Paul tells the Romans that the Spirit of Christ writes in the hearts of Christians the⁴⁰ "law of the spirit," so that they⁴¹ "do not walk according to the flesh." To follow this law is a condition of belonging to Christ:⁴² "anyone who does not have the spirit of Christ, does not belong to him." For only,⁴³ "if by the spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live" Or, in other words:⁴⁴ "Whoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God."

The Epistle to the Hebrews reveals the same two essential elements in specially clear form. First, the new covenant creates a new people of God. This is evidenced from the long passage of 8:6-13 which cites the prophecy of Jeremiah. In v. 10 we note especially: "This is the covenant . . . I will put my laws into their minds and write them on their hearts, and I will be their God and they shall be my people."

Secondly, the same Epistle⁴⁵ makes clear that there is a human condition in the new covenant: obedience. This obedience is basically and first that of Christ:⁴⁶ ". . . when Christ came into the world, He said: 'Sacrifices and offerings thou hast not desired, but a body hast thou prepared for me . . .' Then I said: 'Lo, I have come to do thy will, O God.' In saying before, Sacrifices and offerings . . . thou hast not desired' . . . and then saying: 'Lo, I have come to do thy will, O God,' He annuls the first [covenant] in order to establish the second. It is in this 'will'⁴⁷ that we have been sanctified through the oblation of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."

The requirement of obedience on the part of the members of Christ is brought out several times in Hebrews. It is given in the words of Jeremiah in 8:10: "I will put my laws into their minds and write them on their hearts." And again:⁴⁸ "For you have need of endurance, so that you may do the will of God and receive what is promised."⁴⁹ This obedience is brought into explicit relation with that of Him who⁵⁰ "learned obedience through what He suffered", in the words:⁵¹ "He became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him."

43a. The Father bound Himself in the New Covenant: This follows from our exegesis of the covenants, above. However, if someone should wish to disagree with certain features of that exegesis, it would still remain true that the Father bound Himself. This is clear in several ways:

1) There was certainly at least an implicit understanding or agreement between Christ our Head, and the Father. For Christ often said that He was sent on a mission⁵² by the Father. Now the mere fact that the Father sent Christ on a mission implied an understanding or agreement. If Christ did what the Father asked, the Father would not be free to withhold His own part, the result for which He had sent His Son. It was as if the Father said: "If you do this, I will do that. If you offer yourself, I will give you a treasury of grace for men your brothers." So the Father had bound Himself by at least this implicit agreement, even if not by an explicit covenant.

2) St. Paul teaches that there was a price of redemption.⁵³ The Father called for the payment of that price. Having done so, He could not refuse to grant that redemption for the sake of which He had called for the price. For it would be contrary to Wisdom and righteousness to ask a price of redemption and then to refuse the end for whose sake He had called for the means. The Father would contradict Himself: He owes it to Himself not to contradict Himself.

3) It is the official teaching of the Church⁵⁴ that Christ merited for us. Now the word "merit" in the older official texts is beyond doubt to be understood in the sense of a claim to a reward, for that was the current sense of the word at the time those texts were written. But also, the fact that His merit did produce an objective title which God wills to consider (even though it does not move Him) is constantly taken for granted in many documents of the Magisterium. For example, Pope Pius IX defined that God granted the immaculate conception to Mary⁵⁵ "in view of the merits of Christ." These words make sense only on the supposition that there was an objective title or claim established by the passion. For, in this statement, the passion is not considered merely as a good example, nor as merely a stimulus to love, nor in any other subjective way, but as a thing of great objective worth, which God willed in order to provide a title to grace. Similarly, the graces granted to men before the coming of Christ were given in anticipation of the objective worth of the merits of the passion.

But the existence of this moral order is taught most clearly and explicitly in the Constitution *Indulgentiarum doctrina* of Paul VI:

As we are taught by divine revelation, penalties follow on sins, inflicted by divine justice and holiness. . . . These penalties are imposed by the just and merciful judgment of God to purify souls and to defend the sanctity of the moral order. . . . For every sin entails a disturbance of the universal order, which God established with inexpressible wisdom and infinite love. . . . Therefore, for the full remission and reparation . . . of sin, it is necessary not only that friendship with God be restored by a sincere conversion of heart, and that the offense to His wisdom and goodness be atoned for, but also that all the goods, both personal and social, and those that pertain to the universal order itself, which were diminished or destroyed by sin, should be fully reestablished either through voluntary reparation. . . . Or through endurance of the penalties set by the very just and holy wisdom of God.⁵⁶

4) The redemption is sometimes spoken of in Scripture⁵⁷ as a testament, that is, a last will and testament.

This imagery pictures Christ as leaving an inheritance to us men. In such a framework, men are given an objective title to grace, for, although an inheritance is a gift, yet, the will itself gives to the inheritors a strict title to that gift.

We should add that there are other aspects to the redemption. For our purpose, it is not necessary to treat them in detail. Yet it is good to note the relation of some of them to Christ's obedience. If we think of the redemption as a sacrifice, and recall that a sacrifice is made up of an external sign and the interior dispositions which the sign expresses, then we can see that the great value of His sacrifice came from His loving obedience. The Father took no pleasure in the suffering of Christ as suffering, but as an expression of loving obedience. As He Himself said through Hosea:⁵⁸ "For it is obedience to the covenant that I desire, not sacrifice." So the relation of cenacle and Calvary becomes clear: to make the covenant was to pledge obedience in the sign of a contract; to offer the covenant sacrifice was to manifest and exercise that same obedience in the sign of His death.

Again, if we consider the death of Christ under the aspect of satisfaction,⁵⁹ i.e., the offering to the Father of something He loves more than He dislikes the offense, it is still true that "what pleases the Father is not the pain of Christ as such, but the obedience of Christ that would endure even such pain."

44. The redemption did not move the Father: In the case of the Sinai covenant, we saw that there were two levels on which we could ask why God made the covenant and kept it. On the most basic level, the sole reason was simply the gratuitous unmerited love of the Father for men, to which was joined the secondary, superadded reason for

keeping the covenant: the fact that He had bound Himself and that the condition of obedience was fulfilled.

The situation is fully parallel in the new covenant. Even the obedience of Christ unto death did not move the Father to love men again. He had always loved them. As St. John says:⁶⁰ "For God so loved the world that He gave His only Son." So the Father did not love men again because Christ died; rather, Christ died because the Father had always loved men. So again, the fundamental reason why the Father fulfilled His part in the new covenant, i.e., why He granted grace and forgiveness, was simply His gratuitous, spontaneous love of men, to which was added the obedience of Christ as the reason on the secondary level.⁶¹

This secondary reason stems from the Father's love of objective moral order. In the words of St. Teresa of Jesus, ⁶²"God would never want to do other than give if He found souls to whom He could give." But because of his *sedāqa*, his moral righteousness,⁶³ the Father willed that objective titles or claims be established, as reasons which by their nature make proper, and call for the grant of grace, even though these titles do not really *move* Him to give. St. Thomas explains the two levels very well: ⁶⁴"[God] wills that one thing be for the sake of another thing, but not *because of* the one thing does He will the other thing." So, in this context, God wills that grace be given on account of the merits of Christ, but not because of these merits does He will to give grace, for, according to St. Paul, ⁶⁵"But God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." St. Augustine expressed it well:⁶⁶ "We were reconciled to the one who already loved us." Or as St. Thomas puts it:⁶⁷ ". . . Christ is not said to have reconciled us to God in such a way that God would begin to love us again, for it is written in Jeremiah 31:3: 'I have loved you with an *everlasting* love. . . .'"

45. In the new covenant, the Father bound himself by infinite objective titles: The title or means with which God had bound Himself in the old covenant was a finite one: the obedience of the people of Israel. The favours to which He bound Himself were likewise finite, merely temporal favours. And He bound Himself towards only one people. These limitations disappear under the new covenant: God bound Himself not just in favor of one small people, but for all men, since His Son died for all. He bound Himself to give spiritual rather than temporal favours. And the title by which He bound Himself was not a finite thing, but the infinitely precious meritorious obedience unto death of His only Son, the God-man. Thus the Father bound Himself doubly: inasmuch as He had made a covenant with His Son, and inasmuch as the obedience of that Son, the condition of the covenant, was by its very nature of infinite worth, since every act of an infinite Person has infinite value.

The Father could have employed a finite title even in the new covenant, e.g., the sacrifice of an animal. Or, He could have

established an infinite claim to grace by a less arduous means if He had sent His Son to become man in a palace, and to ascend after a short stay on earth, without ever dying, having redeemed us by reciting one short prayer: "Father, forgive them." Such a prayer, by an infinite Person, would have infinite value.

But the love of the Father was such that as long as there was anything more that could be done, He would not rest content until He had accomplished it. In that attitude, He sent His Son, not to a palace, but to the stable and the cross. And He added also Mary, as the New Eve, the associate of the Redeemer.⁶⁸

46. God bound Himself to the establishment of an infinite treasury: There are two phases to the redemption: the establishment of an infinite treasury, and the dispensation or application of that treasury to men. Of course, we must not think of the establishment of the treasury in a crude sense, as though a physical reservoir were built, into which grace was poured. No, we mean rather that the obedience of Christ was the condition in a covenant or at least implicit agreement, and was by nature of infinite meritorious value, so that it established an infinite objective claim or title to all graces, to be given out at various future times. This treasury is inexhaustible and infinite precisely because it is measured by and in proportion to the infinity of the value of the obedience of Christ.

47. God bound Himself by infinite titles to the dispensation of that treasury: In His love of objective goodness and His love of us, the Father willed that the new pact be constantly renewed,⁶⁹ so that thereby His love might bind itself to the dispensation of all graces, and so that men might be most effectively disposed to receive these fruits by joining in the renewal. Hence the Father did two things:

1) He willed that His Son institute the Mass, the renewal of the new covenant and the covenant sacrifice. In it, the continued attitude of the obedience of Christ is expressed by the apparent separation of body and blood in the double consecration. Thus the same infinite price is presented again, as the covenant condition and objective title for the application of grace to all men. That this is done for all men is clear from the form of offering of the chalice in the Roman rite "for our salvation and that of *the whole world*." So in this way the Father wills to bind Himself to the application of graces, so that He owes it to Himself to offer abundant graces to all men.⁷⁰

2) He willed that men should join in the renewal, so as to participate in the claims of Christ to the great treasury. This participation has two facets:

a) Men become members of Christ, incorporated into Him, and conformed to Him in their loving obedience⁷¹ in doing the will of the Father in their daily lives. Their acts of obedience are all channeled into and brought to focus in the Mass, in which they present their obedience of the time just past, and their pledge of

continued obedience, to join with the obedience of Christ as the condition in the renewal of the new covenant. In His generosity, the Father has promised to reward our obedience with eternal life. Hence St. Augustine says,⁷² "For you deign, 'since your mercy is forever,' to become a debtor by your promises, to those to whom you forgive all debts."

The Father *owes it to Himself*, because of the merits of Christ, to offer to all men the grace to become members of Christ.⁷³ This offer is not owed *to men*. For it is only *after* becoming His members that they can merit. Before that, merit is not possible. (We recall too that it is not men themselves who directly make the covenant with the Father: Christ, our Head, did that. We enter only as His members).

b) The obedience of Christ established a claim or title also in view of its infinite *intrinsic worth* and merit, coming from the infinite dignity of His Person. Men, of course, have no infinite dignity. But yet, the Father's generosity has arranged for them to share in an analogous way with Christ in this respect too. For after becoming, through no merit of theirs, members of Christ, adopted sons of the Father, and sharers in the divine nature, their obedience has a very great, even though not infinite intrinsic dignity. St. Thomas puts it well:⁷⁴ "If we speak of a meritorious work inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, in that way it is condignly meritorious of eternal life. For thus the value of the merit is judged according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us towards eternal life. . . . The value of the work is judged also according to the dignity of grace, by which a man is made a sharer in the divine nature and is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption."

Human merit, then, is simply our participation in these two ways with Christ in the covenant condition. No merit—neither His nor ours—*moves* the Father, for, as we have seen, the Father did not need to be moved to benevolence. On the most fundamental level, His spontaneously generous love is the adequate reason for His grant of grace. On the secondary level, in His love of order and love of us, He willed to have a title or claim provided, the meritorious obedience of Christ, which we imitate analogously and in which we join. On that secondary level, the Father owes it to Himself, not to us, to do His part, to grant a reward, because of His commitment, and because by this grace (for, as we shall see in chapters 7 and 18, our merits are His gift) He makes us apt, fit for further grace or reward.

Obviously, our merit so conceived does not detract from Christ. We merit only inasmuch as we are His members, in the degree of our conformity to Him, and by the grace He gives. We merit only *after* receiving gratuitously the grace of being His members.

Nor need we fear that human merit is ruled out on the ground that infinity (the value of His obedience) does not increase from a finite addition. For the Father is not counting mathematically, nor asking how much *must* He do. Rather, in His supreme generosity, He wants to make all as overflowingly rich as possible. As we have seen, the cross itself goes beyond infinity, in that the incarnation in a palace and redemption by a short prayer would have had infinite value. And actually, all the acts of Christ before His death did have infinite worth.

48. God bound himself to grant graces to each individual man:

As we saw in chapter 3, all these things were done not just for men in a group, but for *each individual as well*. This is clear from the authentic interpretation given by Vatican II of the words of St. Paul to the Galatians:⁷⁵ "The innocent Lamb, by freely shedding His blood for us, merited life for us . . . so that *each one of us* can say with the Apostle: "The Son of God loved me, and gave Himself up for me.'" Pope Pius XII expressed the same thought beautifully:⁷⁶ "And actually, our divine Redeemer was nailed to the cross more by love than by the violence of the executioners: and His voluntary holocaust is the supreme gift that He imparted to *each individual man*, according to the terse statement of the Apostle: 'He loved *me*, and gave Himself up for *me*.'" These statements refer to the first phase, the establishment of the treasury of grace. But, in the Mass, the dispositions of the Heart of Christ are precisely the same as they were on the cross: therefore also in the Mass He intends to present that infinite price to obtain the dispensation of graces to *each individual*. Hence Pope Pius XII also taught, in the same Encyclical:⁷⁷ "There is no doubt that the heavenly Father, 'who spared not even his own Son, but has delivered him for us all' being asked by so great an advocate [Christ] will at all times send down upon all men a rich abundance of divine graces."

We can gather also from the above considerations what is the measure of the graces that God wills for each individual: they are measured by *an infinite objective title for each individual*.

So the care of God is immediate for each individual, according to the explicit teaching of many passages in the Gospels, e.g.,⁷⁸ "but even the hairs of your head are all numbered." And again:⁷⁹ "But if God so clothes the grass of the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, will he not much more clothe you, O men of little faith?" And similarly:⁸⁰ "what man of you having a hundred sheep, if he has lost one of them, does not leave the ninety-nine in the wilderness, and go after the one which is lost, until he finds it? . . . So, it is not the will of my Father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish."⁸¹

We can understand better, then, the reason underlying the triumphant exclamation of St. Paul:⁸² "He who did not spare his own Son, but gave him up for us all, will he not also give us all things with him?"⁸³

We still need to consider two special questions: (1) Can those who lack full membership in the Church and are not present at Mass so as to take part explicitly in the renewal of the covenant still fulfill the covenant condition and come under it? (2) Does the Father owe it to Himself under the covenant to offer the grace of forgiveness to those who have fallen into sin after justification?

In regard to those who do not adhere externally to the Church: They lack one or two requirements for full membership in the Mystical Body, namely, they may lack only external submission and certain beliefs (as do baptized Protestants) or they may lack these and also baptism (as do pagans). Now Vatican II⁸⁴ made clear that baptized Protestants do enjoy a lesser degree of membership in the Church. But it is clear that not only these baptized Protestants, but also unbaptized pagans—provided they are following their conscience—can still fulfill the covenant condition, and can even meet at least the minimum conditions for merit, as laid down by theologians. For they have a certain initial brotherhood with Christ by the mere fact that the Incarnation made Christ the brother of all men. They have His life in them by sanctifying grace, if they are following their own consciences.⁸⁵ If they have sanctifying grace, they have the indwelling of the Spirit, who writes the⁸⁶ "law of the Spirit" in their hearts and moves them. They can fill the requirement laid down by Paul:⁸⁷ "For all who are led by the Spirit of God, are the sons of God." *So, even though they may not realize it, or explicitly intend it, yet, objectively, and by implicit intention, they are joining in the covenant condition in following the law of the Spirit.*

Further, the Mass, objectively speaking, is offered, as the Ordinary itself says, "for our salvation and that of the *whole world*"—including these men. Christ Himself, since His dispositions are the same on the altar as on the cross, still intends to offer His sacrifice as the price for⁸⁸ "each individual *man*"—not just for those who have full membership in the Church. So, though there is a certain deficiency in the lack of external adherence to the Church, and perhaps even of baptism of water yet this deficiency is not voluntary. And the elements that are present, by their very objective nature, and by virtue of the implicit intention of the man himself, amply suffice to make it possible for him to fulfill the covenant condition and to merit. For St. Paul said:⁸⁹ "Any one who does not have the Spirit of Christ, does not belong to him." But these men do have the Spirit of Christ, and follow the law of the Spirit, and, *being led by the Spirit, they are sons, and as sons can be saved.*⁹⁰ Hence they do belong to Christ, not without some deficiency, but in a way that is ample for joining in the covenant and for meriting. St. Paul seems to have had this in mind when he said, speaking of pagans:⁹¹ "When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law unto themselves. They show that what the law requires is written in their hearts." This law is, of course, written by

the Spirit, whom they certainly have since they are in the state of grace. Hence, St. Paul continues immediately: "While their conscience bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them, on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus."

So it is clear that they not only come under the infinite objective titles for the reason that Christ merited and offered Himself for each individual man of them too, but they also join with His obedience in a meritorious way, under the movement of the Spirit, who dwells in them, writes the law of the Spirit in their hearts, and makes them sons. It is good to recall too, that all classes of men receive many graces they themselves have not merited.

Secondly, we must investigate whether the Father owes it to Himself under the covenant to offer the grace of forgiveness to those who have fallen from grace by sin. We find that He does owe it, and for several reasons:

1) He who even before the covenant was Father of all men, even of sinful men, bound Himself in the covenant to act as a Father in *hesed*.⁹² Now it is true that a Father is willing to punish children when that is required. But it also true that a Father, precisely because he is a Father, is disposed to offer forgiveness readily even to sinful children: Christ Himself depicted the Father in this way in the parable of the prodigal. Since, then, God has bound Himself in the covenant to act as a Father, He has bound Himself to offer forgiveness.

2) The basic condition of the covenant is the obedience of Christ. Though men can fail, Christ cannot and does not fail. Therefore, even though the Father does not owe it *to men* to offer forgiveness, yet He does *owe it to Christ*. For Christ did strictly earn even that offer, since He fulfilled the condition for all graces, and since His obedience, being of infinite worth, strictly earned all graces, including the grace of forgiveness. Christ Himself ordered His followers to forgive seventy times seven times, i.e., without limit. He would not order His disciples to do more than He, and the Father, would do—otherwise the disciple would be above the Master.⁹³ Hence St. Paul says that,⁹⁴ "For the gifts of God . . . are irrevocable." He says this in referring to the Jews who had broken the covenant and rejected Christ. Even though they had rejected Him, St. Paul says:⁹⁵ "God has not rejected his people," but rather,⁹⁶ "they also, if they do not persist in their unbelief, will be grafted in" again into the kingdom. So the gifts of God are without repentance in that He who made the beginning also wishes to continue, even though His people are unfaithful. If this was true because of even the old, the broken covenant, much more will God, who has bound Himself in the superior new covenant that is not and cannot be broken, continue the work of love begun in the passion, by offering to each man every grace that the infinite worth of the passion earned for him: which includes the offer of forgiveness.

3) Love can be measured by the obstacles it can surmount. A small love can be stopped by a small obstacle in its course of seeking the welfare and happiness of the loved one. A great love can be stopped only by a great obstacle, and an immense love is stopped by no obstacle whatsoever. We know the size of the obstacle that the love of the Father could and did surmount: the death of the cross for His Son. To offer to a sinner the grace that was earned by that cross is no obstacle at all in comparison to the obstacle of the cross. Therefore the Father most certainly does offer forgiveness to each sinner.⁹⁷

49. Conclusions:

1) Just as in the old covenant, God, out of intense love, willed to bind Himself to grant His favors, so, but much more abundantly, He willed to bind Himself in the new covenant (or implicit agreement). For He established infinite objective titles, valid in justice, not only for the establishment of the treasury of grace and forgiveness, but also for the application of all graces. He did this not only for men in a group, but for each individual. Therefore He owes it to Himself not to reprobate or desert⁹⁸ any man before prevision of that man's resistance to grace and demerits. The resistance must be persistent to outbalance the effects of the rich abundance which God has pledged Himself to offer. So there is *no reprobation before consideration of demerits*.⁹⁹

2) Independently of any covenantal considerations, God has proved in the passion a love for the salvation of each man of such magnitude that it could not be stopped even by the immense difficulty of the passion. Hence it cannot be stopped from completing its work of salvation by any obstacle of lesser magnitude. So there is no reprobation before prevision of persistent resistance to grace.

3) We must note that God made all these arrangements and bound Himself *after original sin* and precisely as a remedy for original sin (as well as for actual personal sins). Therefore, it would be a violation of the covenant (or implicit agreement) to desert anyone because of original sin. And it would be contrary to Wisdom to institute such great remedies precisely for original sin, and yet, after providing the remedy, to make it void by deserting anyone because of original sin.¹⁰⁰

4) According to St. Paul, the redemption is superabundant:¹⁰¹ "For if many died through one man's trespass, much more have the grace of God and the free gift in the grace of that one man Jesus Christ abounded for many." And the Church sings in the canticle of the Paschal candle: "O happy fault!" Now before original sin, God would have deserted no one in such a way that the deserted one would receive only graces such that it would be metaphysically inconceivable¹⁰² for him to be saved. Therefore, after the restoration in a superabundant redemption, God does not desert anyone, leaving him with only graces such that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for him to be saved. For then the redemption would not be superabundant, but very deficient. Nor could the Church sing of the

"happy fault" if many now would be in a worse condition than before and if no one could know for certain whether or not he was one of those to be deserted.

5) It is good to add a speculation. St. Thomas says:¹⁰³ "... it is necessary that in every work of God mercy and truth be found." In the context, St. Thomas takes "truth" to stand for "justice."¹⁰⁴ Now, in giving the treasury of graces into the hands of Christ, God exercised, in one and the same act, both mercy and justice. He exercised mercy inasmuch as mercy and love were the foundation of the whole redemption. He exercised justice inasmuch as He was carrying out that to which He had bound Himself by an infinite price, an infinite objective title. He acts the same way in granting the dispensation of graces, in view of the infinite title of the Mass, and in view of the participation of men in the titles of Christ. In view of the many instances in which God so acts as to exercise simultaneously mercy and justice (we shall see more applications of the principle in chapter 24) it seems likely that God has freely adopted the following principle in all the works He performs outside the divine nature in dealing with men: He wills that all things be carried out in such a way that, as far as possible, rewards be given on the twofold basis of mercy and justice. Thus in His outward works there is an imitation of the fact that within the divine nature itself there is no real distinction¹⁰⁵ of mercy and justice. Only where the free will of man frustrates His generosity will such a fusion be lacking. Now if, as it seems, this is true, then we can conclude again: If the Father deserted anyone before prevision of merits, He would no longer follow this policy which He had established but would instead seek for justice (vindictive justice) without mercy, even though mercy would enter in some small measure, and as it were accidentally, in the diminution of the penalty to a point less than what strict justice would specify.

6) From the fact that justice enters the picture, mercy is not diminished. St. Thomas says well:¹⁰⁶ "... this was a more abundant mercy than if sins were forgiven without satisfaction." For the very fact that God provided such titles in justice, most brilliantly demonstrates how much God loves men in wishing to bind Himself in such tremendous ways to do good to us.

50. Objection 1: From the explanation just given, it seems that predestination itself is owed. But this cannot be true.

Answer: Predestination does not become due *to us*, but the offering of abundant graces becomes due to the merits of Christ. And, if a man does not gravely and persistently resist these graces, he will receive the gift of predestination gratuitously, that is, not because of his merits, nor even after consideration of them, but because the immense love of God has willed from the beginning to save all, and so, since salvation is impossible without predestination, He likewise has willed to predestine all. Actually, this love, in its course, predestines all who do

not gravely and persistently resist. Hence predestination, when given, is given out of merciful love. It will help to consider an analogy from the human family: the son cannot and need not earn the basic love of his father, just as we cannot merit predestination. But the son in the human family can, by resistance to grace and persistent demerits, earn punishment, even to the point of being disinherited and thrown out of his father's house. Similarly, we can merit to be excluded from predestination, even though we cannot merit to be included. The situation will be explained more fully in chapter 17. We shall see that predestination is decreed logically *before* consideration of our merits.

Objection 2: From the explanation just given, it seems that the grace of final perseverance is due and owed. But the Council of Trent calls it a great gift, and implies that we cannot merit this gift. In fact, the council teaches:¹⁰⁷ "If anyone says that he, with absolute and infallible certitude, will surely have that great gift of persevering to the end . . . let him be anathema."

Answer: As we shall see more fully later on,¹⁰⁸ in the *gift* of perseverance there is always included an internal special grace, and at times there is added a special external providence governing the time of death.

The special internal grace is needed in order that a man may *be able* to persevere. Actually, some persevere with this grace, without anything else being added. But, as we shall show later on¹⁰⁹ from revelation, man can resist this internal grace. If by his resistance he falls into sin,¹¹⁰ a special providence governing the time of his death will be needed as part of the gift of perseverance, so that death may not find him in the state of sin.

The offering of the special internal grace is not owed to the man who receives it, but it is owed to the merits of Christ. Therefore, God does offer this to all.

The special providence governing the time of death is granted, as we shall see later,¹¹¹ to all who do not make themselves physically or morally incurable. For the love of God, that is so great as to establish infinite objective titles for each individual, has shown that it sets no limits which it will not pass to save a man (short of the miraculous: for the extraordinary must not become the ordinary). Therefore, if someone is not saved, this happens because the man himself sets limits, in making himself incurable: but God Himself sets no limits.

It is clear that we do not say that a man can merit the gift of perseverance, nor do we say that it is owed to a man. Nor do we contradict the statement of Trent that no one can know with infallible certitude that he "will surely have" that gift. For it is one thing to say that God will *offer* the needed internal grace: another thing to say that a man will *have* it. For if a man resists, he will not have it, even though God offers it. Similarly, God will not grant the special providence governing the time of death if man persistently resists graces in

general. Therefore there is incertitude in two ways-but in both, the cause of the incertitude is in man. On the part of God, all things are certain, inasmuch as God most certainly will offer the requisite special internal grace, and most certainly will specially govern the time of death, unless a man persistently resists. Hence the same council said:¹¹² "...in regard to the gift of perseverance...let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude, although all must place and keep *most firm* hope in the help of God. For God, *unless they themselves fail His grace*, just as He has begun a good work, so He will complete it. . . ." So no uncertainty comes from God's part: otherwise, it would not be true that "all must place and keep most firm hope" in Him. The only source of uncertainty is in the fault of man, for "unless they themselves fail His grace" God will give everything that is needed.

51. Objection 3: But God does not really desert men when He reprobates them negatively before consideration of demerits. He merely permits them to ruin themselves if they wish.

Answer: It is the older Thomists who make this objection. But in their theory, as we have seen above,¹¹³ man cannot really "distinguish himself"-neither in regard to reprobation vs. predestination, nor in regard to whether he will do good or evil at a particular time. For, in their theory, God alone decides these things without any previous consideration of human conditions. For He either sends an efficacious grace (with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable that a man would do other than good, since God physically moves the man's will by it), or a sufficient grace. The sufficient grace (in the sense intended by the Thomists) gives only the ability¹¹⁴ of acting rightly, but it does not give the act itself, for the *application* of the ability is still needed (that is done through efficacious grace). Now man, in their theory, cannot obtain the application, since it is denied if man resists the sufficient grace. But, that he may not resist, the application is needed. (Sometimes the older Thomists say that man has the power of not resisting, or the power of obtaining the application, but in both cases, they mean only that man has the *ability* of not resisting or of obtaining the application-but there is still lacking the *application* of this ability of not resisting or of obtaining the application. And so the process goes on *ad infinitum*).¹¹⁵ For His part, God can deny the application without any fault on the part of man.¹¹⁶ So there is a vicious circle. Further, although the man cannot, by means of sufficient grace, apply himself so as to produce a good act of his will, yet, God physically moves the man's deficient will into action-and the action cannot be a good act or a good decision. And so it must be a sin.¹¹⁷

It is obvious that, in this theory, God does far more than merely permit man to ruin himself. In fact, as we shall see later,¹¹⁸ the things we have just explained imply that in the theory of the older Thomists, God is in the full sense the author of sin.

END NOTES

1 Cf. Jos 24:14; Ez 20:5-9 and S. Lyonnet, S. I., *De peccato et redemptione*, Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, Romae, 1957, 1960, II. p. 36 and 1. 34 ff.

2 Ex 19:5 ff; 1 Pt 2:9.

3 Lyonnet, op. cit., II, p. 43.

4 F. Zorell, SJ, *Lexicon Hebraicum et Aramaicum Veteris Testamenti*, Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, Romae, 1961. D. 255 s.v. *hesed* (italics his). Cf. J. Guillet, *Themes Bibliques*, Aubier, Paris 1954, pp. 43-46.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 256 (italics his).

6 Ps 26:10.

7 Ex 6:6. (my translation).

8 Is 41:14.

9 Zorell, op. cit., p. 136, s.v. *go'el* (part of original italics omitted here).

10 Ex 24:8.

11 Lv17:11.

12 E.g., L. Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans le theologie de Saint Paul* (2 ed., Paris, 1954) p. 110: "The initiative of the reconciliation comes from God (through Christ) and just as there is not a true alliance between God and man, but rather, the covenant is understood of a generous arrangement on the part of God, accepting man into His friendship, so also, in the reconciliation, God alone acts. . . ."; J. Bonsirven, SJ, *Theology of the New Testament* (tr. by S. F. Tye, Westminster, 1963) p. 280: "The essence of the covenant, unilateral rather than bilateral, was the promises God made. . . . We cannot say that blood played any part in it. This is truer still of the new covenant. . . ." J. Giblet, "God's Covenant with Men" in: *The God of Israel, the God of Christians* (tr. by Kathryn Sullivan, RSCJ., Deus Books, 1966) p. 27: "Of course, this Covenant was essentially a favour and is, in no sense a bilateral contract. . . ."; Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology* (tr. by D. M. G. Stalker, NY, 1962) I, p. 131: ". . . the text [of J] clearly understands the covenant . . . as a unilateral protective relationship. In the Elohist's picture in Ex xxiv. 3-8 . . . the human partner is . . . called on to make a decision and only as he declares himself ready to play his part is the covenant made." Cf. also H. B. Huffmon, "The Exodus, Sinai and the Credo" in *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 27 (1965) pp. 101-13. An excellent survey of the various views can be found in: D. J. McCarthy, SJ, "Covenant in the Old Testament: The Present State Of Inquiry" in *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 27 (1965) pp. 217-240. (Father McCarthy himself rejects the unilateral view).

13 Cf. e.g., Walther Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament* (tr. by J. A. Baker, Philadelphia, 1961) I, p. 37: ". . . the use of the covenant concept in secular life argues that the religious berit too was always regarded as a bilateral relationship, for even though the burden is most unequally distributed . . . this makes no difference to the fact that the relationship is still essentially two-sided. The idea that in ancient Israel the berit was always and only thought of as Yahweh's pledging of himself to which human effort was required to make no kind of response (Kraetzschmar), can therefore be proved to be erroneous." Bruce Vawter, CM, "Our God is the God of History" in *Worship* (April, 1958) p. 289: "For Amos a covenant by its very nature consists in *rahamim*, a term which means the spontaneous dedicated love that a mother feels for her child. The other prophets join to this the virtue of *hesed*, the dutiful love which results from a common bond and which conveys mutual obligations. From these two fonts have sprung the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians and the Last Supper discourse of John's Gospel."

14 St. Paul feels this problem: God had promised favor to Abraham and his seed without requiring any condition; later, at Sinai, He seemed to promise the same favor but only on condition of human obedience to the law. Did the Sinai requirement of obedience mean that God would no longer honour His previous unilateral unconditioned promise? If Sinai were simply a unilateral promise, plus a demand for obedience made independently of that promise, there would be no problem: the law

would be merely an exercise of God's sovereignty made independently of the promise-and so not conflicting with it. It is precisely because Paul feels that God made a promise conditioned by human obedience that there is a problem: Sinai to him is a bilateral pact. Paul's solution is in v. 21. On it, Cf. W. Most "A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework" in: Catholic Biblical Quarterly 29 (1967) pp. 1-19 esp. pp. 67 and note 25.

15 Cf. G. E. Mendenhall. "Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near East" in: Biblical Archeologist 17 (1945) pp. 26-46, 49-76; K. Baltzer, Das Bundesformular in: Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament 4 (Neukirchen, 1960); W. Moran, SI, "De foederis Mosaici traditione" in: Verbum Domini 40 (1962) pp. 3-17.

16 D. J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant (Rome, 1963). Cf. esp. p. 172: ". . . the great, original covenant of Sinai . . . does not show the covenant form." We might add too that even if Sinai had much stronger resemblance than it does to the Hittite pattern, we should still say with McCarthy (p. 58): ". . . it should be an axiom of form study that similar situations call forth similar responses, and thus formal similarity hardly proves a casual nexus between similar manifestations in different cultures."

17 Cf. e.g., the words of the treaty of the Hittite King Mursilis (1334-06) with Duppi-Tessub of Amurru (in: J. B. Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, Princeton 1955, p. 204): "So honour the oath (of loyalty) to the king and the king's kin! And I, the king, will be loyal toward you, Duppi-Tessub."

18 Ps 35:11. Cf. also Ps 142:11-12; 32:5; 39:11. In Ps 142, 1 we find *sedaqa* in parallelism with *emuna* (fidelity to the covenant). Cf. also parallelisms of *hesed* with *mishpat* (morally right judgment) in: Ps 32:4-5; 35:6-7; 88:15; 118, 149.

19 It is true that *hesed* is sometimes used in the sense of mere mercy, and *sedaqa* can, in later times, also be used loosely. However, these loose senses cannot be present in at least many of the passages cited since there is a condition required for *hesed*. Thus, Ps 24:10 says: "All the ways of the Lord are *hesed* and *emet* (fidelity) towards those who keep His covenant and His decrees." Now if a condition is required for *hesed*, then it cannot be mere mercy in the exact sense of that word, for mercy as such is gratuitous and so does not call for a condition: but here it is a requirement that the human partner keep the covenant. Further, the fact that *hesed* is coupled with *emet* shows that *hesed* is not a matter of mere mercy, for this exercise of *hesed* is a matter of *emet*, fidelity-that is, fidelity to the covenant. But fidelity to the covenant is not mere gratuitous mercy, it is the execution of a pledge. Similarly Ps 102:17-18 says: "The *hesed* of Yahweh is from eternity to eternity toward those who fear Him; and His *sedaqa* toward children's children among those who keep His covenant and remember to fulfil His precepts."-again, a condition is required, for the carrying out of *hesed-sedaqa* by Yahweh is not promised to all, but "toward those who fear Him" and "among those who keep His covenant." Similar conditions are found in verses cited above: Ps 35:11 and 142:11-12.-Our interpretation is confirmed by several other reasons, given in the paragraphs that follow immediately.

20 The *hiphil* form of the verb is used. The translation of this verse is my own.

21 My own translation. Cf. also Exodus 24:8: "Behold the blood of the covenant which Yahweh has cut with you." We note it does not say "for you," but "with you." See also Dt 7:12: "As your reward for heeding these decrees and observing them carefully, Yahweh your God will keep for you the covenant and the *hesed* which He promised. . . ."

22 Cf. Hos 2:18-22; Jer 2:2; 3:1; Ez 16:1; Is 50:1; 54:5; 62:5.

23 Carrol Stuhlmueller, CP, The Prophets and the Word of God, Notre Dame, 1964, p. 103.

24 Cf. note 14 above and Gal 3:16-21.

25 Jb 22:2-3.

26 Cf. e.g., a Mesopotamian hymn: "What is in Enlil's holy mind? What has he planned against me in his holy mind? A net he spread: that is the net of an enemy. A

snare he set: that is the snare of an enemy." Cited from: Thorkild Jacobsen "Mesopotamia" in: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (Chicago, 1946) p. 144.
27 Constitution on the Church 2, 9.

28 Jer 31:31-33. Since only Judah, and not also Israel, returned from captivity, we have a probable indication that the prophecy refers to another time than that of the return from exile.

29 Translations of this last clause vary. This is the CCD translation, which brings out well the fact that the violation of the covenant called for God to act not as a kinsman, in hesed, but as a master.

30 W. D. Davies in "Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come," in: Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series (Philadelphia, 1952) VII, pp. 21-28 argues convincingly to show that the interior nature of the new law does not preclude the possibility that that same law could also be written.

31 Christ made clear His acceptance of the Father's will, His obedience to the covenant condition, not by signing a document nor by express words, but by the dramatized form of putting body in one place (appearance of bread) and blood in another place (appearance of wine), thus signifying death. It was as if He said: Father, I know what command you have laid upon me, to die tomorrow. Here is my body, my blood. I accept.

32 Mt 26:28.

33 The word "new" seems absent in the better manuscripts of Mt, as also in Mk 14:24, but it is present in Lk 22:20 and 1 Cor 11:25.

34 In the old covenant, God had promised to act as though He were the next of kin and the redeemer, united in life with His people through the sprinkling of the blood of the covenant. In the new covenant, all these things come most fully true. For by the incarnation, God in the most literal sense became the blood kinsman not only of the Hebrew people, but of each and every man, inasmuch as Christ, His true Son, is truly our brother. Again, in the fullest sense, Christ became the go'el, the redeemer for all, in a covenant sealed not with the blood of animals, but with His own most precious blood.

35 2 Cor 6:16. Cf. Rom 11:13-22 and 9:25-26 and also 1 Pt 2:9 and Ap 5:9-10. The latter two passages clearly allude to Ex 19:5-6.

36 1 Cor 11:23-25. Cf. W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (London, 1962) pp. 250-53, esp. 253 "It is not then as sacrificial and expiatory but as covenantal that Paul chiefly thinks of the Death of Jesus in the context of the Last Supper, although of course everything covenantal had a sacrificial basis."

37 Rom 5:19. Cf. Vatican II, Constitution on the Church 1, 3: "By His obedience He brought about redemption." As to the word "many," it is a Hebrew usage meaning "the all, who are many." On this, cf. Vatican II, On the Missions §3: "He gave His life as a ransom for the many-that is, for all."

38 Rom 5:9. Cf. Rom 3:25 and Eph 1:7; 2, 13; Col 1:14, 20 and also Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, pp. 265-66: ". . . the death of the Messiah could only have one meaning for him [Paul], it would be the expression of obedience to the demands of God. . . . Paul's emphasis on the category of obedience as the clue to the Death of Jesus is essentially Rabbinic."

39 Since Paul says that we are saved by the price of redemption (1 Cor 6:20) and says also (Rom 5:19) that we are saved by obedience, it is evident that the price of redemption is Christ's obedience even to shedding His blood. Cf. again Vatican II, On the Church 1, 3 (cited above in note 37) and the citation from Davies given in note 38.

40 Rom 8:2.

41 Rom 8:1.

42 Rom 8:9. Cf. also Paul VI, general audience of October 5 1966, as reported in Catholic Messenger of Davenport, Oct. 13 1966, p. 10: ". . . obedience is first of all a penetration and acceptance of the mystery of Christ, who won our salvation by

means of obedience. It is a continuation and imitation of this fundamental act of His: His acceptance of the will of the Father. It is an understanding of the principle which dominates the entire plan of incarnation and redemption. Obedience thus becomes assimilation into Christ, who is the divine Obedient One."

43 Rom 8:13.

44 Rom 8:14. It is good to note that in Rom 6:16-18, St. Paul does not hesitate to use the imagery of slavery, in spite of his splendid use of the imagery of sonship. In Col 3:23-24 he glides back and forth easily between both types of imagery. Actually, each type of image brings out a different aspect, the one, the warmth of divine love, the other, the rights of divine majesty. We note too that one series of Pauline texts stresses the gratuity of the divine gift (chiefly the texts on sonship, and also Rom. 3:28; 6:23). The texts on obedience which we have cited, imply a sort of earning (cf. also Rom 8:17; 3:31; 2:13-14 and 1 Cor 7:19 and 2 Tm 4:8). There is no contradiction, for each series brings out a different aspect; the one, the fact that on the fundamental level, all is due to the gratuitous unmerited love of God, but the other series brings out that on a secondary level, God has bound Himself, so that man can merit (after receiving gratuitously the first grace, on which all merit depends).

45 Some scholars used to commonly object (especially in view of Hebrews 9:15-17) that *diatheke* (the Greek word used in Scripture for covenant) in secular usage means last will and testament, not covenant. However, as early as the 1920s, exegetes began to give up this forcing Scriptural usage into the form of secular usage. L. G. DaFonseca concluded an exhaustive philological study in *Biblica* ("Diatheke-Foedus an Testamentum" in *Biblica* 9 [1928] p. 158) with this result: "The New Testament authors conceived the old covenant as the old sacred writers did: A pact between God and men, instituted by God alone as its author, but in itself bilateral. . . . They conceive the new covenant in an entirely parallel manner." He found no instance at all in the Septuagint where *diatheke* meant last will. The entry under the word *diatheke* in G. Kittel, *Theologisches Worterbuch zum NT* (II, p. 137) agrees: "The NT owes to the OT the form and content of the concept of *diatheke*. The difference between OT and NT is the step from prophecy to fulfillment." Moulton-Milligan, *Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament* (London, 1957, p. 148) says: "We may fairly put aside the idea that in LXX 'testament' is the invariable meaning: it takes some courage to find it there at all." Various commentators agree. e.g., the article on covenant in A. Vanden Born *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Bible* (N.Y., 1963, tr. and adapted by L.F. Hartman, C.S.S.R.) says: "Throughout, the sacred writers of the NT appear to have kept the OT concepts; a contrary opinion is held by some who conclude that the NT writers misunderstood the OT, and intentionally or unintentionally transformed *diatheke*-covenant' into *diatheke*-testament.' But such a thing is hardly likely for writers who were born Jews. . . . It can hardly be doubted that Paul understands *diatheke* in the OT sense. . . . Only in Gal 3, 15 ff is *diatheke* used in the Hellenistic sense of testament . . . the writers [of Hebrews] understood *diatheke* in the OT sense." G. E. Mendenhall, in *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (NY, 1962, p. 723) writes, speaking of the word in Hebrews: "There is an incidental argument drawn from the Greek usage of *diatheke* to refer to a 'last will and, testament.' There can be no doubt, however, that this is simply an apologetical argument, and cannot be taken seriously as the framework of the author's concept of the covenant, which is entirely within the OT pattern of thought."

S. Lyonnet, SJ, in *Quaestiones in Epistulam ad Romanos* (Roma 1962, ed. 2, I, pp. 89-101) has shown that the old notion of covenant was well known at the time of the New Testament. Paul had to fight against a distortion of that covenant idea which however, was objectionable only in that it attributed to man's unaided power the ability to merit justification. Paul himself as we saw above (cf. note 14) clearly understood the old covenant as bilateral. We saw too that Paul has all the essential elements of the bilateral covenant in his own teaching. The Qumran community surely had the old idea of covenant, which permeates all their writings. Cf. e.g.,

Hymn 5:5-19 (T. H. Gaster, *The Dead Sea Scriptures*, N.Y., 1964, p. 153): ". . . to them that seek after that truth, Thou bindest Thyself in pledge." And the Zadokite document (Gaster, p. 75) speaks of "the covenant which God made with those ancients to forgive their iniquities." (The thought that God had even bound Himself to forgive probably reflects such passages as Mi 7:9 and Ps 50:16. Cf. also § 48 in this chapter. We should add too that not all Scriptural usage of words corresponds to the secular use, cf. e.g., *ilaskesthai* in the study by Lyonnet, *De peccato et redemptione* (Romae, 1960) II, pp. 67-117. Finally, even in secular works, the Scriptural usage of *diatheke* is not completely unknown: Aristophanes, *Birds*, 439. In addition, the Epistle to the Hebrews (as well as certain other NT writings, especially Mt [e.g., 2:15, 20] and Jn [e.g., 1:17] and Acts 3:22) presents Christ as the New Moses, thereby bringing the new covenant into parallel with the old. Cf. the note of the Bible de Jerusalem on Dt 18, 18: "On the basis of this text of Dt. the Jews expected the Messia as a new Moses." Cf. also W.D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, p. 144 and cap. 7- 9, and H. M. Teeple, "The Mosaic Eschatological Prophet" in: *Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series* (Philadelphia, 1957) vol. X.

46 Heb 10:5-10.

47 Thus even though Hebrews speaks more of sacrifice than of covenant, it recognizes obedience as the heart of sacrifice. The same idea appears in a Rabbinic commentary (Sifre on Numbers 28:8). In speaking of the requirement of offering a second lamb at evening "as a sweet-smelling oblation to the Lord" the commentary says: "This is said to teach you that it makes no difference to God whether one offers much or little. For precisely as it says 'a sweet-smelling oblation' in regard to the offering of an ox, so does it also in regard to the offering of a sheep or a goat and so also in regard to the offering of a bird. It is said to teach you that in His sight eating and drinking are nothing, but much more . . . because He has said [commanded] it, and now, in the presentation of the offering, His will is done." This is clearly an echo of 1 Sm 15:22: "Obedience is better than sacrifices." cf. Hos 6:6: "For hesed is my pleasure, and not sacrifice." That is, what counts is obedience to the covenant.

48 Heb 10:36.

49 Note that the promise is a conditioned promise, conditioned by "doing the will of God." Hebrews also brings out the bilaterality in its repeated assertions (7:22-8, 6-9, 15-12, 24) that Christ is the "mediator" or "surety" of a new covenant. In the framework of a last will concept, there is neither need nor place for a mediator. But in the framework of a bilateral covenant, parallel to that of Sinai, in which Moses was the mediator, there is place for the New Moses (cf. note 45 above), Christ. As Paul says, "there is no intermediary where there is only one" party (Gal 3:20). But a bilateral agreement has room for an intermediary.

50 Heb 5:8.

51 Heb 5:9.

52 E.g., Jn 3:17.

53 1 Cor 6:20; 7:23; 1 Pt 1:18-19; Ap 5:9-10.

54 Cf. DS 1529, 3370 (DB 799, 1978a). On the sense of the word "merit," cf. DS 388 (DB 191); "Debetur merces bonis operibus. . . ." and DS 1545 (DB 809). Cf. also J. Lecuyer, CSSP, "La Causalite efficiente des mysteres du Christ selon Saint Thomas," in *Doctor Communis* 1953, 118: "Finally, one can speak of merit as a right to a reward, but it must be well understood: in reality, everything comes gratuitously from God, and merit exists only because God has ordained our acts to receive a reward: if God gives to us the grace and glory that we merit, it is not that He owes us anything, but simply that He owes it to Himself to fill with gifts him who puts no obstacles to them, and who corresponds freely to the divine ordination." Cf. also ST I-II 114.1 ad 3 and *ibid.* a. 3 ad 2, and M. Flick SJ, & Z. Alszeghy, SJ, *Il vangelo della grazia*, Gregorian University, Rome, 1964, pp. 638-39.

55 Pius IX, *Ineffabilis Deus*, Dec. 8 1854 (we note that the expression "in view of" does not fit well with a merely dispositive cause). Of course, inasmuch as the

Immaculate Conception is extraordinary, the Father did not bind Himself to grant it, even though it was actually granted in view of the merits of Christ. Strictly speaking, only the mode (preventive redemption) is extraordinary. The offer of the substance (redemption) is owed to the merits of Christ. It [redemption in general] is to be offered to all.

56 *Indulgentiarum doctrina*, Jan. 9, 1967. AAS 59, 6-7. Again, it is only in referring to objective titles that we can speak of the "treasury of the Church." Cf. DS 1025-27 (DB 550-52), and Col 1:24: ". . . what is wanting of the sufferings of Christ I fill up in my flesh for his body, which is the Church." Now Paul does this not only for those who would see or hear of him, but for the whole church-so, he at least seems to refer to objective titles (on the part of a member of Christ) rather than to the mere force of his preaching or example as a dispositive cause.

57 In Heb 9:15, 17 and Gal 3:15. Cf. note 45 above.

58 Hos 6:6, my translation. For a still more literal rendering of the Hebrew, with the same sense, cf. the end of note 47 above.

59 Cf. ST III 48.2.c.

60 Jn 3:16.

61 Many theologians hold that Mary cooperated immediately in the objective redemption, in the very payment of the price of redemption (i.e., shared in generating objective titles by her obedience). The bibliography is immense. Cf. J. B. Carol, OFM, *De corredemptone Beatae Virginis Mariae*, Civitas Vaticana, 1950; *Estudios Marianos XIX*, Madrid, 1958; and W. Most "The Problem of Causality in the Coredemption" in: *Ephemerides Mariologicae* 13 (1963) pp. 61-76. See also below, § 55.

62 *Conceptions of the Love of God*, 6.

63 Most, *The Thought of St. Paul*, Christendom Press, Front Royal, VA, 1994, pp. 289-301.

64 ST I 19.5.c.

65 Rom 5:8.

66 *Tractatus in Ioannem* 17. 24: Tract. 110.N.6.

67 ST III 49.4 ad 2. Cf. I-II 113.2.c.

68 Cf. note 61 above, and §§ 55 in Chapter 5.

69 Cf. Vatican II, *On the Liturgy* § 10.

70 We say "offer" because God, wishing to respect the liberty He has created, wills that the actual grant of grace be conditioned by free human dispositions (cf. §§ 118-120). We do not, of course, mean that man can, by his own power, dispose himself for grace: without grace man cannot accept grace, as we shall see in chapter 17. However, man can impede or not impede the reception of grace (cf. § 82 and, §§ 77-115, 129-144, 214-242, 284-292, 346-349). However, God does offer grace immediately (as opposed to mediately) to each man (cf. §§ 48-49). Although man cannot merit the first grace, yet its offer is owed in view of the merits of Christ. The reason man cannot merit the first grace is that he can merit only after becoming a member of Christ: that first grace (habitual grace) makes him a member (if other conditions are also fulfilled).

71 As we shall see in chapter 7, St. Paul makes faith the condition for receiving grace. However, as we shall also see in chapter 7 (cf. also Vatican II, *On Divine Revelation* § 5: "'The obedience of faith' . . . an obedience by which man entrusts his whole self freely to God. . . .") Pauline faith means the adherence of the whole man (including intellect and will) to God. This total adherence will produce different effects in different situations. When God speaks a truth to us, we adhere by intellectual assent; when He makes a promise, we adhere by confidence; when He gives a command or law (as in the covenant) we adhere by obedience. This obedience is not, of course, meritorious before we become members of Christ, but only after we gratuitously receive that grace.

72 *Confessions* 5.9.17. PL 32.714. Cf. 1 Jn 1:9 and note 19 above.

73 Cf. §§ 68-69.
74 ST I-II 114.3.c.
75 The Church in the Modern World, P. 1, c. § 22: citing Gal 2:20. (italics added).
76 Haurietis aquas. AAS 48. 333. Cf. the similar words of Pope John XXIII, note 28 of chapter 3 above (italics added).
77 AAS 48.337
78 Mt 10:30.
79 Mt 6:30-31.
80 Lk 15:4 and Mt 18:14.
81 Cf. §32 above. In centuries past, some theologians, e.g. Bañez, Alvarez, Gonet, John of St. Thomas, etc., had taught that God offered the grace of faith only remotely in that He provided general means, sufficient in themselves, but that He did not give immediately the means of salvation to all. But today, even theologians of the same school as those mentioned teach the immediate care of God, as E. Hugon, OP, notes well (Tractatus Dogmatici, ed. 8, Lethielleux, Paris, 1931, II, p. 228. De gratia q. 5, a. 3): "To all infidels, even negative infidels, there are given [and not merely remotely offered] graces that are proximately or remotely sufficient, for the time and place. Although once many theologians taught otherwise, this conclusion is today practically general."
82 Rom 8:32.
83 The Vulgate and the Douay have the past tense (donavit: hath . . . given). But the future is found in the Greek: "How will not give us all things together with Him?"
84 On Ecumenism §§ 3 and 22; On the Church I. 7; 2. 13-16;
85 Cf. note 5 in Appendix II below, and §§ 535a-542.
86 Rom 8:2
87 Rom 8:14. We gather that unbaptized pagans, who live according to their consciences are also members of the Church though in a lesser degree than unbaptized Protestants. Cf. Vatican II, On the Church 7.49: "For all who belong to Christ (Christi sunt), having His Spirit, form one Church. . . ." John Paul II, in Redemptoris Missio, § 10 said: "Since salvation is offered to all, it must be made concretely available to all . . . many do not have an opportunity to come to know or accept the Gospel or to enter the Church. . . . For such people salvation in Christ is accessible by virtue of a grace which, while having a mysterious relationship to the Church, does not make them formally members of the Church." The word "formally" implies that some lesser kind or membership, we might call it substantial, can suffice.
88 Cf. note 76 above.
89 Rom 8:9.
90 Cf. note 85 above.
91 Rom 2:14-16. Cf. note 87 above.
92 Cf. § 40-41 above.
93 Cf. Mt 10:24-25.
94 Rom 11:29. Note the relation of forgiveness to the covenant in Rom 11:27.
95 Rom 11:2.
96 Rom 11:23.
97 Cf. 1 Jn 1:9 and Ez 33:11. It is probable that 1 Jn 1:9 refers to the covenant and means that God has pledged under the covenant to offer forgiveness. Cf. also Rom 11:27; Mi 7:9, Ps 50:16 and the Zadokite Document (cited from Gaster, The Dead Sea Scriptures, p. 75): ". . . the covenant which God made with those ancients to forgive their iniquities."
98 Cf. § 51.
99 Cf. § 269. On the order of the universe, cf. §§ 32-35, 39, 508-535.
100 Cf. § 62.
101 Rom 5:15. Cf. note 37 above.
102 Cf. §§ 6-7.
103 ST I 21.4.c.

104 St. Thomas had cited Ps 24:10: "All the paths of the Lord are kindness and constancy." For "kindness" the Hebrew has *emet*, which means "fidelity" (to His covenant pledge) and not "justice" in the Greek and Roman sense, as St. Thomas seems to have thought. For "kindness" the Hebrew has *hesed* (Cf. §§ 40-41). However, since this verse, taken in its context, teaches that God is faithful to the covenant which He has pledged, and because, as we have seen in this chapter, God wanted to bind Himself by the covenant with objective titles-in fact, with infinite titles in the new covenant-therefore the point that St. Thomas wanted to make happens to be true in itself, and its substance is implied or presupposed in the verse he cited, even though not in the way in which St. Thomas thought it was there. For the fundamental reason for God's gift is mercy, yet, by the covenant, He has bound Himself, so that He exercises moral righteousness (*sedaqa*: cf. § 41) in granting things under the covenant.

105 We do not deny all distinction but only a real distinction, following the words of St. Thomas (1 Sent. d. 22, q. 1, a. 3 ad 4): "All those things are said about God and creatures not equivocally, but according to the pattern of analogy. Hence, since in a creature, the characteristic of wisdom is not the characteristic of goodness, it is necessary that the same thing be true in God. But there is this difference, that in God they [goodness and wisdom etc.] are the same in reality, but in creatures they differ in reality and not [only] in a rational distinction."

106 ST III 46.1 ad 3.

107 DS 1566 (DB 826).

108 Cf. § 151.

109 §§151, 153.3.

110 God could send an infrustrable grace that would forestall or cancel out all resistance. But such graces are by nature extraordinary, as we shall see in § 120. Cf. also § 153.3 and note 28 on chapter 8.

111 § 153.2.

112 DS 1541 (DB 806).

113 Cf. §§ 6-7, esp. § 6.8.

114 Cf. §§ 6, 3-5 and 310-322.

115 Cf. § 6.5. a. 1.

116 Cf. § 6.5. b and § 130.

117 Cf. § 6.6.

118 Cf. §§ 309-322.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 5: The universal salvific will"

52. Only implicitly revealed in the Old Testament: Because the doctrine of salvation in the future life does not appear clearly and explicitly in the Old Testament before about the middle of the second century BC, we cannot expect to find any clear teaching in the earlier parts of the Old Testament on the universal salvific will.

However, the universal salvific will is implied with varying clarity in some texts. In calling Abraham, God said:¹ "By you all the families of the earth shall bless themselves." St. Paul interprets this text as follows:² "And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham, saying 'In you shall all the nations be blessed.'" Therefore, the call of all nations to salvation was already announced to Abraham. The same thought appears in many other passages, e.g., the Lord said to the

"Servant of Jahweh" through Isaiah,³ "I am the Lord, I have called you . . . and given you as a covenant to the people, a light to the nations. . . . And again:⁴ "I will give you as a light to the nations, that my salvation may reach to the end of the earth."

Similarly, the doctrine of the universal mercy of God can contain an implication:⁵ "The Lord is good to all, and his compassion is over all that he has made." And again:⁶ "The compassion of man is for his neighbor, but the compassion of the Lord is for all living beings."

The mercy of God was given even to wicked nations. The book of Wisdom admires the fact that God did not at once destroy those who inhabited the Holy Land before the coming of the Hebrews:⁷ "Thou sparest all things, for they are thine O Lord, who lovest the living. Therefore thou dost correct little by little those who trespass." Even to Edom often considered as a classic type of reprobation, God said:⁸ "Leave your fatherless children, I will keep them alive, and let your widows trust in me." But in the book of Jonah, the sacred writer teaches that God loves and cares for even the Assyrians who, in the minds of the Jews, were the worst of all men. For God sent, or rather, forced the prophet to go to them. After God had miraculously caused a large plant to grow, and then had caused it to wither, Jonah was angry and concerned over the plant. God then taught him saying:⁹ "You pity the plant for which you did not labor nor did you make it grow. . . . And should not I pity Niniveh, that great city, in which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons. . . ." The implication is obvious: if God loves and cares for even the Assyrians who, to the mind of the Jews, were the worst of all peoples, then surely He must love absolutely all peoples.

The implication of the universal salvific will seems specially strong in the words of God to Ezekiel the prophet:¹⁰ "As I live, says the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." In the literal sense, the passage seems to refer to physical death. However, if God does not desire even the physical death of the wicked man, but rather his conversion, much less does He wish his eternal death. Rather, He wills that all be converted and live.

53. Explicitly revealed in the New Testament: The same teaching is most clearly presented in the New Testament. For St. Paul teaches that God always provides the requisite help to avoid sin:¹¹ "God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it." We notice especially the words: "God is faithful." St. Paul was deeply steeped in the teaching of the Old Testament that God had bound Himself by covenant to give help. So, in granting help, God was being "faithful" to His promises, and to the covenant.¹² In the new infinite Covenant (or implicit pact: cf. chapter 4), God had bound Himself by an infinite title. Hence St. Paul, in the spirit of both

covenants, teaches that God, out of fidelity, will always give the help to overcome all temptations.

St. Peter explicitly teaches the same doctrine, saying that God¹³ ". . . is forbearing toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance."

But the principal passage on the salvific will is found in St. Paul's first Epistle to Timothy:¹⁴ "First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings be made *for all men*. . . . This is good, and it is acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who *desires all men to be saved* and to come to the knowledge of the truth, for there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, *who gave himself as a ransom for all*. . . ."

Presently we shall explore fully the meaning of this text. But first, it will be good to see the teaching of the Fathers of the Church on the same point.

54. The testimonies of the Fathers: The passages of the Fathers of the Church are extremely numerous. C. Passaglia¹⁵ gathered two hundred Patristic texts. We shall cite only selected passages, from both eastern and western Fathers. (Cf. also the Patristic texts on predestination in chapter 13.)

1) *The Eastern Fathers:* St. Hippolytus clearly teaches that God:¹⁶ "Casts aside . . . no one of His servants, loathes no one as unworthy of His divine mysteries . . . having mercy on all, and desiring to save all, wanting to make all sons of God and calling all saints into one perfect man." Still more eloquent are the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa:¹⁷ "'The Father raises the dead and gives them life, and the Son gives life to whom He will.'-We do not conclude from this that some are cast out from the lifegiving will. . . . If then, the Father's will (attitude) is in the Son, and the Father, as the Apostle says 'wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth' it is plain that He who has everything that is the Father's and has the whole Father in Him, along with other good things of the Father has fully also the salvific will. . . . For not because of the Lord's will are some saved, but others are lost: for then the cause of their ruin would come from that will. But by the choice of those who receive the word, it happens that some are saved or lost." St. John Chrysostom expresses the same teaching in many places. Especially does he speak clearly in his *Homily on enduring criticisms*:¹⁸ "God never compels anyone by necessity and force, but He wills that all be saved, yet does not force anyone. . . . How then are not all saved if He wills all to be saved? Because not everyone's will follows His will. He compels no one. But even to Jerusalem He says:¹⁹ "Jerusalem, Jerusalem! How often would I have gathered your children together, but you were unwilling.'" And again in his homilies on the Epistle to the Ephesians: ". . . he greatly longs after, greatly desires our salvation."²⁰ St. John Damascene speaks similarly:²¹ "It is necessary to know that God antecedently wills all to be

saved and to reach His kingdom. For He did not make us to punish, but to share in His goodness, because He is good. But He wills that sinners be punished, because He is just. Now the first [will] is called antecedent will and will of good pleasure [and] it is from Him. But the second [will is called] consequent will and a giving way [and it comes] from our fault. . . ."²²

2) *The Western Fathers: St. Ambrose* in a beautiful passage in which he speaks of Christ as a Levite, brings out the salvific love of God for all and for individuals:²³ "'Levite' means 'undertaken for me'. . . . He therefore who was expected and came *for the salvation of all, for me* was born of the virginal womb, *for me* was offered, *for me* He tasted death, *for me* He rose. In Him the redemption of all men was *undertaken*. . . . The Redeemer is the Levite, for the wise man is the redemption of the unwise man. He, like a physician, cherishes the sick soul of the unwise man. . . . For He saw that those who suffered could not be saved without a remedy, and so He provided medicine for the sick. He gave the means of health to all precisely in order that whosoever perishes should attribute the causes of his death to himself, he who was unwilling to be cured although he had the remedy by which he could escape. Let the manifest mercy of Christ to all be proclaimed: for those who perish, perish by their own negligence; but those who are saved, are delivered according to the sentence of Christ, 'who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.'" Several things are to be noted in this excellent passage: First, as we have said, he stresses the love of God for all and for individuals. Then, he distinguishes between the cause of ruin and the cause of salvation. The cause of salvation is in God; but the cause of ruin is in man alone "who was unwilling to be cured." It is obvious that St. Ambrose would never say that God deserts many before consideration of demerits. The same teaching stands out forcefully in the commentary of St. Ambrose on Psalm 39:²⁴ "He wants all whom He has made and created to be His; would that you, O man, would not flee and . . . hide yourself; for *He seeks even those who flee*." St. Ambrose, of course, is merely saying the same things that Christ said about the lost sheep. Again, we are far from a theory of desertion before prevision of any fault.²⁵

St. Jerome, like St. Ambrose stresses the fact that although God wills to save all, yet some are lost through their own fault:²⁶ "' . . . He wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.' But, because no one is saved without his own will (for we have free will), He wants us to will good, so that when we do, He may will to fulfil in us His plan."

St. Augustine in some passages²⁷ seems to flatly deny that the salvific will of God is universal. However, in still other passages, he at least seems to speak in the same way as the other Fathers.²⁸ He too explains that the difference between the elect and the reprobate depends on the human will:²⁹ "'God wills all men to be saved and to

come to the knowledge of the truth;' but He does not [will it] in such a way as to take free will from them, by the good or bad use of which they may be judged most justly." In his *Confessions* he brings out beautifully the care of God for individuals:³⁰ ". . . you care for each and every one as if you were caring for him alone, and you [care] in such a way for all, as if [you were caring for them] individually."

St. Prosper, who defended the teaching of St. Augustine after the latter's death, and answered objections for him, wrote:³¹ "Likewise, he who says that God does not will all men to be saved, but [only] a certain number who are predestined, speaks more harshly than one should speak about the loftiness of the inscrutable grace of God, 'who wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth' and [who] fulfils the design of His will in those whom He predestined after foreknowing, called after predestining, justified after calling, glorified after justifying . . . so that those who are saved are saved for the reason that God wanted them to be saved, and those who perish, perish for the reason that they merited to perish." We note that St. Prosper repeats a distinction we have seen in other places: Salvation comes from the salvific will of God, which wills the salvation of all; but ruin comes from the wicked will of man.

Ambrosiaster expresses the same distinction:³² "'For God wills all men to be saved' but if they draw near to Him; for He does not wish [them to be saved] in such a way that those who are unwilling would be saved. But He wills them to be saved if they also will it. For surely He who gave the law to all, excepted no one from [His desire for their] salvation. Does not a physician make a public proclamation [of his profession] so that he may show he wants to heal all, on condition, however, that he is sought out by the sick? For there is no true health if it is given to one who is unwilling."

55. The doctrine of the salvific will is completely clear in the light of other Scriptural passages, and the Magisterium of the Church: Two questions must be answered in this regard. Actually, the solution is already clear both from Scripture and from the Fathers. But even greater clarity can be had from other parts of Sacred Scripture as they are interpreted by the Magisterium of the Church. The questions are these: Is the salvific will sincere, or is it a mere metaphor (or merely signified will)? How strong is this will?

1) The salvific will is sincere: All Catholic theologians admit that today. But in past times certain Catholics denied this truth or at least questioned it. Garrigou-Lagrange reports it thus:³³ "The opinion of Cajetan and Bañez is that more probably the antecedent will [of God] in regard to the salvation of all men is only a signified will . . . a signified will is present in God only metaphorically. . . ." Here are the words of Bañez himself on the salvific will:³⁴ "It seems much more probable that the will called 'velleity' is not formally present in God, but [rather that] it suffices that such an antecedent will be supposed to

be in God eminently . . . for example, the attitude of a Christian man by which he wants all men to be saved [an attitude] of which God is the cause, must be in God either formally or eminently. Our conclusion in regard to the first alternative is established by the arguments given on the negative side [that is, the first alternative has been shown to be false]. It follows at once that the second alternative is true. Because *such a will is not in God formally*, it must be in God eminently, since God is the cause of it in the saints." In other words: God Himself does not really want all to be saved, but, inasmuch as He causes men to want this, we say that this will for the salvation of all is in God eminently, although actually, He does not Himself want all to be saved. In passing, we might note that it is not surprising that Bañez wrote this way. For he is the very father of the interpretation of St. Thomas in which God deserts man before consideration of demerits.³⁵ An excellent Thomist, F. Muñiz, OP, wrote well about this desertion theory:³⁶ "Negative reprobation before prevision of sins seems to us to be completely incompatible with the universal salvific will of God." And actually, the conclusion is entirely obvious. For God cannot both sincerely will all men to be saved, and yet, without any fault on their part, desert them, giving them only graces with which it would be metaphysically impossible for them to be saved. For if God alone, without any consideration of free conditions in man, determines the eternal lot for each man in such a way that men in no way can "distinguish themselves," then, if God reprobates anyone, He cannot at the same time sincerely say He wants that same man to be saved.³⁷ Nor can it be said that God merely permits such men to ruin themselves, as we have already seen.³⁸ But Bañez in making the statement we have just read, was merely bringing out what is implicit in his system. He, the father of the system, surely should know what it implies. As we have seen, Cajetan agrees with Bañez. But we, along with all Catholic theologians today, know that the universal salvific will is sincere. We know this because of the clarity of many passages of Scripture quoted above, and because of the teaching of the Fathers of the Church. But we can also show in another way that that will is beyond doubt sincere, namely, with the help of other passages of Scripture. Now St. Thomas teaches that:³⁹ ". . . to love is to will good to someone." Elsewhere, speaking specifically of the divine love, he makes it clear that to love someone is not merely to will good to him, but to do so for his own sake.⁴⁰ Therefore, to will salvation to anyone for his own sake is to love him. In other words, the salvific will is really one aspect, and the chief expression, of the love of God for men. *Therefore, if we ask whether the salvific will is sincere, it is the same as asking whether the love of God for men is sincere.* But it would be one of the worst of heresies to deny that God sincerely loves all men. Therefore, the salvific will is sincere, and is not a mere signified will, nor a mere metaphor.

The qualification that to love is to will the other's good *for his own sake* is important. For in the system of the older Thomists (following St. Augustine, as we shall see⁴¹), God predestines in order to manifest His goodness by means of mercy, and reprobates in order to manifest His goodness by means of justice. But in such a system, God does not love anyone, even the predestined. For He wills their salvation not for their own sake, but just to make a point.

2) *The salvific will is most vehement in its desire*: Some theologians hold opinions which contain the implication that the salvific will, although sincere, is very weak. For example, they say that God will deny the graces without which it is metaphysically inconceivable for a man to be saved, even on account of an inculpable⁴² inadvertence in man. They fall into this opinion because they try to solve the question by metaphysics, although St. Thomas warns:⁴³ "Those things . . . that depend solely on the will of God . . . cannot be known to us except insofar as they are handed down in Sacred Scripture. . . ." But the strength of God's desire to save all men is not determined by metaphysical necessity, but by the generous free decision of God.

To solve the question, we come back to the words we quoted above from St. Thomas: ". . . *to love is to will good to someone* [for his own sake]." So, just as we saw above that to ask whether the salvific will is sincere is the same thing as to ask whether the love of God for men is sincere, in the same way, *to ask how great is the strength of the salvific will is the same thing as to ask how strong is the love of God for men.*

How strong is the love of God? We can get a gauge on the strength of any love by seeing how great are the obstacles it can surmount. A great love can ride over even great obstacles; a small love can overcome only small obstacles. But, as we saw in chapter 4, the love of the Father for men was so great that He did not even spare His own Son, but delivered Him up for all of us, not to become man in a palace, but in a stable; not to live a comfortable life, but to die wretchedly on a cross-although actually, even the least act of a God-man would have been enough to provide infinite compensation. He did this out of a most intense love by which He not only wanted to give pardon and grace to men, but willed even to *bind Himself* to do so, by infinite objective titles which were made both for the establishment of the treasury of grace, and for the dispensation of that treasury. All these things were done not only for men in a group but for each individual, as we have seen from the official interpretation given by Pope Pius XII of the words of St. Paul:⁴⁴ ". . . our Divine Redeemer was nailed to the cross more by love than by the violence of the executioners; and His voluntary holocaust is the supreme gift that He imparted to each individual man, according to the terse statement of the Apostle: 'He loved me and gave Himself up for me.'" The love of God is so great that the same Pope could also speak of,⁴⁵ ". . . the infinite love of God

for the human race" and again:⁴⁶ ". . . in the parables of mercy . . . the very Heart of God is manifested." As a result of this love:⁴⁷ "There is no doubt that the heavenly Father 'who has not spared even his own Son but has delivered him for us all,' being asked by so great an advocate [Christ] will at all times send down upon all a rich abundance of divine graces."

Therefore, *the precise measure of the salvific will is this: God wants the salvation of all men to such an extent that He did not spare even His only Son, but sent Him to the most dreadful death of the Cross, in order to establish infinite objective titles for each individual man, so that Pope Pius XII could rightly speak of the "infinite love of God for the human race."*

3) Another, closely related, aspect of the salvific will can be seen through God's love of the objective moral order. As we have already seen⁴⁸ in the Thomistic principle of ST I.19.5.c., God in His love of objective goodness likes to have a reason (or title) provided for giving something, even though He would have given it anyway.

According to this principle, God's reasons for acting are always twofold: He acts for objective goodness, and He acts for our benefit. In order for these two reasons to harmonize, thus preserving the moral order, the title established must correspond to the gift to be given. Thus, we can judge God's love for us by means of His love for the moral order; the two are, in a sense, inseparable.

But as we have just mentioned,⁴⁹ the passion and death of Christ were, in a sense, completely superfluous, since the slightest act which He performed, as the act of an infinite person, was of infinite value. Nevertheless, the Father willed that His Son only suffer the horrible death of the cross. Not only this, but he freely willed that to the infinite merits of Christ be added the truly immense merits of His Mother, though in such a way that her role neither takes away or adds anything to the dignity and the efficacy of the one mediator.⁵⁰

The role which God has given to our Lady is an especially strong testimony to His salvific will. He did not need to give that role, and yet He did, as we know from 17 magisterial texts, including statements from every Pope from Leo XIII to John Paul II inclusive, as well as from Vatican II.⁵¹ (We note that anything taught repeatedly by the ordinary Magisterium is infallible: the repetition shows the intent to make it final and definitive).

What is that role? She really contributed to our salvation, not just by bearing Christ, but also by sharing in the great sacrifice. The texts, especially Vatican II, say she did this by way of obedience. When she first gave her *fiat*, she accepted all the Father willed her to do. At Calvary, the Father willed that her Son die, die so horribly. So, since perfection in any soul requires it to will what the Father wills, she had to will that He die so horribly, in spite of her unimaginable love.

In both the sacrificial and covenantal aspects of the redemption, the thing that gives value is obedience. Thus she did join in offering Him, in making the covenant, and so she really shared in producing the objective title for all grace and forgiveness, in dependence on Him, with Him.

Is it strange that Our Father chose to employ Our Lady with Jesus to, as it were, add her to the infinite offering of Jesus? Actually, as we just noted there is a parallel to this in the suffering of Our Lord itself. If Jesus had been born in a palace and had never suffered, but had soon ascended after the Incarnation, that would have been infinite redemption, in merit and in satisfaction. Yet the Father chose to add infinity to infinity. It should not seem strange, then, that He also freely decided to add the finite but truly immense merits of Mary.

Thus we see that in the redemption, the Father was pleased to make the reasons for giving grace as rich as possible. So, He wanted to add her obedience. We conclude, then, that God has bound himself to give men grace without limit, a fact which Christ himself confirms, speaking through the Roman liturgy of Good Friday: "What more ought I have done for you, and have not done it?"

It is entirely obvious that a salvific will of such a kind and of such force not only finds no obstacle whatever in the inculpable inadvertence of a man, but rather, it *sets no limits whatsoever which it will not pass to save individuals* (short of miracles: for the extraordinary cannot become the ordinary). Therefore, if a man is not saved, this can happen *only because he sets limits*⁵² to the action of God in him. God Himself sets no limits.

From the fact that infinite objective titles were established for each individual, we can see an added proof, in addition to those we saw above⁵³ against the view of some Thomists who want to say that even though God sincerely wills the salvation of all, yet He desires the order of the universe more than the salvation of individuals, so that He reprobates many for the sake of the order of the universe. In replying, we must first recall that the order of the universe is not itself the glory of God, but a *means* to that glory, and a finite means at that. For St. Thomas defines glory as⁵⁴ "nothing other than clear knowledge with praise." The salvation of men is also a means to the glory of God. Now, howsoever much we may suppose that God wills the order of the universe as a means to His glory, He does not will it more than He wills the salvation of individual human beings. For His will for the salvation of individuals is, as we have seen, measured by the passion and by the *infinite objective titles for each individual*, so that Pius XII could rightly speak of "the *infinite* love of God for the human race," as we saw above. Furthermore, if God had willed to provide for the salvation of men *only as a group*, and not for the salvation of *individuals*, He would have merely established some objective titles for men as a group-He would not have established *infinite titles for individuals*. For, in

establishing infinite titles for each *individual*, He has *bound Himself* to provide for the salvation of each individual, so that unless *individuals* resist or fail in their part,⁵⁵ *He owes it to Himself* to give the means to bring them to salvation. *He could not take upon Himself that obligation even towards individuals when He already had it in mind to desert many of the same individuals for the order of the universe, before foreseeing the desertion by the same individuals.* For then He would contradict Himself and *accept an obligation He had determined in advance, not to keep.*

Actually, as we saw in chapter 3, the Vatican Council I teaches that God wills the salvation of men and His own glory to be inseparable.

Now we can understand better the words of St. Thomas which we saw above:⁵⁶ "In created things, *nothing* can be greater than the salvation of a rational creature." And he did not add: "Except the order of the universe."

56. This teaching of Pius XII is by no means new. It is simply a beautiful expression of a truth contained in Holy Scripture which the Church always has taught, teaches, and will teach. St. Thomas puts it well, speaking of the testimony of Scripture on the passion:⁵⁷ "By this man knows how much God loves man, and by this he is moved to love God. . . . Hence the Apostle says:⁵⁸ 'God proves His love towards us, because when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us.'"

Similarly, as Pius XII pointed out in a passage cited above ". . . in the parables of mercy . . . the very Heart of God is manifested." But the parables of mercy, in which God's attitude is revealed, never represent Him as deserting a sinner so that He can punish him, but instead, as leaving the 99 in the desert, to seek the one that has strayed, for, as St. Ambrose says in a text we have just seen, "He wants all whom He has made and created to be His; would that you, O man, would not flee . . . for He seeks even those who flee."

57. The same truth is also contained in the analogy of the Father which Christ Himself so often presented in the Gospel. For no father who has even ordinary human goodness wishes to desert any of his children who has done no wrong. Even a pagan, Cicero, saw this truth and expressed it well. For, after speaking of the love between parents and children that exists even in the animal world he added:⁵⁹ "This is even more evident among human beings, first of all, as a result of that love which exists between children and parents, a love that *cannot be put asunder except by a detestable crime.*" How much less can the love of the best of Fathers⁶⁰ "from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth receives its name" desert a son for no fault or for a mere *inculpable* inadvertence.

Pope John XXIII taught that the love of God for all His children is even greater than a mother's love. For, in writing about St. John Vianney, the Pope said:⁶¹ "He spared no labors in making himself the minister of divine mercy which, to use his words, 'like an overflowing river, carries

all souls along with it' and *beats with a more than motherly love* 'since God is quicker to pardon than a mother is to snatch her son from the fire.'" Now if God is quicker to pardon than a mother is in rescuing a son from a fire, how could we conceive of God as deserting a son before any fault, or for an inculpable inadvertence, so that that son would fall into fire, not just for a few moments, but forever?

58. Confirmatory argument from reason: Even if we did not have the revelation of the universal salvific will, we could gather much about its existence and nature from the very fact of creation (though we could not know it is measured by infinite objective titles for each individual). For in creating man, God made creatures to His own image and likeness inasmuch as He made them with a spiritual intellect and will. At least in this sense it would be clear from reason alone that He can be called their Father. Now, if anyone procreates children, it is not merely from a positive law made by God, but from the very nature of things that that man contracts an obligation of caring for the offspring. Similarly, if God freely becomes a Father, from the very nature of things He will *owe it to Himself* to sincerely care for them. Therefore, infallibly He will not will their ruin. And this will will be sincere. For a metaphorical will, a mere signified will, would not be enough to fulfill the obligation of a parent. So God will owe it to Himself to really-and not just metaphorically-care for His children. Furthermore, by the very nature of things, the glory of any good father as a father lies in the well being of his children. Hence, the father will not seek glory through the ruin of his children. If anyone of them perishes, this detracts from the glory of the father.⁶²

59. Conclusions: 1) It is a revealed truth that the universal salvific will is sincere and most vehement, for it is measured by the immense difficulty of the passion and by infinite objective titles, established at such labor, for each individual. Therefore God sets no limits that He will not pass in caring for the salvation of individuals (short of the miraculous: for the extraordinary cannot become the ordinary). He could not reprobate for the order of the universe because He could not, knowing in advance of such a "necessity," still bind Himself by infinite objective titles in favor of *each individual*.

2) There is no reprobation, positive or negative, before prevision of demerits. God cannot at one and the same time reprobate with no consideration of demerits, and still say sincerely that He wills the salvation of a man who cannot "distinguish himself."⁶³

3) The opinion of Bañez that the universal salvific will is "much more probably" only a metaphorical will, is totally incompatible with revelation. Therefore, any system in which this point of his is an essential part must be rejected.

4) The theory of those theologians who hold that God does not save many because He merely passes them by, or "excludes them from an undue benefit," likewise contradicts the revelation about the salvific

will. (Actually, that theory has two roots: (a) An attempt to determine by metaphysical means that which God has *freely* decided. For the question is not what God metaphysically must do but what He freely has decided to do. He has freely decided to bind Himself by infinite objective titles for each individual. These theologians miss that fact completely, and as a result, say that God is not bound to do anything for individuals, so that He could reject in advance of any prevision of demerits, or after prevision of inculpable inadvertence in men. (b) A misinterpretation of Rom. 8:28- 9:24.⁶⁴

5) As we have seen, St. Thomas says, speaking of the passion, that: "By this, man knows how much God loves man, and by this he is moved to love God. . . ." Now if God willed to desert many before prevision of demerits, man would not be moved to love God, because no one could know which ones God would plan to desert and could not know whether perhaps he himself would be among those deserted. For example, if I had to fear that perhaps God might intend to desert me, with no consideration of my demerits, I would not be moved to love Him in thinking of the passion, which merited a salvation which God would not care to give to me even though He could do so with no difficulty. Rather, I would be left in terror of God.

60. Objection 1: But, in negative reprobation, God does not really desert: He merely permits man to ruin himself if he wishes.

Answer: We have already replied, above, in §51.⁶⁵

61. Objection 2: If God wills all men to be saved why are not all saved? God can do all things.

Answer: Just as a human father can have vehement love for all his children, and yet disinherit a son because of many and great offenses, so also our heavenly Father. For, as we saw in several of the citations given above from the Fathers of the Church, God is unwilling to force anyone. He made us free. If we wish to use our freedom perversely, we are able to do so, for God will not force our liberty. St. Thomas puts it well:⁶⁶ "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition, because *they are unwilling* to receive the fruit of the incarnation within themselves. . . . For freedom of will, by which he can adhere or not adhere to the incarnate God, was not to be taken away from man, lest the good of man be forced, and so be rendered meritless and unpraiseworthy."

If God had left anyone with little or no opportunity for salvation, He would have little or no will for the salvation of that man. But actually, God has provided infinite objective titles for each individual, and has done so by surmounting the tremendous obstacle of sending His only Son to die so dreadful a death. He has proved, therefore, as we saw above,⁶⁷ that He sets no limits, short of the miraculous, which He will not pass to save an individual. Man himself sets limits, by his resistance to grace. As we shall see later,⁶⁸ God could forestall or

overcome that resistance, but that would require a strictly extraordinary grace, comparable to a miracle.

Even if God, without going so far, had provided merely a really good opportunity of salvation, that would prove a really sincere salvific will.

62. Objection 3: Before original sin, God had wanted to save all men. But by original sin, the whole human race became a "mass of damnation."⁶⁹ It no longer is much of a concern to God whether or not a given individual is saved. Rather, He saves some just to show He is merciful, and deserts others, to show He is just.

Answer: Historically, this objection arose from an erroneous interpretation of Romans 9, as we saw in chapter 1. When the foundation falls, that which is built on it must also fall.

However, we have already refuted this objection above,⁷⁰ and shown that to desert anyone thus would be contrary to the covenant (or implicit agreement) by which God bound Himself, and did so even *after* original sin and as a remedy for it. Now we can add that it would also be contrary to the revelation of the universal salvific will, which was made *after* original sin, and was proved to be most vehement after original sin. For we must ask: How great an obstacle to the love of God and the salvific will is original sin? Is it such an obstacle as to make the love of God turn into indifference to men, so that it would no longer matter to Him whether or not a particular man would be saved or lost but rather, He would blindly (before prevision of demerits) choose some for damnation, to display justice, and others for salvation, to display mercy? Most certainly not, and for many reasons.

First, as we have seen, even *after* original sin, God so loved men that He spared not His only Son, but sent Him to the cross precisely to repair the damage of original sin and other sins. So His love did not stop after original sin. Rather, His love was the cause of the Redemption. As St. Thomas says of the passion:⁷¹ "By this man knows how much God loves man, and by this he is moved to love God. . . . Hence the Apostle says:⁷² 'God proves⁷³ His love towards us, because when as yet we were sinners [by original and personal sins], Christ died for us.'" So, *after* original sin, God bound Himself by infinite objective titles towards each individual man.

But we not only note that God bound Himself *after* original sin. We see also that the *measure* of God's love is such that original sin is a very small obstacle in comparison (for we recall that love can be measured by the size of obstacle it can surmount). On the one hand, the love of God is measured by the difficulty of the passion, and by the infinite objective titles created for each man. On the other hand, what is the size of the obstacle in original sin? St. Thomas explains it thus:⁷⁴ ". . . among all sins, original [as found in the descendants of Adam] is the least, since it has the least voluntariness in it; for it is not voluntary by the will of the person [in whom it is found] but solely by the will of the origin of human nature. But actual sin, even venial, is voluntary by

the will of the person in whom it is found. And so a lesser penalty is due to original sin than to venial sin." Now, God will desert no one on account of a venial sin. Therefore, He will not desert for that which, in us, is less than venial sin.

Furthermore, St. Thomas teaches that God actually gives no positive punishment to those who die with only original sin. Rather, he says that these:⁷⁵ ". . . will not grieve at all over the absence of the divine vision. Rather they will rejoice in that they will participate much in the divine goodness in natural perfections." Therefore, if they who die in original sin not only do not suffer, but even rejoice, we can see the attitude of God towards original sin in us.

Actually, the objection implies a denial of both the value of the redemption, and of the salvific will.

63. Objection 4: If the salvific will is sincere, why are not infants who die without baptism saved?

Answer: Before answering directly it is good to note that it is not entirely certain that unbaptized infants are not saved. The opinion of St. Thomas, which theologians rather generally follow, says that they have only a natural happiness.⁷⁶ Some good theologians differ from this view and hold out hope of full salvation. But even if the opinion of St. Thomas is true it does not prove that the salvific will is not sincere and most vehement.

For, in the present order, God has most wisely and most lovingly established natural laws, partly as a result of the very metaphysical nature of reality, partly out of a loving positive decision. For example, according to the ordinary physical laws, no man can walk upon the water. Christ did it, but He did it by a miracle. He could not do it without a miracle. Now Wisdom does not allow the miraculous or the extraordinary to become the regular thing: for then, the extraordinary would be ordinary. That is an inherent contradiction.

In regard to the infants, then: God could not without multiplying miracles, prevent all infants from dying in infancy without baptism. Many die from physical causes before birth. Many are born of parents who, even though they are in good faith, either deny the necessity of baptism, or are completely ignorant of baptism. As St. Paul says, it is inevitable, as a result of human weakness, that there will be many divisions and differences of views among men. Those who first originate a heresy or schism are apt to do so knowingly, and are not so apt to be free of guilt. But yet, the later generations, born in those sects, can easily be in good faith. Similarly, pagans who do not know of baptism are normally in good faith. So, without an immense multiplication of miracles, God could not prevent all infants from dying without baptism.

Even a vehement salvific will does not require that God should make the extraordinary ordinary. On the contrary, wisdom forbids it.

Further light on the problem can be had by speculating on the reason why a particular infant is providentially assigned to a place and situation in which it will die without baptism. Revelation does not give us the answer, but there is a very plausible conjecture, made by a great Doctor of the Church, St. Gregory of Nyssa, who wrote:⁷⁷ "It is likely that He who knows the future as well as the past, prevents the progress of the life of the infant to full maturity, lest the evil which He foresees by His power of prevision be accomplished by the one who would have lived in that way. . . . We conjecture this about the death of newborn infants, that He who does all things reasonably, in His love of men, takes away the opportunity for evil, not giving to the [human] will the opportunity that is known by His power of prevision. . . ."

That is, St. Gregory suggests that since it is inevitable that many infants will die without baptism, God assigns particular infants to situations in which they will die without baptism, out of His love of men. For He knows that these particular ones, if allowed to grow to maturity, would fall into many sins and die in them. Thus they would suffer the fire of hell: but by dying in infancy, they are mercifully spared that, and given instead, a natural happiness.

Of course, it is obvious that not all men who would otherwise go to hell are cut off thus in infancy. This too, would probably call for multiplication of miracles. But the opinion of St. Gregory is highly plausible, at least.

But someone may ask: Could not God have made a different order of nature, in which no infant would have died in infancy?

We reply that He probably could have, but for excellent reasons, which we can guess only in part, He did not do so. Perhaps the reason was that, in line with the opinion of St. Gregory, there is more room for mercy in the present order. Perhaps there are other even better reasons, hidden from us, but known to infinite Wisdom.

We need to be very careful in this and similar matters, that we do not say that because we, weak men, cannot find the reasons in the mind of God, there are no good reasons present. We know by revelation that the universal salvific will is sincere and most vehement. It is sufficient to know this revealed *fact*. It is not necessary that we know *how* to reconcile that fact with the problem of infants. Just as a Catholic who encounters an objection against the faith which he cannot solve is not required-nor permitted-to call his faith into doubt; so we are not permitted to question the reality and force of the salvific will because we do not know all of the *how* it can be reconciled with the fate of infants-especially when that fate itself is not perfectly certain.

64. Objection 5: If God really wants all men to be saved, what are we to say of the salvation of so many pagans?

This objection will be answered in Appendix II on The Universal Salvific Will and Subjective Redemption. For now, it will suffice to say two things. First, as we have already seen,⁷⁸ God bound himself to grant

graces to each individual man. Those who accept grace have the Spirit of Christ, and all those who have the Spirit of Christ pertain in some way to the Church,⁷⁹ and thus are not excluded from salvation. Second, God's vehement desire for the salvation of all men will affect the way he orders the external economy, insofar as this economy bears on salvation.

[N.B. §§ 65-69 of the original edition form part of the material of Appendix II in the present edition (§§ 535a-542).]

70. Objection 6: If God really wants all to be saved, why did He make us so weak, especially in regard to sex?

Answer: We will reply first in regard to weakness in general; and afterwards in particular about sexual matters.

In general, we must note in advance that even if we were unable to find any answer, that would not prove that God does not sincerely and vehemently desire our salvation. For the sincerity and force of the salvific will is taught in revelation.

But we can find at least some of the divine reasons. For, even though we sin more easily out of weakness, we also, as a result of our very changeability, are more easily converted. Perhaps as a result, more are saved. The angels did not have any weakness, yet many fell: and they were *incapable* of receiving a second chance precisely because by their very nature they were strong and immutable. Similarly, Adam and Eve before the fall were not weak, but still fell. God, who commands us to forgive seventy times seven times, is always ready to forgive, and gives us graces whose measure is found in infinite objective titles for each individual. Compare also the words of St. Paul to the Romans.⁸⁰ "God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all."

In regard to human weakness in sexual matters, someone might wish to ask: Could not God have provided for the multiplication of our race in some other way? We must admit that He surely could have done so. But again, we must trust in the goodness of our Father. He loves to give us opportunities of meriting through faith, by putting before us seeming insoluble difficulties. For example, Abraham had to believe that God would give Him a great posterity through Isaac, as He had promised, and yet be ready to obey the divine order to sacrifice the same Isaac. Again, all the Jews, throughout most of the Old Testament period, had to believe that God rewards and punishes justly in spite of the fact that, on the one hand, they did not know that God rewards and punishes in the future life, and, on the other hand, they saw that sinners often fare very well, while good men are often afflicted, even to the end of their lives.

71. But, to return to the reply proper: The sex appetite is very valuable not only for the multiplication of the human race, but also in producing suitable dispositions for salvation. For when a baby is born, it at first is aware only of itself, and thinks of all others as existing solely for it. But,

in order that a man may become fit to enjoy God in heaven, he must learn to love and think of others—other humans, and God. We do not learn this easily. But the sex appetite is a great help, in the following way.

Man consists of two elements, matter and spirit. These two are so bound together that, in the present life, no condition can exist in either one without tending to promote as it were a resonance in the other. In fact, even though our intellect is a spiritual faculty yet, we are unable to think if our material cerebrum should be injured, for it is the immediate instrument of the spiritual intellect.

Now love has a twofold aspect: sensory love (and even sexual love in some instances) in the body, and spiritual love in the spiritual will. Love is essentially in the will. As St. Thomas says,⁸¹ "to love is to will good to someone." Yet, the starter to love is found in the perception of some goodness or excellence in another. Under the influence of this starter, we begin to will that the other remain so fine, and even grow in goodness, and be well off and happy. And, if the love is true, we also wish to work to bring about the welfare and happiness of the other. How far we will go, depends on the strength of the love.

The process of sexual attraction runs as follows: A young man sees a certain girl. She seems good to him—or rather, wonderful (because of the sexual attraction). This reaction serves as a starter not only for the sex appetite, but also for love in the will. For love in the will starts with the perception of goodness or excellence but this girl, thanks to the sex attraction, seems not just good, but wonderful.

Hence, the sex drive promotes real love in two ways: (1) Because the sexual attraction makes another seem good or wonderful, and so provides the natural starter for love in the spiritual will, (2) Because any condition in the one part of man, matter or spirit, tends to produce the corresponding resonance in the other part: the spiritual resonance will be love in the will.⁸² Thus the man who began life thinking only of himself, now is powerfully moved to think and labor for another. The very vehemence of the sex appetite carries him outside himself, to the love of another. Later, if he marries, and if there are children, he will be naturally led to generous love of the children. For a human father, as we have said before, loves and cares for the children not because the children are good, but because he, the father, is good.

Therefore the benefits of the sex appetite are very great since it almost forces one to go outside himself and love others, and to work generously for them. But all these things are an excellent natural disposition for love of neighbor; and they dispose to love of God, inasmuch as love of God and love of neighbor are interconnected, and also because the children, seeing the goodness of their father, can easily learn about the goodness of God who has willed to be and to be called our Father.

72. Furthermore, the great struggle that is needed against sexual temptations greatly promotes the virtue of humility. For sometimes even very good persons can hardly help wondering a bit, after a long hard fight, whether they really have come through unscathed, or at least they have learned by experience that they are not strong by their own strength. But, the virtue of humility is peculiarly necessary for salvation. As Scripture says:⁸³ "For pride is the beginning of all sin." Great then is the value of the sexual appetite in promoting the virtue that contradicts the very source of sin.

Further, the Lord Himself revealed to St. Paul that,⁸⁴ "power is made perfect in weakness," so that St. Paul added: "I will all the more gladly boast of my weaknesses that the power of Christ may rest upon me."⁸⁵

73. Objection 7: God really wills to save all, but He loves more the good of the order of the universe. Therefore, for the good of the universe, He deserts some, so that He may have some to punish, to display justice in punishing.

Answer: The answer was already given above.⁸⁶ Additional explanations will be given in the appendix of this book.

END NOTES

1 Gn 12:3.

2 Gal. 3:8.

3 Is 42:6-7. Cf. Jer.16:19-21.

4 Is 49:6.

5 Ps 144:9.

6 Sir 18:12.

7 Wis 11:26 and 12:1-2.

8 Jer 49:11.

9 Jon 4:10-11

10 Ez 33:11.

11 1 Cor 10:13.

12 Cf. chapter 4 on the covenant. Even if someone would say that St. Paul in this passage does not have the covenant in mind, it is at least clear that he means God bound Himself by promise.

13 2 Pt. 3:9

14 1 Tm 2:1-6.

15 De partitione divinae voluntatis, Romae, 1851. Cf. also the Patristic texts on predestination in chapter 13 below.

16 De Antichristo 3. PG 10.731.

17 Adv. Apollinarium 29. PG 45.1187

18 Homilia de ferendis reprehensionibus 6. PG 51.144.

19 In Ephesios, cap. 1. Hom. 1, n. 2. PG 62.13.

20 The Greek: sphodra ephietai, sphodra epithymeï.

21 De fide orthodoxa 2.29. PG 94.970.

22 Cf. other passages in § 202 below

23 De Cain et Abel 2.3.11. PL 14.364-65.

24 In Ps. 39, n. 20. PL 14.1117.

25 Cf. § 51.

26 In Ephes. 1.1.11. PL 26.485.

27 Cf. § 206.2.

28 Cf. below §§ 207-12.

29 De spiritu et littera 33.58. PL 44.238.
30 Confessions 3.11.19. PL 32.692.
31 Resp. ad capit. Galiorzum 8. PL 51.172.
32 In 1 Tm. 2.4. PL 17.492.
33 De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 418.
34 D. Banez OP, Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae, Romae, 1584. In I 19.6. col. 363 (emphasis mine)
35 Cf. §§ 7 and 51.
36 In his commentary in: Suma Teologica de Santo Tomas de Aquino, B.A.C., 2nd ed., Madrid, 1957. I. p. 704. Cf. § 280 below and J. H. Nicolas, OP, "La permission du peche" in Revue Thomiste, 1960. 4. p. 537: ". . . negative reprobation involves a kind of indifference in respect to the actual salvation of the one who is not chosen."
37 Cf. §§ 6.8, 51, 119.
38 Cf. § 51.
39 ST I-II 26.4.c. If anyone should object: "Even if the love of God is sincere, that might mean only that He sincerely wishes some good to men. It need not prove that God goes so far as to sincerely wish salvation to each man." We reply: The Redemption, the Passion, really did go so far, for its very purpose was to attain salvation, and to earn it for each individual man (cf. § 48 above). The vehemence of that love was proved (cf. Rom 5:8 and § 56) by the very difficulty of the Passion, and by the infinite objective titles (cf. § 48) established at such cost for each individual man.
Really, God not only wills the good of salvation to all, but considers each man as somehow one with Him: ST II-II 27.2.c: "But the love that is in the intellectual appetite also differs from benevolence: for it involves a certain union according to affection, of the lover to the one loved; that is, inasmuch as the lover considers the loved as in a certain way one with him, or pertaining to him, and so is moved towards that one."
40 SCG I 91.3: "For true love, it is required that one will another's good insofar as it is the other's. For if someone wills another's good only because it contributes to his own, the other is loved only accidentally. So a man who wills that wine be kept in order that he may drink it, or loves a man only as useful or enjoyable to himself, loves the wine or the man accidentally; what he loves for its own sake is himself. But God wills each thing's good as such. He wills each thing to be because it is good in itself, though he also orders one to another's use."
41 § 208.
42 See § 130 below, where the passage itself is quoted and commented on. Cf. also §§ 7 and 51.
43 ST III 1.3.c.
44 Haurietis aquas. AAS 48.333. Cf. also §§ 32 and 48.
45 Ibid, p. 315.
46 Ibid., p. 330.
47 Ibid, p. 337.
48 Cf. §44.
49 §45.
50 Lumen gentium, 62.
51 ASS 27.178, 28.130-131, 36.453-455; AAS 10.182, 15.104, 20.178, 35.247, 38.266, 42.768, 45.583, 46.634-635, 51.713, 55.10, 79.382-383; Vatican II, On the Church, §§ 58, 61; Pius XI, Radio message to Lourdes, L'Osservatore Romano, Apr. 29, 1935; John Paul II, Allocution at the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Guayaquil, Ibid., Supplement, Feb. 2, 1985.
52 Cf. § 153.2.
53 Cf. §§ 32-35, 39.
54 ST I-II 2.3.c. Cf. § 526.
55 Cf. § 318, esp. the citation from the Council of Trent.
56 Cf. § 39.2.

57 ST III 46.3.c.
58 Rom 5:8: my translation. On the meaning of the Greek *synistesin*, Cf.: W. F. Arndt-F. W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, Chicago, 1957, s.v. *synistemi* l. c.
59 De amicitia 27.
60 Eph 3:15.
61 Sacerdotii nostri primordia. AAS 51. 574 (emphasis mine). The internal quotes are from St. John Vianney: the Pope obviously makes them his own.
62 Cf. also § 298.
63 Cf. §§ 6.8, 119-120.
64 Cf. chapter 1 above.
65 Cf. also § 130 below.
66 CG 4.55. Cf. the explanation of this passage in § 121.
67 C. §§ 55.2.
68 Cf. §§ 120-122; 126-127, 153.2, 228-231, 289-294.
69 Cf. § 208.
70 Cf. § 49-3.
71 ST III 46.3.c.
72 Rom 5:8.
73 Cf. note 58 above.
74 2 Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 1. ad 2. Cf. III 1.4.c: "A thing can be said to be greater in two ways. In one way, intensively; for example, whiteness is greater which is more intense; and in this way, actual sin is greater than original sin, since it has more voluntariness in it. . . . In the other way, something is greater extensively, e.g., whiteness is said to be greater which is over a greater area, and in this way original sin, by which the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin. . . ."
75 2 Sent. 4.33, q. 2, a.3.c.
76 Cf. note 75 above.
77 De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur, PG 46.183.
78 §48.
79 Cf. chapter 4, note 87.
80 Rom 11:32.
81 ST I-II 26.4.c.
82 What is said above holds for those who obey the commands of God in this matter. But if, on the contrary, youths who think they love one another lead each other into sins against chastity, then the sexual appetite does not produce true love-it is nearer to hate. For he who leads another into grave sin, does not really will the other's good, since he deprives the other of sanctifying grace, the greatest good in this life, and places the other (and himself) in danger of losing all happiness in the future life.
83 Sir 10:15.
84 2 Cor 12:9.
85 Cf. § 357.
86 §§ 32-35, 39, 55.2.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 6: Official teaching on the Sacred Heart and Immaculate Heart"

74. Christ has a fully human love of men: We have already seen the teaching of the Church on the love of God and of Christ for us, and we have seen also the earlier revelations on this subject in the Old Testament. Additional passages can be found in the great encyclical of Pius XII, *Haurietis aquas*.¹

But we still ought to bring out one aspect on which nothing was said above. For, if God had not become man, perhaps someone could have said: "The ways of God are most lofty: who can understand them? Perhaps therefore God can desert some before considering their demerits."

Such a statement cannot properly be made. For God became man in such a way that, according to the official teaching of Pius XII,² Christ has a threefold love, namely:

- 1) Divine love "which He shares with the Father and the Holy Spirit."
- 2) Human spiritual love, which resides in the spiritual human soul of Christ: "Furthermore [His Heart] is a symbol of that fiery love which was infused into His soul, and enriches the human will of Christ."
- 3) Human sensory love: "And finally-and that, in a more natural and direct way-[His Heart] is also a symbol of sensory affection, for the body of Jesus Christ enjoys a most perfect power of feeling and perceiving, truly more than all other human bodies."

Now, no really human heart wants to permit anyone it loves to suffer without necessity without personal fault. But the Heart of Christ is fully human and is enkindled with great love, even sensory love, for us, so that Pius XII said, as we have already seen:³ "And actually our divine Redeemer was nailed to the cross more by love than by the violence of the executioners; and His voluntary holocaust is the supreme gift that He imparted to each individual man, according to the terse statement of the Apostle: 'He loved me, and gave Himself up for me.'" Therefore, the Heart of Christ does not want to desert⁴ anyone without grave and persistent personal demerits. For He who suffered so much for each individual out of love, has proved and demonstrated a most vehement love for each individual.

But if someone objects: "Yes, the Heart of Christ has human love. However, the *person* of Christ is a divine person. We cannot understand such a person"-we reply: By His actions, as Pius XII shows,⁵ Christ showed that His love is such as we have said it to be. Especially in the parables of mercy, as Pius XII said,⁶ ". . . the very Heart of God is manifested."

75. Mary, who dispenses all graces, has a merely human heart:

But the difficulty just mentioned cannot even be broached in the case of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, for Mary is a merely human person. But she is also the most loving spiritual Mother of all men, as many Popes have officially taught,⁷ and, at the same time, she has the power of dispensing all the treasures of divine grace as she wills. Now, no mother's heart, even that of just an ordinary mother, wills to permit her children to be deserted through no fault of their own. Rather, they defend as much as possible even those sons who are actually wicked. How much less is the heart of the best of Mothers willing to permit that her children be deserted through no fault of their own, so that it would be metaphysically inconceivable that they be saved, and so that they

would suffer inexpressibly forever in eternal fire. As Benedict XV taught,⁸ Mary is "suppliant omnipotence." Nothing that she wishes is refused. Therefore, *whatsoever any theologian may wish to think about predestination, all effects of predestination, the distribution of all graces, must be such as to be completely pleasing to the heart of the best of Mothers. Hence, any theory that cannot fully harmonize with this truth that is taught by the Popes, must be rejected.*

We must not forget, too, that, as Pope John XXIII taught, divine mercy⁹ "like an overflowing river, carries all souls along with it' and beats with a more than motherly love 'since God is quicker to pardon than a mother is to snatch her son from the fire.'" Therefore, God Himself has precisely the same disposition as the Heart of Mary.

76. Objection: These things are too anthropomorphic.

Answer: Christ has a completely "anthropomorphic" Heart. For He was really made "anthropos" for us; and, according to the official teaching of Pius XII¹⁰ ". . . in the parables of mercy . . . the very Heart of God is manifested." For we must learn about God through Christ, who is the Word, the perfect expression of God. We learn through both the actions and the words of Christ, particularly the comparisons which He has graciously given us, most especially through the analogy which He proposed again and again, that God is our Father. He taught us to call God Our Father. Surely, it is better and safer to learn about God in the way in which Christ taught us, than to try to deduce the ways of God by mere human reasoning. As St. Thomas warns us:¹¹ "Those things . . . that depend solely on the will of God . . . cannot be known to us except insofar as they are handed down in Sacred Scripture, through which the divine will becomes known to us." The extent of the love of God for us depends solely on His generous will: it cannot be deduced from metaphysics. In this chapter, we are simply repeating the doctrine of the Church, and almost in the identical words used by the Church.

END NOTES

1 AAS 48.309-53.

2 AAS 48.327-28.

3 AAS 48.333.

4 Cf. §§ 7 and 51.

5 AAS 48.329-37.

6 AAS 48.330. Cf. § 39 on chapter 5 above.

7 E.g., cf. the words of Pius XII in AAS 39.271; St. Pius X in AAS 36.454; and Paul VI, at the end of the 3rd session of Vatican II.

Examples of papal texts calling Mary Mediatrix of all graces are found AAS 27.179 (Leo XIII) and AAS 36.454 (St. Pius X). Some theologians today try to deny the force of these latter texts, saying that the documents in which they occur are chiefly devotional, and so leave room for exaggeration. This seems hardly likely, for sound devotion must be built on sound dogma, not on exaggerations. A Pope would fail grossly in his duty were he to indulge in such hyperbole. (Also, the AAS 36.454 is really an Encyclical commemorating a dogmatic definition, that of the Immaculate Conception, and so is hardly to be called merely devotional). Further, even if one were to grant such an objection, we would still know that it is inescapably true that

all graces are so distributed as to please Mary; for all the acts of God are such as to please every soul in heaven, even the least. But Mary, as Spiritual Mother, could not be content with a distribution that would, for no fault of the child, deprive any of her children of the means without which it would be metaphysically inconceivable for that child to be saved.

8 Epistola, Decessore nostrum. AAS 7.202.

9 AAS 51.574. Cf. § 57 above.

10 AAS 48.330.

11 ST III 1.3.c.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 7: The power of man for good and for evil, and the dependence of man on God"

I. In the realm of ordinary graces

A. The Teaching of Sacred Scripture

77. Total dependence on God: Both in the Old and in the New Testament, two things are often expressly taught, and are always presupposed, that is, that man is totally dependent on God in good works, and that man can really decide whether and when he will sin or not sin.

This dependence is expressed by Isaiah the prophet:¹ "O Lord . . . thou hast wrought for us all our works." But St. Paul still more clearly brings out the need of divine aid, not only that we may do good works, but so that we may even make a good decision of will:² ". . . for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure." Furthermore, even the good thought that precedes the good act of will is not in our unaided power:³ "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our sufficiency is in God."

78. Man's power of decision: But equally, Sacred Scripture always takes it for granted, as something beyond doubt, that man can really decide whether and when he will sin or not sin. Hence, for example, the prophets frequently exhort the peoples e.g., Zechariah says:⁴ "Thus says the Lord of hosts: Return to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will return to you. . . ." Or, in Malachi:⁵ "Return to me, and I will return to you. . . ." And similarly in the New Testament, Christ Himself says, with many tears:⁶ "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! . . . How often would I have gathered your children together, as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not." The Epistle to the Romans represents the Lord as saying:⁷ "All day long I have held out my hands to a disobedient and contrary people." And St. Paul begs the Corinthians:⁸ ". . . we entreat you not to accept the grace of God in vain."

In all these passages it is most clearly implied that man can in some way determine when and whether he will sin or not. For a *condition* is supposed: "*If* you return . . . I will return to you." But if the determination did not basically depend on man, God would not exhort men but would merely determine the outcome Himself. Similarly,

Christ would not shed tears over the hardness of Jerusalem nor would He stretch out His hands to an unbelieving people, nor would St. Paul exhort his sons not to receive the grace of God in vain, if the decision and determination were not really made basically by man whether he would receive grace in vain or not.

Similarly, Psalm 80:14 represents God as speaking: "If only my people would hear me, and Israel would walk in my ways. . . ." But again, these words suppose that it really does depend on Israel whether or not Israel listens to God when He speaks. Otherwise God would not say: "If only, . . ." but rather, He by Himself would arrange everything, for it would be a mockery to ask a people for that which is not in some way under their control.

79. St. Paul explicitly teaches that a *condition* is required on the part of man. For he says that even in the first justification, faith is required of man:⁹ "For we hold that a man is justified by faith apart from works of law." And he repeats the same condition, in a more general way, speaking of the Christian life as a whole¹⁰ "He who through faith is righteous shall live."

So it is beyond doubt that the basic decision as to whether and when a man will sin or not is in some way within the control of man. For if the decision basically depended on God alone, the exhortations which God makes directly and through His prophets and apostles would be vain-or rather, a mockery. As we said above, if the basic decision depended on God alone, God would not exhort men, but would arrange it all by Himself.

80. The nature of the human condition: But we must investigate further into the nature of the human condition. As we have seen, St. Paul says that the condition is *faith*. Now this faith, as Fr. Lyonnet explains well, is not a mere intellectual assent, but it is,¹¹ "the adherence of the whole man (including, of course, the intellect) to a living person, that is, to God Himself, who is our supernatural end." The same condition is required in works after the first justification, for, as St. Paul says: "The just man lives by faith." So the adherence of man to God is the condition in all good works.

Faith, in this sense of a total adherence, will produce various effects according to the situation: When God manifests a truth, we adhere by intellectual assent; when He promises, we adhere by confidence; when He commands, we adhere by obedience (and also intellectually, in as much as in obeying, we also believe what He commands is good, and we believe we need His help).

81. In what sense is the condition in man's power?: It is also important to explore precisely to what extent this condition is in the unaided power of man. For as we saw above, St. Paul also teaches that divine power is required not only for the exterior performance of a good act, but also for the good will and for the good thought that precede. How then can faith be in the power and control of man if man

without God can have neither good will nor even a good thought? It must be in man's control in some way, as is evident from the passages we have just seen.

To solve the problem, we must take careful note of precisely what it is that Scripture excludes from man's unaided power. St. Paul says that by our unaided powers we cannot perform an outward good act, nor have a good decision of will, nor even a good thought. What sort of things are these that St. Paul excludes from our power? They are all *salutary goods*, they are *positive things*, that is, they are not absences or privations of things. So we gather that St. Paul teaches that we can have no positive salutary good without grace.

What then did he leave to us, by which we can condition or control the reception of grace, so that we do not receive it in vain? Since he has excluded positive goods nothing is left but *negative things* and *evil things*.¹² These we can have without grace. For we can resist grace¹³ without the help of grace. But Scripture also plainly supposes that still another negative thing is in our power, namely: When grace is offered, we can at least *merely do nothing*, or not resist grace. For if we could not omit resistance to grace, then the exhortations of the prophets would be mere mockery, and St. Paul would speak in vain in exhorting the Corinthians: "We exhort you not to receive the grace of God in vain." For the prophets and St. Paul would urge men on to that which men could not really control.

82. In what sense can we omit resistance to grace? It is possible to speak of omission of resistance to grace in two senses: Non-resistance can mean:

1) *A positive decision, a complete act, in which we formally decide not to resist or not to sin:* In this case, a man makes a positive decision as if he were saying: "I will not resist grace." It is obvious that such a decision is a salutary act, a positive good. Hence, it is not in man's unaided power. (Sometimes in a difficult struggle against a temptation, many such positive decisions are made before the temptation is finally vanquished).

2) *The mere absence of an evil decision, in which the will does not move itself at all, in the first part of the process.* Here the will does not make a decision, so as to say, as it were: "I will not resist." It is not difficult to see how this is possible. For (in the simplest type of movement by grace) grace initiates¹⁴ the process by presenting a good to our mind, which God wishes us to perform, and by moving our will to take pleasure in that good. Now *precisely because it is grace*-not our own activity-*that has produced these two effects* (making our mind see a good, and our will take pleasure in it), *the two effects can continue without any positive decision on our part. If we merely do nothing, they continue*, for they are produced by grace and the grace does not withdraw unless we resist. On the contrary, to interrupt these effects,

something from us would be required, for without a resistance from us, they will continue by the power of grace.¹⁵

We must notice that this type of omission of resistance is only the *first stage* of the process leading to a decision. On condition of this omission, the second stage follows, in which grace moves us further, so that we do make a decision:¹⁶ "It is God who . . . *works* in you both the will and the performance." Of course, we do actively cooperate with grace in the second stage. The entire process need not take more than one instant of time.¹⁷

It is obvious that, at very least, Scripture teaches that we can omit resistance in this sense of merely doing nothing, remaining without any positive decision at all, in the first part of the process. Such an absence of any decision is not a salutary good act:¹⁸ it is no act at all. To do nothing is in our power. But yet we must add, that even this very doing nothing is sustained by grace inasmuch as grace attracts us, and maintains the two effects in our minds and wills by its own power, without any contribution from us.

Would it be contrary to Scripture to assert that we receive at once from grace even the power of a positive good decision? The Molinists, as we shall see later,¹⁹ do say this. But their view seems to harmonize less readily with Scripture, especially with the words of St. Paul that it is God "who *works*²⁰ in you . . . the will." Their view seems to fit less well also with the teaching of the Councils.²¹ And it seems to clearly contradict St. Thomas.²²

To sum up, since Scripture teaches that man can control the decision to sin or not to sin, it necessarily implies that, *at least*, man can refrain from resistance in the sense of making no decision at all against grace, in the first part of the process. Scripture does exclude from our unaided power all positive salutary goods: but such an absence of resistance is merely *doing nothing*-a doing nothing that is sustained by grace itself.

83. This conclusion is confirmed by the words of Christ weeping over Jerusalem. For He assigned a reason why Jerusalem was not gathered under His wings, in saying: "You would not." He did not say that Jerusalem had the power of gathering itself under His wings: grace does that. But He plainly supposed that Jerusalem at least had the power of doing a mere nothing against the grace by which He willed to gather her children. Otherwise, Christ would have no reason to weep and lament: He would be merely indulging in histrionics.

Similarly, when the Lord says through the Apostle that He stretched out His hands all day in vain to an unbelieving people, He supposes that that people had the power of at least doing nothing against the grace which He offered with outstretched hands.

Again, when God so often exhorted the Jews through the prophets to return and be converted, He did not say they could do this without grace: but He plainly supposed that they can do the nothing of merely

making no decision against the grace. Otherwise, the Lord could not have spoken sincerely, if the decision were not basically in man's control. Rather, He should have merely arranged it all Himself.

84. Likewise, if at least this much were not in the control of man, Scripture could not speak of rewards and punishments for men. For he who cannot control basically whether he sins or not cannot be worthy of punishment. Man cannot make a good decision without grace: but he can do the nothing of making no decision against the grace that God offers so abundantly.

85. The same conclusion is implied in the Scriptural teaching on the universal salvific will. For if a man could not at least do nothing against grace, then there would be absolutely *no condition* in man according to which God could decide who should be reprobated or not. But then, the salvific will could not be sincere, because God could not simultaneously say sincerely that He willed the salvation of this man, e.g., of Marcus, and still decree the ruin of Marcus *unconditionally*,²³ i.e., without any condition which Marcus could really control.

86. Our conclusion is not Pelagian or Semipelagian: St. Paul excluded from man's unaided power only the ability of performing or initiating any positive salutary good without grace. He did not say that man could not control whether or not he would resist grace. Rather, as we have seen, his exhortations presuppose precisely that man can control this matter.²⁴

Again, if God made man so perverse that man could not only not perform any salutary good by his own power, but could not even refrain from resisting the grace offered by God-then a great dishonour would be reflected on God Himself for making a man incapable of omitting evil.

87. It is very important to note also this: Very many of the passages cited from Scripture were spoken to sinners. Therefore it is clear that even sinners (i.e., in general, at least if they are not hardened and blinded) can omit resistance to grace in the sense we have described. The Lord Himself often pleaded with sinners:²⁵ "Repent." Therefore He presupposes that sinners can omit resistance to grace: otherwise, such exhortations would be merely an empty mockery.

B. The Teaching of the Fathers of the Church

1) The Greek Fathers

88. St. Justin the Martyr:²⁶ "That we might be made in the first place, . . . this was not ours [to decide]; but that we might follow and choose the things that are pleasing to Him, through the rational faculties He gave us, He persuades us [to do] this, and leads us to faith."

Comments: St. Justin clearly teaches that we depend on God both because He gave us our faculties, and because "He persuades . . . and leads" us to faith by grace. However, in saying that God persuades and leads, he implies that man can refuse or not refuse grace. For,

although it was not ours to decide whether we would come into existence or not, it is ours to decide whether or not we will reject the faith that God offers to us.

89. St. Irenaeus:²⁷ "If . . . you give Him what is yours, that is, faith in Him, and obedience, you will receive [the work of] His artisanship, and you will be a perfect work of God. But if you do not believe Him, and run from His hand, the cause of the imperfection will be in you who did not obey, and not in Him who called you."

Comments: St. Irenaeus teaches the same condition as does St. Paul, namely, faith. The cause of evil is in us: the cause of good is in God. He clearly supposes that we can decide whether we will reject faith or not.

90. Clement of Alexandria:²⁸ "For the coming of the Saviour did not make [men] foolish and hard of heart and faithless, but prudent, amenable to persuasion, and faithful. But they who were unwilling to obey, departing from the voluntary adherence of those who obeyed, were shown to be imprudent and unfaithful and foolish. . . . They who were unwilling to obey, obviously separated themselves."

Comments: Clement obviously teaches the same as St. Irenaeus. He plainly supposes that we can decide whether or not we reject the grace that is offered.²⁹

91. St. Cyril of Jerusalem:³⁰ "Just as those who are about to make a military campaign scrutinize the ages and bodies of the soldiers, so also the Lord, enlisting souls, considers their free choices; and if He finds a hidden hypocrisy, He rejects the man as unfit for the true service; but if He finds [him] worthy, He readily gives him grace."

Comments: God in deciding to whom He will give grace is compared to a general enlisting recruits. He does not give grace without considering the free conditions in the recipient. St. Cyril plainly implies that man can determine whether or not he rejects grace.³¹

92. St. Gregory of Nazianzus:³² "Since there are some who to such an extent are proud . . . that they attribute all to themselves . . . this text [of Scripture: "there is question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy"] teaches them that even good will needs help from God; or rather, that the very choosing of the things that should be chosen is a divine thing, and a gift of God's love of man. For it is necessary that our salvation rest both on us and on God."

Comments: St. Gregory makes a keen distinction. He excludes all positive salutary good from our unaided power, even a good choice of our will. Yet, he teaches equally that in some way our salvation depends on us as well as on God. Since he has excluded positive conditions from our power, it seems that the controlling condition should be a negative. That could be resistance or the lack thereof.

93. St. Gregory of Nyssa:³³ "But [the faithless] are not at a loss for a captious contradiction in this matter. For they say that God can, if He wills, coercively draw even those who resist to an acceptance of the

preaching. Where then [would there be] control of their own affairs? Where [would be] virtue? Where [would there be] praise for those who do what is right?"

Comments: St. Gregory is replying to a difficulty proposed by infidels: "Cannot God always move our wills, even if we resist?" And he answers that God does not do this, because if He did, our freedom and control of our own affairs would be gone. Therefore he plainly implies that we can control whether or not we reject grace.

94. St. John Chrysostom:³⁴

1) "'You are saved by grace' he [St. Paul] says 'through faith.' . . . [But] 'Not even faith' he says, 'is from us.' For if He had not come, if He had not called, how could we have believed? . . . And so not even [the gift of] faith is from us. 'It is God's gift' he says."

2)³⁵ "The call and the purification came from grace. But that the one who has been called and who has been clothed in clean garments should remain such . . . comes from the effort of those who are called. The call was not on the basis of worthiness but on the basis of grace."

3)³⁶ "'If it is by grace' [someone] says, 'why are not we all saved?' Because you do not wish [to be saved]. For grace, even though it is grace, saves those who wish, not those who do not wish and who turn it aside and constantly war against it and oppose it."

Comments: On the one hand, St. John teaches that we depend entirely on God. Even faith, the very condition within man, does not come from us, at least in this sense: "If He had not come, if He had not called, how could we have believed?" Similarly, our call and purification are not due to our merits, but to grace. Yet, on the other hand, he vigorously asserts that the outcome depends on human conditions. For he explicitly says that the reason some are not saved is: "Because you do not wish" to be saved.

95. St. Cyril of Alexandria:³⁷ St. Cyril says that some make an excuse for their lack of faith, saying: "If they are called whom He foreknew according to the purpose and previous choice, this is nothing to those who have not yet believed. For we have not been called, nor predestined." And he answers saying: "He calls all to Himself . . . He sends away absolutely no one." But the reason why some do not respond is this: "they did not will to come."

Comments: St. Cyril seems to distinguish between the positive and the negative sides. On the positive side no one can come without the call. But all are called. Therefore, the critical and decisive point is found on the negative side, that is, they did not respond who did not want to come but cast grace aside. He implies that others came, who did not reject grace.³⁸

96. Theodoret:³⁹ "'For you are saved by grace through faith.' The grace of God deigned to give us these good things. We brought only faith. But even in this, divine grace was a cooperator. For he [St. Paul] adds this: 'And this is not from you. It is the gift of God. . . .' For we did

not believe of our own accord but being called, we approached, and He did not demand purity of life of us when we came, but, accepting only faith, He gave forgiveness of sins as a gift."

Comments: Theodoret teaches the same condition as St. Paul: faith, and he adds with St. Paul that faith is not in our unaided powers. Yet, because the whole process is conditioned by man, and so is under man's control, he added that "divine grace was a cooperator" in the production of faith. So he left something to us, without, however, explaining more precisely just what is the nature of our contribution.

97. St. John Damascene:⁴⁰ "For He gave us as a gift, the power of doing good, and He made us to be in our own power, so that good should come [both] from Him and from us. For God works together for good with everyone who chooses the good, so that, having observed the things that are according to nature, we may attain those that are above nature."

Comments: St. John plainly teaches that everything is conditioned by man, though he does not explain the way in which this is done. We shall see other texts of St. John, in a similar vein, in chapter 13.⁴¹

2) The Latin Fathers

98. Arnobius:⁴² "'But' you say 'if Christ came as the saviour of the human race, why does He not free all with equal munificence?'-Does not He who equally calls all, equally free all? Or does he reject or cast away anyone from His royal pardon when He, without distinction, gives to the lofty, the lowly, to slaves, to women, to children, the power of coming to Him? The font of life is open to all, He says, neither is anyone held off or repelled from the right to drink of it. If you are so haughty as to reject the kindness of the offered gift . . . how does He who invites sin against you, for His function is simply this, that He presents the fruit of His kindness to your free judgment?"

Comments: Arnobius proposes an objection: If Christ came to deliver all, why does He not deliver all? And he answers: God has done His part, but if we reject what He offers, it is our fault. If Christ did not offer grace to all, we could not all be saved. But we can reject the gift He offers. He supposes, obviously, that we are able not to reject it.

99. St. Jerome:⁴³ ". . . the heat of the sun is one, and according to the kind of thing that lies beneath it, it liquefies some, hardens others, loosens some, constricts others. For wax is melted, but mud is hardened: and yet, the nature of the heat [that each receives] is the same. So it is with the goodness and clemency of God: it hardens the vessels of wrath, that are fit for destruction; but it does not save the vessels of mercy, in a blind way, and without a true judgment, but in accordance with preceding causes, for some did not accept the Son of God; but others of their own accord willed to receive Him."

Comments: St. Jerome, the great Doctor of Holy Scripture, teaches that grace in itself always has the power to produce good, like the heat of the sun. He supposes that there are no graces that are by nature

ineffective. For the distinction is not found in the difference in the heat of the sun-or of grace-but in the characteristics of the beings that are exposed to the sun, or to grace. That is, the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of grace depends on man. (We shall see a fuller citation and explanation of this passage later, in chapter 13.⁴⁴)

100. St. Ambrose: See the texts and explanations in chapter 13.⁴⁵

101. St. Hilary:⁴⁶ "The gift of remaining in the faith is from God, but the origin of the beginning is from us. And our will must do that which is its proper task, namely, to will: God will give the increase to him who makes a beginning. . . ."

Comments: If these words are taken in a strict and positive sense, they will mean that the beginning of faith comes from us: this would be the Semipelagian heresy. St. Hilary doubtless did not intend a heretical sense. Yet, though his expression is defective, it is at least clear that he would not deny that in some way the acceptance of faith is conditioned by human conditions.

102. St. Augustine:

1)⁴⁷ "Esau was unwilling, and did not run. But even if he had willed and had run, he would have arrived by the help of God, who by His call would give [Esau] both the willing and running, unless by scorning the call, he would become reprobate."

2)⁴⁸ "For if two persons, equally disposed in soul and body, see the beauty of the same body, and on seeing it, one of them is moved to enjoy it illicitly, but the other stands firm in his chaste resolve: what do we think is the reason? . . . If both are tempted by the same temptation and one gives in and consents, but the other remains the same [as he was before the temptation]: what else is obvious except that one was willing, the other unwilling to fail in chastity? *How does this happen except by their own will*, since before they had the same disposition of body and soul?"

3)⁴⁹ "It is certain that we will when we will; but He brings it about that we will good. . . . It is certain that we act when we act, but He brings it about that we act, giving most efficacious power to our will."

4)⁵⁰ "What is the merit of a man before receiving grace, in accordance with which he receives grace, since it is only grace that makes every good merit in us, and since when God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than His own gifts?"

5)⁵¹ "He works, then, without us, so that we may will, but when we do will, and will in such a way as to act, He cooperates with us. . . ."

Comments: In texts 1 and 2, St. Augustine clearly teaches the same as the other Fathers, that is, that in some way a man can determine whether and when he will do evil. In texts 3-5 he teaches forcefully that man can do no good without grace. In fact, in text 5, he teaches that grace alone, without our cooperation, produces the beginning of a good work. But there is no contradiction in these statements. For in text 1 he implied a distinction. He said that if Esau had run, all would

have been due to God. But the fact that he did not run came from his rejection of grace. Therefore, he excludes all positive salutary goods from man's unaided power. But he does not exclude the negative conditions.⁵²

103. St. Prosper: See the texts and explanations in chapter 13.⁵³

C. In the Councils of the Church

104. Second Council of Orange: This council, held in 529 A.D. against the Semipelagians, was not a general council. However, because of a special confirmation by Pope Boniface II, its Canons have the force of solemn definitions. The council wished especially to condemn the Semipelagian error attributing to man the beginning of faith.

Canon 4:⁵⁴ "If anyone contends that God waits for our will, so that we may be purged from sin, and does not confess that the very fact that we even will to be cleansed takes place in us by the infusion and work of the Holy Spirit, he resists the same Holy Spirit. . . ."

Canon 6:⁵⁵ "If anyone . . . does not confess that it is through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit in us that we believe, will, or are able to do all these things as we ought, and . . . that it is the gift of grace that we are obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle saying: 'What have you that you have not received. . . .'"

Canon 7:⁵⁶ "If anyone asserts that we, by the good vigour of nature, are able to think anything that pertains to the salvation of eternal life . . . or to choose, or to consent to the salutary preaching (that is, of the Gospel) without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit . . . he is deceived by a heretical spirit, and does not understand the voice of God in the Gospel saying: 'Without me you can do nothing' and that word of the Apostle: 'Not that we are fit to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.'"

Canon 9:⁵⁷ ". . . as often as we do good, God works in us and with us that we may work."

105. Comments on the Canons of Orange: The council excludes from the unaided power of man even the beginning of any salutary work: to believe, will, act, obey, be humble, think, choose, consent, in a salutary way. For even the beginning of a good and salutary work is also good and salutary. But man by his own power, without grace, can do nothing that is a truly salutary good.

Nor do the words of the council apply only to the first justification. For in Canon 9 we read ". . . as often as we do good," and again in another passage of the council:⁵⁸ "in every good work, we do not begin . . . but He, with no preceding good merits on our part, first inspires in us both faith and love of Him, so that we may both faithfully seek the sacraments of baptism, and after baptism that we may be able to fulfil, with His help, the things that are pleasing to Him."

In one word, then, the council excludes from our unaided power every positive salutary good. But it does not say that man can in no way

determine whether he will sin or not. Nor does it say that man can never resist grace. Nor does it say that man cannot merely do nothing against grace.

106. The Council of Trent: Decree on justification, chapter 5:⁵⁹ ". . . when God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Spirit . . . man . . . is able to cast it away . . . yet without the grace of God he cannot, by his own free will, move himself to justice before God;"

Canon 4:⁶⁰ "If anyone says that the free will of man, moved and aroused by God, does not cooperate at all in assenting to God who arouses and calls, so as to dispose and prepare himself to obtain the grace of justification, and that he could not dissent if he wishes, but that like a sort of lifeless thing he does nothing at all and is purely passive, let him be anathema."

Canon 6:⁶¹ "If anyone says that it is not in the power of a man to make his ways evil, but that God works our evil deeds just as He does our good, not only by permission, but also properly and through Himself . . . let him be anathema."

107. Comments: The council clearly distinguishes between the power of man for good and for evil. For it is really "in the power of a man to make his ways evil." But man cannot perform good works without grace. Yet, even when grace is already present, when God is already arousing and calling by grace, man really can "dissent if he wishes." In fact, the council goes so far as to say that man can "cast [grace] away."

The council obviously supposes that man can really effectively resist: for it is "in the power of a man to make his ways evil." If resistance could not be effective, the council could not have said that it is in the power of man to *make* his ways evil: it would have said merely that a man can *resist*. Similarly, the council says that man can cast *away grace*. Now he who *casts away* something, does more than he who merely *resists*. For he who casts away, really succeeds in what he attempts to do. But he who merely resists will perhaps accomplish what he wishes, and perhaps not.

108. But by no means could we suppose that man cannot omit resistance if he so wishes. For the council says that man can "dissent *if he wishes*." Therefore it implies that if he does not wish to dissent, he is able not to dissent. Similarly, the council says that a man can "cast away" grace. It implies thereby that a man can also omit the action of casting away.

109. When we say that a man can omit the action of casting grace away, we merely say that he is able to omit doing anything against grace, that is, that he can merely do nothing against it. In saying this, we do not say man can perform a positive complete act, a positive decision made with the formal intention of abstaining from sin as if he were to say: "I hereby decide that I will not resist this grace." Such a

decision would be morally good and salutary, and so not within the unaided power of man. Rather, we are speaking of the mere absence of a bad decision, not of the presence of a good decision. For we are capable of interrupting the effects in our mind and will that grace produces: the nonresistance of which we speak consists merely of not interrupting them, without making any positive decision, in the sense explained above.⁶²

So, without the movement from the Holy Spirit, man cannot positively consent to grace. But without a movement from the Holy Spirit, he can have the malice of resistance; and he is also able simply to *do nothing* against grace.

110. We can gather some important facts from a comparison of the statements of the two councils:

1) The Council of Orange teaches that "in every good work, we do not begin." So, since it is true that it is not we who make the beginning in a good work, it is obvious that it is grace alone that makes the beginning:⁶³ we do nothing in the very first instant of the beginning of the process.

2) The Council of Trent teaches that in making the positive consent to grace, we are not "like a sort of lifeless thing," and rejects the view that man "does nothing at all and is purely passive" in making the positive consent.

So we see that we must distinguish between the *beginning* of a good work, and the further course of the same work in the positive consent to grace. Grace alone makes the beginning. But afterwards, in the *positive consent*, we are not passive, but really make a contribution, since through our faculties, which God gave us and through the power of the grace that is present and moving us, we can really act actively.

111. Schema of the entire process:

1) First, God offers grace. He does this without our cooperation. Through this grace He begins to move us, showing to or producing in our mind a concept of good, and moving our will (which does not yet move itself) to complacency in this good. When these things are done, we can still either resist, or do nothing (not resist). For the absence of resistance is at least logically presupposed before the positive consent.

2) Then, if we do not resist, grace continues, and works in us the good act of will, but in such a way that we also actively cooperate in assenting, through the power we are receiving from grace.

112. Which graces can man resist? First of all, it is clear from the context that the Council of Trent is speaking of graces that of themselves lead to eternal life. Therefore it is speaking of graces of the internal economy of personal salvation. The Council does not consider the external economy.⁶⁴ Further, we can presume that the Council does not deny that God can, by extraordinary graces, forestall or remove all human resistance if He so wills. Therefore, we conclude that the council speaks of ordinary graces within the internal economy of

personal salvation. It says that man can resist these. But there is no other limitation expressed, implied, or suggested in the text or context. Therefore we should not add any other limitation. (Later in this chapter we will consider the views of the Thomists on these points).

113. It is clear that the councils teach the same as Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, namely, that man cannot by his own unaided power without grace do any positive salutary good, but that he can resist grace, and can omit resistance to grace in the sense of merely doing nothing, making no decision against grace, in the first stage of the process. If he does not resist, grace will continue its course and produce the effect of a positive consent, in such a way however that man does not remain "like a sort of lifeless thing" in mere passivity.

D. In St. Thomas

114. St. Thomas teaches and explains all these matters lucidly. For he tells us that in the first justification, even the very assent to grace is the effect of grace:⁶⁵ ". . . when we are being justified, we consent to the justice of God by the movement of our free will. However, that movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect of grace. . . ." He teaches likewise that in accepting other graces, the acceptance cannot be made without grace:⁶⁶ "So in that effect in which our soul is moved but does not move itself, since only God moves it, the operation is attributed to God; and so this grace is called operating grace. But in that effect in which our soul is both moved [by God] and moves itself, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and so this grace is called cooperating grace. . . . Hence . . . St. Augustine says: 'He operates so that we may will: but when we will, he cooperates with us so that we accomplish.'"

115. St. Thomas also teaches that man can by his own power either resist grace or omit resistance:⁶⁷ ". . . although a man, by the movement of his free will, can neither merit nor obtain divine grace, yet he can impede himself from receiving it. . . . And *since this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace* not undeservingly is he charged with a fault who sets up an impediment to grace. For God, so far as He is concerned, is ready to give grace to all . . . but they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves."⁶⁸

By combining these passages we have, as we shall see below,⁶⁹ the same conclusions as those we gathered from the councils.⁷⁰

II. Infallible and infrustrable movements of grace

116. God is always able to move us infallibly or infrustrably. It is clear from Scripture that God always can, if He wishes, so move a man so that at least as a matter of fact the man does not resist, but instead consents. This is clearly taught in the book of Proverbs:⁷¹ "The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns it whenever he will."

Now there are two ways in which it can be infallibly certain that such a divine movement will have the intended effect:

1) According to the Molinists, the certitude comes from the special character or strength of a *moral attraction* together with the divine *prevision* by which God knows precisely what sort of and strength of an attraction is required. It is necessary that prevision be part of the process, because a merely *moral* motion (as contrasted with a physical motion) would not provide more than moral certitude of the outcome, without the addition of divine foreknowledge.

2) According to the older Thomists, the certitude comes from the fact that God *physically* moves the human will infrustrably, so that it freely but infallibly consents.

Both a moral and physical motion can be called *infallible* (if prevision is added to the moral motion). But a physical motion can be called not only infallible but *infrustrable*. The term "infrustrable" would fit less well with a merely moral motion. (Chapter 18 will discuss these motions more fully).

When does God move infallibly or infrustrably? It is obvious that God does not always move in such a way. Otherwise, there would be no sins at all. So we must inquire into the times and conditions in which God moves infallibly or infrustrably.

117. Preliminary distinctions: two economies: To solve our question, we must keep in mind the distinction between the internal economy of personal salvation, and the external economy (these were sketched in chapter 1). And we need to recall also that, as we saw in chapter 1, two categories of questions are contained within the sphere of the external economy, namely:

1) Who will be kings, physicians, emperors, generals, workmen, shoemakers, carpenters, etc.-in other words one type of question within the external economy concerns those vocations which by their nature have little or no influence in deciding the eternal fate of the individual man.

2) Who will be the Chosen People of the Old Testament, or belong, in the full sense, to the Church of the New Testament.

For the sake of clarity, it is good to divide these things into three parts, so that we divide the external economy into the merely external economy, and the external mixed economy, as follows:

1) *The merely external economy:* Here the question is: Will this man be a king, physician, general, shoemaker, carpenter etc. By their nature, as we have said, these vocations have little or no influence in deciding the eternal fate of the individual. We do not say that it would be equally good for a man if he were to knowingly choose a vocation contrary to the clear will of God. But, outside this possibility, it makes little difference in regard to salvation whether a man be a tailor or shoemaker etc., for these things do not directly exert an influence on *determining* his eternal lot.

2) *The external mixed economy*: Here the question is: who will belong to the Chosen People of the Old Testament or to the Church of the New Testament, in the full sense. Whether one has such a place or not does not strictly decide his eternal lot (as we saw in chapter 1). Yet, it does make a difference, inasmuch as those who are in the Church in the full sense have better external means of grace. Yet, even without these external means, provided that a man in some way pertains to the Church at least by implicit desire, he can be saved, through the abundant graces which God sends down to all.

3) *The internal economy*: Here the question is about the things that by their nature determine a man's eternal lot, e.g., the grant of sanctifying grace and of actual graces. Salvation itself depends directly on these.

118. Another preliminary distinction: autonomous and secondary freedom: Before taking up the question of when and in what conditions God moves men infrustrably or infallibly, we must add a distinction on two kinds of liberty.

1) In secondary liberty: The first decision is made by God, who, according to the older Thomists, *physically* moves the human will so that it consents freely but infallibly. The Thomists say that under such a movement man is truly free, but yet that he infrustrably does that which God has decided. This sort of freedom should be called *secondary freedom* because the *first* decision, after which all else flows not only infallibly but infrustrably (since the will is *physically* moved by God) is made by God alone (more on this in chapter 18).

2) In primary or autonomous freedom: The first decision is made by man, not however, without divine help and movement. Autonomous freedom can easily find a place in the process which we deduced above⁷² from Scripture and the councils. That is, briefly: God first makes a decision to send to man a grace by which He wills to move a man to a specified effect. Grace makes the beginning, for, as the Council of Orange says, it is not we who begin. Grace makes the beginning by presenting good to our intellect, causing it to perceive the good, and moving our will to an initial complacency in this good. Grace alone does these things. Man's intellect and will really act, but only God moves them: the man himself does not move them at this stage of the process. Next, a man can resist or not-resist grace. If he merely does nothing against these effects, he does not resist. He does not even make a decision: I will not resist. On condition of this non-resistance, grace moves him to the positive consent, but in such a way that man becomes active too, for he is not like something passive. (We have sketched the simplest type of process of movement of grace. Later⁷³ we will consider the more complex process in which man chooses among several alternatives).

Even though God begins the process and begins it with the purpose of moving a man to a specified thing, yet the first decisive step comes

from man, for by his resistance or lack of resistance man really controls an outcome, an outcome which is not predetermined by God in advance of this negative determination by man.

Even a physical movement from God is compatible with autonomous liberty, provided that God does not move man to the positive consent unless a man omits resistance. (It is obvious that a moral motion would fit with autonomous freedom, though it may diminish freedom if the attraction is very strong).

In regard to the existence of autonomous liberty: In view of the very transcendence of God we must say that God is not limited to using infrustrable movements (in the Thomistic sense) so that without them He would be simply *incapable* of moving a man to consent to grace. Again, in view of His transcendence, we must reject the older Thomist view that God is simply incapable of making a creature that possesses autonomous freedom. We shall see the reason for these statements more fully in the following paragraphs.

119. The divine principles of acting in the internal economy: In view of the words just cited from the book of Proverbs, and especially, in view of divine transcendence, we hold that God can move a human will physically and infrustrably so that the man freely but infallibly consents. But-it is one thing to hold that God *is able* to do this. *It is quite another thing to hold that God is incapable of moving a man to consent in another way*, so that under any other sort of divine motion (i.e., the Thomists' "sufficient grace") it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man not to *sin*, at least by a sin of omission. The older Thomists, as we have already seen briefly,⁷⁴ and will see fully later on,⁷⁵ not only hold that God can move a man physically and infrustrably, by efficacious grace, without destroying liberty, but they add that God cannot move a man to consent in any other way, so that a divine frustrable movement (sufficient grace) not only never produces a good action, but instead, under it, a man always infallibly sins, at least by a sin of omission (since, although a man cannot,⁷⁶ with the help of sufficient grace, rise or apply himself to a good act of will-*efficacious* grace being required for that-yet, God physically moves man's *deficient* will to the exercise of an act that cannot be a good act).⁷⁷ Nor can man, in the older Thomistic system, obtain efficacious grace in any way.⁷⁸ For to obtain efficacious grace, he must omit resistance to sufficient grace: but, according to the older Thomists, to omit resistance requires efficacious grace. Thus there is a complete vicious circle. God, on His part, according to the Thomists, can deny efficacious grace for even an *inculpable* inadvertence in man.

On the contrary, in view of the very transcendence of the divine will, we must hold that, as we have said, God is not limited to physical infrustrable movements, so that He would be totally *incapable* of moving a man to consent in any other way.

The salvific will leads us to the same conclusion. The system of the older Thomists cannot coexist with the universal salvific will. For in their system, all things are in such a way controlled by infrustrable movements⁷⁹ that a man is totally incapable of "distinguishing himself"⁸⁰ in regard to reprobation or non-reprobation, and in regard to whether or not he will do evil. God alone, with no previous consideration of the free conditions within man, determines whether and when a man will do good or evil and, similarly, He determines the eternal fate of each individual. *Now if God alone so determines everything that man is totally incapable of "distinguishing" whether he will be reprobated or not, then, if God really does reprobate anyone, He cannot simultaneously say that He wills the salvation of such a man.* Therefore the system of the Thomists contradicts the universal salvific will, even the minimum degree of such a will.

Nor could the older Thomists avoid the conclusion by saying that God merely permits a man to ruin himself, as we saw above.⁸¹ For man, in their system, is totally unable to "distinguish himself" as to whether he will be reprobate or not.

We do not deny that man is truly free even under infrustrable physical movements (in secondary freedom). Nor do we deny that man makes decisions in secondary freedom. Yet, *precisely because a man is unable to "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation, God cannot, within the Thomistic system, simultaneously reprobate any man and still say He wills the salvation of that same man.*⁸²

Furthermore, as we shall see below,⁸³ in the system of the older Thomists, God becomes, in the full sense, the author of sin.

120. Therefore, from the fact that the universal salvific will is sincere and truly universal, it is obvious that God will do one of two things: (1) He will either give man autonomous freedom, or (2) He will give only secondary freedom, but will not reprobate anyone-for a sincere salvific will, as we have seen, cannot reprobate anyone who has only secondary liberty, and so cannot "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation.

But, it is revealed, in the Scriptural description of the Last Judgment, that some men are reprobated, *therefore it is clear that God has granted autonomous freedom to men.* He has surely granted it to the reprobates -else He could not have reprobated them and still said He willed their salvation. But, since human nature is the same in all men, He granted autonomous freedom to all men.

Further, *it is clear that infrustrable movements are extraordinary.* For a salvific will that has its measure in infinite objective titles for each individual⁸⁴ will not stop short of anything that is ordinary in order to save a man. But, God does ordinarily stop short of infrustrable graces (if He regularly used them, no one would be lost). Therefore, infrustrable graces must be extraordinary.

By speculative considerations we can show how this is so. From the very fact that God willed to create man, it was necessary to make man free in some way. For a man who would not be free would not be a man. Therefore, since God cannot contradict Himself, His decision to make man involved necessarily the decision to make man free.

We have already shown that God has actually, at least by positive decision, made man free in autonomous freedom. But we can also show that it is the very nature of man to have autonomous freedom. This can be seen if we recall that the kind of action a being can perform depends on the kind of being it is: in the familiar scholastic axiom: *agere sequitur esse*. Now since man, as he is actually constituted, does have autonomous freedom, if we compare to actual man a hypothetical creature that would be like man in all other respects except that it would have only secondary, not autonomous freedom, then, since the kind of act a being can perform depends on the kind of being it is, it becomes apparent that a being that could not act in autonomous freedom would be quite different from man. That difference would be no small accidental thing: it would flow from the very nature of the being (for the kind of action a being can perform depends on the kind of being it is). The difference is so large between a creature having autonomous freedom and one lacking it and having only secondary freedom that the Thomists declare it metaphysically impossible for God to make a creature having autonomous freedom. A difference of such magnitude and kind presupposes a different nature. Therefore a creature like man in every respect except autonomous freedom would not be a man. Hence, it is part of the very nature of man to have autonomous freedom. Therefore, in deciding to make man, God had to make man naturally autonomously free: otherwise God would contradict Himself, just as He would contradict Himself if he decided to make man, but not to make man rational.

Therefore, since the nature of man is such, if God, after making man such, were to regularly reduce the freedom of man to a secondary freedom, by using infrustrable motions, He would contradict Himself by not respecting the natural condition of the nature He had decided to make.⁸⁵ *God can, of course, use such motions sometimes by way of exception. But to do so regularly would involve Him in a self-contradiction.* Therefore, if, for these reasons, God can use infrustrable motions only by way of exception, it is clear that *they are extraordinary*.

Our reasoning is confirmed, at least to some degree, by another chain of thought. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that God always used infrustrable movements and saved everyone. There would be two classes of men: (1) Those who would have been saved even if God has used only frustrable motions. (2) Those who would not have been saved if God has used only frustrable motions.

As to the first group: It would be unreasonable for God to use infrustrable movements to save those who would have been saved with frustrable movements.⁸⁶ It would be unreasonable because it would diminish both the glory of God and the merit of man (we note in passing the interlock of these two: cf. again chapter 3). It would diminish the glory of God because it is less glory to God if a creature chooses to adhere to Him when it cannot really "distinguish itself" to do otherwise, than if a creature chooses to adhere to Him when it really could "distinguish itself" to do otherwise. Further, God would have used a greater exercise of power (for an infrustrable movement requires transcendent power) and have produced thereby a lesser effect: that would be less glorious for Him.⁸⁷ The merit of man would also be diminished: for there is less merit in choosing to adhere to God when one cannot really "distinguish oneself" to do otherwise, than when one really could have rejected Him.

As to the second group, those who would not have been saved if they had been moved by only frustrable movements: These would have been saved, in a sense, against their will, i.e., against the will they would have had if they had been given a chance to "distinguish themselves." But to regularly save those who, if able, would have rejected salvation, is scarcely fitting, if at all reasonable.

We did not consider at this point the possibility that God might have reprobated some, though giving them only secondary freedom. For we have already shown that such a hypothesis contradicts even the smallest degree of a true universal salvific will.

The *weight* of the reasons for which God created man having autonomous freedom can also be seen in the following way. God vehemently desires that all be saved: He has shown this by the passion and by establishing infinite objective titles for each individual as we have seen. Likewise, as Infinite Sanctity, He vehemently hates all sin. If He had given only secondary freedom, he could have achieved both goals: all could have been saved, and He would have never been as it were forced to material cooperation in sin, by way of divine concursus. The older Thomists try to say that God is completely incapable of creating a creature capable of autonomous freedom. But, we have shown by Scripture that He actually has created man as such a creature. No reasoning can wipe out the actual existence of an accomplished fact. He did it: therefore He was able to do it.

But even by way of reason we can explain how man can be free in autonomous freedom. For the whole process in the natural order can be explained in a way closely parallel to the explanation we have given above⁸⁸ for the supernatural order. That is: God, in the simplest type of process in the natural order, begins to move man by causing a simple apprehension of good in man's intellect and an initial complacency in man's will. This done, man can either resist or omit resistance. And just as no decision or positive act is required from man in not resisting

grace in this first logical momentum, similarly in the natural order: the effects of the divine movement in the intellect and will continue by force of the divine movement-not by the work of man. Something definite,⁸⁹ a resistance from man would be required to remove these effects: but nothing is required of him that they remain, since they remain by force of the divine movement. If man does not resist, the divine movement continues its course, and moves man to positive assent of will in such a way that in this second logical momentum he is both moved by God and moving himself in virtue of the power then being received from God in the faculties which he has previously received from God

We can add that the divine motion can be specified in itself⁹⁰ rather than versatile (as the Molinists hold). And it can be a physical⁹¹ motion without destroying autonomous liberty, provided that God does not move to positive consent until the condition of non-resistance is verified in man.

An added partial confirmation of the conclusion that infrustrable movements are extraordinary will be provided in chapter 8. For there we shall see that St. Paul promises the grace of perseverance to all. Yet, not all actually persevere. Therefore, even the grace of perseverance is not regularly an infrustrable grace. But, if even the grace of perseverance is not regularly an infrustrable grace, it is not likely that other graces are regularly infrustrable.

121. Several passages of St. Thomas confirm that infrustrable graces are extraordinary: In the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas explains why not all are saved:⁹² "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition, because they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the incarnation within themselves. . . . For freedom of will, by which he can adhere or not adhere to the incarnate God, was not to be taken away from man, lest the good of man be forced, and so be rendered meritless and unpraiseworthy."

In order to bring out the implications of this passage let us note the context: St. Thomas wants to explain why not all are saved if the incarnation really provided means enough for all. In his answer he supposes that two things cannot actually coexist: (1) That all be saved, (2) That man be truly free. The reason why they cannot coexist is that if men really are free, some of them will *be unwilling* to accept the fruit of the incarnation, which is grace. That is, they will resist grace. But, if St. Thomas held the system of sufficient and efficacious graces which the older Thomists propose, in which everything is controlled by infrustrable motions and infallible permissions, then these two things would not be incompatible. For God really could save all by infrustrable movements and yet, all would be truly free, so that the good of man would not be forced, meritless, and unpraiseworthy. Therefore it is

implied that St. Thomas did not hold the older Thomistic system.⁹³ For if he really held that system, then his explanation in this passage would not solve the question.

Similarly, that which is really decisive, according to the Thomists, is not the fact that *men are unwilling* to accept the fruits of the incarnation: according to the older Thomists, men are completely incapable of "distinguishing themselves".⁹⁴ So the real explanation why not all are saved would be, according to the Thomists, that *God is unwilling*. But this is not what St. Thomas says: he, on the contrary, says that the reason is that men "are unwilling." He takes it for granted that men can "distinguish themselves" in regard to reprobation or in regard to accepting or not accepting the fruits of the incarnation.

Further, in the system of the older Thomists, the indisposition or resistance to grace is present in *all* men, unless God forestalls or removes it. For men, in their system, in the adequate sense are not able not to resist.⁹⁵ It is true, the Thomists say, that man has the *ability* of not resisting, but they add that man lacks the *application* of this ability-which is refused unless a man refrains from resisting. Hence, in the adequate sense, man is unable not to resist: for if he could do so, he would by that very fact be able to "distinguish himself"-a thing the Thomists say man cannot do.⁹⁶-But, to return to the argument, according to the Thomists, the indisposition is present in *all* men. But that which is present in *all* cannot provide the explanation why *some* receive and others do not receive the fruit of the incarnation. Yet, St. Thomas thinks he is really giving the explanation in saying that men "are unwilling." Nor could the difficulty be removed by saying that God gives pardon to some to show His mercy, and not to others, to display His justice⁹⁷-such an explanation (if it were true that God acted that way) would explain only why *in general* God would want to have reprobates and elect. It would not explain why *these particular men* are reprobated and those particular men are saved. But St. Thomas thinks he is explaining not why there are reprobates in general, but why these particular individuals are reprobated. For he says that these are reprobated precisely because they "are unwilling" to receive the fruit of the incarnation.

It is obvious, then, that the text we are considering cannot be explained if we suppose that St. Thomas held that all things are ruled by infrustrable motions, and that such motions are part of *ordinary* providence. But if, on the contrary, we suppose that St. Thomas considers infrustrable motions *extraordinary*, then it is easy to understand the passage and we can see why he did not mention them in any way in the passage cited. For he wanted to explain the ordinary order and providence: it was not required that he speak of extraordinary providence.

122. Again, St. Thomas explains how it happens that prayer, even though it is made with all the due conditions, sometimes does not

obtain its effect, and yet, the promise of Christ about prayer is not made void:⁹⁸ "It happens sometimes that a prayer made for others does not obtain its effect, even though it is made devoutly and perseveringly, and for things that pertain to salvation. [This happens] because of an impediment on the part of the one for whom the prayer is made. . . ."

So, St. Thomas explains that prayer for another sometimes does not have its effect because of an impediment in the one for whom the prayer is made, that is, because of his resistance to grace. Now in the system of the Thomists, in which everything is controlled by infrustrable movements, the good effect of a prayer cannot be brought about without an efficacious grace: for, in their system, a sufficient grace never produces a good work. Further, in their system, man always resists, unless he receives efficacious grace. Therefore, because resistance is *always* present unless God forestalls or removes it by efficacious grace, the resistance cannot provide the explanation why, in some cases, God does not give efficacious grace through which the prayer could be granted. For, since the same impediment, resistance, is present in *all*, it cannot provide the explanation of why the prayer is not granted in *some* cases. So, the true explanation of the refusal of a prayer would not be the impediment in man: it would be that God would be unwilling. But if that were true, the promise of Christ would be made void; and the explanation of St. Thomas would not explain the matter.

We must recall too that in the system of the older Thomists, man cannot, in the adequate sense, refrain from resistance.⁹⁹ For if he could, he could "distinguish himself."¹⁰⁰ But the Thomists deny that he can. Hence, it would follow that God would refuse to grant a prayer because of something that is not within the power of man.

If however, on the contrary, we suppose that St. Thomas considers infrustrable motions (which are needed to forestall or remove resistance) as *extraordinary*, then it is easy to see why he does not suppose that God will regularly move men who resist. Thus the explanation of St. Thomas really will hold.

St. Thomas makes a similar comment on merit for others, with a similar implication.¹⁰¹

123. The divine principles of acting in the merely external economy:

Even in matters of this economy God does not regularly move man infrustrably, since the reason explained above¹⁰² holds here too. However, we must notice that many things can be more easily and often accomplished in this external economy by frustrable motions, since men can more easily feel the attractions of things in the natural order, and because man is less likely to resist natural attractions. Furthermore, by giving different men different talents and abilities, God can incline them in various directions: for in general men like to do

that which they do easily and well. Therefore, it is rather easy for God to move men in these matters even without infrustrable motions.

It is necessary for God to move men in many things in this economy. For if all men wanted to be physicians, or if all wanted to be shoemakers, the world could not go on, for it is necessary to have men well distributed in a variety of vocations. Hence, God moves men by varied talents and various attractions so that this distribution will be made. In practice, a sufficient number will come into various vocations without the use of infrustrable motions.

124. The divine principles of acting in the external mixed economy: Here too God does not regularly move infrustrably, because the reason explained above holds here too. And we can add that as we saw earlier in this book,¹⁰³ the words of St. Paul to the Romans seem to imply that God does not regularly move men infrustrably to enter the Church.

However, the assignment of places in the world in which the proximate opportunities are provided for full entry into the Church does not affect autonomous liberty, and so does not fall under the reasons explained in §120. As we saw in chapter 1, these assignments are not made according to merits, but according to other considerations. We also made¹⁰⁴ the speculation that in general, God makes these assignments in such a way, following the needs and foreseen resistance of each, that as many as possible may be saved.

125. The same principles seem to apply to vocations to the priesthood and the religious life. God does not choose men for these callings according to their merits, but according to other considerations. He moves them by attractions that are short of infrustrable movements, and by giving various talents and abilities. The fact that He does not regularly use infrustrable movements for such vocations is clear from the fact that in our own times those who follow these vocations are fewer than are needed. But we could not suppose that God would really leave the Church with too few vocations. So it must be that many receive these vocations by way of frustrable movements, and resist them. If God regularly used infrustrable movements, there would be no shortage.

Scholion on Hardness and Blindness

126. It is clear both from Scripture and from experience that sometimes men become hardened or blinded. A man, by repeated sins, makes himself such that he is no longer moved by the usual means, that is, the usual graces and exhortations that move other men do not touch him.¹⁰⁵

How does hardening take place?

1) Repeated sins *increase the natural inclination to sin*. The use of the sacrament of Penance will not always remove this increase unless the change of heart is specially strong, or many difficult works of penance are performed. For that reason the Church in the first centuries

ordered difficult penances. Now, even though the Church no longer strictly commands such works in connection with the sacrament of Penance, yet she does not cease to advise and urge us to do them, and she does this even though she so easily grants many plenary indulgences. For indulgences can diminish or remove the punishment due to sin, but they do not touch the evil inclinations, for the latter are in the natural order. If a man keeps on sinning and does not take care to work against these increased inclinations they will grow gradually. They can, in time, *grow to such a point that a man always or almost always, by force of habit, actively resists grace*. If that happens, the usual means will not touch or convert him: he is hardened.

2) If a man sins mortally for the first time, e.g., by drunkenness, he will probably feel remorse of conscience. For he has acted contrary to his beliefs. But if the same man keeps on sinning, gradually the *remorse of conscience is dimmed*, so that eventually he will be able to sin and feel no remorse at all. Then the graces and exhortations that move other men will not move him.

3) Just as a good life increases the ability of a man to see religious truths, especially in moral matters, so, on the contrary, a bad life diminishes that power. For example, a man indulging in drunkenness is at first disturbed, because he acts contrary to his beliefs. But if he continues in the same sins, he will eventually reach a point at which he will no longer consider drunkenness to be a sin, or at least, not a great sin. For the things that he says in his beliefs cannot remain indefinitely in conflict with the things he says by his actions. Actions speak louder than words. As a result, eventually a man will either conform his beliefs to his actions, or his actions to his beliefs. The conflict must be resolved. Thus it is that sins cause blindness, so that a man gradually *loses the power of seeing the truth in moral matters*.

Now it is obvious that a man whose mind can no longer see the moral truths that other men see, and whose will and lower nature are more and more inclined to sin, will not be moved by the means that move others. He will not be touched by exhortations and will not even perceive the presence of ordinary interior graces that move others.¹⁰⁶

127. What sort of grace will move a hardened man? Certainly, the graces will need to be greater than ordinary graces at least in degree. But must they be different also *in kind*? It seems that we must reply affirmatively, and say that they must be really *extraordinary*. For these men actively and persistently resist grace. Now, as we have explained above, God does not, within *ordinary* providence, move men infrustrably so as to forestall or overcome resistance.¹⁰⁷ Hence it is clear that the grace required to move a hardened sinner must be greater not only in degree but also in kind: it must be extraordinary.

128. Conclusions:

1) Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church explicitly teach that man can accomplish no positive salutary good of his own power

without grace. At least most of the Fathers also clearly teach this. Some few Fathers, though they knew well that we depend entirely on God and that yet we can really determine whether or not we will adhere to God, not knowing how to reconcile these two truths, expressed a few points in less apt ways, because they were trying not to deny that man can really determine whether or not he will adhere to God.

2) Scripture, the Fathers, and the Magisterium also explicitly teach that man can, by his own power, determine whether and when and what sort of evil he will commit.

3) Scripture, the Fathers, and the Magisterium also explicitly teach that man can resist grace. From the words of the Council of Trent, considered in context, it is clear that the graces which the Council says man can resist are the ordinary graces of the internal economy. The Council makes clear too that man can effectively resist these graces.

4) It is at least implicitly taught that man, even though he be a sinner (at least if he is not hardened) can omit resistance to grace, in the first part of the process in which grace moves him, in the sense described above.¹⁰⁸

5) The councils distinguish between the beginning of a good work and the further progress towards consent of the same work. For in the beginning, we do nothing at all: grace alone works. But in making the positive consent itself, we really actively cooperate. Before this consent, we are really able to resist the grace that has already begun to move us; and we can omit this resistance.

6) It is clear that God also can, when He so wills, move the wills of men infrustrably. But this belong to extraordinary providence.

129. Objection 1: But the older Thomist's system of sufficient and efficacious graces can be proved from Scripture, the Magisterium, and St. Thomas. Nor does it contradict the universal salvific will.

Answer: We shall show: (1) That the theory of the older Thomists lacks all foundation in Scripture, (2) and in the Magisterium, (3) and in St. Thomas; (4) We shall also show that the Thomists cannot reconcile their system with the universal salvific will. (5) Further, we shall show in summary fashion (fuller treatment in chapter 18) that their system makes God the author of sin.

1) The theory of the older Thomists has no foundation in Scripture: The texts they cite from Scripture are far from proving their point. This is clear from a consideration of the passages adduced by Garrigou-Lagrange.

To prove the existence of sufficient graces: He cites first, Isaiah 5:4:¹⁰⁹ "What more should I have done for my vineyard and I did not do it?" Garrigou-Lagrange comments:¹¹⁰ "Now if God did not have to do anything more, the help is really sufficient. But in this text we do not read, 'What more is there that I *could have* done.' So we see that God can do more, but is not bound to do it."

However, the words of Isaiah show merely that God had given the grace with which the vineyard really could have produced fruit: He had done everything possible *within ordinary providence*. They do not prove that God gave only a grace with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable to produce fruit unless something more would be added. Furthermore, Garrigou-Lagrange often speaks of that which God "is not bound to do." But he misses the point. The *basic* question is not what God is *bound* to do, but what He has *freely decided* to do. *On the most basic level*, God is not bound to do anything; He cannot strictly owe anything *to a creature*. Yet, the revelation of the salvific will has shown that He has *freely decided* to do much-to be precise (as we saw in chapters 4 and 5), He freely decided to bind Himself in the Covenant (or implicit agreement), by infinite objective titles for each individual man. In that sense, God is bound to do everything needed for the salvation of each individual, within the realm of ordinary providence (that is, excluding infrustrable graces). So nothing in the text cited proves the definition of sufficient grace that Garrigou-Lagrange holds.

Again, he quotes the words of Proverbs 1:24: "I have called and you have refused. . . ." Obviously, these words do not prove that God gave only a grace with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable that man would *not* resist.

Similarly, he cites Isaiah 65:2: "All day I stretched out my hands to a people that did not believe and that contradicted." But these words not only do not say anything about a grace with which a good act is metaphysically inconceivable-on the contrary, as we explained above,¹¹¹ they imply that the grant of grace is really conditioned by human conditions that are fully in human control.

He also quotes the Gospel of St. Matthew 23:37: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem . . . how often I wanted to gather together your children . . . and you were unwilling!" Again, these words by no means prove that Christ gave to Jerusalem only a grace with which, if nothing were added, the conversion of Jerusalem would be metaphysically inconceivable. For if He had done that, He would not have been able to weep sincerely because Jerusalem was not converted.

He quotes too from the Acts of the Apostles 7:51: ". . . with stiff-neck and uncircumcised hearts and ears, you have always resisted the Holy Spirit."

And the words of second Corinthians 6:1: "We entreat you not to receive the grace of God in vain." The words of Acts surely do not prove that God had given only a grace with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable for man not to resist. The words of second Corinthians prove the contrary of Garrigou-Lagrange's position, as we saw earlier in this chapter. For if it were metaphysically inconceivable that a man would not resist when he had only sufficient grace, and yet he could not control whether or not he would receive

efficacious grace, it would be superfluous-or rather, a mockery- to encourage him not to resist.

To prove the existence of efficacious graces: he cites the following passages:¹¹²

Ezekiel 36:26: "I will give you a new heart and place a new spirit in the midst of you, I will take away the stony heart from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit in the midst of you, and bring it about that you walk in my precepts and that you keep and work my judgments."

Esther 13:9: "Lord almighty king, all things are in your power, and there is no one who can resist your will if you decree to save Israel. . . . You are the almighty Lord of all, nor is there anyone who resists your majesty." And *ibid.*, chapter 14: "Remember, Lord, and show yourself to us in the time of our tribulation, and give me confidence, Lord, king of gods, and of all power . . . and change the heart [of Ahasuerus] to hatred of our enemy. Mighty God above all, hear the voice of those who have no other hope, and deliver us from the hand of our enemies, and deliver me from my fear." And *ibid.*, 15:11: "And God changed the spirit of the king to meekness."

Proverbs 21:1: "Just as the divisions of the waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, wherever He wills, he will incline it."

Wisdom 3:1: "The souls of the just are in the hand of God." And *ibid.*, 10:12: "He gave to him a great struggle so that he conquered."

Garrigou-Lagrange also cites some other similar texts, which can be seen either in Scripture itself or in Garrigou-Lagrange's book: Eccl 33:13; Is 29:16, 45:9, 64:8; Jer 18:6; Rom 9:21; Is 10 and 14; Ps 94; Jn 15:5, 10:28; Rom 8:35; 2 Cor 3:5; Heb 4:12; Rom 9:15; Phil 2:13; 1 Cor 4:7.

We have already considered some of these texts in chapter 1. But of all of them we can say that, at most, some texts show that God can, when He wishes, move a man infrustrably. But they by no means prove that God *cannot* move a man to consent in any other way than by an infrustrable movement, so that with any other movement (a sufficient grace) not only will no good work take place, but it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man not to sin at least by a sin of omission. Furthermore, all the texts cited above could be explained by the use of moral rather than physical movements: God used a sufficient strong moral movement, and, by His foreknowledge, knew infallibly that the desired result would follow. (As we have already said, we do hold that God can move infrustrably when He so wills, even with a physical movement, without thereby destroying secondary freedom.)

2) The theory of the older Thomists has no foundation in the Magisterium:

*To prove the existence of sufficient graces:*¹¹³ He cites first the words of the Council of Valence saying that: "those who are wicked do not perish because they could not be good, but because they were

unwilling to be good." Now these words prove that a man can resist grace, but they do not prove that some receive only graces such that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them not to resist.

He quotes also some condemned propositions of Jansenius: "Some precepts of God are impossible for just men even though they will and try; there is lacking to them the grace by which they may become possible." But the condemnation of this proposition proves only that the grace with which men can act well is never lacking: it does not prove that some receive only graces such that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them to do good.

Again, he cites the second condemned proposition of Jansenius: "Interior grace, in the state of fallen nature, is never resisted," and the third: "Freedom from necessity is not required, in the state of fallen nature, so that a man may merit or demerit. . . ." But these words are far from proving Garrigou-Lagrange's thesis.

He gives only a summary of the fourth proposition of Jansenius, thus: "The fourth proposition is that the semipelagian heresy consisted in [saying] this, that the human will can resist or obey grace." Therefore, because the proposition was condemned, we infer: "It is *not* semipelagian to say that the human will can resist or obey grace." But this not only does not establish the thesis of Garrigou-Lagrange: rather, it almost proves ours (let us recall that, as we saw earlier in this chapter, we hold that it is not in man's unaided power to give positive consent to grace without grace).

Similarly, he cites, in part, other texts, namely: DB 1359-75, 1521, 200, 321, 804. But, just as the texts we have examined, so also these do not prove his position.

*To prove the existence of efficacious graces:*¹¹⁴ He gives the following passages from the Council of Orange: Canon 16: "Let no one glory over that which he seems to have, as if he did not receive it from God." Canon 22: "No one has anything of himself except sin and a lie." Canon 20: "Man does no good acts that God does not grant that he may do." From the Council of Trent, he quotes: Session 6, chapter 13: "For God, unless they themselves fail His grace, just as He has begun a good work, so He will complete it." Canon 22: "If anyone says that a man who has been justified either can persevere in the justice he has received without a special help of God, or that he cannot [persevere] with it, let him be anathema."

In regard to the first of the above citations, Garrigou-Lagrange adds the comment: "This is the formulation of the principle of predilection, that is, no one would be better than another, if he were not more loved by God." But actually, the words of the Council mean only that a man cannot have any positive salutary good except by grace. We too have taught this, insistently, in the first part of this chapter: but it does not follow that man cannot "distinguish himself," in regard to the distinction between the reprobate and the elect, or as to whether or

not he will do evil. For it is one thing to say that we cannot accomplish salutary good without grace; another thing to say that God does not freely wish to consider the negative free conditions of a man (resistance or nonresistance) in giving or refusing graces. As we saw above,¹¹⁵ Garrigou-Lagrance thinks he can deduce such a principle from 1 Cor 4:7. But we have already shown¹¹⁶ in chapter 1 that the deduction is invalid. Garrigou-Lagrance also thinks he can draw the same conclusion from ST I 20.3.c. We shall show below, in the reply to objection 7,¹¹⁷ that he does not correctly interpret St. Thomas on this point.

The other texts cited above also mean only that a man cannot have any positive salutary good without grace: but we hold that too, without concluding that a man cannot "distinguish himself." The texts from the Council of Trent refer to the gift of perseverance. In the first of them, the Council itself explicitly refers to the condition in man: "unless they themselves fail His grace . . . He will complete it [the good work He has begun]." As we have shown briefly above,¹¹⁸ and will see more fully in chapter 8, the words of Trent not only do not prove the position of Garrigou-Lagrance, but, on the contrary, they prove ours.

3) The theory of the older Thomists has no foundation in St. Thomas: In chapter 18, we shall show in a positive way what is the real position of St. Thomas, which is not the same as that of the Thomists. Among other things, we shall see, in chapter 18, that St. Thomas has two series of texts. The Thomists frequently cite the first series, but do not so often quote the second. The Molinists, conversely, prefer the second series. In the explanation we will give in chapter 18, we can embrace whole-heartedly both series.

Furthermore, in the *Prima secundae*, where St. Thomas divides and subdivides grace in many ways, he has not one word about a distinction of graces into sufficient and efficacious. Likewise, in all his other works, he simply never proposes such a distinction. Garrigou-Lagrance thinks he can find such a distinction implicitly present in some passages. *A priori* it seems unlikely that St. Thomas would propose such a system and distinction-which is by no means easy to understand-only implicitly and never explicitly, and that he would do this not only in his more difficult works, but even in the Summa, which he explicitly intended for beginners.

However, it will be worthwhile to inspect the passages which Garrigou-Lagrance proposes so as to see that such a distinction cannot be supported by them:

To prove the existence of sufficient graces: Garrigou-Lagrance tries to find this distinction in various places.¹¹⁹ First of all in ST III. 79.7 ad 2: "The passion of Christ is profitable to all, as far as *sufficiency* is concerned, both for the remission of fault and for the gaining of grace and glory, but it does not have its *effect* except in those who are joined to the passion of Christ by faith and charity." But the fact that St.

Thomas speaks of sufficiency and effect in this text hardly proves that he really meant to say that the distinction between those who are saved or not saved by the passion depends on two kinds of graces such that with the first kind ("sufficient") it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to act well or to be saved, while with the other kind ("efficacious") it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to resist. Rather, St. Thomas himself in another passage explains the same point:¹²⁰ "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition, *because they are unwilling* to receive the fruits of the incarnation within themselves. . . ." We note that he does not say: "because they received only graces with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them to be saved," but rather: "because they are unwilling." As we have shown above,¹²¹ these words completely exclude the system of the older Thomists.

Likewise, Garrigou-Lagrange quotes *III Sent.* d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2 ad 5: "Christ satisfied for all human nature sufficiently, but not effectively; because not all become partakers of that satisfaction; a thing which comes from their importunity, not from insufficiency of the satisfaction itself." But this surely does not prove the thesis of Garrigou-Lagrange. Rather, it means the same as the citation of note 120 above.

Similarly, he refers the reader to *De veritate* 29.7 ad 4, but he does not quote it. The text itself reads thus: ". . . the merit of Christ, as far as its sufficiency is concerned, is the same towards all, but not as far as efficacy is concerned. This happens partly as a result of free will, partly from divine choice, by which to some the effect of the merits of Christ is mercifully conferred, but from others it is withheld by just judgment."- Here too it is obvious that St. Thomas is not speaking of two kinds of graces, but of the question whether the effect of the passion which is sufficient in itself, actually reaches all. He replies that the effect does not come to all, and gives two reasons: (1) Free will, (2) Divine choice. He explains the second reason thus: the effect is given to some, by mercy. That is, it is the mercy of God, not our merits, that is the cause of predestination and salvation. But from others the effect is withheld "by just judgment." Now a just judgment is made only after considering demerits. Therefore the sense is: God refuses election or predestination to some because of their demerits. (Below¹²² we shall examine this text and another similar one more fully).

Again, Garrigou-Lagrange quotes St. Thomas' commentary on 1 Timothy 2:5: "Effectively for some; but sufficiently for all, because the price of His blood is sufficient for the salvation of all, but it does not have effectiveness except in the elect, because of an impediment." But this text means nearly the same as the text cited above at note 120.

Likewise, he quotes ST I-II 106.2 ad 2 which says that God "gives sufficient help not to sin." But this does not prove that God gives some

helps such that with them alone it would be metaphysically inconceivable they would not sin.

He cites also the commentary on Ephesians, chapter 3, lesson 2:¹²³

"God gives the *faculty* by pouring in virtue and grace, by which a man is made *capable* and *fit* for working. But the work itself He grants inasmuch as He works interiorly in us, moving and inciting to good . . . inasmuch as His power works in us the *will* and the *accomplishment*. . . ." But these words mean merely that man needs a movement from God not only so that he may be fit to work a good work, but also in the very performance itself. We teach the same, as we have seen in the first part of this chapter. For man can do nothing good and salutary except by grace. But it does not follow that God gives certain ones only such a grace that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them not to sin, and that He does this with no consideration at all of conditions that really depend on man so that a man is completely incapable of "distinguishing himself" in regard to reprobation, or in regard to the decision to do or not to do evil.

Other passages cited by Garrigou-Lagrance in the same pages¹²⁴ have the same or a similar meaning, namely: ST I-II, 109.1: "The action of the intellect and of any created being depends on God in two ways: 1, inasmuch as man has from Him the form by which he acts; 2, inasmuch as man is moved to act by Him." And in article 2 of the same question: "Man . . . needs an added power above the power of nature in two respects, namely, that he may be healed, and further, that he may perform a work of supernatural virtue." Garrigou-Lagrance also refers the reader to articles 9 and 10, and ST II- III, 137, a.4 and I-II, 137.7 and 10. But immediately after, he confesses that these texts do not prove the thesis he wants to establish: "At least, St. Thomas always distinguishes infused habits which grant the ability of acting well supernaturally, and the actual grace which gives the good work itself; in fact, he distinguished good thoughts which are from God, and the good consent, which presupposes a greater help." In a note, moreover, he at once quotes ST I-II, 112.3: "If God who moves so intends that man whose heart He is moving, should obtain grace, man infallibly obtains it."-But these words prove only that *when God so wills* He can so move a heart that a man is infallibly moved. They do not prove that God is completely incapable of moving a man to consent in any other way than by an infrustrable motion. We too teach that God can, when He so wills, move infrustrably.¹²⁵ And even in frustrable movements, we teach that God moves a man's will physically, but that He does not move a man all the way to positive consent except on the condition of the omission of resistance. Only if that condition is fulfilled does God intend to move to consent.

Then, in the same note, Garrigou-Lagrance continues: "In fact, St. Thomas gives the supreme foundation of the distinction of efficacious and sufficient grace: ST I, q.19. a.6, ad 1: 'Whatever God wills *simply*,

is done,' although 'that which He wills antecedently, is not done.'" Again, this text does not prove the distinction of Garrigou-Lagrance. We ourselves teach the same as the text just cited, for we said above: ". . . even in frustrable movements . . . God moves a man's will physically, but . . . He does not move a man all the way to positive consent except on the condition of the omission of resistance. Only if that condition is fulfilled does God *intend* to move to consent." That is, *antecedently*, God always wills that the man to whom grace is offered should really receive it. But *simply* (in His consequent will) God wills or intends this only on condition of non-resistance-which does not compel, nor move God. God has freely decreed that within ordinary providence He will not move man to consent except on this condition, as we have proved earlier in this chapter from Scripture, the Fathers, and the Magisterium. Hence St. Thomas himself says:¹²⁶ ". . . the consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature." Garrigou-Lagrance also cites in the same note, *De malo* 6.1 ad 3 and ST I-II. 10.4 ad 3. But they have the same meaning as ST I-II. 112.3. *To prove the existence of efficacious graces:* Garrigou-Lagrance cites very many passages of St. Thomas.¹²⁷ Merely to copy out all, without comment, would be very long. But that is not required for our present purpose. In Chapters 14 and 18 we shall positively show that the position of St. Thomas is not what Garrigou-Lagrance claims, and we will submit all the principal texts to detailed analysis. It is not required that we examine all at this point, since there is absolutely no passage in which St. Thomas explicitly teaches what Garrigou-Lagrance holds. So, for the present, we shall give the references, and shall consider only the principal texts alleged. Now these principal texts can be divided into four categories, according as they more formally speak of divine causality in general, of divine foreknowledge, of predestination, or of the transcendence of the divine will:

a) *Texts on divine causality in general:* Garrigou-Lagrance refers us to ST 1.2.3, but he does not quote it, he merely gives the substance as follows: "Every movement comes from the first mover, all created causality depends on the supreme cause; every contingent being depends on the first necessary being; every being that has being by participation has it from the Being that is Being by its essence; whatever is ordered to something else is so by the first Orderer. There are five ways to prove the existence of God. Now from these it is clear that God is the one who *determines*, and cannot be *determined by another*, neither in His knowledge, nor in any other attribute. Whatever is outside God, even the free determination of our will, must have the *relation of causality or dependence* in respect to God. So our whole question is reduced to this **dilemma**: '*God is either determining or determined by another: there is no other alternative.*' This is evident from the following texts of St.

Thomas, Ia, q. 6, a. 4: 'Each thing is said to be good with divine goodness inasmuch as it [divine goodness] is the first exemplary, efficient and final principle of all goodness.' But, a salutary choice is good. Therefore."

Comments: We too hold that every positive salutary choice comes from divine causality, as we have explained in the first part of this chapter. Grace alone makes the beginning, producing a simple apprehension of good in our intellect, and an initial complacency in the will. If we do not resist, grace continues, and produces the consent itself, in such a way, however, that, as Trent teaches, we also cooperate actively. Therefore the human contribution in the first stage, in which comes the first condition which controls the outcome is something *negative*, that is, the evil specification¹²⁸ (if we resist) or the mere absence of resistance (if a good act is to follow). But, a negative does not require divine causality, for it is non-being. Hence, the arguments of Garrigou-Lagrange based on divine causality prove nothing against our position. As to the dilemma that God is either determining or determined-this dilemma is not found in St. Thomas, but is inferred by Garrigou-Lagrange. For convenience, we shall reply to it separately, in the answer to objection 8 below. (Similar problems are also treated in other objections to this chapter, below).

b) *Texts on divine foreknowledge:* All the texts cited come from ST I. 14 (from articles 5, 8, 11 and 14) except the last one, which is ST I. 16. 7 ad 3 (by typographical error the words "De veritate" are inserted in this citation in Garrigou-Lagrange's book).

From ST I. 14.5 he quotes: "Since the divine power extends to other things, since it is the first efficient cause of all beings, it is necessary that God knows things other than Himself. *He sees things other than himself not in themselves but in Himself.*" Garrigou-Lagrange comments: "But, if, out of two men, equally tempted and equally helped, one would be converted and one not, that difference would not be from God. Therefore God could not know that in Himself, in His own power. [This conclusion would be] contrary to the principle of St. Thomas."

Comments: In the comments of Garrigou-Lagrange there is an underlying assumption that God cannot be said to know anything in Himself unless He knows it by His own causality. But let us read the words of St. Thomas on the expression "to know things in Himself." In the body of the same article, St. Thomas explains: "One knows a thing in itself when he knows it by its proper intelligible species, which is adequate for its object: just as when an eye sees a man by the species of a man. One sees something in another, when he sees it by the species of that which contains it: as when a part is seen in the whole by the species of the

whole, or when a man is seen in a mirror by the species of the mirror or in any other way in which it happens that one thing is seen in another. Therefore thus we must say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence. But He sees things other than Himself not in themselves, but *in Himself, inasmuch as His essence contains the likeness of things other than Himself.*"

It is obvious that Garrigou-Lagrange *assumes but does not prove* that the divine essence cannot "contain the likeness of things other than Himself" except through the causality of His will. He supposes, from the fact that divine causality is required for the existence of all beings, that causality is the *only medium* of divine knowledge. He forgets two things: (1) That causality is not required for non-beings, among which are the absence of resistance, and the evil specification in resistance. Yet, as we have seen, God wills that these non-beings be the conditions according to which He will or will not move man to positive consent. (2) That it is one thing to say that divine causality is a *prerequisite* for the *existence* of beings (but not, of course, for non-beings); and another thing to say that causality is the *only medium of divine knowledge*. And he implicitly denies that the transcendent divine intellect—which is also in the divine essence—can do anything of itself,¹²⁹ for he makes it depend totally on the help of the divine will in knowing.

However, a complete treatment of this matter is too long for a mere reply to an objection. In chapters 19-23 we shall give it an exhaustive treatment. We shall see that when St. Thomas takes up the question of divine foreknowledge of free human acts, he *always* gives an explanation different from that of Garrigou-Lagrange. We shall see that absolutely all the witnesses of tradition, that is, the Greek and Latin Fathers, and the scholastics, who treat the question, *unanimously, without one dissenting voice*, hold that God can have knowledge in another way besides by divine causality. Furthermore, because they speak in this matter as witnesses of divine revelation (as their words show) it seems to be divinely revealed that God can know in a way other than by divine decrees, that is, by His transcendent intellect.

Garrigou-Lagrange also cites ST I. 16.7 ad 3: "That which is now was to be before it came to be, because it was [established] in its cause that it should come to be. Hence, if the cause were removed, it would not be true that it was to be. Now only the First Cause is eternal. From this it follows that it was always true that the things which are were to be only inasmuch as it was [established] in the everlasting cause that they were to be. This cause is God alone."

Comments: We too hold all these points. For nothing that is being, will be except through divine causality. But divine causality is not required for nonbeings, among which are the evil specification in resistance and the absence of resistance, which by the will of God condition all free acts of man. Divine causality is required for the existence, conservation, and movement of the beings in which these non-beings are. But it is not required for the non-beings themselves. Besides, as we have already said, we must not forget that it is one thing to say that the divine causality is a *prerequisite* for the existence of *beings*-but another thing to say that divine causality is the *only medium* of divine knowledge. However, we do not say that any truth, ontological or logical, exists without divine causality. For in the non-beings that condition free acts there is no ontological truth (since they are non-beings) nor does non-being bring logical truth into any mind, not even into a created mind. Therefore we do not say that truth is independent of the divine mind and divine causality. Yet with St. Thomas and as a result of his words,¹³⁰ we hold that the *negative* determination made by a creature (in the evil specification or in the lack of resistance) is logically prior to divine foreknowledge, even though the *positive* determination is posterior to divine causality. In this way, no truth is prior to the divine foreknowledge, for there is no truth in the negative determinations. These points will all be explained more fully below.¹³¹

c) *Texts on the transcendence of the divine will:* Garrigou-Lagrange quotes: ST I. 19.4, 6, 8 and I. 20.2 and 4. He does not quote, but merely refers the reader also to I. 22.2 ad 4 and I. 22.4. Later (after the texts on predestination, which we shall see soon) he adds: ST I. 83.1. ad 3; I-II. 109.1; I-II. 112.3 and II-II. 24.11.

The most important text is as follows (I. 19.8): "Since the divine will is most efficacious, it not only follows that the things which God wills happen, but that they happen in the way in which God wills them to happen, that is, some things necessarily, some things contingently."

Comments: The text just quoted, and other similar texts, prove only that the divine will, because it is transcendent, can always bring it about that a man chooses the things that God wants him to choose, and in such a way that the man does this freely. We too hold this truth, because of the transcendence of the divine will-though we too cannot explain *how* it is done, nor can Garrigou-Lagrange, as he himself admits.¹³² But the text does not prove that God *cannot* move a man to good in any other way, nor does it prove that God always moves in this way whenever

any good is done. We have already explained this point briefly above¹³³ and will explain more fully in chapter 18.

From ST I. 20.3 and 4 Garrigou-Lagrange deduces what he calls the "principle of predilection"¹³⁴ and negative reprobation before prevision of demerits. We have already shown in many ways that this negative reprobation contradicts revealed truths. We will take up the "principle of predilection" more conveniently below, in the reply to the 7th objection.¹³⁵

d) *Texts on predestination*: Garrigou-Lagrange quotes ST I. 23, 4.5 and 6. He wants to prove by these passages that St. Thomas teaches predestination before consideration of merits. We grant that it is at least probable that St. Thomas does teach this. We ourselves teach that it is certain that predestination is before prevision of merits. But it does not follow that God reprobates before prevision of demerits, as we have already indicated briefly,¹³⁶ and will show more fully below, from the words of St. Thomas¹³⁷ and from revelation.¹³⁸

130. 4) *The Thomists cannot reconcile their theory with the universal salvific will*: Finally, the objection to which we are replying stated that the system of the older Thomists does not contradict the universal salvific will. We have already proved above¹³⁹ that it does contradict even the least degree of such a will. However, it will be useful to examine the way in which these Thomists try to defend themselves. An excellent example is found in the words of Father Lumbreras, OP. He first quotes John of St. Thomas saying that the defect on account of which God deprives a man of efficacious grace (without which it is metaphysically inconceivable that a man would not sin) can be even something *inculpable*:¹⁴⁰ "To be deprived of efficacious grace, it is not always required that we first desert God by sin; for we would never desert, if we had efficacious help; yet, on our part, there is always some impediment to efficacious grace not by way of fault, yet by way of inconsideration or some other defect . . ." Lumbreras explains this statement of John of St. Thomas as follows: "Because of this defective consideration [in the human intellect, before the act of the will], because of this voluntary defect-which is not yet a sin, since the consideration is for the sake of the judgment, and the judgment for the sake of the work, that is, the assent-God can refuse a man efficacious grace. [God] could indeed correct the defect, by moving the [human] will to impose a new examination or new consideration on the intellect. And He will surely correct it if, in His consequent will He wills that this man, in these circumstances, that is in spite of these circumstances, should embrace the faith. But He is not bound to do it; nor will He do it, if in His antecedent will He wills to bring this man to the assent of faith prescinding from such a defect. . . . Let us use a familiar example. A student, who in school is listening to both the professor and a nearby student, if at some instant he comes closer to the latter to hear him

better, is then distracted from hearing the explanation of the professor. The professor indeed could raise his voice, or could repeat the explanation. And he will do so if he has decided to teach the student that point in spite of his distraction. But he is not bound to do so; and he can have a sincere will to instruct even this student, since he speaks to him too, for he has given him a sufficient explanation." Several comments are needed on these words of John of St. Thomas and Father Lumbreras:

a) If God really denied a man the graces without which his salvation would be metaphysically inconceivable because of an *inculpable* failing, then the universal salvific will would be either extremely weak or non-existent. For the force of the will can be measured by the obstacles it can surmount. If it could not surmount even an inculpable failing, it would be non-existent, or practically so. But, we have proved that the universal salvific will is sincere and most vehement. But these theologians, and many of the same school, are inclined to fix their gaze solely on what God "is not bound" to do. It is true that God cannot strictly owe anything to a creature. But these theologians seem to be following a method more philosophical than theological. From metaphysics we cannot know that which God *most freely wills* to do—even though He may not strictly owe it to a creature. The most essential question is not: "What does God owe to a creature?" nor: "What is He bound to do?" but: "What does God *will* to do?" From revelation we know what He wills to do: He most sincerely and vehemently wills to save all. His vehement salvific will cannot be stopped by an obstacle that is slight, in fact, in a sense nonexistent—in the sense that it is, as these theologians say, *inculpable*. An inculpable obstacle does not count in moral affairs. Furthermore, we must add: Even though God cannot strictly owe anything to man, yet He can owe things to Himself. He has freely *bound* Himself by infinite objective titles for each individual so that He does really owe it to Himself to give graces in proportion to infinite objective titles:¹⁴¹

b) The analogy given by Lumbreras is an argument from a parallel. But the parallel is not parallel in several essential respects, namely:

1) The student's defect is not really inculpable: he was capable, in every sense, of repelling the distraction. But the inconsideration on account of which they say efficacious grace is denied is, according to the same theologians, inculpable.

2) It is not metaphysically inconceivable that the student should repel the distraction. But it is metaphysically inconceivable that a man would not resist when he has only sufficient grace, according to the older Thomist

system. For man, as we have seen, in that system, is totally incapable of "distinguishing himself" in regard to doing or omitting evil.¹⁴²

3) Someone might possibly consider it extraordinary for the professor to repeat or raise his voice. But for God to grant efficacious grace is surely not extraordinary: if it were, it would follow that no one could be saved without extraordinary means. No one would say that.

4) Whether or not the student understands everything the professor says is not, in general, a matter of life and death. If, in some special case, it were so, no good professor would refuse to repeat. Rather, even without noticing any distraction, he would, merely as a precaution, repeat and speak with special care.

A parallel which is not parallel on so many major points cannot prove a case.

131. Some Thomists candidly admit that sufficient grace does not suffice for salvation: A group of excellent Thomists wrote:¹⁴³

"Sufficient grace is certainly not of itself sufficient for salvation, because it cannot produce any acts by itself." The reason for this statement is that the word "sufficient" is a relative word. We must ask: For what is it sufficient? Sufficient grace is not sufficient for salvation, it is not sufficient to produce a good act, it suffices only to give the ability of a good act. But "it cannot produce any acts by itself."¹⁴⁴

Now if God did not give graces that suffice for salvation, the universal salvific will could not be sincere even in the minimum degree. But we have shown from revelation that it is sincere, in a vehement degree.

The statement quoted above rests on the following train of metaphysical thought: Sufficient grace, as we have said,¹⁴⁵ gives the *ability* to perform a good act, but it does not give the *application*.

Without the application, the good act is metaphysically impossible.

Now man cannot of himself obtain this application, for it is not given to men who resist. Yet, as Garrigou-Lagrange says:¹⁴⁶ ". . . efficacious grace is required that a man may not fail [to cooperate with] sufficient grace, that is, that he may not resist."

Therefore the vicious circle is complete: The application is refused unless we omit resistance. But we are *not able* to omit resistance unless the application is given.

Garrigou-Lagrange does say in one place that¹⁴⁷ "although he has the *ability* not to resist [sufficient grace], nevertheless he actually resists."

But in another passage in the same book he says:¹⁴⁸ ". . . [man] *cannot* of himself alone, refrain from placing an obstacle [to sufficient grace]."

And he adds the reason: "since this [not placing an obstacle] is good."

At first sight it seems that Garrigou-Lagrange contradicts himself. But actually he does not. For, in one text he says that man can omit resistance in this sense: man has the *ability* of non-resistance. But in another text he says that man cannot omit resistance in this sense:

because non-resistance (in the sense in which Garrigou-Lagrange understands it) is a positive good, there is need of application. But the application of the ability of non-resisting is not given unless we do not resist. So the vicious circle is again complete: To non-resist we need the application of the ability of non-resisting. But the application of this ability is not given unless we non-resist.

It is plain that nothing is really determined by human conditions in such a theory.¹⁴⁹ For if it were, man could "distinguish himself." But Garrigou-Lagrange vehemently denies that man can "distinguish himself."¹⁵⁰ So, there is no room for the universal salvific will in such a theory, in which man can "distinguish himself" neither in regard to reprobation, nor in regard to doing or omitting evil.

132. Obscurity of some explanations: The authors who follow Garrigou-Lagrange do not always speak with all desirable clarity. For, in one place they will say that God gives sufficient grace to all men. Then, if someone wishes to infer from this statement that it depends on each man whether or not he is reprobated, they add that sufficient grace does not suffice for salvation. Then, if someone objects that God will not refuse the means needed for salvation, they add that no one is deprived of efficacious grace except for having resisted a sufficient grace. But if someone from this wishes to deduce that God does not desert anyone before prevision of demerits, they add that man always resists unless God, by efficacious grace, impedes resistance. Further, they sometimes say that efficacious grace is given to those who have sufficient grace and pray. But if someone then infers that man can determine by this means whether he will or will not get efficacious grace, they point out that no one can pray so as to get efficacious grace unless he first has an efficacious grace to pray.

133. The theory of the older Thomists makes God the author of sin: We by no means deny that God can, when He so wills, move a man in such a way that that man freely but infallibly does good.¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, we must say that in the system of the older Thomists, God becomes the author of sin. We shall demonstrate this fully in chapter 18.¹⁵² For the present, we shall give a brief sketch of the reason for this statement. According to these Thomists, a certain man, e.g., Marcus, is moved by God (when God gives only sufficient grace) out of a state of indetermination as regards sin, into a process as a result of which by metaphysical necessity he is incapable of not committing that sin which God has determined, in the way in which God has determined, and in the circumstances and at the time which God has determined.

For sufficient grace gives only the *ability* to do good or to avoid sin, but it does not give the *application* of that ability. For the application, efficacious grace is required. The application is given only to those who do not resist. But, as we have seen briefly above,¹⁵³ and will see more fully later,¹⁵⁴ in the adequate sense, Marcus cannot omit resistance.

Therefore, he cannot not fall into the evil specification, because he cannot not resist the good specification. So, when Marcus is in such a state of deficiency, with an evil specification which he cannot not have, God moves him to act. The act cannot be good, since the good specification is lacking. So the act is a sin. Therefore, because God physically moves Marcus from a state of indetermination as regards sin, and then physically moves the will of Marcus (which, as we have said, cannot be other than deficient, in an evil specification) to an act that cannot be other than evil, God becomes the author of sin. For Marcus, according to these Thomists, is completely incapable of "distinguishing himself." God, on the contrary distinguishes or determines everything alone, and physically moves the human will to an act that cannot be other than sin.

Objection 2: St. Thomas teaches that man cannot omit resistance to grace. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews he says:¹⁵⁵ "If grace be given, not according to works, but only according to the fact that a man does not place an obstacle to grace, therefore, to have grace depends solely on human free will, and not on the choice of God. This is the error of Pelagius. I reply: We must say that the very fact that a man does not place an obstacle proceeds from grace."

Answer: St. Thomas likewise says:¹⁵⁶ "Since . . . a man cannot be directed to his ultimate end except by the help of divine grace, without which also no one can have those things that are necessary for tending to the ultimate end, such as faith, hope, love and *perseverance*: it could seem to someone that a man should not be blamed if he lacks the aforementioned [graces] especially since he is not able to merit the help of divine grace, nor to be converted to God unless God converts him; for *no one is charged with that which depends on another*. . . . To solve this problem we must consider that although a man, by the movement of his free will, can neither merit nor obtain divine grace, yet he can impede himself from receiving it. . . . And *since this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace* not undeservingly is he charged with a fault who sets up an impediment to grace. For God so far as He is concerned, is ready to give grace to all 'for He wills all men to be saved. . . .' but they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves. . . ."

134. It is to be noted that St. Thomas distinguishes three things, namely: (1) to merit grace, (2) to impede grace, (3) not to impede grace. He says that a man, by his free will, cannot do the first, i.e., merit grace. But he explicitly says that man can do the other two things, that is, it "is in the power of free will to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace." Further, we need to note carefully that he makes the distinction between eternal salvation and eternal ruin depend precisely on these two things, impeding or not

impeding. For he says: "God, so far as He is concerned, is ready to give grace to all."

We notice that among the graces of which St. Thomas speaks in the first part of the passage cited are "faith, hope, love" and the grace of conversion from the state of sin, for he speaks also of the graces without which man cannot be converted to God, since that is possible only if God converts him. In fact, among these graces he even enumerates the grace of perseverance. Therefore, God is prepared to give to all even the grace of conversion and the grace of perseverance, and actually gives these graces among others. To whom does He not give them?: "they *only* are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves. . . ."

Thus St. Thomas makes it entirely clear that the distinction between those who are saved and those who are not saved depends on the two conditions, namely, to impede or not to impede grace. We must notice, however, that St. Thomas does not say that a man can merit or cause grace. Not to impede is only a *condition*. The true cause of the conferring of grace is the goodness of God.

135. Some have tried to reconcile the two passages by saying that in the *Contra Gentiles* St. Thomas speaks of *actual* graces, while in the commentary on Hebrews he means to say that it depends on *habitual* grace whether or not a man is capable of abstaining from resistance. But this solution does not seem to remove the difficulty, because in the commentary on Hebrews, St. Thomas gives his reason, namely: "If grace be given . . . only according to the fact that a man does not place an obstacle, therefore to have grace depends solely on human free will, and not on the choice of God. This is the error of Pelagius." So, even if a man receives the power of not resisting from habitual grace, the difficulty still will remain, for it will still be true to say: As far as further graces are concerned, and even in regard to the grace of perseverance, "to have grace depends solely on human free will." For St. Thomas says in CG 3.159 that to have even perseverance depends on the power of free will.

136. Nor could we say that St. Thomas perhaps changed his opinion. For the time of composition of books II-IV of *Contra Gentiles* is 1261-1264;¹⁵⁷ for the commentary on Hebrews it is 1259-1265.

137. Should we then say that St. Thomas contradicts himself? By no means is this necessary. Rather, the discrepancy comes from the special fidelity with which he followed strict theological method. Let us recall what we said in the Introduction about method. The ideal theologian should investigate all passages in revelation that treat even indirectly of his question. He should interpret each passage most faithfully, with the help of the declarations of the Magisterium of the Church. He should try to work out the solution separately from each passage, so far as possible. In doing this, he can be compared to a man who stands on the circumference of a circle, and from each of two

or more points on the circumference tries to draw lines that will reach the center, the true solution. If he has drawn each line perfectly, then all the lines will meet in a focus in the center. But what will the good theologian do if at least two lines do not seem to focus? If he is following strict theological method, he will not force either line. Rather he will say: Mysteries can easily be present in the highest truths of revelation. I must neither deny nor force any line. I must hold both parts, even though I cannot see how they fit together.

138. St. Thomas acted this way. He used two starting points in revelation, that is, Romans 8:28-9:24 (as we have already seen in chapter 1) and 1 Timothy 2:4 (as we have just seen in CG 3.159). He saw that the two lines did not seem to focus. Yet, he most faithfully held to both lines. Therefore, in CG 3.159 he followed the line from 1 Tim. 2.4. In the commentary on Hebrews he followed the line from Romans 8-9. It is evident from the teaching itself that in the commentary on Hebrews he followed the same line as in the commentary on Romans. For if it in no way depends on man whether he will resist or not, we have the theory of the *massa damnata*,¹⁵⁸ which St. Thomas taught in the commentary on Romans, as we have seen. The same thing is confirmed by the words that follow immediately the passage cited from the commentary on Hebrews. For immediately after saying: ". . . the very fact that a man does not place an obstacle proceeds from grace," he continues: "Hence, if someone places [an obstacle], and yet his heart is moved to remove it, this is from the gift of the grace of God calling through mercy. . . . Therefore, the fact that this obstacle is removed in some, is from the *mercy* of God; the fact that it is not removed [in others] is from His *justice*." In other words: All men justly belong to a mass of damnation resulting from original sin. Hence, they are unable not to place an obstacle to grace. Out of justice, God leaves many in the mass of damnation, out of mercy, He withdraws some from that mass.

Which of the two lines should we keep? Because, as we saw in Chapter I, the true interpretation of Romans 9 was not known in the days of St. Thomas, but is now known, we see that St. Thomas inherited an incorrect interpretation of part of the Epistle to the Romans. So we should leave the line based on this erroneous interpretation, and also, everything that he deduced from that interpretation. But we should keep the conclusions he so correctly drew from 1 Tim 2:4. Besides, we recall from the earlier part of this chapter that Scripture itself teaches that even sinners can omit resistance in the sense explained above. (We shall see a more minute analysis of CG 3.159ss in chapter 14).

139. Objection 3: If the result of the offer of grace depends on a condition in man, then man gives efficacy to grace.

Answer: By no means do we hold that man confers efficacy on grace. All the efficacy in the first stage, which controls the outcome, comes from grace: man does no more than to not impede. However, we do

not deny that which no one denies (for it is the teaching of Trent) that in the second stage, the making of the positive consent, man is not like something inanimate and passive, but truly cooperates by his faculties which God gave Him, which are moved by power received from grace.¹⁵⁹

140. Objection 4: St. Paul says in 1 Cor. 4.7: "Who distinguisheth thee?" But, if the effect of grace depended on man, even by way of a negative condition, then man would "distinguish himself." This would contradict St. Paul.

Answer: As we have seen above,¹⁶⁰ in these words St. Paul is simply not speaking of the graces of the internal economy. He was merely rejecting the pride of the Corinthians who thought they had been called into the Church because of their special good qualities and even into special sects within the Church similarly. Nor is it permissible to transfer the principles of the external economy into the internal, as we have seen.¹⁶¹

141. Objection 5: St. Thomas says:¹⁶² "Since then the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible for the divine will not to obtain its effect." And again:¹⁶³ "Always . . . does man choose this thing, according as God works in his will." But, if the effect of grace depended on a condition in man, these things would not be true.

Answer: By no means do we deny these teachings. But we note that St. Thomas at once adds, after the words of the first citation: "Hence, that which seems to recede from the divine will according to one order falls back into it according to another order: just as a sinner, who, so far as in him lies, recedes from the divine will by sinning, falls into the order of the divine will when he is punished by His justice." We must note also the words of the response to the first objection of the same article: ". . . antecedently, God wills all men to be saved, but consequently, He wills that certain men be condemned, according to the exigence of His justice." Therefore, *the will of God is this: that men be able to resist ordinary grace if they wish (and to not resist if they so wish) but that they be punished if they do resist.* In other words, as St. Thomas says elsewhere:¹⁶⁴ ". . . God wills the non-occurrence of moral faults in His antecedent will, but not in His consequent will except in the case of those whom He knows do not will to commit moral fault: because the consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature." That is, by His antecedent will, God wills that sins not be committed. But by His consequent will He permits the same sins. His consequent will decrees the absence of sin only in those cases in which He knows that the men concerned do not will to sin. *So it is true that the will of God always accomplishes what it wills. But it does not will everything without any condition: the consequent will takes into consideration the condition of the creature.* Similarly, it is true that man always chooses what God works in man's will. But, within ordinary providence, God does not move the will to positive consent to grace

until after the "condition of the creature" which the consequent will takes into consideration, that is, after the absence of resistance.¹⁶⁵

142. Objection 6: If these things are true, then God does not really govern the world. For the course of events is regulated by created wills.

Answer: God governs the world as He wills, in the way He wills, and to the extent He wills. If God wills that many things be conditioned by creatures, who can deny that He can do as He pleases? Now He does will, as St. Thomas says, that¹⁶⁶ "the consequent will take in [consideration] the condition of the creature." Once He has freely chosen this mode of governing, He will not contradict Himself by governing in a different way. Within this way of governing, He can effect many things by frustrable movements. This is particularly easy in matters of the external economy.¹⁶⁷ But both in the internal and in the external economy, God can always obtain anything He wills, at least by infrustrable movements. He can move in this way even the hardened, even those who actively resist.¹⁶⁸ However, God has freely decreed not to use these infrustrable movements *regularly*, as we have seen.¹⁶⁹

Still further: If everything depended on the will of God alone in such a way that nothing would really be controlled by human conditions (resistance and absence of resistance), then the whole state of the world- hardly a pretty one!-would have to be attributed to God Himself. And what a picture of the world do we see-with so many, such great crimes and sins! Do we have to say that all these evils are such precisely because God alone, without consideration of any created condition, has so arranged everything?

143. Objection 7: St. Thomas says:¹⁷⁰ "Since the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things . . . one thing would not be better than another if God did not will to one a greater good than to another." And this is the great principle of predilection, which explains predestination and reprobation and all the degrees of goodness that are found in creatures. But if the effects of grace really depended on the absence of resistance, then the reason why one would be better than another would not be that God wills to one a greater good than to the other: the reason would be the human will.¹⁷¹

Answer: In this passage St. Thomas teaches that no good, in whatsoever degree, is found in any creature at all except as a result of the will of God (for to love is to will good to someone). He teaches likewise that God does not love creatures because He has found good in them (as we do), but, on the contrary, good is in creatures *because* God loves them.

But we must not contradict that which St. Thomas also says in the immediately preceding question on the will of God, especially:¹⁷² "Antecedently God wills all men to be saved; but consequently, He wills that certain men be condemned, according to the exigence of His

justice." And similarly, in the body of the same article: ". . . that which seems to recede from the divine will according to one order, falls back into it according to another order: just as a sinner, who, so far as in him lies, recedes from the divine will by sinning, falls into the order of divine justice when he is punished by His justice." And in the *De malo* he says:¹⁷³ "God, so far as He is concerned, communicates Himself to all in accordance with their capacity hence, the fact that anything falls away from participation in His goodness comes from the fact that there is found in it some impediment to the divine participation . . . in as much as it turns aside from the light that does not turn itself aside." And in the *Contra gentiles* 3.159, as we saw above, he says:¹⁷⁴ "God, so far as He is concerned, is ready to give grace to all . . . but they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves. . . ."

Therefore, it remains true that creatures have good only because and insofar as God wills. But, *within ordinary providence, God wills the good of grace to creatures only on condition of absence of resistance*, because as we have seen, by the will of God,¹⁷⁵ "the consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature." And, as we saw above, "God, so far as He is concerned, communicates Himself to all in accordance with their capacity" and "is ready to give grace to all . . . but they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves. . . ."

Actually, the objection implicitly denies the universal salvific will. For if we were to say that all things are decreed by God alone, in an absolute fashion, without any consideration whatever of the absence of resistance in creatures, since creatures could not at all "distinguish themselves", then it would not only follow that God would decide in an absolute, unconditioned way who would be good, better, or best, but also that in the same unconditioned way He would determine who would be bad, worse, and worst-for according to the older Thomists, men can in no way "distinguish themselves." And we would have to say that no one at all would be bad and would perish forever unless God would will to him a good of grace so scanty, and, by its very nature, so ineffective, that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for such a man to be saved.¹⁷⁶ Such an opinion is incompatible with even the least degree of an universal salvific will.

144. Objection 8: If the effects of grace are conditioned by the absence of resistance, then God must wait for the good pleasure of man. And God is determined by man. For it is necessary that one of two things be true: Either God determines, or He is determined. There is no other alternative.

Answer: But there is another alternative. For God can determine Himself, that is He can most freely decide this or that, not as if He were *moved* by reasons outside Himself, but, in accord with His Wisdom, He can decide this or that with consideration of conditions in man. In other

words, as St. Thomas says:¹⁷⁷ "...the consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature." And similarly he says in the *De veritate*:¹⁷⁸ "... we must say that although the divine will is not impeded or changed by anything else, yet according to the order of wisdom, it directs itself to a thing according to the condition of that thing; and thus something from our part is attributed to the divine will."¹⁷⁹

It is true, these reasons or conditions in creatures cannot by their own force *move* God.¹⁸⁰ But can we say that God is *altogether incapable* of *freely* considering them if He so wills? To say that would be to impose a great *limitation* on God. We do not say that God must await our consent. But if God *freely wills* to await our *absence of resistance*, who could prove that He would be incapable of doing this if He so wills? Nor is this unworthy of God: surely, it is less unworthy than that God became man, and was crucified

Furthermore, in the absence of resistance, no causality is exercised, because in absence of resistance there is no action, but rather, the absence of action. No one is passive under the absence of action. In resistance, two things are to be distinguished:¹⁸¹ the evil specification, and the exercise of the act. Now the evil specification is a falling away. It does not have efficient causality, but "deficient" causality. It is the lack of goodness that should be present. Man, as all concede, can fall away by himself. The exercise of the act comes from the divine movement itself. Hence, God is not passive. He is passive neither under the evil specification which is a mere privation and falling away, nor in the exercise of the act which He himself produces. Furthermore, even if there were causality present in the non-resistance or in the evil specification, it would be exercised not on God Himself but on an exterior effect of God. Actually, all theologians concede that men really do often resist God. The older Thomists hold that man always resists sufficient graces.

The truth is that the objection is not derived from revelation but from metaphysics. Revelation, as we saw in the body of this chapter, clearly teaches that God wills to decide many things in consideration of human conditions.

(The relation of this objection with divine foreknowledge will be treated below in the chapters on foreknowledge).¹⁸²

(See also many other objections and answers, especially on speculative points, at the end of chapter 18).

END NOTES

1 Is 26:12.

2 Phil 2:13. Cf. M. Brunec SDB, "Cum timore et tremore vestram salutem operamini" in: *Verbum Domini* 40 (1962).

3 2 Cor 3:5. In the context, St. Paul speaks primarily of apostolic activity. However, as we shall soon see (§ 104), the Council of Orange makes the same assertion about good works in general, and bases its assertion on this text.

4 Za 1:3.

5 Mal 3:7.

6 Mt 23:37

7 Rom 10:21.

8 2 Cor 6:1.

9 Rom 3:28.

10 Rom 1:17. Cf. Hb 2:4. Even though we do not merit first justification, but do merit things after it, yet the inherent structure of our act in accepting justification is the same as that in accepting other graces. Our contribution is, as we shall see below, faith, in the sense of a total adherence of the whole man to God (cf. note 71 on chapter 4: as we shall soon see, our contribution to faith is only a negative condition, if considered at the most fundamental moment in the process). The reason why our adherence does not merit first justification, though it does merit after it, is that first justification is needed for becoming living members of Christ, which is a prerequisite for merit. On merit, cf. § 47 above.

11 Exegesis epistulae ad Romanos, Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, Romae, 1960, I. p. 258. Cf. M. J. Lagrange, OP, Saint Paul, Epitre aux Romains, Gabalda, Paris, 1931, p. 139; and St. Thomas on 1 Tm 1:8: "There is no hope of justification in the law but in faith alone." On the relation of faith to the covenant condition, cf. note 71 on chapter 4.

12 Cf. ST I-II 112.3 ad 2: ". . . the first cause of the lack of grace is from us, but the first cause of the granting of grace is from God; according to the words of Hosea 13:9: 'Destruction is your own, O Israel; your help is only in Me.'"

13 There are two elements in resistance, the evil specification and the exercise of the act. For the latter, a divine motion is needed, since there is ontological good in the exercise of the act. God however always moves to the exercise of the act when we make the specification evil. The evil specification is in our power. Hence, St. Augustine says (De civitate Dei 12.7): "Let, then, no one seek for the efficient cause of evil will; for [the cause] is not efficient but deficient; for that is not efficiency but deficiency." On how these things take place, see §§ 344-345.

14 Cf. §§ 105, 110-111.

15 It could not be said that perhaps the grace itself could remain but its effects in mind and will would depart before a man placed any condition (by resisting or non-resisting). For in such a case, a man would perceive nothing to resist and so surely would not resist: he does not perceive the grace itself directly, but only its effects. But, if he did not resist, grace could continue and produce positive assent.

16 Cf. § 347.

17 Cf. § 111.

18 Cf. §§ 347-348, 370, 372-376.

19 § 329.2.

20 The Greek has energon.

21 §§ 104.11.

22 Cf. chapter 18.

23 This will be made clearer in §§ 118-120.

24 As we shall see in chapters 14 and 17, the resistance to grace, from which sin flows, is really the reason for reprobation even though the absence of grave resistance is not the cause of predestination, but only a condition which God, in His goodness, most freely has decided to observe, even though it does not really move Him. Cf. §§ 139-144.

25 E.g., Mt 4:17

26 Apologia 1.10. PG 6.342. Cf. also other passages in § 193.

27 Adv. haereses 4.39.2-3. PG 7.1110-111. Cf. also § 194.

28 Stromata 1.18. PG 8.804-05

29 Cf. the fuller citation and explanation in § 195.

30 Catechesis 1.3. PG 33.371, 374. Cf. also § 196.

- 31 Cf. § 189.
- 32 Orationes 37.13. In Matt. 19.1-12. PG 36.298-99. Cf. § 197.
- 33 Oratio catechetica 31. PG 45.78. Cf. § 198.
- 34 In Ephes. Cap. 2. Homil. 4.2. PG 62.33.
- 35 In Matthaeum Homil. 69.2. PG 58.650.
- 36 In Ep. ad Rom. Homil. 18.5. PG 60.579. Cf. § 199.
- 37 In Ep. ad Rom. 8.30. PG 74.828. Cf. § 200.
- 38 Cf. the fuller citation and explanation in § 200.
- 39 Quaestiones in Script. Sacr. In Eph. 2.8. PG 82.522. Cf. § 201.
- 40 De duabus in Christo voluntatibus 19. PG 95.150. Cf. § 202.
- 41 Cf. § 202 and 424.
- 42 Adv. nationes 2.64. PL 5.910.
- 43 Ep. 120.10. PL 22.1000.
- 44 § 203.
- 45 § 204.
- 46 Tract. super Psalmos. 118.20. PL 9.598. Cf. 205.
- 47 Ad Simplicianum 1.2.10. PL 40.117.
- 48 De civitate Dei 12.6. PL 41.353.
- 49 De gratia et libero arbitrio 16.32. PL 44, 900-01.
- 50 Epistola 194.5.19. PL 33.880.
- 51 De gratia et libero arbitrio 17.33. PL 44.901.
- 52 Cf. the further texts and comments on St. Augustine in chapter 13.
- 53 § 212.2.
- 54 DS 374 (DB 177)
- 55 DS 376 (DB 179).
- 56 DS 377 (DB 180).
- 57 DS 379 (DB 182).
- 58 DS 397 (DB 200).
- 59 DS 1525 (DB 797).
- 60 DS 1554 (DB 814).
- 61 DS 1556 (DB 816).
- 62 Cf. § 82 above.
- 63 Orange teaches that we need grace not only for the beginning, but for the entire good work, but it says more about the beginning: "we do not begin."
- 64 Cf. §§ 14-16 and 117.
- 65 ST I-II 111.2 ad 2.
- 66 ST I-II 111.2.c. Cf. a fuller explanation, § 340 below.
- 67 Cf. §§ 133-138 and 341-353.
- 68 This will be explained more fully in chapters 14 and 18.
- 69 § 340.
- 70 § 111.
- 71 Prv 21:1.
- 72 Cf. §§ 82 and 111.
- 73 Cf. § 350.
- 74 §§ 6-7.
- 75 §§ 309-322.
- 76 Cf. § 6.4-5.
- 77 Cf. § 6.6.
- 78 Cf. §§ 6.5, 51 and 311-314.
- 79 Cf. §§ 51 and 310-322.
- 80 Cf. § 6.8.
- 81 § 51.
- 82 On the order of the universe, see §§ 32-35, 39, 508-535.
- 83 §§ 310-322.

84 In chapter 4 we saw that the Father established infinite objective titles for each individual man. Thus He bound Himself to grant graces according to such a title, that is, according to a limitless title. The only exception would be that which is extraordinary by nature (for it is contrary to Wisdom to make the extraordinary ordinary). But, He has bound Himself to grant all ordinary graces. Therefore, whatever graces God does not actually normally give towards salvation must be extraordinary.

The same conclusion can be shown from the data of Chapter 5: God displayed, in sending His Son to the Cross, a desire for our salvation measured by the difficulty of the Passion. Hence, He will not refuse anything that is less difficult to provide.

Again, the Passion, being infinitely satisfactory and meritorious, earned all graces. Hence God will not stop short of any grace, except, of course, the extraordinary. And, of course, sometimes He gives even extraordinary graces. Cf. Rom 8:32.

These comments apply, of course, to internal graces, not directly to the external government of things, for the external economy (cf. § 14) does not come under merit. Yet the salvific will rules even the external economy. A will of such proved intensity will not omit anything in external government that is less difficult to provide than the Passion. Further, Christ merited that assignment of places, etc., be made wisely, in so far as needed for salvation. Hence, indirectly, such matters do fall under His merit.

85 Cf. also § 357.

86 Autonomous liberty could coexist with impeccability. However, no creature is naturally impeccable, as St. Thomas has shown (ST I 63.1., De veritate 24.7). Therefore, in the natural power of liberty there is included the power of "distinguishing oneself" so as to sin. To take away that which is natural is to act in an extraordinary way. Therefore, only by an extraordinary gift could a man become impeccable. But the extraordinary must not become ordinary. (The blessed in heaven cannot sin, but this follows from the very nature of the beatific vision, which is far above all created natures).

87 Neither would it be more glorious simply to exercise greater power: for it is not more glorious to use greater power so as to produce a lesser result. Furthermore, then the good of man and the glory of God would be in conflict: but we saw in chapter 3 that they are inseparable.

88 § 82.

89 Cf. §§ 344-345

90 Cf. § 350.

91 § 353.

92 CG 4.55.

93 Cf. §§ 32-39, 508-530.

94 Cf. § 6.8.

95 Cf § 51.

96 Cf. § 6.8.

97 Cf. §§ 32-39, 508-530.

98 ST II-II 83.7 ad 2

99 § 121: cf. §§ 6-7, 309-322.

100 Cf. § 6.8.

101 ST I-II 114.6.c.

102 § 120.

103 § 17.

104 Cf. §§ 68-69.

105 Cf. § 357.

106 Cf. §§ 221-230, esp. 228-230.

107 Cf. §§ 119-122.

108 § 82.

109 De gratia, Marietti, Taurini, 1947, pp. 154-156. In this and succeeding passages where Garrigou-Lagrange cites Scripture, I have made my own translation, so as to adapt it to the sense he supposes.

110 Ibid., p. 154.

111 §§ 78-79.

112 De gratia, pp. 191-194.

113 Ibid., pp. 152-154.

114 Ibid., p. 195.

115 § 6.8.

116 § 18.

117 § 143.

118 § 50.

119 De gratia, pp. 159-160.

120 CG 4.55. Cf. the full explanation in §121 above.

121 § 121

122 § 384

123 De gratia, pp. 174-175 (emphasis his).

124 Ibid.

125 §§ 354-357.

126 1 Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.

127 De gratia, pp. 196-98 (emphasis his).

128 Cf. § 344-45

129 Cf. §§ 385-387.

130 As we shall see in § 470.

131 §§ 387, 470, 481-485, 499-501.

132 Cf. §§ 320, 309.4.

133 §§ 118-119.

134 Cf. § 6.8.

135 § 143.

136 § 50.

137 In chapter 14.

138 In chapter 17.

139 §§ 118-120.

140 P. Lumbreras, OP, De gratia, Angelicum, Romae, 1946, pp. 95-96 and *ibid.* n. 1. citing John of St. Thomas on I-II q.111. disp 24, a.1, n.12 (emphasis mine).

141 Cf. chapters 4 and 5.

142 Cf. §§ 6.8, 118-120.

143 Cf. note 15 on the introduction to this book.

144 Cf. §§ 6-7 and 309-322.

145 § 6.4

146 De gratia, pp. 179-180. The words cited are from an objection but Garrigou-Lagrange comments (p. 180): "I concede the major; I concede the minor. . . ."

147 De gratia, p. 190 (emphasis his).

148 Ibid., p. 63, § 2 (emphasis mine).

149 Cf. § 6.8.

150 Garrigou-Lagrange, De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum 1938, p. 431.

151 Cf. §§ 119, 354-357.

152 §§ 309-322.

153 §§ 6.4, 5, 8 and 118-120, 131.

154 §§ 309-322.

155 Cap. XII. Lect. III. 689.

156 CG. 3. 159. The passage is explained more fully in chapters 14 and 18.

157 Cf. "Operum S. Thomae series chronologica digesta" between pages vii and ix in: S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Theologica, I, cura et studio P. Doct., Fr. Raymundi A. Verardo, OP, Marietti, Taurini, 1954.
158 Cf. § 208.
159 A fuller explanation is given in chapter 18.
160 Cf. § 18.
161 Cf. § 16.
162 ST I 19.6.c.
163 CG 3.92. Cf. §§ 358-360.
164 1 Sent. d. 46, q.1, a.4 ad 3.
165 Cf. §§ 144, 358-360.
166 Cf. note 164 above.
167 § 123.
168 Cf. §§ 118-119, 126-127.
169 Cf. §§ 118-120.
170 ST I 20.3.c.
171 Cf. § 6.8.
172 ST I 19.6 ad 1.
173 De malo 3.1 ad 9.
174 Cf. the answer to objection 2 of this chapter, and also chapters 14 and 18.
175 Cf. §§ 141-142.
176 Cf. §§ 118-120.
177 Cf. note 164 above.
178 De veritate 23.2 ad 4.
179 Cf. § 141.
180 Cf. § 44.
181 Cf. §§ 344-345
182 §§ 480-501.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 8: The virtue of hope, and final perseverance"

145. Preliminary note: Often in this chapter we will speak of the grace "with which a man can persevere." We do not mean these words in the sense of "sufficient grace" as Garrigou-Lagrange defines this. Rather, we use the expression in the light of what we have seen in chapter 7, namely, that man can really resist or not resist ordinary graces in such a way that he can "distinguish himself" in regard to doing or not doing evil. And we hold, as we will explain in this chapter, that the gift of perseverance is not, in all cases, an extraordinary grace, i.e., a grace that forestalls or overcomes all human resistance. We hold that the grace of perseverance in ordinary cases is a special grace but that it is not an extraordinary grace. *For if it had to be extraordinary, then it would follow that no one could be saved by ordinary means.* No theologian would say that. Therefore, we shall show that God is accustomed to offer to all the graces with which they really can persevere. We concede, of course, that in extraordinary cases, God can give a grace of perseverance that is extraordinary so that it converts or saves even a man who resists.

146. In the Old Testament: Even in the Old Testament we seem to find the implication that God, so far as He is concerned, is disposed to offer to all the grace with which they can persevere. For He solemnly announced through Ezekiel the prophet:¹ "As I live, says the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore, since God wills that the wicked man be converted and live, He must be disposed to give the grace with which a man can really be converted. And further, it seems to be implied that God does not want the wicked man to return to his impiety after his conversion, for He says that He desires "that he may live." Therefore, He seems to want the converted wicked man to persevere. But God could not sincerely say He wanted the wicked to be converted and to remain in piety if He were not disposed to give the graces without which this could not be done. So it seems to be implied that God offers them the grace of perseverance.

147. We find a similar statement in the words of St. Paul to the Corinthians:² "God is faithful and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it." We note specially the word "faithful." As we saw above,³ by this word St. Paul implies the fact that God has bound Himself in the covenant to give the requisite graces in all temptations. Therefore, if God has promised that He will never allow a man to be tempted above what he is able to bear, and if He has also promised to "provide the way of escape," then there will never be a temptation in which a man cannot really come out victorious. It is unthinkable that God would make such a promise and at the same time intend to give only that with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to have a way out of the temptation.

A similar implication appears in texts on the firmness of hope. For St. Paul writes to the Romans that:⁴ ". . . hope does not disappoint us. . . ." In the Epistle to the Hebrews we read:⁵ "We have this as a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul, a hope that enters into the inner shrine behind the curtain, where Jesus has gone as forerunner. . . ." And again: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for he who promised is faithful." Now if God were not ready to give all that is required for a man to really and actually persevere, Scripture could not call hope "a sure and steadfast anchor" which "does not disappoint." For if God wished to desert some without the means of persevering, hope would not be sure and firm, but instead, it would disappoint many.

148. But a much clearer and more explicit promise is found in three Epistles of St. Paul. For he wrote to the Corinthians:⁶ ". . . in every way you were enriched in him . . . so that you are not lacking in any spiritual gift, as you wait for the revealing of our Lord Jesus Christ; who will sustain you to the end, guiltless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.

God is faithful, by whom you were called. . . ." He wrote similarly to the Thessalonians:⁷ "May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. *He who calls you is faithful, and he will do it.*" And to the Philippians:⁸ ". . . *he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ.*"

So, St. Paul promised the Philippians, Corinthians, and Thessalonians that God would keep them blameless up to the day of Christ, that is, until the second coming. In other words, he promised the grace of perseverance to the end.

How should these words be explained? Are they a special revelation for the Corinthians, Philippians, and Thessalonians, saying that all the members of those churches were infallibly predestined to heaven?

No one would hold that Paul gave a revelation of a special privilege for these three churches. For the words of St. Paul are not limited to these churches, but are valid for all. So, will all Christians be infallibly saved? No one would hold this either. Therefore, St. Paul is revealing that God promises to all the grace with which they can actually persevere. It is clear, however, that men can resist this grace: for otherwise, all would be infallibly saved.

149. We notice again that St. Paul says that God will give this grace because He is "faithful." In this way, as we have already noted in speaking of other texts, St. Paul refers to the Old Testament teaching in which God is called "faithful" inasmuch as He always does that to which He has bound Himself in His covenant⁹ with His people. So, when St. Paul calls God "faithful" in the context of the grace of perseverance, he is saying that we are certain God will offer that great grace, because He is faithful to the New Covenant in which He bound Himself by infinite objective titles for each individual man (cf. chapter 4). As we saw in chapter 4, the obedience of Christ is by its nature of infinite value, so that the graces which the Father has pledged Himself to give in the covenant include absolutely all graces of ordinary providence. Only extraordinary graces are not pledged: for the extraordinary cannot become ordinary. Since, as we have seen, the grace of perseverance is not extraordinary, it is clear that it comes under the covenant, so that the Father, in His fidelity, will most surely offer it. Its offer is not owed to our merits, but it is owed to the merits of Christ.

Still another implication emerges: since Christ died for all, even for each individual, as we have seen, and since He likewise offers Himself in the Mass for each individual, to obtain the dispensation of graces "for our salvation and that of the whole world," therefore, the grace with which a man can really persevere is offered not only to those who are members of the Church in the full sense, but also to others "of the whole world" provided that in some way they pertain to the Church. It is true, St. Paul does not explicitly mention these latter. But, since among those of whom St. Paul does speak explicitly (all Christians)

there are both reprobate and elect, it is not absurd to suppose that his words apply also to all good men who pertain in some way to the Church.

150. This interpretation is confirmed by the revelation on the universal salvific will, which we studied in chapter 5. For if God so vehemently wills all men to be saved that He established infinite objective titles for each individual man, certainly He will not refuse the means without which no one could be saved: among which means is perseverance. The infinite objective titles extend to all ordinary graces. But the grace of perseverance is an ordinary, not an extraordinary grace. Therefore He intends to offer it to every man for He wills every man to be saved. St. Thomas reasons similarly in *Contra gentiles* 3.159, as we have already seen above.¹⁰ For among the graces which He says God is ready to give as a result of the universal salvific will, he explicitly names perseverance.

151. It is evident from the words of St. Paul that the grace of perseverance is not, ordinarily, an infrustrable grace. For St. Paul promises this grace to all. But not all persevere. If it were infrustrable, all would persevere. (He does not, however, imply that the grace is a merely sufficient grace in the sense meant by the Thomists: for we have shown above that their system contradicts revelation).¹¹

152. In the Council of Trent: In regard to the gift of perseverance in general, the council said:¹² "...in regard to the gift of perseverance... let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude, although all must put and place most firm hope in the help of God. For God, unless they fail His grace, just as He has begun a good work, so He will complete it 'working both the will and the performance.'"

We must note two things in this teaching of the council: (1) Some incertitude remains, for the council warns "let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude." (2) However, "*all* must put and place most firm hope in the help of God."

How can these two assertions be reconciled? How can the council prohibit certitude and still command *all* to have *most firm* hope? The council itself gives the explanation: "For God, unless they fail His grace, just as He has begun a good work, so He will complete it. So the reason for incertitude is that man can fail grace. For he can really resist grace. But the reason for the firmness of hope is this: Unless a man does resist God, just as He has begun the good work, so He will complete it." So all the incertitude comes from man's resistance. All the firmness comes from God. That is, God is faithful, as St. Paul tells us. God began the good work, giving the first grace and many subsequent graces. He will likewise to complete the work, and He most certainly will do it, giving perseverance "unless they [men] fail His grace" by resisting.

153. What is the nature of the gift of final perseverance? We note that Trent does not speak just of the grace of perseverance. Rather, the council uses more general words. For it speaks of the "gift of perseverance",¹³ and calls it a "great gift",¹⁴ and teaches that we cannot persevere "without special help."¹⁵ Probably the council speaks thus because at least in some cases, more is required than an internal grace in order that men may *actually* persevere. For it is one thing for God to *offer* to all the grace with which they *can* persevere; it is another thing for men to really and actually persevere: What is needed for actual perseverance may differ in different cases:

1) In the case of many men, probably an internal grace is all that is needed. This grace could be either a special quality added to usual actual graces, or another grace accompanying usual actual graces. It will be required at the times at which something additional is needed to overcome the special difficulty of not resisting that will *eventually* be present.¹⁶ It is obvious that this added special quality need not necessarily work infrustrably,¹⁷ so as to overcome or forestall all human resistance. It is enough, at least in many cases, that it provide the help required to overcome or compensate for the special difficulty that will eventually be present. In those who do not resist, this internal grace will suffice for actual perseverance. As we have already seen, it is clear from the teaching of Trent and from Scripture that God offers this interior grace to all. (The same things are true of the grace needed to persevere *for a long time*).¹⁸

2) But it is possible to resist this interior grace, as we have seen. Hence, some will resist it, and so fall into mortal sin. Hence Trent says that perseverance can be had only¹⁹ "from Him who is able to make to stand him who stands . . . and to restore him who falls. . . ." This restoration would not necessarily require a *special* grace. But the care of divine providence will be needed so that death does not find such a man during the interval in which he is in the state of sin.

So we must ask: Does God provide such providential care even for all who fall into grave sin in spite of the special interior grace?

In order to find the answer, we recall²⁰ that *infinite* objective titles were established in the redemption for *each individual*. These titles or claims by their nature apply to all interior graces of ordinary providence. Although they do not so directly apply to the external providential assignment of the time of death, yet, in another way, they lead us to the answer. For if the universal salvific will is so great that the Father sent His Son to a most dreadful death to establish infinite titles for each individual, therefore, from the very infinity of the titles we can see the measure of the salvific will: *God Himself on His part sets no limits* to what He will do in virtue of the salvific will. (It is true, one mortal sin has a sort of infinity from the infinite majesty of the Person offended. However, the meritorious and satisfactory value of the Passion of Christ, which was offered for each individual, surpasses

even the collective gravity of all the sins of the whole world taken together). Therefore, because the salvific will holds in all classes of things, even in regard to external providence, God will refuse nothing short of the extraordinary in external providence. However, not all men are saved, because *men themselves set limits*, by refusing graces to such an extent that they become incurable. Now a man becomes incurable in two ways:

a) *Physical incurability*: A man becomes physically incurable, i.e., such that he cannot be healed by ordinary graces, if, by repeated sins he makes himself so hardened and blinded that he can no longer perceive ordinary graces, and so that by the very force of bad habit, even without deliberation, he resists ordinary graces. It is obvious that such a man cannot be converted by ordinary graces: an extraordinary grace will be required, so as to forestall or overcome all human resistance.²¹

Now even the most vehement salvific will does not mean that God will regularly grant extraordinary graces: the extraordinary cannot become ordinary.

b) *Moral incurability*: A man becomes morally incurable if he sins persistently for a very long time, even though in brief intervals he returns (or seems to return) to the state of grace through the sacrament of penance. (For even slight and unstable dispositions can suffice for a return through this sacrament). Yet, such a man cannot be said to be really cured of his wickedness, since he is not really converted to a sound way of life: for he quickly returns each time to the same sins. Certainly, the immense mercy of God does save some such persons. But even His vehement salvific will does not demand that He *regularly*, by special providence, send death precisely within the brief interval in which such a man is in the state of grace.

So, the answer to our question about the use of external providence to save a man who resists the interior grace of perseverance and so falls, is this: Because the salvific will is so great, *no limits are imposed by God* either in regard to interior ordinary graces, or in regard to providential control of external events (including the moment of death). But *man does impose limits*, by making himself incurable.²² Therefore, God will so govern the time of death that those who are not foreseen to be incurable may not be caught by death in the state of sin.

Of course, we do not say that God will regularly work miracles to prevent a man from dying in the state of sin. But, at least in general, God can govern the time of death without miracles.²³ If however in some cases He could not do this without a miracle, then we must say that the man who is thus caught in the state of sin would have received from God a different assignment of external place,²⁴ carrying with it a different time of death, if he had not been foreseen as going to be incurable.

Nor does our answer give grounds for presumption, or void the Gospel warning to watch. For we hold that God can, if He so decides, send death even to a man who has just committed one, or few, mortal sins, even though he is not yet actually incurable, but is foreseen as going to be incurable if he lives. An early death for such a man would be a great mercy, for it would mean that his eventual eternal ruin-which is certain even if he lives-will be less. And, because the man in question has already sinned mortally, his damnation is just. Nor does God in this way violate the covenant, for He is not supposed to have intended to bind Himself to give many graces not only in vain, but to the eternal ruin of the recipient.

3) God can also use an infrustrable grace to bring about perseverance. We have already seen above²⁵ from the words of St. Paul, that the grace of perseverance *regularly* is not an infrustrable grace. The same conclusion seems at least to be implied in the words of Trent: "God, unless they fail His grace, just as He has begun a good work, so He will complete it. . . ." We note that the council added a condition, "*unless* they fail His grace." But no one fails an infrustrable grace. So the addition of such a condition would be superfluous if the council believed the grace of perseverance to be infrustrable-unless perhaps the council had meant that an infrustrable grace of perseverance is given to those who do not resist previous graces. But such a distinction is neither expressed nor implied in the words of the council.²⁶ The presumption is that the council is expressing the same teaching as that of St. Paul.²⁷

Neither does the fact that the council calls the gift of perseverance a *special* gift mean that it is also infrustrable.²⁸ For it is one thing to call a gift special, another to call it infrustrable. The gift is special because it differs from usual graces both in regard to the special interior grace, and (in cases where it is needed) in regard to the special providential provision for the time of death.

It is good to recall also that St. Thomas, without any distinction, enumerates perseverance among the graces that are given to those who do not resist.²⁹

Nor need we fear that in considering the grace of perseverance as a frustrable grace, we reduce predestination to mere foreknowledge. For it always includes special providential care so that the external place a man has in the world, its circumstances, the time of his death, and all other things are such that the predestined man really is saved. Nothing in the sources of revelation requires us to hold more-in fact, it is not easy to prove from the sources even the existence of an infallible predestination to heaven. *A fortiori*, it is not easy to show precisely what must be the effects of this predestination. We admit that St. Augustine does speak of the certitude of predestination, but he does not make sufficiently clear on precisely what the certitude depends. And, whatever may have been his thought, nothing can be proved from

the words of only one Father, especially when his opinions on this matter are so coloured by an erroneous interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans.

154. Conclusions:

1) The interior grace with which a man really can persevere is offered to all. On the part of God, there is certitude. On the part of man, there is incertitude, because man can, by his resistance, fail grace. This interior grace, in ordinary providence, is not infrustrable.

2) It is plain that St. Paul and the Council of Trent do not suppose that God will desert some before considering demerits. For if God did that, hope would be uncertain not only on the side of man, but also on the side of God, and the council could not order us all to have most firm hope, if it believed that God would deny this grace to many even without considering demerits.

3) God adds also a special external providence governing the time of death, when that is needed, for those who do not make themselves physically or morally incurable.

155. Objection: Trent defined³⁰ "If anyone says that he, with absolute and infallible certitude, will surely have that great gift of persevering to the end . . . let him be anathema." Therefore, there is incertitude even on the side of God. No one can know for sure he will have this grace.

Answer: In regard to the interior grace, it is one thing to say: "God will offer this grace," and another thing to say: "This man certainly will have this grace." For even though God offers the grace, man can resist. If man resists, he will not *have* it, even though God offers. Furthermore in some, because they at least sometimes resist this interior grace, the added providential care is needed so that death may not find them in sin. As we have seen, God does provide this care for those who are not foreseen as going to be incurable-but not for others, hence another source of incertitude. But the sole cause of this incertitude is again in man, since God will provide this providence unless a man makes himself incurable.

END NOTES

1 Ez 33:11.

2 1 Cor 10:13.

3 Cf. note 12 on chapter 5 and § 53.

4 Rom 5:5.

5 Heb 6:19-20; 10:23.

6 1 Cor 1:5-9.

7 1 Thes 5:23-24.

8 Phil 1:6.

9 Cf. note 12 on chapter 5 and § 53.

10 Cf. the answer to objection 2, chapter 7, and also, chapters 14 and 18. St. Thomas also draws an argument from reason in Compendium of theology 2.4. cf. § 298.

11 Cf. § 119.

12 DS 1541 (DB 806).

13 Ibid.

14 DS 1566 (DB 826)

15 DS 1572 (DB 832).

16 Cf. § 303.

17 Cf. § 116.

18 Cf. § 303.

19 DS 1541 (DB 806).

20 §§ 45-48.

21 Cf. §§ 126-27, 357.

22 Cf. § 202.

23 Cf. § 264.4.

24 Cf. §§ 68-69.

25 § 151.

26 The older Thomists try to suppose that the council had in mind their distinction of the *sensus compositus* and *sensus divisus* (cf. § 309.4). But their assertion is gratuitous, for neither explicitly nor implicitly is that distinction found in the words of the council. These Thomists make this supposition simply because it is needed in order to reconcile the words of the council with their system: but the exegesis of the text of the council in no way requires or even suggests such a supposition. Actually, as we have shown above (§ 119) the system of these Thomists contradicts revelation (cf. also chapter 18, esp. §§ 310-322).

27 Cf. § 151.

28 The Thomists generally say that the grace of perseverance necessarily must be an *infrustrable* grace in all cases, so that no one could be saved without an *infrustrable* grace. We, for the reasons given above, hold that the grace of perseverance is not (regularly) an *infrustrable* grace. However, if the reasons given above were not in the way, it would not contradict what we said about autonomous liberty (§ 120) to say that the grace of perseverance is regularly and must be regularly *infrustrable*. For if it were true that no one could be saved except through an *infrustrable* grace of perseverance, then we would add that such an *infrustrable* grace of perseverance not only would not destroy the regime of autonomous freedom, but would be required in order that autonomous liberty be had on the matter of greatest moment—salvation—since without such a grace, man could not "distinguish himself" as regards reprobation. Of course, in this hypothesis, we would hold that the *infrustrable* grace of perseverance would be given to all who did not gravely resist previous graces.

29 Cf. §§ 115, 217.

30 DS 1566 (DB 826).

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 9: The special promises of Christ"

156. *The promise for those who leave parents, wives, houses, etc.:* In the Gospel according to St. Luke we read that Christ promised:¹ "And he said to them, 'Truly, I say to you, there is no man who has left house or wife or brothers or parents or children, for the sake of the kingdom of God, who will not receive manifold more in this time, and in the age to come eternal life.'" And similarly in the Gospel according to St. Matthew:² "And everyone who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my name's sake, will receive a hundredfold, and inherit eternal life." We notice the great sweep of the promise:

1) According to St. Luke, *no one* who fulfils the conditions will not receive eternal life. According to St. Matthew, *everyone* who fills the conditions will possess life everlasting.

2) The required conditions are not great: It is not demanded that a man leave *both* home, *and* parents, *and* wife, *and* fields . . .-it is enough to leave *even one* of these: "house *or* parents, *or* brothers . . ." Even to leave lands alone is enough!

Therefore, one of two alternatives must be true:

1) Either we have here a special revelation that all who leave even lands for Christ are predestined, and will most certainly be saved.

2) Or not all who fulfill these conditions are predestined.

Now the first alternative cannot be true. For, according to the way the Church has always understood these promises, not everyone who enters the religious life, not everyone who observes celibacy or virginity from a religious motive, not everyone who gives lands to pious causes will most certainly be saved. The definition of the Council of Trent seems to confirm this traditional interpretation:³ "If anyone says that he, with absolute and infallible certitude, will surely have that great gift of perseverance to the end . . . let him be anathema."

Therefore the second alternative is true, namely: Not all who fulfil these conditions are predestined.

But we must ask at once: If not all who fill these conditions are predestined; on what does the reprobation depend in those who are not predestined?

We reply that there are again two alternatives:

1) Either the reprobation is decided altogether *after* considering the personal fault of the one who is reprobated, who really is able to "distinguish himself"⁴ in regard to reprobation,

2) Or the reprobation is decided *before* considering the personal fault of the individual, who cannot "distinguish himself."

If the first alternative is true, there is no problem. For then the fault lies solely on the part of the man who is reprobated. God, on His part, has given that man⁵ "a rich abundance of divine graces" so that the man was able to be saved, and was able to "distinguish himself." The man is reprobated solely after and because of his personal foreseen demerits.

But if the second alternative were true, there would be an immense difficulty: For then God, through Christ, would have promised to give eternal life to *all* who would leave lands, or wife, or father etc.-but yet, *before* considering their demerits, He would decide to desert⁶ many, so that they could not "distinguish themselves," and so that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them to reach heaven. Then the promise of Christ would be totally vain and empty in regard to these reprobates. For example, let us imagine a certain man, Gaius, who left wife and lands for Christ, but yet, since God (in the second alternative) would reject many without even considering demerits, God could happen to reprobate Gaius and others too who had fulfilled the

conditions laid down by Christ-for in the second alternative, God would reject some *without even looking* to see if they had fulfilled the conditions laid down by Christ. Gaius would be reprobated without consideration of demerits, and in spite of the fact that he had fulfilled the conditions laid down by Christ: thus, without any fault of Gaius, the promise of Christ would be vain: Gaius would be damned.

Nor could we escape the difficulty by saying: "God has so arranged everything that no one is reprobated who has actually filled the conditions:" For this is the same as the first alternative in the first set of alternatives, that is, then the words of Christ would be a special revelation that all who fill the conditions are predestined. But this, as we have seen, is contrary to the way the Church traditionally understands the promise, and seems also to be against the definition of Trent cited above.

157. The promise for those who receive the Eucharist: Christ Himself promised:⁷ "I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if any one eats of this bread, he will live for ever. . . ."

The Council of Trent has officially interpreted these words saying:⁸ "He wished it furthermore to be a *pledge* of our future glory and perpetual happiness. . . ."

Now he who gives a *pledge*, does not make merely a verbal promise, but in addition, by an action, and by giving a thing, he provides a powerful confirmation that he will do as he has promised.

Therefore, Christ has given us a most firm promise: He who receives the Eucharist will have eternal life in heaven.-The alternatives are the same as above. And there is a much greater difficulty against the theory of negative reprobation before consideration of demerits, for those who receive the Eucharist are far more numerous than those who leave lands, father, wife, etc., for Christ.

158. The promise and command of Christ on forgiving: Christ promised us pardon on a condition:⁹ ". . . if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father also will forgive you." And when Peter asked how many times he ought to forgive, He revealed that God is always disposed to forgive. St. Matthew relates it this way:¹⁰ "Then Peter came up and said to him, 'Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?' Jesus said to him, 'I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven.'" That is, He ordered Peter to forgive always.

Now according to the words of Christ:¹¹ "A disciple is not above his teacher, nor a servant above his master. It is enough for the disciple to be like his teacher, and the servant like his master." But if Peter, following the command of Christ, were to forgive offenses seventy times seven times, but Christ, in His divine nature, would reprobate men on account of original sin alone-in which there is no personal fault even after an infinite price has been given in satisfaction for original sin: then the disciple would forgive much more easily than the master.

The disciple would be above the Master. And if God were to desert¹² men before any consideration of demerits, then the disciple would have much more love, and would forgive much more readily than God Himself. Further Christ would have contradicted Himself in saying, "It is enough for the disciple to be like his master," when at the same time He would order His disciples to always forgive, while the Master would be accustomed to desert even before any fault.

159. Conclusions:

- 1) The theory of negative reprobation before consideration of demerits cannot harmonize with the special promises of Christ.
- 2) Christ has revealed that God does confer salvation on men according to the human conditions of which He speaks in these promises.

160. Objection 1: But God does not positively condemn, but merely deserts before consideration of personal sins.

Answer: Even so, the disciples will be above the Master. First, because the disciples do not even desert in that way. But besides, Christ ordered His disciples to come to the aid of the needy. Now needy persons can be in various circumstances: for example, (1) A man can come to my door, asking shelter, at a time when the weather is good, and the man who asks is in no particular need, or (2) He can come at a time when the weather is severe, and he, the beggar, is so weak that if I do not help him he will die wretchedly. No disciple of Christ would be excused from caring for a needy man in such a state, in which he is going to die of weakness. In fact, many who are not disciples of Christ would not refuse help to such needy men. Therefore, if Christ, in His divine nature, would wish to desert men without any fault on their part, although He knows most clearly that without His aid they will perish wretchedly out of weakness, then many disciples of Christ-in fact, many pagans-would be above the Master.¹³

161. Objection 2: But God is the supreme Lord. He is not *bound* to give anything to creatures.

Answer: The difficulty remains without diminution. For Christ, though He knew well that God owes nothing to men, still ordered men to forgive always, and also said that it is enough for the disciple to be like the Master.

Furthermore, the question is not only about what God *owes to man*: there is question also of what God *has freely decided to do*. Now we cannot know what God has freely decided to do without revelation. But the objectors are accustomed to forget the need of consulting revelation in this matter, since they are preoccupied with trying to find the answer by mere human metaphysical reason-through which the free decisions of God cannot be known.

Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 4, God freely bound Himself by infinite objective titles for each individual man. So He does *owe it to Himself* not to desert without any consideration of demerits.

162. Objection 3: But Christ promised pardon only on a condition: If man forgives his fellow men.

Answer: This is true, but it does not prove that Christ, as God, deserts men before consideration of any human condition. Rather, it proves that God gives pardon after considering human conditions. It is true, to give pardon is a positively good and salutary work, and man cannot do this without grace. But this grace is always offered to men, and is given to those who do not resist, as we see from chapters 4, 5 and 7. Therefore, to forgive others really is within human control; and Christ reveals that our pardon from God depends on our pardoning other men. Therefore He implicitly reveals that God gives pardon on a condition that is within our control.

END NOTES

1 Lk 18:29-30.

2 Mt 19:29.

3 DS 1566 (DB 826).

4 Cf. §§ 18, 118-20.

5 Cf. § 48.

6 Cf. § 51.

7 Jn 6:51-52.

8 DS 1638 (DB 875).

9 Mt 6:14.

10 Mt 18:21-22.

11 Mt 10:24-25.

12 Cf. § 51.

13 Cf. also § 51.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 10: The obligation of striving for perfection"

163. In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ said:¹ "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."

We note the broadness of the words of Christ: the perfection He calls for is not just that of some great Saint, but that of the heavenly Father Himself. It is clear that no creature could actually reach that perfection. One can only never cease trying, for he never will arrive at the perfection of the Father so that he would finally be justified in not trying to go farther.

But we must ask: Do these words of Christ contain a command or a counsel? We have an official interpretation in the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, written for the third centenary of St. Francis de Sales in 1923:² "'Be you therefore perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect.' But let no one think that this pertains to a few specially chosen ones, and that the rest are permitted to stop at a lower level of virtue. As is evident, absolutely all, with no exception, are bound by this law. . . ."

So it is clear that we have more than a mere counsel in the words of Christ: for all "are bound by this *law*." And we note that the Pope stressed that the law refers to all without exception.

Now whenever God imposes an obligation, *He owes it to Himself* to give likewise the needed means to fulfil the obligation. Therefore, since He commands all to strive towards the perfection of the heavenly Father Himself, it is obvious that He is also ready to give to all the required means of rising always higher and higher in holiness. But if He does this, then He cannot simultaneously desert³ anyone with only such means that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for the deserted one to reach even the minimum degree of salvation, since such a man could not⁴ "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation. Therefore, God gives much more than what is needed for salvation. Or, in the words we have often quoted from Pius XII,⁵ ". . . the heavenly Father . . . will at all times send down upon all men a rich abundance of divine graces."

164. Very similar statements on attaining sanctity are found in other documents of the Magisterium. For example, Leo XIII in his *Rerum novarum* taught that⁶ "virtue however is the common patrimony of all mortals, [and is] equally obtainable by high and low, rich and proletariat. . . ." Pius XI, in his Encyclical on Christian marriage, tells us:⁷ "All, of whatever condition, and whatsoever their mode of life, can and must imitate the most absolute model of all sanctity proposed to men by God, that is, Christ the Lord; and, with the help of God [they can and must] also arrive at the highest peak of Christian perfection, as is shown by the examples of very many Saints."

Therefore, if virtue is the common patrimony of all men, and is equally obtainable to all, it is obvious that there is given to all a rich abundance of grace. No one is given only such a grace that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for him to be saved-not to mention the attainment of highest perfection. Again, if all, in every state and vocation "can and must imitate the most absolute model of all sanctity," that is, Christ Himself, it is again evident that all receive truly abundant graces.

165. Conclusion: To all men there is sent grace so abundant that they not only can be saved, but they can and must tend to the highest perfection. Therefore there is no negative reprobation before consideration of demerits.

166. Objection: But God offers the graces of perfection not proximately but remotely.

Answer: We must distinguish. God does not offer immediately and at once to each man the graces that will be needed when he reaches the highest level of sanctity, e.g., the unitive way. He offers these immediately only at the time when they are needed. But He does offer to each one immediately the graces needed for the level of spiritual

development at which he is at a given time. This care is immediate and proximate.⁸

END NOTES

1 Mt 5:48.

2 Rerum omnium perturbationem. AAS 15:50.

3 Cf. § 51.

4 Cf. § 6.8.

5 Cf. note 47 on chapter 5.

6 Rerum novarum. AAS 23:652.

7 Casti connubii. AAS 22:548.

8 Cf. §§ 32, 48-49.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 11: The conformity of the human will with the will of God"

167. All ascetical theologians agree that no one can come to perfection unless his will is perfectly conformed to the will of God; and, in turn, that if someone has conformed his will perfectly to the will of God in all things, that one most certainly will be perfect. For example, St. Teresa in her great work, the *Interior Castle*, writes:¹ "The whole task of the one who is beginning mental prayer . . . is to work and to prepare and dispose himself as diligently as possible to make his will conformed with the will of God; and it is quite certain that in this consists all the greatest perfection that one can attain in the spiritual way."

Now, the more a soul grows in holiness, the more it desires the salvation of all men. Hence St. Paul himself said:² "I have become all things to all men, that I might by all means save some." And Pope Pius XI taught:³ "But from this perfection of the Christian life which retreats obviously bring . . . another most choice fruit flows . . . that is, the desire to gain souls for Christ. We call this the apostolic spirit. For it is the true effect of love that the just soul, in which God dwells by grace, is marvellously inflamed with the desire of calling others to share in the knowledge and love of that infinite God which it has attained and possesses."

But, if God Himself did not truly, sincerely, and vehemently desire the salvation of all-if, on the contrary, He willed to desert⁴ many without consideration of demerits-then, the more a soul would grow in sanctity, the less it would be conformed to the will of God. But this is impossible.

168. Furthermore, in heaven itself even the least soul is entirely conformed to the will of God. Yet, if any soul in heaven knew that even one of those whom it had loved in this life was being punished in hell because God, without even considering the demerits of that one, had given him only graces such that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for him to be saved,⁵ and so that he was totally

incapable of⁶ "distinguishing himself" in regard to reprobation-how could the soul in heaven fully acquiesce in such a will of God?

It is true that many in heaven do see their friends or dear ones in hell. But it is one thing to see them there totally because of their own fault, because they gravely and persistently resisted a rich abundance of grace; it is another thing to see them there because they received a kind of grace which⁷ "is certainly not of itself sufficient for salvation."

169. Conclusion: Desertion without consideration of demerits is incompatible with the common and certain ascetic doctrine on the conformity of the human will with the will of God.

END NOTES

1 Interior castle 2.1.8.

2 1 Cor 9:22.

3 Mens nostra. AAS 21.694-695.

4 Cf. § 51.

5 Cf. §§ 118-120.

6 Cf. § 6.8.

7 Cf. note 15 on the introduction to this book.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Ch. 12: The ordinary teaching of the Church, and the faith of the people"

170. The unanimity of preaching: The teaching of the ordinary preachers in the Church and the faith of the people are not of themselves infallible. But they can provide a not inconsiderable indication of the faith of the Church, which cannot err. Now, although many theologians, from the various schools, defend various theories about grace and predestination, still, as soon as they ascend the pulpit to preach to the people, *all from all schools*, preach the same way.

For, the people believe, and the preachers preach, that God is our most loving father, who out of the most intense love wants to save *all* His children. Never do the preachers preach, nor do the people suspect, that God really would want to desert many with no consideration of their faults, so as to have some to punish.¹

The people believe, and the preachers preach, that God is the Father who wants the return of the prodigal. Never do the preachers teach, nor do the people suspect, that the Father wants the return of only some prodigals, but that He not only does not want the return of the others, but excludes the possibility by deserting them.²

The people believe, and the preachers preach, that Christ is the good shepherd, who even gives His life for His sheep. Never do the preachers teach, nor do the people suspect, that Christ said this only about some, while as to others, He not only does not seek when they wander, but rather, deliberately deserts them, so that they wander and perish, so He can have some to punish.

The people believe, and the preachers preach, that Christ, when He wept over Jerusalem, had not failed to give abundant graces with which Jerusalem really could have been converted. Never do the preachers teach, nor do the people suspect, that Christ really had given Jerusalem only such graces that with them it would be metaphysically inconceivable for her not to reject Christ.

The people believe, and the preachers preach, that the words of St. Paul,³ "With the temptation [he] will also provide the way of escape that you may be able to endure it," always apply to all, so that man really and truly does have the needed means to overcome temptation. Never do the preachers teach, nor do the people suspect, that God really has so marvellously adjusted His graces that many men, with no personal fault preceding, are put into such a state, and receive such graces, that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them to overcome the temptation.

And similarly from many other passages of Scripture, as they are explained by the preachers of all schools, the people do not even suspect that God would wish to desert many without even considering their demerits.

171. Popular books of theology: These too hand down the same sound doctrine as the preachers preach. For example, in an excellent book, *A Primer of Theology*, by J. W. Regan, OP, J. A. Henry, OP, and T. C. Donlan, OP, we read:⁴ ". . . attached to God's promise of eternal beatitude there is the assurance of every single detailed help that is necessary to reach that great destiny. . . . They are as dependable as the word of God himself, on which indeed they do depend. St. Paul says:⁵ 'And God is able to provide you with every blessing in abundance, so that you may always have enough of everything and may provide in abundance for every good work.'" And in another passage in the same book:⁶ ". . . can a man be certain in his hope? Faith is certain, and so hope that is rooted in faith is touched with its certitude. The elements of hope that involve God-omnipotence, mercy, fidelity-of these a man can be certain. But he himself is unpredictable. If he is faithful to his faith as he lives his life, his hope will be fulfilled certainly and abundantly."

We read similar excellent theology in another outstanding popular book:⁷ "The act of hope gives its possessor absolute certainty of salvation, because from faith we have certitude that the omnipotence of God cannot fail: so we are infallibly sure that God's power can, and will, assist us in attaining salvation and the means of salvation. . . . But *on the part of the subject of hope*⁸ there is no such certainty: our own free will can place sin as an obstacle to our attaining heaven." Therefore the author teaches the same as we have already taught,⁹ namely, that hope is altogether certain on the part of God, even though incertitude remains on our part, since we can resist grace and so sin.

The same book adds:¹⁰ "Note that the motive of our hope is not the mere omnipotence of God; the knowledge that God *could*¹¹ aid us by his power is not enough. It is his actual exercise of that power on our behalf which is our assurance that our hope is not vain." In other words it is not enough to believe in a general way that God *could* help me. It is required that He actually do so: Only then is hope really firm.

172. If, on the contrary, it were true that God would desert some without considering their personal demerits, then theologians should have written in a different way. For example, they should write as follows: "Those elements in hope that involve God-omnipotence, mercy, fidelity-are also uncertain in our regard. For it is certain that God will give the graces without which they cannot be saved to *some*: but He does *not* want to give these to *all*, for He deserts some. Nor can any individual man know whether God means to give them *to him* or not. It is only certain that God wills to give these to some. To others He gives grace that¹² is certainly not of itself sufficient for salvation, because it cannot produce any acts by itself. And so, although the help of God will certainly be given to some, it is quite uncertain in our regard, for there is no way in which we can be sure whether He intends to give the needed help to us-or instead, to desert us."

Similarly, the ordinary preaching in the Church should be made in approximately the following vein: "God wants to show that He is both merciful and just. To show that He is merciful, He gives to many men such graces that they will actually be saved. But, to show Himself just, He gives grace indeed to the others-but such graces that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for anyone to be saved with them. For man cannot "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation. How can we know in which class we are? We cannot know. For perhaps God wants to give us effective graces for a time-but later will withdraw them, so that we will most certainly fall into sin, and afterwards into hell."

173. The words of the saints: It would be easy to heap up citations from works of many Saints, who expressed the same sound teaching as that which the people believe and have always believed. Here are a few examples:

St. John of the Cross, the great mystical doctor, in his *Living Flame of Love*, writes:¹³ "If in this way the soul is free of all these things, which is . . . that which the soul is able to accomplish, it is impossible, when it does its part, that God should fail to do that which is His part in communicating Himself, at least in secret and in silence. It is more impossible than that the sun should fail to shine in a clear and open sky; for just as the sun rises in the morning to enter your house if the shutters are opened, thus God . . . will enter into the soul that is empty and fill it with divine goods. God is like the sun above souls, to communicate Himself to them."

St. John is speaking about the gift of infused contemplation. He teaches that God wants to give this gift to all, for he stands "like the sun" in the

sky "above our souls to communicate Himself to them." To which souls does He communicate Himself? To all who do not impede: "if the shutters are opened." The soul cannot positively obtain this gift for itself; rather, it must do something negative: the soul voids itself of all things so that the shutters are open and do not impede the sunlight. Of course, St. John is not talking about predestination. But if he, in speaking of the highest gifts of infused contemplation, teaches that God denies these lofty graces to no one, for if the soul does its negative part, "it is impossible . . . that God should fail to perform His own part by communicating Himself to the soul"-then *a fortiori*, St. John could hardly think that the same God would want to desert anyone before any consideration of personal demerits. St. John teaches that the role of the soul in preparation for contemplation is a negative one: to void itself, so as *not to resist* the grace of contemplation. Therefore, at least probably, St. John would say that the role of the soul in receiving other graces is something parallel.

It seems, then, that St. John believes the same as St. Thomas, who said in a passage we have already seen:¹⁴ ". . . they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, when the sun illumines the world, he is charged with a fault who closes his eyes, if any evil comes of it. . . ." ¹⁵

174. St. Thomas: We have already seen much of his views from his strictly scientific works of theology. But we find the same view also in his more popular works, for example in the Sequence, *Lauda Sion*, which the Church herself sings in the Mass of the Feast of Corpus Christi:

Good receive [it], wicked receive [it], but with a different lot of life or death

It is death to the wicked, life to the good: see, how different is the outcome of an equal reception.

That is, Christ desires to give Himself to all. But whether the outcome of receiving Him is good or ill depends not on a difference in the gift of God-for the Eucharist is always good-but on men. The outcome of the "equal reception" [reception of the same gift] is different, because both good and wicked persons receive: It is death to the wicked, life to the good.

So in this way St. Thomas teaches-or rather, the Church herself teaches through his words-that even the effects of the Eucharist, the greatest sacrament, are conditioned by human conditions.

175. St. Teresa of Jesus: She clearly teaches the same sound doctrine in her work, *Conceptions of Love of God*:¹⁶ "God would never want to do other than give if He found souls to whom He could give."

According to St. Teresa, God so loves to give graces that He would *never* wish not to give. Why then does He not always give, and give more? The sole reason is the resistance of men, for God would "give if He found souls to whom He could give." Therefore, two things are

clear: (1) God, so far as He is concerned, wants to give abundant graces to all, (2) But the actual conferring is conditioned by human conditions.

In other words, St. Teresa agrees with St. Thomas:¹⁷ ". . . they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves. . . ."

176. St. Therese of Lisieux: She also held the same view. For she wrote, speaking to God:¹⁸ "It seems to me that if you would find souls offering themselves as Victims of holocaust to your Love, you would swiftly consume them, it seems to me that you would be happy to not repress the waves of infinite tenderness that are in you. . . ."

Even without the need of comment it is obvious that the younger St. Therese held the same as the elder St. Teresa.

177. St. Rose of Lima: She seems to have had a private revelation on predestination:¹⁹ "One day, when the thought of the mystery of predestination caused St. Rose of Lima to fear greatly, Jesus said to her: 'My daughter, I condemn only those who will to be condemned. Therefore, from today forth banish from your mind all uneasiness on the point.'"

Now of course, no valid dogmatic proof can be had from private revelations. Yet, it is at least certain that this great Saint held such a view on predestination, namely, that God reprobates "only those who will to be condemned." We notice that the saint did not say that Christ chooses men after considering merits: rather, He spoke in the *negative* form: "I condemn only those who will [by demerits] to be condemned." So it appears that St. Rose holds that reprobation is conditioned by human negative conditions, that is, by the grave resistance of a man. Most certainly, St. Rose did not believe that God would will to desert anyone before considering demerits.

178. Conclusion: It is entirely obvious that the faithful-both the ordinary faithful and the great saints-believe, and the preachers preach, that God deserts no one before considering demerits. And, especially from the fact that even those theologians who speak otherwise in their technical works speak thus in their sermons, we have a strong argument, pointing to the constant faith of the Church.

179. But we can also add: From the abundant experience of many it is clear that not a few of the faithful are gravely disturbed when they learn of the theory of negative reprobation before consideration of demerits. But, a truth about God cannot be such as to cause such fear in a devout man. It is not strange if divine truth frightens the sinner, but, according to the classic rules for the discernment of spirits, divine truth does not upset a good man. Hence Pope Pius XII wrote in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis*:²⁰ ". . . mysteries revealed by God cannot be harmful to men, nor should they remain without fruit, like a treasure hidden in a field; rather, they were divinely given precisely in order to

contribute to the spiritual progress of those who devoutly contemplate them."

If, then, a theory is such that, in view of the abundant experience of those who hold it, the theory should be hidden from the faithful, so that preachers never dare to present it in the churches, such a theory cannot be among the mysteries revealed by God-which cannot be harmful to men, nor should remain without fruit like a buried treasure.

180. Objection: But if the theory of negative reprobation and predestination before consideration of merits and demerits is well presented, it does not cause fright. Rather, some listeners thank the professors who explain it.

Answer: It is true, this does happen in some cases. But one must wonder: Is the theory really *clearly* presented in such cases, so that nothing is hidden or veiled? Or do some professors perhaps say that "God reprobates no one, except for his demerits"-when they mean only *positive* reprobation-and say nothing about negative reprobation before consideration of demerits? Do the professors sometimes quote the words Garrigou-Lagrange;²¹ ". . . no one who has the use of reason is deprived of the efficacious grace required for salvation except for having, by his own fault, resisted a sufficient grace . . ."-and fail to add: No one can abstain from resistance unless he receives efficacious grace-so that a vicious circle is established, as we explained above?²² The situation seems to be this: The clearer the presentation, the more the listeners are upset.²³

END NOTES

1 Cf. § 51.

2 Cf. § 51.

3 1 Cor 10:13.

4 A Primer of Theology, Priory Press, Dubuque, 1955. III. pp. 30-31.

5 2 Cor 9:8.

6 A Primer of Theology, p. 32.

7 F. L. B. Cunningham, OP, (ed.) The Christian Life, Priory Press, Dubuque, 1959, p. 373.

8 Italics in original.

9 In chapter 8.

10 The Christian Life, p. 369.

11 Italics in original.

12 Cf. § 51.

13 Living Flame of Love 3.46-47.

14 CG 3.159. Cf. §§ 133-38 and chapters 14 and 18.

15 A difficulty can be raised about the opinion of St. John from the fact that he says elsewhere (Dark Night 1.9.9.) "God does not raise to contemplation all those who train themselves purposely in the way of the spirit; not even half of them. As to the reason: He knows." Now if only God knows the reason for the denial, in cases where this gift is denied, then it seems that the man to whom it is denied does not know the reason. And if the man does not know, it seems that, at least often, it is not denied because of man's demerits or resistance. (Not everyone knows himself perfectly. But at least some could know whether their demerits make them deserve to be deprived of the higher gifts). Therefore, if the gift is not denied because of demerits of the

man, then it seems that the gift is, at least in one aspect, charismatic. For charismatic gifts pertain to the external economy, and are not given or refused according to merits.

But in the Living Flame (2.27) St. John says: "At this point it is proper to note the reason why so few come to such a high state of perfection of union with God. In this regard we must know that it is not that God wills that so few be raised, for rather He would want all to be perfect, but that He finds few vessels which stand so lofty and hard a work."

So in one text (Dark Night), St. John speaks of this gift according to the principles of the external economy; while in the other (Living Flame), he speaks according to the principles of the internal economy. Therefore, it seems likely that the same gift has two aspects, so that, at least probably, St. John holds this: (1) To give or deny contemplation in general, pertains to the internal economy. Therefore, God gives it to all who do not resist. (2) But as to the type of contemplation-arid or sweet-that a man receives, this does not depend on merits because the matter pertains to the external economy. Cf. also the second citation in note 16 below.

16 Conceptions of the Love of God 6.

17 CG 3.159.

18 Sainte Therese de l'Enfant Jesus, Manuscripts autobiographiques, Carmel, Lisieux, 1957, p. 210. Fol. 84 r°.

19 In: A Saudreau, Divine Communications, Burns, Oates & Washburn London, 1935, I, p. 55.

20 *Mystici Corporis*. AAS 35.197.

21 Cf. note 18 on the introduction to this book.

22 Cf. §§ 6.5, 131-132, 309-322.

23 Cf. § 132.

"Pt. 1: Research in the sources of revelation - Conclusions from Part One"

181. 1) There is no positive or negative reprobation before consideration of personal demerits. Reprobation is decreed only after consideration of personal demerits.—This conclusion flows from many fonts, especially: from the purpose of creation, from the covenant (or implicit pact) and the infinite objective titles established for each individual in the redemption, from the sincere and vehement universal salvific will, having its measure in those titles and in the immense difficulty of the passion, from the teaching of the Church on the Sacred Heart and the Immaculate Heart, from the teaching of Scripture and of the Church on the virtue of hope and perseverance, from the promises of Christ to those who leave spouses, parents, lands etc., from the promise of Christ to those who receive the Eucharist, from the promise and command of Christ about forgiving, from the common teaching of theologians on the conformity of the human will with the divine will, from the ordinary preaching and constant faith of the people and of the Saints.

2) The universal salvific will is sincere and vehement. It has its measure in the infinite titles established in the passion of Christ for each individual.—This conclusion flows from 1 Timothy 2:4 compared

with other passages of Sacred Scripture and with the teaching of the Magisterium, especially that of Pius XII.

3) In the purpose of creation, the manifestation of the glory of God and the communication of good things to men are inseparably bound, by the will of God, even in regard to individuals. This conclusion flows from the words of the first Vatican Council and from other parts of revelation cited in chapter 3.

4) Man by his own power: (a) Cannot accomplish any salutary good, (b) But he can decide to resist all ordinary graces of the internal economy of personal salvation, (c) He can also merely make no decision against grace, in the first part of the process of the conferring of a grace, immediately after grace has caused him to see a proposed good, and to have an initial complacency in it. However he can, by repeated sins, become gradually less and less capable of omitting resistance in this way. This conclusion flows from Scripture and from the Councils of Orange and Trent, and from the Fathers.

5) God is always capable of so moving human wills that they freely but infallibly do that which God wills.—This flows from divine transcendence, as shown in Scripture.

6) To move human wills infustrably to consent belongs to extraordinary providence.—This conclusion is deduced from the fact that there are reprobates, even though the universal salvific will stops short of no ordinary grace needed to save (since that will is measured by infinite objective titles for each individual man). It follows also from reflection on the nature of man such as God has made it.

7) There is no explicit text of Scripture speaking on infallible predestination of individuals to eternal glory or reprobation to eternal ruin.—This flows from the agreement of exegetes of all schools on the meaning of those passages of Scripture which were once thought to speak explicitly on this point.

8) Yet, the words of St. Paul in Rom 8:28-30 leave no room for negative reprobation before consideration of demerits.

"Pt. 2: Predestination and reprobation - General preliminary notes"

182. We have now investigated all the *explicit* data of Scripture and the Magisterium, and have seen many of the things contained only implicitly as well. We have also seen some of the Patristic teachings, chiefly those that touch our problem indirectly.

It is now time to examine the more explicit Patristic texts. We shall follow this up with an historical survey of later views. For very helpful light can be had on the solution by seeing the progressive clarification which the Holy Spirit has brought about throughout the centuries, in His work of teaching the Church all truth, and bringing to her mind all that the Master has told us.

From the very fact that the providential design does include this *progressive* clarification, it is obvious that we cannot expect to find teachings so clear and explicit in the first centuries as in later centuries. And especially, for many centuries, practically up to our own times, there was a great obstacle in the way of seeing the solution, namely, the erroneous interpretation of Romans 8-9 which began in the works of St. Augustine. This interpretation prevented theologians from seeing clearly the implications contained in other parts of Sacred Scripture on predestination. For theologians thought they could not take these implications at face value since they seemed to contradict what they thought was the *explicit* teaching of St. Paul to the Romans. A similar obstacle was present from a misinterpretation of the words of St. Paul in 1 Cor 4:7.

But today, since divine providence has removed these obstacles for us, it is easy to see the true solution implied in other parts of Scripture.

First, however, as we said above, it will be helpful to see how the light gradually increased throughout the centuries, by the work of the Holy Spirit.

For this purpose, it will suffice to consider only the principal stages and the authors who really made notable progress towards the solution. Since, as we have seen, there is nothing *explicit* in Scripture, we will begin with the Fathers of the Church. Afterwards, having taken advantage of the light accumulated over the centuries, we will return to the *implicit* texts of Sacred Scripture.

"Pt. 2: Predestination and reprobation - Ch. 13: The teaching of the Fathers on predestination"

I. Criteria to Be Used in Interpreting the Fathers

183. The gradual clarification of revelation: From the very fact that the providential clarification of revelation is gradual, we must not expect that the Fathers found all the distinctions we know today. Nor did they find all the distinctions needed in their exegesis of Romans 8:28-9:24. However, if we investigate the words of the Fathers with great care, we will see that some Fathers found some portions of the solution, while others found other portions. Hence it seems that, by providential disposition, the full solution can be had if we take from each of the Fathers those components which providence gave them.

184. On adding distinctions to the words of the Fathers: Theologians have often judged it necessary to add certain distinctions to the words of the Fathers, lest the Fathers seem to teach error. Theologians have, in general, done this in two ways:

1) The older Thomists, in general, have thought that the Fathers do speak of the complete process of predestination, taken adequately (i.e., not only about predestination to glory considered separately), but

they thought the Fathers, in many texts, speak only of the order of execution and not of the order of intention.

2) The Molinists, on the other hand, have thought that the Fathers are speaking of the order of intention, but they restrict the sense of the Fathers to glory considered separately, i.e., they do not think the Fathers speak of predestination in the adequate sense of the full process.

185. The order of intention in the teaching of the Fathers: As we have said, many theologians have thought that, in many passages, the Fathers spoke only about the order of execution and not also about the order of intention. To find the truth in this matter, we need to keep clearly in mind the nature of this distinction. Not all theologians speak in the same way about these two orders in this subject matter.

The older Thomists, in general, explain it thus:

1) *In the order of intention:* God first decides on the end, i.e., eternal glory for the predestined man. Then He decrees the merits needed for this end. Finally He decrees the graces needed for those merits.

2) *In the order of execution:* God, in eternity, decrees the execution in time of the decrees He has already made. First He decrees the graces needed for merits, then He decrees the merits, finally He decrees glory for the predestined man. For a reprobate however, He first decrees only sufficient graces (or, at least He does not decree efficacious graces to such an extent that the man would be saved), then He decrees the absence of merit after sufficient graces. Because it is metaphysically inconceivable for a man to perform a good work with such graces, sins infallibly follow, or rather, God moves the man to these.¹ Because of the sins, He decrees eternal punishment.

And so all things in the order of execution are done in inverse sequence to that of the order of intention.

The Molinists admit the existence of the distinction of the two orders, but so arrange things that everything follows the same, not the inverse sequence in the two orders.

186. Of course, the Fathers did not know these distinctions of the two orders. How then can we find their true mind on these matters? It is not too difficult. For the Fathers put to themselves questions about reprobation and salvation, and gave answers to these questions. There are two reasons that show the Fathers did not intend to restrict the sense of their answers to the order of execution:

1) When we consider the individual answers, we see that, at least in many instances, the Fathers think they have given a full and adequate reply to the questions proposed. Now, a man who thinks he gives an adequate answer to a question about reprobation, necessarily intends his words to apply also to that part of the process in which alone adequate reply can be found—that is, the part of the process which we call the order of intention. This is the case precisely because otherwise he could not give an adequate response to such questions. For the

fundamental and adequate answer to the question of why a man is reprobated cannot be found in the order of execution, since everything in the order of execution depends on decisions made in the order of intention, and presupposes those decisions. Therefore, from the very fact that the Fathers think they are giving adequate replies, it is clear that they do not intend to restrict their meaning to the order of execution.

2) There are two ways in which a man can restrict the meaning of his reply:

a) If he does not know of the very existence of a part of the process, he can, obviously, speak only of the part of which he knows and pass by the other part.-But this is not the case with the Fathers. For what would it mean to be ignorant of the existence of the order of intention? It would mean to not know that God, in a fundamental sense, elects and reprobates men. But no one would say that the Fathers were ignorant of this. For it is not required that they should know the technical terms we use today: it is enough that they know that God, in a fundamental sense, elects and reprobates.

b) A man can also restrict his meaning to one part of a process if, at least in some way, he has a *distinction* in his mind. It is not required that the distinction be conceived in technical terms. But he must have at least the substance of the distinction, in some form. If he in no way perceives a distinction, he cannot restrict his sense. For the distinction is the instrument of restriction (unless, as we said above, a man is totally ignorant of the very existence of part of a process-but we have already dealt with that possibility). But the Fathers, as all admit, did not know the distinction of the two orders. And especially, they did not even dream of a distinction such that things would all go in inverse sequence in two orders, so that the explanation in the order of execution would be practically opposite to the explanation in the order of intention. E.g., the Thomists say that in the order of execution, God deserts men because of personal demerits; but that in the order of intention, personal demerits follow infallibly on desertion.

Therefore, because the Fathers could restrict their meaning in neither way, and, in addition, since they thought they were giving an adequate reply to questions (which reply could not be had in the order of execution), the Fathers did not restrict their meaning to the order of execution.

The situation will be clearer from a concrete example. St. Irenaeus, as we shall see below, raises the question about election to the faith. The acceptance of the faith is an external effect of a decree in the order of execution. But the decree in the order of execution presupposes and depends entirely on a decree in the order of intention. Therefore, no

adequate reply could be given if the sense were restricted to the order of execution. St. Irenaeus asks why God does not choose some for the faith. He replies that God "left them in the darkness which they chose for themselves." Therefore two things are clear: (1) Because St. Irenaeus thought he had given an adequate reply, he thought he gave a reply which actually applied to that part of the process (which we call the order of intention) in which alone an adequate reply can be found; (2) Because St. Irenaeus did not know the distinction of the two orders, he lacked the instrument by which he could have restricted his sense to the order of execution. We conclude therefore that St. Irenaeus certainly did not restrict his sense to the order of execution. The conclusion is confirmed from the fact that if he really intended to teach the Thomists' opinion, he should have spoken somewhat as follows: "God first deserted² these men, so that it was metaphysically inconceivable for them not to choose darkness. Then, because they chose darkness, God reprobated them." It is obvious that this is far from the sense intended by St. Irenaeus. Actually, the older Thomists propose the insertion of such a distinction in patristic texts, not as a result of scientific exegesis of the texts, but from the *a priori* needs of their system. (We shall speak below of the connection, in the mind of the Fathers, between reprobation from the faith and salvation.)³

187. Predestination to glory, considered separately, in the teachings of the Fathers: The Molinists wanted to defend the universal salvific will and human liberty. To do this, they thought it necessary to put predestination after prevision of merits. Still, because they know that predestination in the adequate and complete sense is gratuitous, it seemed necessary to restrict predestination after consideration of merits, to predestination to glory considered separately, i.e., to predestination considered as touching only one effect: glory. Hence, they said that the same distinction is supposed in the words of the Fathers.

The two reasons we explained above⁴ apply also in this question. For: (1) Because the Fathers thought they were giving the basic reply to questions about salvation, they could not have restricted their meaning to glory taken separately, since a basic reply would have been impossible in that way. For the reason for predestination to glory taken separately does not really decide the matter, since it presupposes the reason for the earlier stages of the whole process; (2) Because the Fathers did not know the distinction proposed by the Molinists. Actually, this distinction is very subtle, so much so that some modern theologians have tried to deny its validity. It makes it appear that a man can "distinguish himself" in regard to predestination. But actually, if a man can "distinguish himself" only if he receives that which God *sometimes denies without any demerits*, then *basically*, a man cannot⁵ "distinguish himself" in regard to predestination. Now such subtleties are readily enough found later on, in the scholastics.

But in the Fathers they must be proved to be present, and not assumed for *a priori* reasons. Actually, the Fathers speak without distinction⁶ on a distinction that is in itself clearer, i.e., on the question of predestination to membership in the Church and predestination to eternal glory.

The situation will be clearer from a concrete example based on a text of St. John Chrysostom (to be cited fully below): "If, then, all have sinned, how is it that some are saved, but others perish? Because not all want to draw near. For as for His part, all have been saved: for all were called."

Now two points are clear: (1) St. John thought he was giving an adequate reply: therefore he did not mean to restrict his meaning to the stage in which an adequate reply cannot be found; (2) He was not able to restrict his meaning without the instrument of restriction, a distinction.

But furthermore: Would it really be possible to suppose that St. John meant these words to apply only to glory, taken separately, so that, in regard to the total and adequate process of predestination, the answer should be practically the opposite: "Why are some saved, but others perish? Because even though all are called, and abundant graces are provided in the redemption for all, yet God chose for this particular man only graces with which, by His foreknowledge, God knew the man would not do good, but would sin. If God had foreseen that this man, whom He did not wish to elect, would act well with the graces given, He would have chosen other graces: for otherwise, the man would be able to 'distinguish himself' in regard to salvation, which is contrary to the words of St. Paul, 'Who distinguisheth thee?' In the adequate sense, God alone distinguishes the predestined. Therefore, this man does not wish to approach. Because he does not wish to, he will not be saved." (This explanation is given according to the sense which, as we shall see in chapter 15, is the more general among Molinists).

188. Conclusion on inserting distinctions to avoid errors: As we have seen, the reason why many theologians have wanted to insert these distinctions into the words of the Fathers is not scientific exegesis of the patristic texts but the need of so interpreting the Fathers as to avoid error. However, we can avoid imputing errors to the Fathers in another way, without any aprioristic interpretation. It really would be a heretical error to say that man can actually merit predestination, in the adequate sense, in the order of intention. But it is quite a different thing to say that men can have in them some condition,⁷ at least a negative condition (the absence of resistance, in the sense explained above).⁸ A mere condition would not merit predestination, nor would it move God, nor determine God.⁹ Yet God, if He so wishes, can freely and wisely condition the whole process according to such a condition. As we shall see, the Fathers teach that man can *in some way* have a condition in him which conditions the

whole process. Only in St. Augustine do we find a partial exception. And the exception is only partial, for, as we shall see, St. Augustine, in his striving to follow sound theological method, has two series of texts, as also does St. Thomas.¹⁰ In the second series, St. Augustine agrees with the other Fathers, as we shall also see.

In this way, at least if the condition is a negative, predestination can be truly gratuitous, and not given on account of merits, in spite of such a condition. Further, predestination can be decided *before* consideration of merits, but after taking into account a negative condition, and yet (as we saw briefly above¹¹ and will see more fully later¹²) reprobation can be decided *after* consideration of demerits.

We conclude, therefore, that there is no need of aprioristically inserting the proposed distinctions. On the one hand, we can interpret the Fathers in a satisfactory sense without these distinctions. On the other hand, as we have seen, there are positive reasons for excluding the proposed distinctions.

189. The nature of the human condition according to the Fathers: The Fathers do not raise the question of the nature of this condition, nor do they inquire if it is a positive or a negative condition. Some Fathers speak only of the rejection of grace, on the negative side. Some, since they explicitly attribute the good act of will to God, leave the same implication as St. Paul.¹³ Others in a general way say that reprobation is decreed in consideration of acceptance or rejection of faith, but they do not investigate the precise human role in this.

But the question must be raised: In a line of reasoning like that which we followed in regard to the distinctions the Molinists and Thomists wanted to insert, should we reason that since the Fathers do not distinguish, they must refer to both positive and negative conditions?

We neither can nor may draw that conclusion here, for the two situations are not parallel.

Before, the Fathers showed they thought they were giving an adequate and fundamental answer to a *question explicitly raised* as to why some men perish. But in this matter, in regard to the positive or negative nature of the human condition, the Fathers do not think they are making a fundamental response precisely because the *question is not raised at all*.

Before, the Fathers gave what they considered a fundamental answer to a question whose fundamental answer would have been impossible if the meaning had been restricted according to the suggestions of the Molinists and Thomists. Here, the Fathers do not raise the question of whether the condition is negative or positive, and the question they do raise on salvation can be answered fundamentally even if we suppose that the Fathers meant only a negative or only a positive condition. This can be seen by recalling the examples cited above from St. Irenaeus and St. John Chrysostom-whether we suppose these Fathers had in mind only positive or only negative conditions does not affect

the fundamental character of their answers. Further, we said above that the Fathers were unable to restrict their meaning to the order of execution or to predestination to glory alone because they did not know the means of making the restriction, namely, the needed distinction. But here, the distinction of positive and negative could not be unknown to them: First, since no one is ignorant of the difference between accepting, resisting, and omitting resistance, or between positive and negative in general; second because the Fathers knew well that St. Paul had excluded from our power all positive salutary good works: ". . . for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure. . . ." ¹⁴ "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us. . . ." ¹⁵

Therefore, even though we see, in some Fathers, implications that they considered the condition to be a negative, we must say that the Fathers in general simply did not raise the question of whether the condition was positive or negative.

190. *The external and internal economies in the words of the Fathers:* We must still raise one more question about the interpretation of the Fathers. They almost always speak of predestination while commenting on passages of Scripture that refer to vocation or predestination to the Church, e.g., in the text on the banquet mentioned in the Gospels, and in Romans 8:28-9:24. Therefore: Must we conclude that the words of the Fathers apply only to vocation or predestination to full membership in the Church, and not also to eternal glory?

By no means. The Fathers knew at least implicitly that to predestine to membership in the Church is not the same as to predestine to eternal glory. For they knew that a man who is a full member of the Church can still fall. But, since revelation was to be clarified gradually, the Fathers do not seem to have explicitly thought through everything in this matter, nor to have seen all the problems. And so it happened that, although they knew that not all in the Church are saved, yet they did not clearly perceive that these two predestinations belong to two different economies, the external economy (in which God does not regulate the outcome according to merits) and the internal economy of personal salvation. So the Fathers, not seeing the existence of the two economies, also did not see that different principles applied to the two. ¹⁶ But, *precisely because they did not see that there are two different economies, ruled by different principles, the Fathers thought the same principles applied to both economies.*

191. Now, since the Fathers confuse the two economies, and assume that the same principles apply in both, it is of great importance to know what principles the Fathers think apply in both, namely: Did they think that what we call the principles of the external economy apply also in the internal economy, so that even in the internal economy God does not decide the outcome in view of free human conditions? Or did

they think that what we call the principles of the internal economy apply also in the external economy, so that even the call to full membership in the Church would be decided according to free human conditions? As we shall see from considering the individual texts below, *all the Greek Fathers, and all the Latin Fathers before St. Augustine speak as though entry into the Church is also decided according the free human conditions*. St. Augustine certainly held that the same principles apply in both economies. In most passages, he teaches that the outcome is not decided according to free human conditions. However, as we shall see,¹⁷ in some texts he teaches the opposite.

This view of the Fathers is especially clear when they are speaking of the negative side, of reprobation. For the Fathers thought, as we shall soon see, that men exclude themselves from the Church through their own fault. Now if someone through his own fault does not enter the Church, surely, they believe, there is no hope of salvation for such a man.¹⁸

192. At least this is clear: The Fathers, since they taught that even predestination to membership in the Church is given or denied according to human conditions, could not simultaneously hold that eternal reprobation is decided without consideration of human conditions, especially since, as we have often seen above, such an antecedent reprobation is excluded by many passages of Scripture.

II. The Greek Fathers

193. St. Justin Martyr:¹⁹ "But I have already shown that it is not by the fault²⁰ of God that those angels and men do become wicked who are foreseen as going to be unjust, but [rather that] by his own fault²¹ each one is such as he will appear [then]."

Comments: From the context we know that St. Justin is commenting on the words of Christ:²² "Many will come from east and west and sit at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven, while the sons of the kingdom will be thrown into the outer darkness." Now the children of the kingdom are, according to St. Justin, the Jews (as to racial descent). The question St. Justin asks himself is this: How can we explain the fact that the Jews are cast out of the kingdom? He asserts that the fault (*aitia*) is found in men, not in God.

It is obvious that St. Justin thinks he is giving an adequate and fundamental answer to the question he proposes when he says that this rejection happens by the fault of men, not by fault of God. Therefore, he does not intend to restrict his meaning to the order of execution, nor to reprobation from glory, taken separately. Hence, according to the criteria of interpretation explained above,²³ we conclude that St. Justin teaches that God does not reject anyone except after and because of consideration of personal demerits. In other words: He teaches that the ultimate reason for the decision as to

who is to be reprobated or not is found in the disposition of men themselves.²⁴

St. Justin makes a similar statement a bit farther on:²⁵ "But if the word of God predicts at all that some, both angels and men, are going to be punished, it predicts these things because He foreknows that they are going to be unchangeably wicked, but not because God made them such."

194. St. Irenaeus:²⁶ "If therefore even now God since He foreknows all things, has handed over to their infidelity as many as He knows will not believe, and has turned His face away from such ones, *leaving them in the darkness which they chose for themselves*: How is it strange if then He handed over to their own infidelity Pharaoh, who never would believe, and those who were with him?"

Comments: St. Irenaeus is refuting the argument of the Marcionites who tried to call God the author of evil because He blinded Pharaoh. St. Irenaeus argues from a *general* principle: for he describes what God did in the past and does "even now." The general principle is this: "God . . . has handed over to their infidelity as many as He knows will not believe . . . leaving them in the darkness which they chose for themselves."

So what is the ultimate reason, the fundamental reply to the question of why these men do not believe? Is it: Because God deserted them, so that they fall, so that He punishes them for the fall? By no means. St. Irenaeus does not say that they lack the faith because God deserted them, but rather, that God handed them over to infidelity because they chose darkness for themselves. Clearly, St. Irenaeus intended to give the fundamental answer, as is apparent from the purpose of his argument. For if he really meant: God deserted them so that men would desert God so He could punish-then the Marcionites, against whom St. Irenaeus is arguing, would seem to be right. For they said that God initiated the hardening of Pharaoh. St. Irenaeus tries to refute this charge. It is clear then, since he tries to give the fundamental reason, that St. Irenaeus is speaking of the order of intention, and of the total process of predestination (not of just predestination to glory taken separately).²⁷

It is clear also that St. Irenaeus by no means says that men can merit predestination. He does not, actually, speak at all about the positive side, but only about reprobation.²⁸

We conclude, then, about St. Irenaeus: He teaches that *the ultimate reason for the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves*.

195. Clement of Alexandria:²⁹ "For the coming of the Saviour did not make [men] foolish and hard of heart and faithless, but prudent, amenable to persuasion, and faithful. But they who were unwilling to obey, departing from the voluntary adherence of those who obeyed, were shown to be imprudent and unfaithful and foolish. 'But to those

who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.³⁰ Should we not, then consider as negative (as is better) the statement 'God has not made foolish the wisdom of the world'³¹ . . . lest the cause of their hardheartedness seem to have come to them from God 'who made foolish the wisdom [of the world]?' For altogether, since they were wise, they were more at fault in not believing the preaching. For the preference and choice of the truth is voluntary. But also the statement: 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise'³² means that He sent forth light, in contrast to the despised and condemned barbarian philosophy; just as also a lamp that is shone on by the sun is said to have perished, since it does not exert equal power [in comparison to the light of the sun]. Although, then, all men are called, those who willed to obey are named 'called.' For there is no unrighteousness with God. So those out of each people who believed are the 'chosen people.' And in the Acts of the Apostles you would find 'So those who received His word were baptized'³³ *but those who were unwilling to obey, obviously separated themselves.* To them the prophecy says: ³⁴'And if you wish and hear me, you will eat the good things of the land,' showing that it lies in us to accept and to turn aside."

Comments: Clement is explaining the words of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 1:19 ff. He inquires why it is that some do not believe. He does not want to say that they did not believe because God blinded them. And he finds three statements in this passage of St. Paul difficult, namely: "But to those who are called . . . Christ the power of God," and: "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?" and: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise."³⁵

He first takes up the statement: "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?" In the Greek original of St. Paul, these words could either be read as we have just given them: "Has not God made foolish? . . ." Or they could be read: "God has not made foolish. . . ." Clement prefers the second way of reading it.

Then by means of a comparison he explains the words: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise." If an ordinary lamp is placed in the brilliant light of the sun, the light of the lamp is almost invisible. Similarly, the light of philosophy is a real light, but when placed along side of the brilliant light of divine wisdom, the human light is so faint as to be practically invisible, like the lamp in the sunlight.

Finally he explains the words: "But to those who are called . . . Christ is the power of God." He wants to avoid saying that only some are called; yet he sees a difficulty to be answered in the seemingly restrictive form of St. Paul's words. He solves the difficulty by explaining that the word "called" can have two senses. All men are truly *called*, but those who both have been called and have obeyed can be named "called" in a special sense: so those, both Jews and Greeks, who obeyed the call are named the *chosen* people or the *special* people. But he is anxious

to show that the reason why some rejected the faith and others did not is found in men, not in God: "For there is no unrighteousness with God." And he finds the explanation implicitly contained in a line of the Acts of the Apostles: "So those who received His word were baptized." From this he concludes: "*those who were unwilling to obey, obviously separated themselves.*" For: "It lies in us to accept and to turn aside." So the reason for the difference is not found in God but in man.

Does Clement try to give the *fundamental* reason why some do not accept the faith? He at least seems to intend it. For it does not seem possible to suppose he holds that the fundamental reason is that God deserts some, so that they are blinded, so that they reject the faith. Clement is arguing precisely against such a view. So, it is clear that Clement is not speaking merely of the order of execution, nor of predestination to glory taken separately.³⁶ It is true, the acceptance or rejection of faith *takes place* in the order of execution-but Clement is inquiring into the fundamental *reason why* this happens.³⁷ And he is working vigorously to prove that the reason why some reject faith is not in God but in men.³⁸

Therefore we conclude: Clement teaches that *the ultimate reason for the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves.*

196. St. Cyril of Jerusalem:³⁹ "For not by necessity but from free choice we come to such a holy adoption as sons."

Comments: We see from the context that by these words St. Cyril is rejecting the error of those who taught that different men have different natures, and that they, according to their different natures, obtain or do not obtain the divine adoption of grace which makes a man an adopted son of God.

St. Cyril vigorously denies that the difference between those who do and do not obtain the divine adoption depends on different natures given by God to men. Instead, he teaches that the difference depends on a cause in man, namely, "from free choice."

It is true, St. Cyril has rather few words on this subject. However, he at least seems to hold the same teaching as the other Fathers, namely, that the ultimate reason for the decision as to who is or is not to be reprobated is found in the dispositions of men themselves. For sure, he provides no ground for suspecting that he thinks that God deserts men before any consideration of their dispositions, so that men are totally incapable of "distinguishing themselves"⁴⁰ in regard to reprobation. If he held such a view, he could not say that it is from our free choice that we come to the divine adoption. For these words mean that a man can "distinguish himself."

197. St. Gregory of Nazianzus: In commenting on Matthew 19:11 ("Not all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom it has been given"), St. Gregory says:⁴¹ "When you hear this 'it has been given,' do not take any heretical attitude, nor introduce varied natures-

earthly and spiritual and middle. For there are some so ill disposed that they think some are altogether of a nature that will perish, others [of a nature] that is going to receive salvation, others, finally, are so disposed according as their own choice leads them to worse or to better. . . . When you hear 'to whom it has been given,' add: It is given to those who are called, and to those who are so disposed. For when you hear those words: 'There is question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy,'⁴² I judge you should think the same thing. For since there are some who to such an extent are proud of their good deeds that they attribute all to themselves and nothing to the one who made them and made them wise and led them to good, this text [of St. Paul] teaches them that *even to will good needs help from God*. Or rather, that *the very choosing of the things that should be chosen is something divine, and a gift from God's love of man*. For it is necessary that salvation depend both on us and on God. Hence he [St. Paul] says: 'There is question not of him who wills,' that is, not only of him who wills, 'nor of him who runs' only, 'but' also 'of God showing mercy.' So, since *even the act of will*⁴³ *is from God*, he properly attributed all to God." And after a bit St. Gregory continues, explaining the words of Christ to the mother of the sons of Zebedee, from Mt 20:23: "You will drink my cup, but to sit at my right hand and at my left is not mine to grant, but it is for those for whom it has been prepared by my Father." He comments: "Does then our mind that guides [count for] nothing? . . . Does work [count for] nothing? . . . Does fasting [count for] nothing? . . . Shall none of these profit a man anything but [instead] by a sort of capricious choice, is Jeremia sanctified, while others are rejected from the very womb? . . . There too, to the words 'for whom it has been prepared' add this: who are worthy, and who have not only received from the Father that they may be such, but also have given [it] to themselves."

Comments: St. Gregory begins, as we saw, with the words of Christ, "Not all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom it is given."⁴⁴ He applies the same principles to these words about virginity as he does to the words of St. Paul in Romans 9 (about the call to full membership in the Church) and to the words of Christ to the sons of Zebedee (about special positions in the external government of the Church) and to the question of the eternal salvation of the individual. Certainly, distinctions should have been made, which St. Gregory does not make. Yet, since he speaks of all these matters in the same way as he speaks about eternal salvation, it is obvious that we can see from his words the principles he holds in regard to eternal salvation.⁴⁵

St. Gregory is concerned to reject the same error that we saw St. Cyril rejecting, i.e., the error that says that different men were made of different natures by God, and that, according to these natures, they will be saved or lost. Against these errors, St. Gregory vigorously

teaches that salvation does not depend on an absolute decision of God made without consideration of human conditions.

We must note, however, the distinction implied in his words. For he says: "*the very choosing* of the things that should be chosen is something divine and a gift from God's love of man," and again: "since *even the act of will* is from God, he properly attributed *all* to God."- Therefore, he attributes all *positive good things* to God, and indeed, to God's *love of man*. Therefore, God does not give these things because of man's merits, but out of His love. Hence, when St. Gregory says, "it is necessary that salvation depends both on us and on God," since he has taught that man's contribution cannot be on the *positive* side, therefore, even though he does not explicitly say so, he seems to think that the difference between those reprobated and those predestined comes from the negative side, namely, from the resistance (or absence thereof) of man to the love of God from which comes even "the very choosing of the things that should be chosen."⁴⁶

Similarly, his words "but [they] also have given [it] to themselves," should be understood in the light of the above as referring to negative condition. That is, by not resisting the love of God, they gave it to themselves.

Does St. Gregory think he is giving the *fundamental* reason for the difference between those who are reprobated and those who are not? When we consider his words, especially when we hear him say so vehemently, "Shall none of these profit a man anything, but [instead] by a sort of capricious choice, is Jeremia sanctified, while others are *rejected from the very womb*?" it seems entirely impossible to suppose that St. Gregory would think the ultimate and fundamental explanation of reprobation would be desertion by God. For then it would be true that some would be rejected from the very womb. But St. Gregory vigorously rejects such a thought. Therefore, because he intends to give the fundamental reason, it is obvious that his explanation is meant to refer not only to the order of execution, but also to the order of intention; and similarly, that it refers not just to glory taken separately, but to the whole process of reprobation and predestination.⁴⁷

So, St. Gregory teaches the same as the other Fathers whose teachings we have seen, namely: He holds that the ultimate reason for the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves. Further, it appears that he believes the critical dispositions are negative rather than positive (resistance or lack thereof).

198. St. Gregory of Nyssa:⁴⁸ "The Father raises the dead and gives them life, and the Son gives life to whom He will.'-We do not conclude from this that some are cast out from the lifegiving will; but since we have heard and we believe that all things of the Father belong to the Son, we obviously also see the will of the Father, as one of all these, in

the Son. If then the Father's will [attitude] is in the Son, and the Father, as the Apostle says, 'wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth' it is plain that He who has everything that is the Father's, and has the whole Father in Him along with other good things of the Father, has fully also the salvific will. Since then He does not lack the perfect will, it is altogether clear that those whom the Father wants to give life to, He too gives life to, not being lesser in a will that loves men, as Apollinarius says that He wants to give life to some, not to all. For not because of the Lord's will are some saved but others are lost: for then the cause of their ruin would come from that will. But by the choice of those who receive the word, it happens that some are saved or lost."

Comments: St. Gregory is refuting the error of Apollinarius. He sees that a difficulty could be proposed from the words "The Son gives life to whom He will," as if the Son would not want to give life to all by grace. St. Gregory shows that the difficulty is only an apparent, not a real difficulty, by showing that the will of the Father and the Son is the same. But, the Father wills to save all. Therefore, the Son too wills to save all. And he adds: "For not because of the Lord's will are some saved but others are lost: for then the cause of their ruin would come from that will. But by the choice of those who receive the word it happens that some are saved or lost."

It is clear that St. Gregory found the reason for the difference between those who are or are not reprobated, not in God but in man: For the Lord's will is not the cause: God wants to save all. Certainly, it would be impossible to suppose that St. Gregory did not think he was giving the fundamental reason, but instead kept back in his own mind: "Really, the Lord's will is the fundamental reason why some perish, for God, before any consideration of human demerits deserts some. Then men infallibly fall. Because of their fall, God rejects them." Therefore, St. Gregory is not speaking only of the order of execution, nor only of predestination to glory separately considered.⁴⁹

We conclude therefore that St. Gregory of Nyssa too held that the ultimate reason for the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves.⁵⁰

199. St. John Chrysostom:⁵¹ "But he [St. Paul] says that all have sinned and need the glory of God. If, then all have sinned, how [is it that] some are saved but others perish? Because not all willed to draw near. For as for His part, all have been saved. For all were called."

And similarly:⁵² "'Having predestined us in love.' For it does not happen as a result of [our] labours or good works, but from [His] love. But not from love alone, but also from our virtue. For if it were from [His] love alone, it would be necessary that all would be saved. But again, if it were from our virtue alone, His coming would be superfluous, and all that He did through dispensation. But it is neither from love alone nor from our virtue, but from both. For he [St. Paul] says: 'He chose us.'

But he who chooses, knows what he chooses. . . . Why then does He love us so, and whence such affection for us? out of [His] goodness alone. For grace is from goodness. Hence he [St. Paul] says: 'He predestined us to the adoption of sons.'"

Comments: In the first passage cited above, St. John proposes a difficulty based on the words of St. Paul in Rom 3:23: "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God." So, since all have sinned, he inquires into the reason why some are saved and some not. He explains that the reason why not all are saved cannot be in God: "For as for His part, all have been saved." And similarly in the second passage above: "For if it were from [His] love alone, it would be necessary that all would be saved." Therefore, the fundamental reason for the difference is not found in God: He wants all to be saved. But the reason is in man: "Because not all willed to draw near," and again: "But it [salvation] is neither from love alone nor from virtue alone but from both."

What is the nature of the condition, positive or negative? He does not say that we can accomplish our salvation by the power of nature: "If it were from our virtue alone, His coming would be superfluous." Nor does he say that we can *merit* our predestination: there is no word about merit in either passage. For it is one thing to say that the difference between being saved or not in some way depends on man; quite another thing to say that a man can *merit* predestination. For the difference can depend on man if it is in man's power to *condition* the outcome even in a negative way, by his resistance to grace or absence thereof. So the words of St. John do not have to imply that a man can merit predestination.⁵³

It is entirely obvious that we cannot suppose St. John is holding back in his mind a belief that the fundamental reason for reprobation is desertion by God. Rather, he thinks that he is giving the fundamental reason. Therefore it is clear that his words apply not only to the order of execution, nor only to glory taken separately.⁵⁴

We conclude: St. John Chrysostom held that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves.

200. St. Cyril of Alexandria:⁵⁵ "It is not unnatural that some make a ready excuse for their lack of faith, being caught in their ignorance, and saying: 'If they are called whom He foreknew according to the purpose and previous choice, this is nothing to those who have not yet believed. For we have not been called nor predestined.' To them we say that He who made the marriage feast for His Son sent His servants to gather those who were called, but they did not will to come. After them, those who were called according to the special purpose came in. . . . Therefore, then, obviously, no obstacle lies in the way of those who want to come. For foreknowledge hurts no one at all nor does it help anyone. . . . we find our Lord Jesus Christ saying clearly: 'Come to me all who labour and are burdened and I will refresh you.' Behold, He

calls all to Himself. So no one would not have a share in the grace of the call. For in saying "all," He sends away absolutely no one. [Scripture] says: Having foreseen far in advance of what sort they would be, He predestined them to share in the future goods, so that through faith in Him they might enjoy justification."

Comments: St. Cyril clearly distinguishes between the positive and the negative sides. For it is clear that no one can come without the call. Hence, on the positive side, all depend on God, and cannot come by the power of their nature. But the difference between those who do and do not come to the marriage feast does not come from a lack of call to some: "He calls all . . . He sends away absolutely no one." So the reason for the difference is in man, because even though men could not come without the call, yet, they can refuse: some "did not will to come." Those were predestined whom God foreknew would not refuse: "Having foreseen far in advance of what sort they would be, He predestined them. . . ."

It is clear that St. Cyril thinks he is giving the fundamental answer to the question he proposed. Therefore, according to the principles explained above,⁵⁶ we conclude that he does not intend to restrict his meaning to the order of execution, nor to predestination to glory considered separately. Therefore St. Cyril too, with the other Fathers, held that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves.⁵⁷

201. Theodoret:⁵⁸ "'Those whom He predestined, them He also called. . . .' Those whose purpose He foreknew, these He predestined from the beginning. . . . But let no one say that foreknowledge is the cause of these things. For the foreknowledge did not make them such. But God, as God, foresaw far in advance what would be."

Comments: Theodoret speaks rather briefly in commenting on Romans 8:30. He clearly puts the condition in man, for by "purpose" (Greek *prothesis*) he means men's dispositions. But he does not say that a man can have the required disposition by his own power. He seems to be saying the same thing as the other Fathers said, and they, as we have seen,⁵⁹ attribute the good in men to God, in such a way, however, that some controlling condition is in human power.⁶⁰

202. St. John Damascene:⁶¹ "It is necessary to know that the choice of things to be done is in our power, but that the accomplishment⁶² of good things [is] from the cooperation of God, *justly cooperating, according to His foreknowledge, with those who in right conscience choose good*, but [that the accomplishment] of evil things is from the *desertion by God, again according to His foreknowledge, justly deserting [the wicked man]*. There are two kinds of desertion. For there is a dispensatory and instructional desertion, and there is a total, reprobating desertion. The dispensatory and instructional desertion is for the emendation and salvation and glory of the one who suffers

it. . . . But the *total desertion happens when, after God has done everything to save, the man remains unreformed and not cured, or rather, incurable, as a result of his own resolve.*⁶³ Then he is given over to complete destruction, like Judas. . . . It is necessary to know that God antecedently⁶⁴ wills all to be saved and to reach His kingdom. For He did not make us to punish, but to share in His goodness, because He is good. But He wills that sinners be punished, because He is just. Now the first [will] is called antecedent will, and will of good pleasure [and] it is from Him. But the second [will is called] consequent will⁶⁵ and a giving way⁶⁶ [and it comes] from our fault. . . . It is necessary to know that virtue is given by God to our nature, and that He is the beginning and cause of all good, and that *without His cooperation and help it is impossible for us to will and do good.* But it is in our power either to remain in virtue and to follow God who calls us to it, or to depart from virtue. . . ."

Comments: St. John does not teach that man can merit predestination. He clearly says that "without His cooperation and help, it is impossible for us to *will . . . good.*" But it is one thing to merit; another thing to place some condition which, inasmuch as there is good in it, is from God, but which is under man's control on the negative side.⁶⁷

In regard to reprobation, he clearly distinguishes between the antecedent will, in which God wants all to be saved, and the consequent will, in which He actually condemns some. He teaches that God deserts man in one of two ways:

1) "Dispensatory and instructional desertion."-This desertion does not lead to damnation but to salvation. It is temporary, and brings good to the man who is so deserted.

2) "Total desertion," which really deserves to be called reprobation in the true sense. But-it is most important to note St. John, with no ambiguity whatsoever, teaches what is the cause of this total desertion. For he says: "Total desertion happens when, after God has done everything to save, the man remains unreformed and not cured, or rather, incurable. . . ." In other words, God does not desert nor reprobate before consideration of demerits. God deserts in this way only after consideration of demerits, and at that, after demerits that are so great that the man is "*incurable,*" although God has done everything to save him. And the reason for the incurability of the man does not come from desertion by God-instead, desertion follows after incurability, and the incurability comes "as a result of his [the man's] own resolve, that is, from grave and persistent resistance to grace."

So it is most evident: St. John together with the other Greek Fathers, teaches that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves. Since the reason he gives is the fundamental reason, he does not restrict his meaning to the order of execution, nor to

predestination to glory taken separately.⁶⁸ Probably he puts the human condition in negative dispositions, for he says that "to will . . . good" is from God.⁶⁹

III. The Latin Fathers Before St. Augustine

203. St. Jerome:⁷⁰ "If . . . the patience of God hardened Pharaoh, and for a long time put off the punishment of Israel, so that He more justly condemned those whom He had endured so long a time, God's patience and infinite clemency is not to be blamed, but the hardness of those who abused the goodness of God to their own destruction. Moreover, the heat of the sun is one and according to the kind of thing that lies beneath it, it liquefies some, hardens others, loosens some, constricts others. For wax is melted, but mud is hardened: and yet, the nature of the heat [that each receives] is the same. So it is with the goodness and clemency of God: it hardens the vessels of wrath, that are fit for destruction; but it does not save the vessels of mercy in a blind way, and without a true judgment, but in accordance with preceding causes; for some did not accept the Son of God; but others of their own accord willed to receive Him. Now these vessels of mercy are not only the people of the gentiles, but also those of the Jews who willed to believe, and one people was made up of those who believe. From this it is plain, that it is not nations [as such] that are chosen, but the wills of men. . . ."

Comments: From the context we see that St. Jerome is explaining the most difficult parts of chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans. He compares the action of divine grace to the heat of the sun: the action of grace is always good in itself. The fact that some are hardened, while others are saved, is not explained therefore by differences in the heat, or in the actions of God: "The nature of the heat is the same." Instead, the difference is "according to the kind of thing that lies beneath it." For God "does not save . . . in a blind way," without consideration of human conditions, "and without a true judgment, but in accordance with preceding causes, for some did not accept the Son of God; but others of their own accord willed to receive Him."

The great Doctor of Sacred Scripture thus bears clear witness to the teaching that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves. He describes the condition in much the same way as St. Paul: it is faith. But he does not explore what is the precise role of man in having this faith.⁷¹

204. St. Ambrose:⁷² "The Apostle says: 'Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined.' For He did not predestine before He foreknew, but He predestined the rewards of those whose merits He foreknew."

Comments: From the context, we see that St. Ambrose is commenting on the response of Christ in regard to the sons of Zebedee, whose mother had asked for them the first places in the kingdom of Christ. Christ had said:⁷³ ". . . but to sit at my right hand

and at my left is not mine to grant, but it is for those for whom it has been prepared by my Father." St. Ambrose comments:⁷⁴ "'that is not mine to give,' for I observe justice, not favouritism. And then, referring to the Father, He added: 'It is for those for whom it has been prepared by my Father,' so that He might show that the Father too is not accustomed to defer to petitions, but to merits, because God is no respecter of persons. Hence also the Apostle says: 'Those whom he foreknew . . .'" And St. Ambrose continues with the passage we cited above.

It is obvious that St. Ambrose is really discussing a text that in itself refers to the first places in the external economy. Like the other Fathers, he seems not to know this distinction explicitly. For such places (of the external economy) are not assigned according to merits. However, if St. Ambrose holds that even these things-which actually are not regulated according to human merits-really are given according to human dispositions, then certainly he could not hold that reprobation and eternal predestination are decided without consideration of demerits. Rather, in accordance with the explanation given above,⁷⁵ he thinks that the same principles apply to both internal and external economy.

Does St. Ambrose teach that we can merit predestination itself? It is not necessary to understand his words in this sense. For he merely teaches that predestination is decided after considering merits. But, it is one thing to say that predestination is decided *after* consideration of merits; quite a different thing to say it is decided *because of* merits, so that predestination itself would be, strictly, merited. For St. Ambrose could mean merely that human merits are a *condition*, which God freely wills to consider, not a *cause*. And even in this condition, all that is positively good is, he would no doubt hold, from God.⁷⁶

We conclude then, that St. Ambrose holds at least substantially the same as the Greek Fathers. Actually, it is well known that he drew much on the Greek Fathers.

205. St. Hilary:⁷⁷ "'Blessed is he whom you have chosen and taken up, so that he may dwell in your tabernacles.' All flesh, indeed, will come, that is, we are gathered together from the whole human race; but blessed he who is chosen. For according to the Gospel, many are called but few are chosen. The chosen ones, moreover, are marked by the nuptial garment, and are splendid in the pure and fresh body of the new birth. *So the choice is not a matter of haphazard judgment; but the distinction is made on the basis of a choice of merit.* Blessed then is he whom God has chosen: blessed for this reason, because he is worthy of being chosen. Now it is good for us to know for what this blessed one is chosen. He is chosen for that which follows: 'He will dwell in your tabernacles.' The rest of the heavenly dwelling is the perfection of all goods. The Lord testifies that there are many

mansions in the heavens: but He asks the Father, that the Apostles may remain where He Himself also is. . . ."

Comments: St. Hilary is commenting on Psalm 64:5. He refers these words to the Gospel parable about those invited to the wedding feast, about whom the Gospel says:⁷⁸ "Many are called, but few are chosen." In itself, this Gospel parable does not speak of infallible predestination to eternal glory, but of the call to full membership in the Church. All of the people of Israel are called, but few actually enter. However, as we saw above⁷⁹ St. Hilary, like the other Fathers, holds that the same principles apply to predestination to the Church as to predestination to eternal glory. Further, he seems to understand this parable as referring also (but not exclusively) to eternal life. For he notes: "It is good for us to know for what this blessed one is chosen. . . . 'He will dwell in your tabernacles.'" And he continues at once, speaking of the eternal glory of heaven: "The rest of the heavenly dwelling is the perfection of all goods. The Lord testifies that there are many mansions in the heavens. . . ."

Since, moreover, St. Hilary thinks he is giving the fundamental answer to the question of the choice, it is clear that he does not restrict his meaning to the order of execution, nor to glory considered separately.⁸⁰

Like the other Fathers, St. Hilary most clearly teaches that election is conditioned by human conditions: "The choice is not a matter of haphazard judgment, but the distinction is made on the basis of a choice of merit." (In regard to the word "merit," see the comments above on St. Ambrose). Therefore, he hands down the same teaching as the other Fathers, namely, that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is or is not reprobated is found in the dispositions of men themselves.

IV. St. Augustine

206. Preliminary notes: To better understand the opinion of St. Augustine, we need to examine a few preliminary factors that exercised a great influence on his view:

1) A tendency to allegorical interpretations: In the early part of his life, St. Augustine was much disturbed by the Manichean objections against the Old Testament. From the sermons of St. Ambrose, however, he first found a way out of these objections: it was by way of allegorical and mystical interpretations. St. Augustine himself tells how, before his conversion, he listened to St. Ambrose:⁸¹ "I rejoiced also, that the old writings of the law and the prophets were not now presented to me as to be read in the way in which they had before seemed absurd to me, when I charged your Saints with such ideas, though they did not really hold them. Joyfully I used to hear Ambrose saying in his sermons to the people, as though he were most diligently *teaching a rule*: 'The letter kills, but the spirit gives life,'⁸² when he opened up in a spiritual sense, removing the mystical veil, those things which taken literally, seemed

to teach perversity." Hence St. Augustine was, at least somewhat predisposed to give-not always, but not rarely either-allegorical interpretations of Scripture. Hence we can see part of the reason why he fell into an interpretation of Romans 9 which today is totally rejected by the exegetes of all schools, so that it is held:⁸³ "Most certainly the interpretation of the 'clay' which takes its beginning from Augustine, is *entirely arbitrary*. In all of chapter 9 there is not even a remote allusion to original sin that corrupts the mass of the human race. . . ." Or, the comment of Pere Lagrange on St. Augustine's interpretation of Romans 8:28 ff.:⁸⁴ "That opinion, so full of consequences, isolated in ancient times, and rejected by modern authors . . . *has no foundation in the text and is contrary to the whole context.*"

2) St. Augustine's opinion on the universal salvific will: In spite of many entirely clear texts of St. Augustine, some theologians try to say that he really did hold for the sincerity of the universal salvific will. Before reading his texts themselves, it will be good to see certain factors which created a predisposition in St. Augustine on this point:

a) Predispositions in St. Augustine:

1) In the natural order, St. Augustine almost destroyed the line between the ordinary and the extraordinary works of God. Hence he says:⁸⁵ "Because . . . His miracles, by which He rules the whole world and governs all creatures, had become commonplace by constant experience . . . according to His mercy. He reserved to Himself certain things which He would perform at opportune times, beyond the usual course and order of nature so that they for whom the daily things had become commonplace, might be amazed in seeing, not greater, but unusual things. For the government of the whole world is a greater miracle than the feeding of five thousand men from five loaves. . . ." And similarly:⁸⁶ "That so many men, who were not, are born daily, is a greater miracle than that a few rose [from the dead] who had existed [before]. . . ." In a similar way, he does not seem to have drawn the distinction in the supernatural order between ordinary and extraordinary graces:⁸⁷ ". . . who would dare to say that God lacked a way of calling, in which even Esau would apply his mind to faith, and join his will [to that] in which Jacob was justified?" In other words: If God had really wanted to convert Esau (whom St. Augustine, according to his erroneous interpretation of Romans 9, believes was reprobated before consideration of demerits), God could have done so. St. Augustine seems to feel: Because God did not use this means of converting Esau, God did not really want to: God did not will the salvation of Esau.

If St. Augustine had invoked the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary graces, he could have said: God gave Esau many graces, with which he really could have been converted. Esau however was not converted by these graces. God could have converted Esau even so, but an extraordinary grace would have been needed, for the grace would have needed to forestall or even cancel out resistance to grace.⁸⁸ The extraordinary cannot become ordinary: So God could sincerely will the salvation of Esau even though He did not send an extraordinary grace.

And even without this distinction, St. Augustine could have salvaged a true salvific will for Esau if he had said: God gave Esau many and great graces. Through these, Esau really could have been converted [we do not speak in the sense of the sufficient grace of the Thomists, with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable for Esau to be converted]. From the fact that God did give these abundant graces, it is plain that God really and sincerely willed the salvation of Esau, even though by still more abundant graces, Esau might have been converted.

However, it is clear that these interpretations were not actually in the mind of St. Augustine, for he explicitly gives another explanation, namely: Esau was reprobated before consideration of personal demerits because of original sin. This conclusion flows from the theory of the *massa damnata*, of which St. Augustine is the father, and which we shall soon consider.

It is clear, then, that the lack of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary graces helped predispose St. Augustine to deny the sincerity of the universal salvific will.

2) He was also predisposed because he did not know the distinction between the antecedent will, in which God sincerely wills the salvation of all, and the consequent will, in which God actually reprobates some after consideration of demerits. For it is clear that God does not actually save all. Without this distinction, one is practically compelled to say: If God does not save some, it is because He does not want to.

b) The actual texts of St. Augustine on the salvific will

1) *Enchiridion* 103:⁸⁹ "When we hear and read in the sacred Scriptures that He wills all men to be saved . . . we must . . . so understand [it] . . . as if it were said that no man is saved except whom He wants [to be saved]. . . . Or certainly it was so said . . . not that there is no man whom He is unwilling to have saved, He who was unwilling to perform the wonders of miracles among those whom He

says would have done penance if He had done them; but in such a way that we understand 'all men' to mean the whole human race, distributed into various categories: kings, private citizens, nobles, ordinary men, lofty, lowly, learned, unlearned. . . ."

2) *De correptione et gratia* 14.44:⁹⁰ "And that which is written that 'He wills all men to be saved,' and yet not all are saved, can be understood in many ways, of which we have mentioned some in other works, but I shall give one here. It is said in such a way . . . that all the predestined are meant; for the whole human race is in them."

3) *De correptione et gratia* 15.47:⁹¹ "That 'God wills all men to be saved' can be understood also in this way: that He causes us to wish [that all men be saved]. . . ."

4) *Epistle* 217.6.19:⁹² ". . . and so that which is said: 'God wills all men to be saved' although *He is unwilling that so many be saved*, is said for this reason: that all who are saved, are not saved except by His will."

c) *Comments on the texts on the salvific will*: We see that St. Augustine vacillated between various interpretations, namely:

1) "All" means: "Out of all categories of men."

2) No one is saved unless God wills it.

3) All the predestined.

4) God causes us to will that all be saved.

Most certainly, St. Augustine did not arrive at so many and such varied conclusions from the exegesis itself of the text. *They have only one thing in common: absolutely all of them deny the universality of the salvific will.* St. Augustine felt himself forced to these lengths, because it seemed clear to him that God is unwilling for all to be saved. His interpretations are forced and aprioristic. In reality, Scripture says, without restriction, "all men." It does not say: "Some of all categories." Nor does Scripture say: "all the predestined," but rather, "all men." Nor does it say: "God brings it about that we will," but rather it says that *God wills*. And to say that in saying "He wills all men to be saved" he really means: "No one is saved unless God wills him to be saved"-this is merely running in a vain circle. For the sense would be: "God wills that only those be saved whom He wills to be saved."

So, since St. Augustine thought it necessary to have recourse to forced interpretations, we can scarcely suppose that he kept back in his mind, even implicitly, a simple distinction with which he could have avoided the necessity of straining texts. For if he had even implicitly thought: God wills all to be saved, but because of their demerits he does not save some-it would have

been so easy to say this, instead of searching for such varied and such strained interpretations.

Actually, there is an obvious explanation of why St. Augustine spoke this way. For he held, as we shall see below, the theory of the *massa damnata*, i.e., he held that as a result of original sin, all men belong to, are in, a damned mass. Although an infinite price has been paid in satisfaction for each one of these, God still wills to leave the great majority in that *massa damnata*. In other words, St. Augustine is the very father of the system of negative reprobation before consideration of demerits. But, as we have shown many times in the first part of this investigation, such a theory cannot be reconciled with the universal salvific will as it is revealed to us in Scripture. So it is not strange that St. Augustine denied the universal salvific will. Rather, it would be inexplicable how he could admit it as it appears in Scripture and still hold the theory of the *massa damnata*.

Hence, St. Augustine even explicitly denies the salvific will, saying, in the fourth text cited above, that, "He is *unwilling* that so many be saved," and, in the context of the same passage, he had said, a bit before: "when so many are not saved, not because they [do not will it] but because God does not will [it]. . . ." And similarly, in the first text above, he reasons that God could have converted many by miracles, but yet did not do so: "not that there is no man whom He is unwilling to have saved, He who was unwilling to perform the wonders of miracles among those whom He says would have done penance if He had done them. . . ." But this is the very train of reasoning we mentioned above in showing that St. Augustine was predisposed to deny the salvific will.

d) Confirmation of our interpretation of his texts on the salvific will:

1) St. Augustine explains his view on a salvific will that is merely an eminent will thus:⁹³ "That also is called the will of God which he brings about in the hearts of those who obey His commands. . . . In the sense of this will, which God produces in men, *He is also said to will that which He Himself does not will*, but which He causes His [servants] to will. . . . Therefore when the saints, according to this plan of God, will and pray that all may be saved, we can say, according to this form of speech: 'God wills [it], and does not do [it].'" Thus St. Augustine makes clear that God causes men to will that all be saved, but that God Himself does not will it.

2) At least a probable confirmation of our interpretation emerges from the words of St. Augustine on the number of those lost. He holds that the reprobates are so much more

numerous than the saved that⁹⁴ "by an incomparable number they are more numerous than those whom He deigned to predestine as sons of the promise to the glory of His kingdom; so that by the very number of those rejected, it might be shown that the number, howsoever large, of the justly damned is *of no importance* with a just God. . . . For that entire mass of just damnation would receive its due, if the potter⁹⁵ who is not only just, but also merciful, did not make out of it some vessels for honour according to grace, not according to what is due. . . ." - Therefore, if the damned are incomparably more numerous, and yet this is a matter "of no importance" to God even though no one can decide for himself whether or not he will be left in that mass - there hardly seems room left for a salvific will.⁹⁶

207. The two Augustinian theories of predestination: But we must recall what was said in the introduction of this investigation, about theological method. A good theologian can be compared to a man who stands on the circumference of a circle, and from two or more points on it tries to draw lines that will come to a focus in the center, which is the true solution. The lines are drawn from various passages in revelation which at least implicitly contain the solution of the problem. Now the good theologian, if he sees that two lines, from two different parts of revelation, do not focus, will not force one to agree with the other, but will hold to both, admitting that mysteries can be found in theology.

As we saw above,⁹⁷ St. Thomas, following this method with great fidelity, arrived at two theories on predestination: one founded on St. Augustine's interpretation of Romans 9, the other founded on the universal salvific will.

St. Augustine seems to have done the same thing, though not with the same fidelity to method as St. Thomas. For, although St. Augustine most certainly held the theory of the *massa damnata*, and is its father, nevertheless clear and unmistakable implications of a second theory are found in many of his works.

We must, therefore, investigate the two theories in the words of St. Augustine himself.

208. The first theory of St. Augustine: the *massa damnata*: Since no one denies that St. Augustine held this theory, it will suffice to cite just a few passages:

1) The texts themselves:

a) *Ad Simplicianum* 12.16:⁹⁸ "Therefore all men are . . . one condemned mass [*massa damnata*] of sin, that owes a debt of punishment to the divine and supreme justice. Whether it [the debt] be exacted, or whether it be condoned there is no injustice." (We note that St. Augustine never deserted this

theory, since in the last years of his life, he was still able to refer his readers to this work *Ad Simplicianum* for his opinion.)⁹⁹

b) *Enchiridion* 27:¹⁰⁰ ". . . the condemned mass of the whole human race lay in evils, or even rolled about in them, and was precipitated from evils into evils . . ."

c) *De civitate Dei* 21.12:¹⁰¹ "Hence there is a condemned mass of the whole human race . . . so that no one would be freed from this just and due punishment except by mercy and undue grace; and so the human race is divided [into two parts] so that in some it may be shown what merciful grace can do, in others, what just vengeance can do . . . In it [punishment] there are many more than in [mercy] so that in this way there may be shown what is due to all."

d) *Epistle* 186. 6.16:¹⁰² "'For He says to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I shall show mercy to him to whom I shall be merciful.' What does he teach us here, except that it pertains not to the merits of men, but to the mercy of God that some are freed from that mass [resulting] from the first man, to which death is rightly owed?"

e) *Epistle* 190. 3.9:¹⁰³ "It would rightly seem unjust that vessels of wrath for perdition are made [created] if the whole [human race] were not a condemned mass, from Adam."

2) Comments on texts on the *massa damnata*: It is obvious that St. Augustine holds that many, in fact (as we saw above) incomparably more than not, of the human race are deserted in the *massa damnata* because of original sin. Those who are rescued are saved merely¹⁰⁴ "so that in some it may be shown what merciful grace can do," for¹⁰⁵ "it pertains not to the merits of men, but to the mercy of God that some are freed from that mass." Obviously, desertion is decreed entirely independently of any consideration of human personal demerits. No man can "distinguish himself" so as to determine whether or not he will be left in that condemned mass. If a man really could "distinguish himself," St. Augustine's words would not hold.

209. The common element in the two theories: Since in both the first and the second theory St. Augustine holds predestination before consideration of merits, it will be helpful to see his statements on this point before turning to the second theory. It is clear from many passages that he did hold predestination before consideration of merits. Nor are his words such as to leave room for us to suppose that he was speaking only of the whole process of predestination, so that he could conceivably hold at the same time that predestination to glory, separately considered, could be after consideration of merits:

1) *He teaches that every good work, even the good decision of our will is the work of God.*

a) *De gratia Christi* 25. 26:¹⁰⁶ "For God not only has given [us] our ability, and aids it, but also, He 'works both the will and the

performance,' not that we do not will, or that we do not act, but that without His help we neither will nor do any good."

b) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16. 32:¹⁰⁷ "It is certain that we will when we will; but He brings it about that we will good. . . . It is certain that we act when we act, but He brings it about that we act, giving most efficacious power to our will."

c) *Ibid.* 6. 15:¹⁰⁸ "If, then, your merits are gifts of God, God does not crown your merits as merits of yours, but as gifts of His."

d) *Epistle* 194. 5.19:¹⁰⁹ "What then is the merit of a man before receiving grace, in accordance with which he receives grace, since it is only grace that makes every good merit of ours, and since when God crowns our merits, He crowns nothing other than His own gifts?"

2) *He explicitly excludes consideration of merits as a condition:*

a) *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 17.34:¹¹⁰ "Let us, then, understand the call by which the elect are made [elect]: [they are] not [persons] who are chosen because they have believed, but [they are persons] who are chosen so that they may believe. For even the Lord Himself made this [call] sufficiently clear, when He said:¹¹¹ 'You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.' . . . This is the unshakeable truth of predestination and grace. For what else does that mean, that the Apostle says, 'As He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.' For surely if it was said [that they were chosen] because God foresaw that they would believe, [and] not because He Himself was going to make them believers-the Son speaks against that sort of foreknowledge, saying: 'You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.' . . . So they were chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination by which God foreknew His own future acts: they are chosen out of the world by that vocation by which God fulfilled that which He had predestined. 'For those whom He predestined, them also He called. . . .' Therefore God chose the faithful, not because they already were [faithful] but that they might be [faithful]. . . . So by choosing, He makes them rich in faith, just as [He makes them] heirs of the kingdom."

b) *Enchiridion* 99:¹¹² "For grace alone distinguishes the redeemed from the lost, whom a common cause from [their] beginning had joined into one mass of perdition. . . ."

c) *De correptione et gratia* 7.12:¹¹³ "They, however, are distinguished not by their merits, but by the grace of the Mediator . . . from that mass of perdition which was made through the first Adam. . . ."

d) *Epistle* 194.8.35:¹¹⁴ "It is, moreover, marvellous into what precipices they hurl themselves, in their fear of the nets of truth, when they are pressed by these difficulties. 'It is for this reason'

they say, 'that He hated one of those not yet born [Esau] and loved the other [Jacob], because He foresaw their future works.' Who would not be surprised that this most keen thought would be lacking to the Apostle? . . . This, then, was the place for him [St. Paul] to say what these [persons who reason incorrectly] think: 'For God foresaw their future works, when He said that the elder would serve the lesser.' But the Apostle did not say this, but instead, lest anyone dare to boast of the merits of his works, he wanted what he did say to be able to teach the grace and glory of God."

210. The second theory: *Reprobation after and because of personal demerits:* St. Augustine does not propose this theory explicitly and clearly, but he does propose it, by inescapable implications, in many passages, in works written at various times, against various opponents, and in works that are not controversial as well.

As we briefly indicated in the introduction to this study, and will explain more fully later,¹¹⁵ reprobation after consideration of demerits can fit with predestination before consideration of merits (we already know St. Augustine held the latter.) Since, then, St. Augustine held both points, he seems to have possessed the most essential elements of the theory we proposed in the introduction, even though he did not know how to reconcile the two points.

The way is, as it were, prepared for the second theory in some statements St. Augustine makes about the difference in human power for good and for evil. We have already¹¹⁶ seen what he said about the power of man for good. He speaks far differently about human power for evil. Namely, in the *De civitate Dei* 12. 7 he says:¹¹⁷ "Let, then, no one seek for the efficient cause of evil will; for [the cause] is not efficient but deficient; for that is not efficiency but deficiency." And similarly in his *De correptione et gratia* 11. 31:¹¹⁸ "Free will suffices for evil, but for good it is too little, unless it is helped by the Almighty God."

But we must come to the texts in which he implicitly teaches that reprobation comes after consideration of personal demerits. It is important to notice that (as we shall see below), in the majority of the texts, his words could *not* be understood as applying only to positive reprobation, but necessarily apply also to *negative* reprobation:

1) *De diversis quaestionibus* LXXXIII. 68.5:¹¹⁹ "For not all who were called willed to come to that dinner, which as the Lord says in the Gospel, was prepared, nor would they who came have been able to come if they had not been called. And so neither should they who came attribute [it] to themselves, for they came, being called; nor should those who were unwilling to come attribute [it] to anyone but themselves, for, in order that they might come, they were called in free will."

Comments: St. Augustine makes a clear distinction between the power of man for good and for evil. Man without help cannot perform supernatural good: "nor would they who came have been able to come if they had not been called." But for evil, as he said elsewhere, free will suffices: "nor should those who were unwilling to come attribute it to anyone but themselves." In this passage, he is speaking about the dinner in the Gospel, to which "many were called, but few were chosen."¹²⁰ He explains why many of those who were called were not also chosen. He says that a man could not come by his own power, but he can, by his own power, refuse to come. He gives the reason for the non-election of those who did not come when they were called: "nor should those who were unwilling to come attribute it to anyone but themselves." Now if the fundamental reason why they were not chosen were in God's desertion of them (in negative reprobation), then St. Augustine could not say that the non-elect should not "attribute it to anyone but themselves." For they could *also*, and most fundamentally, attribute it to God, who deserted them before considering their demerits. *Therefore according to this text, man himself, by his evil will, can "distinguish himself" from the good, so that whether or not he is reprobated does depend on human conditions.* Obviously, this view is quite the opposite of the view St. Augustine expressed in a text cited above for the first theory:¹²¹ "grace alone distinguishes the redeemed from the lost, whom a common cause from [their] beginning had joined into one mass of perdition. . . ."

2) *De correptione et gratia* 13.42:¹²² "Those, then, who do not belong to that most certain and most happy number [of the predestined] are judged most justly according to their merits. For they either lie under the sin which they contracted originally by generation. . . . Or they receive the grace of God, but are temporary, and do not persevere; they desert and are deserted. For they were let go in their free will, not receiving the gift of perseverance, by a just and hidden judgment of God."

Comments: In the latter part of this text, St. Augustine speaks of men who have received forgiveness of original sin by grace, but who do not persevere. Now, from the very fact that they no longer have original sin, it is clear that they are not reprobated and refused the grace of perseverance because of original sin. If then they are not reprobated for original sin, what is the reason for reprobation? Two alternatives could be conceived: (a) God acts without any reason at all, in a blind fashion; (b) God reprobates because of personal demerits. Now of course, the first alternative must be rejected. First, because it is altogether unbecoming for God to act blindly, without reason. Infinite Wisdom cannot do that. Second, because St. Augustine denies that God acts blindly. He says: "They were let go in their free will . . . by a just and hidden judgment. . . ." So they were not let go without a cause, since a just judgment is not passed without a cause. But

especially, St. Augustine also said: "They desert and are deserted." The sequence is of prime importance. He did not say: "They were deserted by God [in negative reprobation] so that they deserted God," but instead: "They desert and are deserted" that is, they first desert God by sins, and after this, by a just judgment, they are deserted.

Their case could not be accounted for by saying that they perish because of the weakness that remained even after original sin is forgiven-for this weakness remains in *all*, even the baptized. Yet not all perish. So we must still seek for the reason why some of the baptized perish but others do not. The alternatives given above still apply. So again, St. Augustine implies that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is to be reprobated or not is to be found in the dispositions of men themselves. (Of course, this text in itself shows our conclusion only in regard to the baptized. Other texts, as we have seen and will see further, are more general in wording).

3) *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 2.17.26:¹²³ "Men are not willing to do what is right either because the fact that it is right is hidden from them, or because it does not please them. It is from the grace of God, which helps the wills of men, that that which was hidden becomes known, and that which did not please becomes sweet. The reason why they are not helped [by grace] is in themselves, not in God, whether they are predestined to damnation because of the wickedness of their pride, or whether they are to be judged and emended, contrary to that pride, if they are sons of mercy."

Comments: Again St. Augustine distinguishes the power of man for good and for evil. He is insufficient for supernatural good: "It is from the grace of God . . . that that which was hidden becomes known and that which did not please becomes sweet." But man can reject this grace. Therefore, the distinction between those reprobated and those not reprobated depends precisely on this point: whether or not man rejects grace, for he says: "The reason why they are not helped [by grace] is in themselves, not in God . . ." Now, if the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is or is not reprobated were found in desertion by God, these words would not be true. For then he should have said the opposite, namely: "The reason why they are not helped by grace is *not* in themselves, but in God, who freely deserts him whom he deserts without consideration of any condition in the man who is deserted." So again, St. Augustine holds that the reason underlying the decision as to who is or is not reprobated is found in conditions in men themselves.

4) *De actis cum Felice Manichaeo* 2.8:¹²⁴ "Felix said: You call Manichaeus cruel for saying these things. What do we say about Christ who said: Go into eternal fire? Augustine said: He said this to sinners. Felix said: These sinners-why were they not purified? Augustine said: *Because they did not will* [it]. Felix said: Because they did not will it-did

you say that? Augustine said: *Yes, I said it: Because they did not will it.*"

Comments: St. Augustine is having a public debate with Felix the Manichaeon. At the end of the debate, Felix publicly repudiated Manichaeism. St. Augustine had said that the theory of Manichaeus is cruel for it teaches that many particles of light (which are divine) would be shut up in a ball of fire forever. For the Manichees taught that there is a mixture of light and darkness in this world. They said that this mixture was permitted by God, so that the way might be prepared for a greater victory-yet they taught that at the end of the world, not all the particles of light would be separated from the darkness, so that, through no fault of their own, many particles of light (which are divine) would have to suffer forever. Really then, God would have permitted a mixture to prepare the way for a greater victory-which would never come!

Felix tries to retort that Christ too is cruel, since he condemns men to eternal fire. St. Augustine defends Christ, saying that sinners are condemned: "Because they did not will [to be purified]." Felix finds it hard to believe his ears. So St. Augustine repeats with insistence: "Yes, I said it: Because they did not will it."

So again, St. Augustine teaches that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who will or will not be reprobated is found in dispositions in men themselves. For if a man does not wish to be purified, he is not purified, and so is condemned.

Could we say in spite of this that perhaps St. Augustine is keeping in the back of his mind such a thought as this: Certain men do not wish to be purified, because God deserts them, so that it would be inconceivable for them to will to be purified?-If St. Augustine really held that view, he would have defeated Felix by a shameful deception. For Felix was defeated on this point precisely because St. Augustine said that sinners were not purified because they did not will to be purified. But if the fundamental reason were not the fact that they did not will it, but the fact that God had deserted them, giving them *no opportunity at all* of "distinguishing themselves" in regard to being reprobated or not-then the objection raised by Felix would really hold, for men would be damned with no chance to extricate themselves from it. And Felix could have added that the Christian God too, like the Manichaeon God, would have permitted an evil to prepare for greater good-but the good, the greater victory, would never come, for (in Augustine's view)¹²⁵ incomparably more men are condemned than are saved, and that, not fundamentally because these men did not want to be purified, but because they were not given an opportunity to really "distinguish themselves."

5) *Tractatus in Ioannis Evangelium* 53.6:¹²⁶ "'They were not able to believe' since Isaias the prophet predicted it; and the prophet predicted it because God had foreseen that this would happen. But *if I*

am asked why they were not able, I reply quickly: Because they did not want to: For God foresaw their evil will, and He from whom future things cannot be hidden announced it in advance through the prophet. But, you say, the prophet speaks of another cause, not of their will. What cause does the prophet speak of? Because 'God gave them a spirit of compunction, eyes so that they did not see, and ears so that they did not hear, and He blinded their eyes and hardened their heart.' I reply that their will merited even this."

Comments: In this passage, St. Augustine is giving the *fundamental* reason for the reprobation of certain men. For first, in explaining the words of Isaiah the prophet, he says that the reason why they were not able to believe was "their evil will"-not desertion by God. But secondly, foreseeing that perhaps someone might say that those who were unwilling to believe were such because God had deserted them or blinded them, he answers firmly: "I reply that their will merited even this."

So again, St. Augustine teaches that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to why some are reprobated or not is found in the dispositions of men themselves, that is, in the evil wills of those who were unwilling to receive grace.

Could we suspect that St. Augustine is still holding back in his own mind this belief: "Men merit this because they are in original sin?" This seems scarcely possible, for, if he felt thus, why would it be necessary to go through so long a verbal process, and to propose an objection to himself that perhaps the ultimate reason was that God blinded them, and to deny the force of the objection by again asserting very firmly that the reason was in their evil wills? Surely if he really held such a view, he would be open to the charge of having misled his hearers. For they could hardly suspect his real meaning from his words: instead, they would almost surely get the opposite meaning.

6) *De catechizandis rudibus* 52:¹²⁷ ". . . the merciful God, wishing to free men, if they are not enemies to themselves and do not resist the mercy of their Creator, sent His only-begotten Son. . . ."

Comments: Again St. Augustine teaches that the distinction between those who are freed and those who are not freed depends on the resistance or lack thereof on the part of men. Nor could we suspect that he really means: All men will resist unless God prevents it. For then the words just cited above would be deceptive, and would surely lead the reader into error. For they seem to mean that the outcome is determined by a condition in man: "if they are not enemies to themselves and do not resist the mercy of their Creator." But if it were not in the power of men not to resist, the outcome would not really be so conditioned.¹²⁸

211. The times and circumstances of composition of the passages of the second theory: It cannot be said that St. Augustine proposed this second theory only at one period, and later changed his

view. For the texts we have seen come from all periods of his literary activity:¹²⁹

De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII-written between 388 and 395 A.D.

De actis cum Felice Manichaeo-398 A.D.

De catechizandis rudibus-399 A.D.

De peccatorum meritis et remissione-411 A.D.

Tractatus in Ioannem-between 413 and 418 A.D.

De correptione et gratia-426 A.D.

Thus texts containing the second theory are found at the beginning and at the end, and at many intermediate points in the career of St. Augustine. So it cannot be said that he merely changed his mind. For during this same span of time he also taught the theory of the *massa damnata*.

Nor could one say that his theory varies with the various adversaries against whom he is writing. For the passages we have considered for the second theory come from works against the Pelagians, against the Manichees, and works in which he is not engaged in controversy. Further, they come from technical theological works, and from more popular works as well.

So we cannot do other than to admit that St. Augustine, moved by sound theological method, did not altogether leave out conclusions drawn from faith in the goodness and justice of God in general. However, he did not follow sound method with such fidelity as did St. Thomas. Yet he did follow it, and, to understand his opinions, it is quite necessary that we work on the assumption that he followed it.

212. Confirmation of our interpretation of texts of the second theory:

1) *From St. Augustine himself:* In a number of places, especially in his early works, St. Augustine had said some things about grace, which he later corrected:

a) In his *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.3.6 he had said:¹³⁰ "Now that light . . . feeds the pure hearts of those who believe God. . . . This [believing] all men can do, if they wish, for that light illuminates every man who comes into this world." But in his *Retractationes* 1.10.2 he corrected the above statement, saying:¹³¹ "As to the fact that I said, 'That light feeds . . . all men can [believe] if they wish'-let not the new heretics, the Pelagians, think it was said in their sense. For it is entirely true that all men can do this [believe] if they wish; but 'the will is prepared by the Lord' and it is only built up by the gift of love so that they can. . . ." So St. Augustine corrected this passage in which he could at least seem to attribute to free will the power of *positive* salutary good. And quite rightly. But he never did correct or retract the passages in which he attributed to man only a negative type of power to condition, nor did he correct the texts we cited above for the second theory, in which he attributes

reprobation to personal demerits. The reason is that he distinguished, as we have seen, between the power of positive good, and the power of negatives. For man cannot, by his own unaided power, do any positive salutary good. But he can do two negative things, namely, to resist, and to omit resistance (in the sense explained above).¹³² In this negative channel, reprobation really does depend on human conditions.

b) In his *De dono perseverantiae* 17.42 he explicitly teaches that in his teaching on predestination he was writing *solely* against attributing the power of positive salutary good to man (for thus, if a man could of himself accomplish a positive salutary good, then predestination would be according to merits):¹³³ "... let them see . . . that by this preaching of predestination there is impeded and overthrown *only* that most dangerous error in which it is said that the grace of God is given according to our merits, so that he who glories would glory, not in the Lord, but in himself."

So St. Augustine by this teaching on predestination wanted to teach *just one* truth: that man cannot merit predestination, or, that predestination is not given according to the merits of men. But this truth which he so insistently defended in no way conflicts with another truth, namely, with the teaching of the second theory that reprobation is decreed after and because of consideration of demerits.¹³⁴ St. Augustine, however, since he did not see how these two things could harmonize (and as a result of his erroneous interpretation of Romans 8-9) was led to the theory of the *massa damnata*, in such a way, however, that in fidelity to sound theological method he did not altogether abandon the truth of the second theory.

c) St. Augustine also wrote:¹³⁵ "He [God] will more easily restrain His wrath than His mercy." Now in the theory of the *massa damnata*, St. Augustine teaches that God damns many more than He saves. Therefore, in that theory, God will much more easily restrain His mercy than His wrath. But in the passage just cited, he says the opposite. So, at least in part, he seems to imply the second theory.

2) *Confirmation of our interpretation from the words of St. Prosper:* Controversies arose over St. Augustine's teachings on predestination and grace both during his own lifetime and after his death. Shortly after his death, St. Prosper answered objections on behalf of St. Augustine. Some think that St. Prosper modified the views of St. Augustine somewhat. But Garrigou-Lagrange, who vigorously defends the theory drawn from St. Augustine's interpretation of Romans 8-9, says that St. Prosper was¹³⁶ "a most faithful disciple of Augustine." Whatever be the case, it is clear that St. Prosper most faithfully proposed the same view as St. Augustine taught in the second theory:

a) *Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Gallorum 3:*¹³⁷ ". . . for this reason they were not predestined because they were foreseen as going to be such as a result of voluntary transgression. . . . Therefore, just as good works are to be attributed to God who inspires them, so evil works are to be attributed to those who sin. For they were not deserted by God so that they deserted God; but they deserted and were deserted, and they were changed from good to evil by their own will and as a result . . . they were not predestined . . . by Him who foresaw them as going to be such."

Comments: St. Prosper is speaking about those who do not persevere. He is speaking about reprobation, the denial of predestination, and he gives the reason for it, namely: "They were not predestined because they were foreseen as going to be such as a result of voluntary transgression. . . ." So reprobation is decreed only after consideration of demerits. St. Prosper also excludes negative reprobation before consideration of demerits: "For they were not deserted by God so that they deserted God but they deserted and were deserted." If he had held negative reprobation he should have said: "They were deserted by God so that they deserted God; they were deserted, and [then] deserted God." But he said the opposite, as we see.

b) *Ibid. 7.85:*¹³⁸ ". . . He foresaw that *they would fall by their very own will*, and for this reason He did not separate them from the sons of perdition by predestination."

Comments: St. Prosper is obviously saying the same as in the text we have just considered above.

c) *Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum 12:*¹³⁹ "Now these, of whom it is said: 'They went out from us, but they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us'-these went out *by their will, by their will they fell*. And because they were foreseen as going to fall, they were not predestined."

Comments: Again, the same teaching as in the two passages cited above.

V. Conclusions from all the Fathers, Taken Together

213. To prove a doctrine from the Fathers, it is necessary to find them morally unanimous, and speaking as witnesses of revelation. We do not find that unanimity on the matters we are considering, though they approach closely to it in the teaching that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is or is not to be reprobated is found in the dispositions of men themselves. All the Eastern Fathers vigorously state this thesis, and obviously base it on revelation. The Western Fathers before St. Augustine do the same. And even St. Augustine himself, in not a few texts, at least seems to imply it. His disciple St. Prosper beyond doubt holds it.

But in spite of the lack of a rigid proof, we can make a very plausible speculation. From the fact that Divine Providence has so arranged things that there is a progressive clarification of revelation throughout the centuries, there is not to be expected such clarity in the first centuries as later. So it is not strange that we find some differences in different Fathers. Yet it seems plausible to suppose this: Some Fathers, by providential disposition, saw some parts of the complete picture, while others saw others. Namely:

1) *St. Augustine*: We should certainly retain from him the teaching which he says is the only point he really wishes to insist on in this matter. Namely, he wished to refute¹⁴⁰ "only that most dangerous error in which it is said that the grace of God is given according to our merits." On the other hand, we should certainly not accept his denial of the universal salvific will. Nor should we accept his theory of the *massa damnata* which is based on an interpretation of Romans 8-9 which exegetes of all schools today reject, and on a failure to understand the real nature and force of the universal salvific will, as it is revealed to us in Scripture (as we saw it in chapters 4-5).

2) *The other Fathers*: We should certainly accept from them that which they saw most clearly and most urgently proclaimed, namely, that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who is or is not to be reprobated is found in conditions within men themselves. In other words: God does not reprobate before consideration of demerits. The Fathers did not see clearly the exact nature (positive or negative) of the human condition. But they did see clearly that the condition is present.

3) *All the Fathers*: If we combine the two points to be accepted, as we have just indicated them, we have the following: Predestination is not given according to merits, but reprobation is given only after consideration of demerits.

Of course, the Fathers did not see how to reconcile these two statements. But they are not to be blamed for that, since there is, by Divine Providence, a gradual clarification to be expected over the centuries.

In spite, then, of some obscurities, the Fathers deserve great praise for having each preached that part of the truth which Divine Providence assigned to him. And St. Augustine still deserves to be called Doctor of Grace, since, in spite of difficulties that must have been painful to him, he still most faithfully taught the gratuity of grace, a point which some other Fathers saw only obscurely.

END NOTES

1 Cf. § 132.5.

2 Cf. §§ 51, 131-32.

3 §§ 190-92.

4 § 186.

5 Cf. §§ 248, 251-58.

6 Cf. §§ 190-92.
7 Cf. § 299.
8 § 82.
9 Cf. § 144
10 Cf. §§ 137-38.
11 § 5.
12 In chapters 14 and 17.
13 Cf. §§ 79-81.
14 Phil 2:13.
15 2 Cor 3:5.
16 Cf. §§ 14-16 and 117-124.
17 § 210.
18 The Fathers would not deny that a man can be saved who, without any fault of his own, has never heard about the Church. For such a man is not left out because of his demerits, but rather, the opportunity never came to him. The Fathers seem to have thought little about such a case. Nor do they seem to have thought much if at all of the case so frequent today: that of a man who was born of parents who are outside of full membership in the Church, but are in good faith, so that he himself is kept from the Church by deeply rooted beliefs, acquired early in life and without any fault on his part.
19 Dialogus 140.4., PG 6.797.
20 The Greek has aitia.
21 Cf. note 18.
22 Mt 8:11-12.
23 Cf. §§ 185-92.
24 Cf. §§ 188-89.
25 Dialogus 141.2. PG 6.797.
26 Adversus haereses 4.29.2. PG 7.1064.
27 Cf. §§ 185-187.
28 Cf. §§ 188-189.
29 Stromata I.18. PG 8.804-05.
30 1 Cor 1:24.
31 1 Cor 1:20.
32 1 Cor 1:19.
33 Acts 2:41.
34 Is 1:19.
35 1 Cor 1:19.
36 Cf. §§ 185-187.
37 Cf. also §§ 190-192.
38 Cf. §§ 188-89.
39 Catechesis 7.12. PG 33.620.
40 Cf. §§ 6.8, 118-120.
41 Oratio 37.13-15 in Matt. 19.1-2. PG 36.398-99, 302.
42 Rom 9:16.
43 The Greek has to boulesthai.
44 Mt 19:11.
45 Cf. §§ 190-92.
46 Cf. §§ 188-89.
47 Cf. §§ 185-87.
48 Adversus Apollinarium, Antirrheticus 29. PG 45.1187.
49 Cf. § 185-87.
50 Cf. §§ 188-89.
51 In Epistolam ad Romanos Homilia 16.5. PG 60.554.
52 In Ephesios 1.2. PG 62.12-13.
53 Cf. §§ 188-89.

54 Cf. also the citation from St. John given in § 54.1 and his words on the purpose of creation in his commentary on Ephesians (PG 62.13): "'For the praise of glory' What is this? That someone should praise Him? That someone should glorify Him? We? Angels? Archangels? That all creation [should glorify Him]? And what [would] that [be]? Nothing. For the divine is without need. Why then does He wish to be praised and glorified by us? So that our love for Him may be warmer. For He desires nothing of our things, but only our salvation-not service, not glory, not anything else. And for this He does everything."

55 In Epistolam ad Romanos 8.30. PG 74.828-29.

56 §§ 185-92.

57 Cf. §§ 188-89.

58 In Romanos 8.30. PG 82.141, 144.

59 Cf. e.g., § 197.

60 Cf. §§ 188-89.

61 De fide orthodoxa 2.29. PG 94.968-69, 972-73.

62 Greek: telos.

63 Greek: protheseos.

64 Greek: proegoumenos.

65 Greek: hepomenon.

66 Greek: parachoresis.

67 Cf. §§ 188-189.

68 Cf. §§ 185-187.

69 Cf. §§ 188-189.

70 Epistola 120.10. PL 22.1000.

71 Cf. §§ 188-89.

72 De fide 5.6.83. PL 16.692-93.

73 Mt 20.23.

74 De fide 5.6.82-83. PL 16.692-93.

75 Cf. §§ 190-192.

76 Cf. §§ 188-189, 299.

77 In Psalmum 64.5. PL 9.415.

78 Mt 22:14.

79 §§ 190-192.

80 Cf. §§ 185-187.

81 Confessiones 6.4.6. PL 32.722.

82 2 Cor 3:6.

83 SS Lyonnet, S.I., Quaestiones in Epistolam ad Romanos Series altera, Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, Roma, 1956, p. 4; (emphasis mine).

84 Cf. cap. 1 note 2.

85 In Ioannis Evangelium 6.1. Tr. 24 PL 35.1593.

86 Sermo 142.1.1. PL 38.1139.

87 Ad Simplicianum 1.14. PL 40.119.

88 Cf. § 127.

89 PL 40.280.

90 PL 44.943.

91 PL 44.945.

92 PL 33.985.

93 De civitate Dei 22.2.1-2. PL 41.753.

94 Epistola 190.3.12. PL 33.860-61. Cf. also Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum 1.121. PL 45.1127.

95 Cf. Rom 9:21 and chapter 1 of this book.

96 A probable, though not certain, confirmation is had in the famous words of St. Augustine on the grace of perseverance (De correptione et gratia 11.32. PL 44.935-36): "Then [before original sin], therefore, God had given to man good will, for He had made him in it. . . . He had given the help without which he could not remain in it

[even if] he wished but [the decision] whether he might wish [to remain in good will] He left in the power of his free will. . . . If however this help had been lacking either to angel or to man, when they had first been made (since their nature had not been made such as to be able to remain, even if they wished, without divine help) they would not have fallen by their own fault, for the help would have been lacking without which they could not remain. Now [after original sin], however, to those to whom such a help is lacking [this lack] is the penalty of sin: but to those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not as something due; and it is given so much more fully through Jesus Christ . . . to those to whom it pleases God to give it, that we not only have that without which we cannot remain, even if we wish, but even so great and such [a help] that we do will [to remain in good will]."

So he teaches that before original sin, Adam had had the help without which he could not persevere-but yet, such a grace that he could fail if he wished. After original sin, God gives to many a greater grace, that is, a help so great and such that they infallibly do will to persevere. However, after original sin, God denies to many both the help without which they cannot persevere and the help by which they would infallibly persevere. He denies this help as a penalty of sin. Without these helps, men are in such a state that if our first parents-who were not so weak-had been in that state "they would not have fallen by their own fault."

Now if a man is deserted in this way because of his own personal sins, God can still sincerely say that He wants all men to be saved: for the man ruins himself by his personal sins. But if the reason for such a desertion is original sin, it is evident that men cannot "distinguish themselves" as to whether they will be reprobates or not: and if they cannot, then, if God reprobates, He cannot at the same time sincerely say that He wills the salvation of such men.

Now it is probable, at least, that St. Augustine is speaking of original sin when he says: "to those to whom such a help is lacking [this lack] is the penalty of sin." For, considering the context, he seems to be thinking of original sin, since he is comparing the state of men "now," after original sin, with the state of men "then," before original sin. He says that some are deserted because of sin, but that some are saved by mercy gratuitously-but this is the fashion of speaking he employs in speaking of the two categories of men, one which is mercifully drawn out of the *massa damnata*, while the other is justly left in the same *massa*. Further, he speaks in the singular number: "is the penalty of sin,"-not in the plural "the penalty of sins." However, as we said above, this confirmation is only probable, since it is not entirely certain that he is speaking of original sin. If he is speaking of personal sins, then this text belongs to the second theory of St. Augustine, of which we will speak below. Cf. §§ 210-12 and esp. § 210.2 where a citation is given from the same work which we are presently considering.

97 Cf. §§ 137-138.

98 PL 40.121.

99 *De dono perseverantiae* 21.55. PL 45.1027 and *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 4.8. PL 44.966.

100 PL 40.245

101 PL 41.727.

102 PL 33.822. Citation from Rom 9:15.

103 PL 33.860.

104 Cf. note 101 above. F. J. Thonnard, AA. ("La predestination augustinienne et l'interpretation de O. Rottmann" in: *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes*, IX, 1963, pp. 259-87) asserts (p. 270) that the thought of St. Augustine is distorted if one separates the theory of the *massa damnata* from the context of the eternal predestination decreed by God even before original sin. (He refers chiefly to *De civitate Dei*, books 11-14, esp. 14. 26, where St. Augustine speaks of a "definite number" of the predestined which God could fill up even after the human race became a *massa damnata*). We deny the distortion. However, whatever one may

think about it will not change the fact that the massa damnata theory does correctly describe St. A's thought on the actual, present stage of the human race and God's dealing with it at present, for original sin has actually occurred. No one denies that St. A does hold, in his first theory, a predestination of some, and a passing over of others before prevision of merits.

105 Cf. note 102 above.

106 44.373.

107 44.900-901.

108 44.891.

109 33.880.

110 44.985-86.

111 On the correct exegesis of the passages cited by St. Augustine, cf. § 18.

112 PL 40.278.

113 PL 44.923.

114 PL 33.887.

115 In chapters 14 and 17.

116 § 209.1.

117 PL 41.355.

118 PL 44.935.

119 PL 40.73.

120 Cf. §§ 190-92.

121 Cf. note 112 above.

122 PL 44.942.

123 PL 44.167.

124 PL 42.540

125 Cf. § 206.

126 PL 35.1776-77.

127 PL 40.345.

128 Cf. the passages cited in chapter 5 in which St. Augustine seems to suppose that the salvific will is really sincere and universal. Cf. also § 102, text 2.

129 Cf. F. Moriones, O.R.S.A., *Enchiridion theologicum Sancti Augustini*, B.A.C., Matriti, 1961, pp. 706-08.

130 PL 34.176.

131 PL 32.599.

132 §§ 82, 344-348.

133 PL 45.1019.

134 Cf. chapters 14 and 17.

135 *Enarrationes* in Ps 76:11. PL 36.977.

136 Note in Context:

De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 424.

137 PL 51.158-59.

138 PL 51.161

139 PL 51.184

140 Cf. note 133 above.

"Pt. 2: Predestination and reprobation - Ch. 14: The opinions of St. Thomas"

214. Between the time of the Fathers and the time of St. Thomas, not a few things were written and said on our problem. As we have seen,¹ the definitions of the second Council of Orange are of special importance. However, these definitions, in spite of their importance, contain only principles that are useful for the solution. Nowhere in the

time between the Fathers and St. Thomas do we find a better solution explicitly proposed.

215. The problem of interpreting St. Thomas: To be able to understand the view of St. Thomas, it is very necessary, as we said in the introduction, to keep in mind that he followed strict theological method with great fidelity. As a result of this there are, as we have seen,² two series of texts in St. Thomas. For, in his fidelity to sound method, he tried to draw lines from two starting points in revelation, and, although they did not seem to harmonize, he abstained from forcing one line to fit with the other. He knew that in theology there are mysteries, so that at times it is necessary to hold two truths without being able to see how they can be reconciled.

We see this demonstrated especially in St. Thomas's commentary *On the Epistle to the Romans*, and in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book three, chapters 159-163. For in the former, which is the chief place where St. Thomas gives his reasoning based on Romans 8-9 (the *massa damnata* theory), there are still found traces of the line based on 1 Timothy 2:4. And in the *Contra Gentiles*, where he is chiefly presenting the line from 1 Timothy 2:4., we still find traces of Romans 8-9. So in the *Commentary on Romans*, Chapter 9,³ we read: "Since all men because of the sin of the first parents are born exposed to damnation, those whom God frees through His grace, He frees out of mercy alone. And so He is merciful to certain ones whom He delivers, but to certain ones He is just, whom He does not deliver."

But also: "... foresight of sins can be some reason for reprobation . . . inasmuch as God proposes to punish the wicked for sins which they have of themselves, not from God, but He proposes to reward the just because of merits, which they do not have of themselves. Osee, 13:9: 'Your ruin is from yourself, Israel; only in me is your help.' . . . Those whom He hardens, earn that they be hardened by Him."

And in *Contra Gentiles* 3.159, we find: "They only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, when the sun illumines the world, he is charged with a fault who closes his eyes, if any evil comes of it, although he cannot see unless he first has the light of the sun."

But also, from the *massa damnata* theory: ". . . by the divine operation, some, helped by grace, are directed to their ultimate end, but others, deserted by the same grace, fail to reach the ultimate end; and since all things that are done by God are provided for and arranged from eternity by His wisdom . . . it is necessary that the above mentioned difference of men have been arranged by God from eternity. . . . But He is said to have reprobated those to whom from eternity He has arranged that He would not give grace."

But some theologians, even though they sincerely intended to follow St. Thomas, yet failed to keep sufficiently in mind that St. Thomas had

followed this sound method. They themselves, being accustomed to begin with metaphysics, and thinking that they could find the whole solution by metaphysics, thought it necessary to force one of the lines drawn by St. Thomas to agree with the other. This attempt was regrettable. First, because sound theological method does not approve of any such straining. But especially, they were unfortunate in deciding which line to reinterpret so as to make it harmonize with the other. Actually, they forced the sense of passages of St. Thomas drawn from 1 Timothy 2:4 so as to make them agree with his conclusions drawn from Romans 8-9. This was, as we said, specially unfortunate, because we now know (as we saw in chapter 1) that the interpretation of Romans 8-9 which St. Thomas inherited from St. Augustine is erroneous.⁴

But if we keep firmly in mind the nature of the method which St. Thomas followed, we will abandon the conclusions he drew from the erroneous interpretation of Romans, and keep the conclusions he drew from 1 Timothy 2:4. This process will permit us to remove the obscurities that St. Thomas felt obliged to leave. For, as we have seen,⁵ he wrote less clearly than he was accustomed, in commenting on Romans, and also, he wrote less clearly in drawing out the final conclusions from 1 Tim 2:4. He did this because when he came, as it were, to the centre of the circle,⁶ where both interpretations should have focused and agreed, he saw that they were not going to agree. In his fidelity to sound method, and his intellectual humility, he forced neither line, but instead, merely wrote a bit less clearly than usual, not daring to speak with a clarity that he saw was unjustified.

216. The thought of St. Thomas based on 1 Tim 2:4: In *Contra Gentiles* 3.159-61, St. Thomas gives an excellent description of the process of the grant of grace, explains its principles, and draws out certain more specific applications. In chapters 162-63 he wanted to say explicitly where predestination and reprobation fit into this process. But, for the reason just explained, he spoke with less than his usual clarity in chapters 162-63. There was also, we suspect, another reason for the lesser clarity. We shall see it later in this chapter.

He describes the process of the grant of graces in two stages. That is, in chapter 159 he explains the general principles which apply to all men and all graces. Then, in chapters 160-61 he explains what happens, according to these principles, to men who do not have the state of grace. It will be well worthwhile to follow the thought of St. Thomas as he presents it through each of these stages:

217. 1) *General principles:* In chapter 159 he proposes a difficulty to himself: "Since . . . a man cannot be directed to his ultimate end except by the help of divine grace, without which also no one can have those things that are necessary for tending to the ultimate end, such as faith, hope, love and perseverance: it could seem to someone that a man should not be blamed if he lacks the aforementioned [graces];

especially since he is not able to merit the help of divine grace, nor to be converted to God unless God converts him; for no one is charged with that which depends on another."

First of all, it is clear that St. Thomas is speaking about the distribution of all graces in general. For he speaks of the first grace, and of the final grace. He says that no one can be directed to the ultimate end except by the help of grace, and adds that man "is not able to merit the help of divine grace, nor to be converted to God unless God converts him." Among the graces he enumerates he explicitly includes not only the grace of conversion but also the very grace of *perseverance*. Thus he makes clear that he is giving the principles that apply to all graces, even to the very end.

But St. Thomas sees a great difficulty: Man must have all these to be saved. Yet, it is not in his power to get them for himself. So he asks: How can a man be blamed if he fails to reach his ultimate end?

218. He proposes the following solution: "To solve this problem, we must consider that although a man, by the movement of his free will, can neither merit nor obtain divine grace, yet he can impede himself from receiving it . . . And since this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace, not undeservingly is he charged with a fault who sets up an impediment to grace. For God, so far as He is concerned is ready to give grace to all, 'for He wills all men to be saved . . .' but they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, when the sun illumines the world, he is charged with a fault who closes his eyes, if any evil comes of it, although he cannot see unless he first has the light of the sun."

219. Following sound theological method, St. Thomas begins his solution with Scripture: God "wills all men to be saved." He says that God is like the sun in the sky: He wants to give light to *all*, and He actually does so, unless they, by their own fault, impede: "For God, so far as He is concerned, is ready to give grace to all." Therefore, since God wants to give grace to all, St. Thomas can find the basic principles of the distribution of all graces (including, as we have seen, the first grace that converts a man from the state of sin, and the final grace of perseverance): "They *only* are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves."

We notice that St. Thomas distinguishes three things, of which the first is not in human power, but the other two are:

- a) Man "by the movement of his free will, can neither merit nor obtain grace."
- b) But yet "this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or
- c) not to impede the reception of divine grace."

220. St. Thomas' solution is admirably clear and simple: Man cannot do any positive salutary good by himself. As we have seen,⁷ this is the teaching of the Council of Orange. But God wants to give to all the

graces they need, even perseverance itself, and He actually does give them to those who do not impede. For man, even though he cannot perform the positive salutary work of getting grace for himself, yet has two negatives in his power: He can impede grace. And he can also abstain from impeding it.⁸ So man can be really blameworthy if he does not attain salvation, because in this negative way he can control whether or not he attains salvation. He has two things in his power: impeding and not impeding. If he had only one possibility in his power, impeding, he could not be blamed for failing to reach salvation: "no one is charged with that which depends on another."

221. 2) *The problems of men who are not in the state of grace:* Having explained these general principles, St. Thomas comes to apply them to men who are not in the state of grace. At once he sees a problem:⁹ "Now that which we have said [namely] that it is in the power of free will not to place an impediment to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power is integral. But if a man, by a previous inordination, has declined to evil, it will not be entirely in his power to place no impediment to grace. For even though at a given moment, he can, by his own power, abstain from a particular act of sin: yet, if he is left to himself for a long time, he will fall into sin, through which an impediment to grace is placed. For when the soul of a man has declined from the state of rectitude, it is evident that he has receded from the order to the proper end. So that which should have had chief place in his affection, as the ultimate end, becomes less loved than that to which the soul has been inordinately turned, as though [the inordinate thing] were his ultimate end. So when something presents itself that is in harmony with the inordinate end, but is contrary to the proper end [the true ultimate end], it will be chosen, unless he is brought back to the proper order . . . So it is evident that after sin, a man cannot abstain from every sin before he is brought back to the proper order by grace."

222. First of all, we must notice to what men this problem applies: it applies only to men who are in the state of sin. It applies therefore to a man "*before* he is brought back to the proper order by grace." So it does not apply *after* he is brought back to the proper order by grace. Hence we can note in passing that St. Thomas is not saying that sometimes God gives merely sufficient graces [in the sense proposed by the older Thomists¹⁰] with which it is metaphysically inconceivable that a man would *ever* do good, and sometimes gives efficacious graces, with which it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to resist. Rather, St. Thomas is explaining the difficulties that apply *only* to men who are in the state of sin. They do not *always* apply precisely because he says that they apply only *before* a man is brought back to the proper order by regaining grace. But-the principles which the older Thomists propose about sufficient and efficacious grace ought to apply *always, and to all men, even to those who have been*

brought back to the state of grace. Clearly, their description does not match his.

223. We must note carefully also the *effect* which St. Thomas says takes place in those who are in the state of sin. He does not say that they *never* can omit resistance. It is only *finally*, after a time, that they will surely resist: "If he is left to himself *for a long time* he will fall into sin *through which* an impediment to grace is placed."

224. It is important to determine whether the impediment that excludes grace, of which St. Thomas speaks, is an actual or a habitual impediment.

It is obvious that in a man in the state of sin there is an *habitual* indisposition or deordination, for he has declined to evil, away from the path to his ultimate end. So: Is the "impediment" of which St. Thomas speaks which deprives a man of receiving grace, this *habitual* indisposition? Or is it an *actual* resistance which at length-not at once-will inevitably occur unless the man "is brought back to the proper order by grace?"

225. It is clear that the impediment of which St. Thomas speaks, which deprives a man of grace, is not merely an habitual indisposition, consisting in his having turned to an inordinate end. It is the actual impediment of resistance. This is clear for the following reasons:

a) Because if a merely habitual indisposition were enough to deprive a man of receiving grace which he would otherwise receive in accordance of the principle given by St. Thomas in chapter 159, then in the chapter which we are discussing (160), it would have been enough to say simply: "A man in the state of sin is *always*, from his very habitual indisposition, incapable of receiving grace." Then St. Thomas would not have had to explain so carefully how the difficulty would be at hand only *eventually*. For he says about the man in the state of sin: "it will not be *entirely* in his power to place no impediment to grace." And he goes on, explaining the word "entirely" in a chronological sense, i.e., he shows that eventually, after some time, a man will not continue to hold out in not resisting: "For even though at a given moment, he can, by his own power, abstain from a particular act of sin: yet, if he is left to himself *for a long time*, he will fall into sin, through which an impediment to grace is placed." In this way St. Thomas makes entirely clear that the impediment that excludes graces that would otherwise be received is not *always* present in a man in the state of sin. But, the habitual indisposition is always present. Therefore, the merely habitual indisposition cannot be the thing of which he speaks: it does not of itself alone exclude the reception of grace.

b) In chapter 159, among the graces that fall under the general principle, was also the grace of conversion from the state of sin. For St. Thomas had spoken about the grace that was needed,

"since [a man of himself] is not able . . . to be converted to God unless God converts him." Now if a merely habitual indisposition, which is always present in the state of sin, and therefore is always present before conversion, were enough to automatically exclude the grace of conversion, then it would be idle, at least, to give a principle expressing the condition for conversion when the condition could never be realized, since the habitual indisposition is always present in those who need conversion.

c) The words "*place* an impediment to grace" at least seem to mean something active and not merely habitual. For to express an habitual indisposition it would have been more suitable to say: "he will be in an indisposed *state*" instead of: "he will *place* an impediment."

226. Before going on, it will be worthwhile to stop to apply this thought of St. Thomas to various categories of sinners:

a) *A man who is still in the state of unforgiven original sin:* This man really does labour under the difficulty described in chapter 160. Yet, such a man-as also a man in the state of actual personal sin, who has had original sin previously forgiven-is not *entirely* and *at once* and *at all times* incapable of omitting resistance to grace. Only *eventually* will this happen (that he will be incapable), if *for a long time* he is left to his own resources. But, according to the teaching of Pius XII, as we have often seen, the Father¹¹ "will at all times send down upon all men a rich abundance of divine graces." Therefore, a man who is *not always* incapable of omitting resistance, really can be converted by some of the graces of that rich abundance.

b) *A man who has had original sin forgiven, and who is not now in the state of actual sin even though he has previously sinned:* This man does not have the indisposition and deordination from the ultimate end under which the sinner labours so that the sinner must eventually fall into the inability of not resisting of which St. Thomas speaks. However, this man does have a smaller difficulty of a different kind in that he has a certain habitual inclination to sin which remains even after forgiveness of original sin. As a result of this, such a man needs a special grace *to persevere to the end*. However, St. Thomas taught in chapter 159, as we have seen, that even this grace of perseverance is given to all who do not resist. And men in this category are capable of not resisting it.¹²

c) *A man who is in the actual state of personal sin:* This man is in the same kind of difficulty as that which we spoke of above, in regard to the first category of sinners. However there is this difference, that he may have a difficulty *greater in degree*. For, by repeated sins, a man is more and more confirmed (if he is not converted) in his deordination, so that more and more-and

eventually, even without advertence, out of mere habit-he resists grace. It is obvious that such a man if he continues to sin, can come into a dreadful state in which an extreme degree of difficulty will be at hand precisely because the man can become so hardened as to scarcely even perceive that grace is being offered to him when it is offered.¹³

227. Having given these explanations in chapter 160, St. Thomas goes on, in chapter 161, to consider the case of a sinner who places actual resistance to the grace of conversion, but who, nonetheless, is converted.

228. A sinner who places *actual* resistance to the grace of conversion when it is offered to him-whether he does this out of blindness and hardness or not-should not receive grace, according to the principle given in chapter 159. For grace, ordinarily, will not move a man who resists it. (We say "ordinarily" since there are extraordinary graces¹⁴ which forestall or even cancel out all resistance).

229. Here is what St. Thomas himself says about such a sinner:¹⁵
"Although he who sins places an impediment to grace, and, so far as the order of things calls for, should not receive grace: nevertheless, since God can work beyond the order that is built into things, as He does when He gives sight to a blind man or raises a dead man, sometimes God, out of the abundance of His goodness, forestalls by His help even those who place the impediment to grace, and turns them from evil and converts them to good. And just as He does not give sight to all the blind . . . so that in those whom He cures, the work of His power may appear, while in the others the order of nature is observed; so too He does not forestall by His help all those who impede grace so as to turn them from evil . . . but [He does this for] some, in whom He wishes His mercy to appear, in such a way [however] that in others, the order of justice is manifested. Hence it is that the Apostle says: "God, wishing to show his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, ready for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy, which he has prepared for glory."

230. It is important to note carefully the various elements of the description that St. Thomas gives. He is speaking about a man who places an impediment to grace, and sins. He says that so far as the order of things calls for, this man should not receive grace. This is in accord with the general principle explained in chapter 159: in general, grace is given to those who do not resist, and not to those who do resist. Since this is the general principle, God "does not forestall by His help all those who impede grace, so as to turn them from evil." The implication emerges that the conversion of a man who resists is extraordinary, precisely because it is done beyond the general principle. This implication is confirmed when St. Thomas says that "so far as the order of things calls for, [this sinner] should not receive

grace: nevertheless, since God can work beyond the order that is built into things, as He does when He gives sight to a blind man or raises a dead man, sometimes God . . . forestalls by His help even those who place the impediment to grace." Now, if the conversion is so carried out that it is "beyond the order that is built into things", and is compared to the miracle of raising the dead or giving sight to the blind—such a conversion is obviously something extraordinary, for St. Thomas has used technical expressions that designate extraordinary things. Such a description would not apply to the conversion of ordinary sinners, because, as St. Thomas himself teaches, in general, the conversion of a sinner is not miraculous.¹⁶ But the conversion described in chapter 161 is compared to a miracle. It is such precisely because God is converting a sinner by forestalling or canceling out actual resistance. This can be done only by an extraordinary grace.¹⁷ Because this sort of conversion is extraordinary, God does not work it for all. Hence St. Thomas can apply the words of Rom 9:22, saying that God converts some even though it requires an extraordinary grace, to show His goodness, but that He does not convert all of this type, to show His justice.

So we conclude that in chapter 161, St. Thomas is not speaking of conversions of all sinners in general, but only of the conversion of sinners who resist the grace of conversion. He says that such a conversion is extraordinary, beyond the normal order of things, so that it is properly compared to a miracle.

231. Confirmation of our interpretation from the impossibility of other interpretations: Some theologians want to interpret chapters 159-61 in other ways. It will be helpful to consider their proposals.

1) *The massa damnata theory:* In this theory, God deserts men before considering their demerits or resistance to grace, so that they fall into sins, so that He condemns them, so that He can display vindictive justice. According to this theory, we would have to say that man, as a result of original sin, is always in a state of *habitual* indisposition and that this *state always excludes* the reception of grace, unless God wills to overcome the indisposition. The backers of this interpretation would add that grace is not owed to man: "so far as the order of things calls for [he] should not receive grace," because he has this habitual indisposition in him. Therefore, they say, God gives the grace to some, to show mercy, but refuses it to others, to show justice.

But this interpretation will not fit with the words of St. Thomas:

a) Because if original sin were the impediment of which he speaks, it would be only an *habitual* impediment. But, we have already proved that St. Thomas is not speaking of a merely *habitual* impediment.

b) Because St. Thomas teaches that all graces, including the grace of conversion (from original or personal sin), and even the

grace of perseverance, are given to those who do not resist. And he teaches that even a man in the state of sin will be incapable of omitting resistance only if left to himself *for a long time*. Before such a point, he really can omit resistance, and so by that means, he can really determine whether or not he will receive various graces, even perseverance itself. In fact as St. Thomas explains in the *De veritate*, after conversion, it is actually difficult for a man to resist grace, because¹⁸ "there is in him an habitual inclination to avoid sin. And so when anything presents itself to him in the form of mortal sin, out of habitual inclination he refuses it, *unless he strives in the opposite direction . . .*" [i.e., unless he positively labours contrary to his inclination].-But, such conditions as these cannot occur in the theory of the *massa damnata*. For a man who can "distinguish himself" in regard to rejecting or not rejecting the grace of perseverance, can also determine whether or not he will be reprobated.

c) In regard to the interpretation proposed by the backers of the *massa damnata* theory for the words "so far as the order of things calls for [he] *should not* receive grace,"-we readily concede that grace is not *owed* to a man in sin. But even so, the interpretation proposed does not harmonize with other expressions used by St. Thomas in chapter 161. For he uses technical expressions, saying that God in such a case can work "beyond the order that is built into things" and he compares the conversion of *this type of sinner* to miracles, so that it is clear that the type of conversion of which he speaks is *extraordinary*. But, the conversion of sinners in general is not extraordinary. Hence, chapter 161 does not apply to *all* sinners, as it would if St. Thomas meant the *massa damnata* theory. Furthermore, even though grace is not *owed* to man, yet, God does will to give it, as St. Thomas said in chapter 159. In fact, as we saw in chapter 4, God has *bound Himself* to offer it. The sinners mentioned in chapter 161 do not all receive it, because they resist: only to some does God give an extraordinary grace that either forestalls or cancels out resistance.

d) Again, as we have seen,¹⁹ St. Thomas rejects the theory of the damnation of unbaptized infants. But, their damnation flows necessarily from the theory of the *massa damnata*. Therefore, St. Thomas does not hold the theory of the *massa damnata*.

e) Even if it could be proved that St. Thomas really did teach the theory of the *massa damnata* in these chapters, we would still be obliged to abandon it, for it comes from an erroneous foundation (the mistaken interpretation of Romans 9) and contradicts the actual revelation about the salvific will, which we saw in chapter 5.

2) *The theory that says St. Thomas is explaining exclusion from salvation as from a benefit that is not owed:* As we have seen, St. Thomas teaches (chapter 159) that grace is offered even to men in the state of sin, so that they can be converted, and that "they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves." In chapter 160 he teaches that men in the state of sin can at least for some time omit resistance to grace. Therefore, such men can be converted *if they want to*. They can "distinguish themselves." But this cannot be admitted within the theory of exclusion from an undue benefit. Again, in that theory of exclusion, it could not be admitted that even a man who has been brought back to the state of grace could "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation. But according to St. Thomas, a man can, for he can have even perseverance if he does not resist. Further, even in the theory of exclusion from an undue benefit, it is not said that every conversion is "beyond the order that is built into things," nor is every conversion compared to the great miracles of raising the dead or giving sight to the blind.

But, still more clearly, the theory of exclusion from an undue benefit implies that the universal salvific will is non-existent. For if God, for no other reason than that salvation is not owed, excludes some from salvation, He cannot simultaneously say sincerely that He wills that everyone, including these, be saved. For the fact that salvation is not owed is no real obstacle. But St. Thomas says, in chapter 159, that the salvific will is real. Further, we have seen above²⁰ that the salvific will is actually a part or aspect of the love of God for men. Now, as we have seen²¹ love finds a measure in the obstacles which it can overcome. If the love of God and the salvific will were overcome by that which is really no obstacle at all—the mere fact that salvation is not owed—then the measure of the salvific will would be precisely *zero*. But revelation shows its measure is in infinite objective titles established for each individual, at the terrible price of the Passion.

3) *The theory that says St. Thomas is merely explaining the grace of perseverance:* In this interpretation, St. Thomas, in chapter 160, would be merely explaining how a man can have the power of avoiding individual sins, but still cannot persevere without a special grace but yet could be culpable even if denied this special grace. Thus God could refuse that special grace for no particular reason, and so no man could "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation.

We reply that it is true that St. Thomas is speaking of perseverance in chapter 160. But he is not speaking of it on the broad plane, as referring to *all*. Rather, he speaks of the problem in those who are in the state of sin. The difficulty he explains in chapter 160 no longer applies, as he himself says, after a man is "brought back to the proper order through grace." Further, as we have shown above from the words of St. Thomas, even men in the state of sin can omit resistance for a time, for St. Thomas says that they inevitably resist only if "left to

[themselves] for a long time." Within that period, abundant graces are offered. Men really can omit resistance, within that period, and so can "distinguish themselves," can determine whether or not they will be converted. After conversion, according to the principle of chapter 159, even the grace of final perseverance will be offered, and men can determine whether or not they will receive it by not resisting, of which they are fully capable after regaining the state of grace. In fact, it is actually difficult to resist, as we have seen.²² Hence, the explanation of St. Thomas is far different than the proposed theory would suppose. We can recall too that, as we have already seen,²³ the resistance of which St. Thomas speaks is not a mere habitual indisposition, but actual resistance.

It is plain too, that this proposed third interpretation supposes a denial of the salvific will. For this reason alone it must be rejected.

4) *The theory that says St. Thomas is speaking of sufficient and efficacious graces, in the sense intended by the older Thomists:* We have already shown above²⁴ that St. Thomas excludes this interpretation. We might add too that nowhere²⁵ does he speak of such a theory and distinction of graces.

232. Therefore, since all other alternatives are excluded, we have an added confirmation of the interpretation we gave of the words of St. Thomas.

233. St. Thomas' conclusions on predestination and reprobation: After this excellent description of the process of conferring grace, which he gave in chapters 159-61, St. Thomas explains, in chapter 162, that even though God does not convert some of those of whom he spoke in chapter 161, He is not the cause of their sins.

Then, in chapter 163, he begins to speak *explicitly* of predestination and reprobation. It was necessary to do this explicitly, because it is one thing to describe the process of conferring graces and its principles, and another thing to point out precisely at what point in the process predestination and reprobation are decreed. It will be helpful to see first the *implications* on predestination and reprobation that are contained in the description given in chapters 159-61; and after that to see the *explicit* teaching of chapter 163.

a) *The implications of chapters 159-61:* At the start of chapter 159, St. Thomas had posed a problem for himself: Why are some not saved, and yet they are culpable, even though they cannot of their own power get the required graces. Since St. Thomas obviously thinks he is giving the fundamental answer to this question, it is clear, according to the principles we saw above²⁶ that he does not restrict his meaning to the order of execution, nor to predestination to glory taken separately. Therefore his conclusions apply to the full process of predestination and reprobation, in the order of intention.

It is obvious that he implicitly excludes negative reprobation before consideration of demerits. This is clear both from the general analysis of these chapters that we have just given, and also from the fact that we have shown²⁷ that his words exclude various individual theories that involve reprobation before consideration of demerits.

Since he excludes reprobation before consideration of demerits, he obviously cannot hold any view of predestination that would be inseparable from such reprobation. Therefore, he does not hold a theory of predestination before consideration of merits in the form proposed by the Thomists.

However, his words in chapters 159-61 could really be harmonized with predestination *after* consideration of merits; or, they could fit with predestination *before* consideration of merits, but after consideration of the absence of grave resistance to grace. So we must try to determine which of these views St. Thomas held.

Can we conclude from the description St. Thomas gives of the process of conferring grace that he places predestination before consideration of merits, but after consideration of absence of resistance? For he does make this absence of resistance (and not merits) the condition in the conferring of individual graces. The answer is that we cannot with certainty deduce this conclusion from the description of the process that St. Thomas gives. First of all, St. Thomas nowhere expresses such a conclusion. But further, such an implication does not logically follow at once from the description he gives. For it is one thing to describe the process of conferring graces; another thing to find the place of predestination. For even though, in speaking of *each individual grace*, he says that it is given after consideration of the absence of resistance, it is quite a different thing to say the same of predestination. For predestination is not decreed after *one* absence of resistance, in the conferring of *one* grace, but after a *whole series* of graces, in which series the grant of many further graces depends on the outcome of previous graces. For if one thinks of such a series, he will see these things: (1) God offers one grace. (2) Man impedes or does not impede. (3) If he does not impede, grace moves him to positive consent, and a good and meritorious work is done. (4) After this, further graces are given, but in such a way that at least some of them would not have been offered if the man had rejected previous graces that lead up to later graces.-Therefore, it seems that in the actual prevision of the *series*, it is impossible *not* to foresee merits, for many graces are given, and, at least after some of them, merit will be present. So, since predestination is not decreed after just one grace is offered and not rejected, but after many graces are

offered and not rejected, actually, it will be decreed after several merits are foreseen.-So, the description St. Thomas gives of the process of conferring grace not only does not necessarily imply that predestination is decreed before consideration of merits, but, on the contrary, it *seems* to imply that merits must be foreseen before the point at which predestination is decreed. So we cannot conclude from this description that St. Thomas puts predestination before consideration of merits, but after consideration of the absence of resistance.²⁸

So, our conclusions as to the implications of chapters 159-61 are these: St. Thomas certainly holds that reprobation (even negative) comes after consideration of demerits. He certainly excludes any view of predestination that would imply that any reprobation comes before consideration of demerits. But we cannot be sure where he will put predestination: after consideration of merits, or before consideration of merits but after consideration of the absence of grave resistance.

234. b) *The explicit conclusions of chapter 163:* When we turn to chapter 163, we not unnaturally expect to find explicit applications of the principles given in chapters 159-61. Yet, St. Thomas makes no such explicit application in this chapter. Instead, he speaks in a more general, not too clear fashion. He teaches only one thing clearly: Merits are not the *cause* of predestination.

From the fact that he teaches that merits are not the *cause* of predestination, can we conclude that, in chapter 163, he puts predestination *before* consideration of merits? This conclusion could not be proved. The most important words come in the last paragraph of chapter 163: "The fact that predestination and election are not caused by any merits can be shown from the fact that the grace of God, which is the effect of predestination, is not preceded by merits, but precedes all human merits, as we have shown (chapter 149): but it also can be shown from the fact that the divine will . . . is the first cause of the things that happen, for nothing can be the cause of the divine will and providence. . . ."

Now from these words it cannot be proved that St. Thomas placed predestination before consideration of merits: (1) Because in these words he is trying to prove only one thing, namely, that merits are not the cause of predestination and of the divine will. But it is one thing to say that predestination or the decision of the divine will is caused by, or because of merits; quite another thing to say it is merely *logically after*, but not *because* of prevision of merits. (Something can be logically after another thing if the first thing is even a *condition*: it need not be a cause); (2) From the fact that St. Thomas says: ". . . the grace of God,

which is the effect of predestination, is not preceded by merits, but precedes all human merits" some would like to argue thus: "God first wills the end, namely, eternal life to a predestined man. After the end, He wills the means, namely, grace. Since merits do not come without grace, predestination must be before consideration of merits." But this conclusion is not certain. For, to understand the words of St. Thomas, we must ask: what does he mean by the word "grace" in this passage?

1) He cannot mean *all* grace and every grace:-For then he would be saying that the reprobate are deprived of all grace (since he speaks of grace as the effect of predestination). This would be heretical.

2) He cannot mean efficacious grace in the sense the older Thomists propose, and be saying that efficacious grace is given *only* to the elect.-For we have already shown above²⁹ that St. Thomas does not know such a distinction and that he implicitly excludes the older Thomists' system.

3) He might perhaps mean a grace of perseverance that would be infrustrable and would be given to all the elect and only to them. It would be given, however, after, but not because of, consideration of the merits flowing from previous graces. Or, it might be given after consideration of absence of resistance to *previous* graces. In as much as only those who would be foreseen as such would be predestined, this grace would be given only to the predestined: thus it would be a special and proper effect of predestination.-This interpretation would not contradict the principles of chapters 159-61. Nor would it contradict the statement of chapter 163 that the special grace of predestination is not preceded by merits *in the category of causality*, even if it came after merits that would be foreseen as a *condition*, not a cause. For in the context of chapter 163, St. Thomas wants to exclude merits only as a cause. This conclusion is confirmed from chapter 149, to which we are referred in the passage cited. For in chapter 149, St. Thomas says that "man cannot merit divine help," and he clearly is arguing against the Pelagian error that says that such help is given "because of merits, and that the *beginning* of justification comes from us. . . ." But in the interpretation we are now considering, predestination would not be given because of merits, nor would man make the beginning: for grace comes first, before any act on the part of man, according to the explanation given by St. Thomas in 159-61, in which he expressly sets out to solve the difficulty that arises from the fact that man "is not able to merit the help of divine grace."

4) However, since we have shown above³⁰ from St. Paul and from the Council of Trent that the grace of perseverance is not ordinarily an infrustrable grace, and because St. Thomas, in chapter 159, lists perseverance under the same general principle as other graces (which he says are given to those who do not resist them), it is better to suppose that, in the passage we are considering, "grace" means that grace which consists in special providential provision of the assignment of a place in the external order, of the time of death, and all else;³¹ which providence is such that, taken together with the graces granted according to the principle of chapter 159, the predestined man will infallibly arrive in heaven. In this interpretation it will still be true that "the grace of God which is the effect of predestination is not preceded by merits, but precedes all human merits" in the category of causality, of which St. Thomas speaks.³²

However, we must admit that in the last two proposed explanations, it is necessary to have recourse to distinctions that St. Thomas does not expressly give. Yet, on the other hand, if we add no distinction at all to his words, we would have to say that *no grace* is given to the reprobate. That would be heretical.

Therefore, we are forced to conclude that St. Thomas wrote somewhat obscurely³³ in chapter 163. We can suggest two reasons why he did so:

a) In this chapter 163 he is coming to the very center of the circle³⁴ (to use our previous analogy) in which the solution drawn from 1 Tm 2:4 should harmonize with the conclusion from Romans 9. He saw that the solutions would not harmonize. It is explicitly clear that Romans 9 was on his mind, for he had quoted it in chapter 161, and implicitly in chapter 162, and again explicitly in chapter 163.

b) Very probably also, he saw the problem that we explained above about placing predestination in the series in which merits cannot be not foreseen. Probably he did not like to place predestination after consideration of merits, but yet did not see how else he could apply the principles of chapters 159-61.

Seeing these things, and not knowing the full answer, he quite prudently did not wish to affirm clearly more than what was clear.

So we conclude that St. Thomas gave an excellent description of the process of conferring graces, and that he found the essential principles. His description clearly

implied that no reprobation of any kind comes before consideration of demerits. He thus implicitly excluded the type of predestination before consideration of merits that the Thomists propose. He also teaches plainly that merits are not the cause of predestination. But beyond this he did not go, not even by implication. Therefore, he might have thought that predestination comes before consideration of merits but after consideration of the absence of resistance;³⁵ or he might have thought it comes after consideration of merits.

235. Confirmation of our interpretation from other passages of St. Thomas:

In many other passages, St. Thomas said various things that express at least part of the truth we have deduced:

1) *Summa theologiae*:³⁶ "Antecedently God wills all men to be saved; but consequently, He wills that certain men be condemned, according to the exigence of His justice." And:³⁷ ". . . that which seems to recede from the divine will according to one order, falls back into it according to another order: just as a sinner, who, so far as in him lies, recedes from the divine will by sinning falls into the order of divine will when he is punished by His justice." In other words, God primarily and antecedently wills all to be saved, but after and because of human faults, He wills that certain ones be condemned "according to the exigence of His justice." Hence St. Thomas also says:³⁸ ". . . the *first cause* of the lack of grace is from us, but the first cause of the granting of grace is from God, according to the words of Hosea 13:9: 'Your ruin is your own, O Israel; [but] your help is only from me.'" Now, if God were to desert us before any fault of ours, so that we would sin, so that He could punish, then the first cause of the lack of grace would not be from us, but in desertion by God. And we must note carefully that *St. Thomas is not speaking of the first cause of sin, but of the first cause of the lack of grace*. If he were speaking of the first cause of sin, someone might wish to say: Even though God deserts before any fault of ours, He is not the cause of sin, but only permits sin.³⁹ But, as we see, St. Thomas speaks of the first cause of the lack of grace, and he says that that first cause is in us. Therefore it is not in desertion by God.

2) *Commentary on the Books of Sentences*:⁴⁰ ". . . God wills the non-occurrence of moral faults in His antecedent will, but not in His consequent will except in the case of those whom He knows do not will to commit moral fault: because the consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature." That is, in His antecedent will God wills that moral evils should not occur. But the same cannot be said without qualification about His consequent will. For in this He wills to impede sins only "in the case of those whom He knows do not will to commit moral fault." And he gives the reason: "the

consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature." For He makes His decrees about the free acts of the creature in His consequent will only in consideration of the free dispositions of creatures. Hence, as St. Thomas says in *Contra Gentiles* 3.159: "they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves."

3) *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*:⁴¹ "... God, for His part, communicates Himself to all in proportion to their capacity: hence, the fact that any thing fails in participation of His goodness is from the fact that in it there is found some impediment to divine participation. Thus, therefore, the cause of the fact that grace is not given to someone is not in God, but in the fact that he to whom grace is presented sets up an impediment to grace, in as much as he turns himself aside from the light that does not turn itself aside. . . ." -This is precisely the same teaching as we saw in *Contra Gentiles*.

4) *Quaestiones quodlibetales*:⁴² "God moves all things according to their own manner. And so some things participate in the divine motion by necessity, but rational creatures [participate] with freedom, since the power of reason is [capable of turning] to either direction [for or against]. And therefore God so moves the human soul to good, that it can still resist this motion: and hence, the fact that a man prepares himself for grace, comes from God-but the fact that he lacks grace, has no cause in God, but in the man, according to the words of Hosea 13:9: 'Your ruin is your own, O Israel; [but] your help is only from me.'" -Again, the same distinction that we saw before. He says that positive salutary good cannot come from man's own power, but yet says that man is the first cause of the lack of grace, as we saw above in the citations from the *Summa*.⁴³

5) *Contra Gentiles*:⁴⁴ "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes *from their indisposition*, because they *are unwilling* to receive the fruit of the incarnation within themselves. . . . For freedom of will, by which he can adhere or not adhere to the incarnate God, was not to be taken away from man lest the good of man be forced, and so be rendered meritless and unpraiseworthy." We have already shown⁴⁵ that in this passage St. Thomas implicitly excludes the system in which everything is governed by infrustrable decrees. Instead, he says that all are saved who are not unwilling to receive grace.

6) No passage in St. Thomas would explain *why this particular sin rather than another is permitted at this particular time by this particular man in these particular circumstances*, if our interpretation were not true. The distinguished Thomist, J. H. Nicolas, OP, says well:⁴⁶ "That which remains impenetrable, since it depends solely on infinite liberty, is the reason why such a particular sin is permitted rather than a different one. . . . this difficulty arises from the incontestable truth, admitted by all, that God could prevent moral evil in general, and that

he could, in each particular case, preserve a given creature from it without violating its liberty. . . ." The distinguished author seems to defend the theory in which there are infallible permissions of sinning, and he draws from it the inescapable conclusion: It is totally inexplicable, within such a theory, why God permits one sin rather than another. For whether one says that God permits sins for the good of the order of the universe, or because all men are a *massa damnata*, or because he wants to exclude a given man from an undue benefit—all these things (if they were true) could explain only why God would will to permit some sins *in general*. But, in no way does the order of the universe, or the *massa damnata*, or the exclusion from an undue benefit designate *precisely which individual men should be reprobated or precisely which individual sins should be permitted, and when*.—But if we say that God offers each man a rich abundance of graces without which men could not do good, but does it in such a way that men themselves can "distinguish themselves," by resistance or the lack thereof, as to whether or not they will sin—then a perfectly clear explanation is provided for why this particular sin is permitted rather than a different one. In regard to God's power of always being able to impede sin—it is true, He has this power. But, according to good order, He does not will to exercise it in *ordinary* providence in such a way as to infrustrably keep men from sin. For to move a man infrustrably, forestalling or cancelling out resistance, pertains to *extraordinary* providence, as we have already shown.⁴⁷

236. What point in revelation is St. Thomas' starting point in the Summa?

It is evident that nearly all passages of the *Summa* can agree with the line drawn from 1 Tm 2:4. The chief passage about which a doubt could be raised is ST 1.23.5, and especially, the response to the third objection: "For God is said to have made all things because of His own goodness in such a way that the divine goodness is represented in things. Now it is necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, be represented in a manifold way in things . . . And hence it is that various grades of things are needed for the completion of the universe, of which some hold a high, others a low place. And that this variety of degrees may be preserved in things, God permits some evils to happen, lest many goods be impeded. . . . God wished, then, to represent His goodness by way of mercy, by sparing, in some men, whom He predestines; but by way of justice, in others by punishing. And this is the reason why God chooses some, and reprobates others. And the Apostle gives this reason in Rom 9:22-23, saying: 'God, wishing to show His wrath. . . .' But why He chooses these for glory and reprobates those, has no reason except the divine will."

237. These words could be explained in three ways:

1) *According to the theory of the massa damnata*: Garrigou-Lagrange argues against this interpretation:⁴⁸ "In regard to negative

reprobation . . . since original sin is the same in all the predestined and in the reprobate, it cannot be the cause, in the reprobate, for the permission of sins that will not be remitted. Hence St. Thomas does not speak of original sin in this article [5]. . . . This is the opinion of the theologians of Salamanca, Alvarez, John of St. Thomas." J. H. Nicolas speaks similarly:⁴⁹ "Really, St. Thomas, in the 23rd question of the *Summa*, in no way appeals to the notion of the *massa damnata*, a thing that would be inexplicable, if for him it were the notion that explains the mystery of predestination. . . . He wrote at the beginning of the *Summa* 1.23.1 ad 3: 'It is to be said that it is suitable for both angels and men to be predestined, even though they never were miserable. . . . For it makes no difference in regard to the characteristic of predestination whether or not it is from a state of misery that one is predestined to eternal life.'"

2) *According to the theory of negative reprobation, independently of the massa damnata theory:* In this sense Garrigou-Lagrange writes:⁵⁰ "So the reason for negative reprobation, absolutely considered, is this: the manifestation of divine goodness by way of justice. . . ."

3) *According to the thought of Contra Gentiles 3.159-61:* The interpretation could be made approximately as follows: In the passage cited from the *Summa*, St. Thomas is saying, in general, that God wills to manifest Himself in many ways, using varied creatures, since no single creature could adequately represent the infinity of divine perfection. In the course of doing so, He permits many evils to exist, for to prevent them would necessarily entail the loss of many goods. But, to understand this statement rightly, it is necessary to distinguish between various types of evils. St. Thomas himself elsewhere explicitly gives us the needed distinctions:⁵¹ ". . . in regard to all evils in general, it is true that if [none of them] were permitted to be, the universe would be more imperfect, because there would not exist those natures that are such that they can fail-if these were taken away, the universe would be more imperfect, for not all degrees of goodness would be present. . . . There are some evils that are such that if they did not exist, the universe would be more imperfect, namely, those evils upon which follow a greater perfection than the perfection that is taken away, such as [is the case with] the corruption of elements which is followed by mixture and the nobler forms of mixed elements. However there are certain evils such that if they did not exist, *the universe* would be more perfect, namely, those evils by which greater perfections are taken away than are acquired in another, as is chiefly the case in moral faults, which take from one grace and glory and give to another the good [of seeming better] by comparison, or some characteristic of perfection [such that] even without it, the ultimate perfection could be had. . . ." The words that he cites from Rom 9:22-23 could be understood in the same sense as that in which he himself explains them in CG 3.161 (as we saw it above). The words "why He

chooses these . . . and reprobates those, has no reason except the divine will" could mean that there is no cause (article 5 is devoted to showing that predestination has no cause) that moves the divine will, and also, that, in a concrete case, we cannot know for certain what precise extent of the negative conditions God requires. Further, they could be taken as referring only to the one category, to which he applies Rom 9:22-23 in CG. 3.161. This interpretation fits with the statement St. Thomas quotes from St. Augustine (immediately after the passage we cited from ST I.23.5 ad 3): "Do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err." But, St. Augustine himself did not hold that God decides blindly. For example, in ST I.23.4 ad 2, St. Thomas quotes him saying: "nor does He err who chooses." And St. Augustine, even when he is speaking of the *massa damnata* often says that God judges justly.

238. There are difficulties against each of these interpretations:

1) Against the interpretation which Garrigou-Lagrange proposes, in which there is negative reprobation, but not the *massa damnata*:

a) Garrigou-Lagrange says that "St. Thomas does not speak of original sin in this article." But actually, he does speak of it, in the very objection to which our passage replies: "Besides, 'there is no injustice with God' as Rom 9.14 says. Now it seems to be unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are *equal* both in regard to nature, and *in regard to original sin*: there is inequality in them according to the merits or demerits of their own actions."

b) If St. Thomas, in this article, were really teaching that there is negative reprobation for a reason other than original sin (and independently of original sin)-then he would have not two but three theories, namely: In the commentary on Romans, he teaches the *massa damnata* theory (as we saw in chapter 1). In CG. 3. 159-61 he certainly teaches a different theory, based on 1 Tm 2:4. And the third theory would come in this article 5. Now it is not difficult to explain how it happened that St. Thomas came to have the first two theories: he did this out of outstanding fidelity to strictest theological method, as we have seen. But how would we explain the addition of the third theory? It would be much easier to say that St. Thomas joined speculative considerations on the order of the universe with the theory of the *massa damnata*.

2) Against the interpretation that would make St. Thomas speak of the *massa damnata* theory in this passage, Father Nicolas argues, as we saw above, that if "it makes no difference in regard to the characteristic of predestination whether or not it is from a state of misery that one is predestined to *eternal life*," then the *massa damnata*, the state of misery, makes no difference in the theory of St. Thomas.-But the argument is not conclusive. For in the line cited by

Nicolas, St. Thomas says it makes no difference whether or not it is from misery that one is predestined to eternal life. But St. Thomas does not say the same-nor could he say-the same about *reprobation*. For, according to the backers of the *massa damnata* theory, the reason why God could justly leave many in the *massa* was original sin. Without original sin, this would be unjust.

So no conclusive argument can be brought against the interpretation of this passage of St. Thomas according to the *massa damnata* theory. His words could agree with that theory; and he does cite Romans 9. But, no conclusive argument for this interpretation can be given either.

3) Against the interpretation according to CG. 3. 159-61, no conclusive argument can be brought. But neither can a conclusive argument be given in its favour. Rather, we must admit that it is not entirely easy to interpret the *Summa* passage in line with CG. 3.159-61. However, we must recall that St. Thomas was constantly under the pressure of holding two conclusions which really could not be reconciled. Hence some obscurity is to be expected.

239. Conclusion on the interpretation of the thought of ST

1.23.5 ad 3: It is difficult to be sure what Scriptural starting point was dominating the thought of St. Thomas in this passage. Reasons that are not to be scorned can be found for the various positions, and great commentators, not without reason, differ. But, one thing still remains entirely certain: If St. Thomas really does teach the theory of the *massa damnata* in this passage, the passage will require correction for, as we have shown in chapters 1, 4, and 5, that theory is based on an erroneous interpretation of Romans 9, and contradicts the actual revelation on the salvific will, as well as other revealed truths. Similarly, if St. Thomas really teaches negative reprobation without the *massa damnata* theory, the passage will still need correction, for, as we have seen many times over, any such reprobation contradicts many revealed truths, especially the revelation on the salvific will.

So, whatever may be the true thought of the *Summa* passage, it does not prevent us from retaining the teaching of St. Thomas that is found CG 3. 159-61, which is founded on a true interpretation of Scripture.⁵²

240. General conclusions from St. Thomas:⁵³

1) No reprobation, either positive or negative, is decreed before consideration of personal demerits. It is decreed only after and because of foreseen grave resistance to grace.

2) Predestination is decreed for all in whom this grave resistance is not found. It is not clear from the words of St. Thomas whether it is decreed after consideration of merits, or before merits but after consideration of the absence of grave resistance. More probably he would have preferred to put it before consideration of merits. He seems not to have known how to solve the speculative difficulty about the position of predestination in regard to the *series* of graces. Or if he knew, he gave no indication of knowing, although he normally raises

and solves every difficulty he can think of, even difficulties of much lesser importance than this one.

3) St. Thomas deserves high praise for finding at least the major part and chief elements of the true solution, and this, in spite of the truly great difficulties under which he laboured from the erroneous interpretation of Romans 8-9. He accomplished so much through complete fidelity to precise theological method. To understand his thought, we must realize that he did this for if we followed a method more philosophical than theological, and assumed he did the same, we would be inclined to force the interpretation of his words in CG. 3.159-61 to fit with the erroneous interpretation of Romans 9.

241. Objections: We have already answered the most direct objections against our interpretation, for we presented and answered other proposed interpretations.

We already answered above⁵⁴ the objection based on the order of the universe. A more complete treatment of the matter will be given in the appendix. Here we can note particularly that according to St. Thomas: "they *only* are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves"-he does not say that: "they *also* are deprived of grace who have to be deserted for the good of the universe."

We have also replied at the end of chapter 7 to many other objections pertinent to this material, based on other passages of St. Thomas.

242. Here we can also add something to the reply we gave to the objection 1 in chapter 7, on the theory of the older Thomists about sufficient and efficacious grace. This theory contradicts the teaching of St. Thomas in CG 3. 159-61. For the objection which St. Thomas proposes to himself in chapter 159 would retain its force if the theory of these Thomists were correct. For in their theory, man cannot really "distinguish himself" in regard to sinning or not or in regard to being reprobated or not.⁵⁵ Rather, the decision would be made by God alone. But, as St. Thomas says in CG. 3.159: "no one is charged with that which depends on another." We also have shown above⁵⁶ by analysis of other parts of chapter 159 that there is no room for the theory of these Thomists.

Several objections can also be raised from passages of St. Thomas on the way in which grace is efficacious. These passages will all be presented, and explained in chapter 18.

An objection could be raised about the sense in which we can omit resistance. St. Thomas does not explain this matter. We have already explained it in chapter 7.⁵⁷

END NOTES

1 Cf. §§ 104-105.

2 Cf. §§ 137-138.

3 Lesson 3, comments on v. 15, and lesson 2, comments on v. 13.

4 St. Thomas knew that at least part of this view of Augustine was an error. For in De malo q.5.a.3 ad 4, he wrote: "The infants [who die without baptism] are separated

from God perpetually, in regard to the loss of glory, which they do not know, but not in regard to participation in natural goods, which they do know. . . . That which they have through nature, they possess without pain." In contrast, Augustine, as his *massa damnata* theory really required, held for the positive damnation of infants: *Enchiridion* 93.

5 Cf. § 12.

6 Cf. §§ 2-3.

7 Cf. § 104.

8 Cf. § 82.

9 CG 3.160.

10 Cf. §§ 6-7, 51, 118-`20, 129-`32, 309-322.

11 *Haurietis aquas*. AAS 48.337.

12 Cf. § 303.

13 Cf. §§ 126-127.

14 Cf. §§ 118-120.

15 CG 3.161.

16 ST I-II 113.10.

17 Cf. §§ 118-122.

18 *De veritate* 24.13.

19 § 62.

20 In chapter 5.

21 *Ibid*.

22 § 231.1.b.

23 §§ 224-26.

24 § 222.

25 Cf. § 129.3.

26 §§ 185-88.

27 § 231.

28 Cf. § 302.

29 §§ 222, 121 122, 129.3.

30 §§ 151 and 153.3.

31 Cf. Cf. § 153.2.

32 Cf. § 153.2.

33 The references inserted by some modern editors have aggravated rather than removed the confusion. In the first part of chapter 163, a number is inserted sending the reader to chapter 161, as follows: "Therefore, since it has been shown (c. 161) that by the divine operation, some, helped by grace, are directed to their ultimate end, but others, deserted by the same grace, fail to reach the ultimate end, and since all things that are done by God are provided for and arranged from eternity by His wisdom . . . it is necessary that the above-mentioned difference of men have been arranged by God from eternity. Therefore, according as He has preordered some from eternity, to be directed to their ultimate end, He is said to have predestined them. . . . But he is said to have reprobated those to whom from eternity He has arranged that He would not give grace. . . ." -The editors should have inserted the numbers 159-61, and not only 161. For, as we have shown above, in c. 161, St. Thomas speaks only of one category of men, that is, of those who resist the grace of conversion so that they cannot be converted except by a grace that forestalls or overcomes resistance. But, as is evident from the very passage in c. 163 into which the number is inserted, St. Thomas really wants to refer the reader to the passages in which he treats of all men: therefore, he refers the reader to chapters 159-61 and not only to 161. Probably the editors acted this way in the thought that St. Thomas held that no one could "distinguish himself" as to reprobation, and in thinking that in chapter 161 St. Thomas held such an idea. But as we have shown in many ways already, especially in our analysis of chapter 160 (cf. §§ 221-26) and also in § 231, all men really can "distinguish themselves" (cf. § 18, 119).

- 34 Cf. §§ 2-3
35 Cf. §§ 284-91, 302.
36 ST I. 19.6 ad 1.
37 ST I. 19.6.c.
38 ST I-II 112.3 ad 2.
39 Cf. §§ 51, 310-22.
40 1 Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
41 De malo 3. 1 ad 8.
42 Quodlibet I. q. 4, a. 2 ad 2.
43 Cf. note 38 above.
44 CG 4.55.
45 § 121.
46 "La permission du peche" in: Revue Thomiste 60 (1960) p. 544.
47 Cf. §§ 118-20.
48 De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 551.
49 Art. cit., p 538, n. 1.
50 Op. cit., p 544.
51 1 Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3 ad 6.
52 We would speak similarly about ST I 23.7 in which St. Thomas says that God has determined the number of the elect according to the proportion of the principal parts for the good of the universe. At first sight, these words may seem incapable of being reconciled with any true universal salvific will. However, reflection shows that such a conclusion is not necessary. For, the number of the elect must be truly great, since mercy is the greatest virtue in God (cf. ST II-II 30.4.c) and the greatest virtue should be most greatly represented. Therefore, perhaps the number required for the good of the universe is greater than the number of those who would be saved if God saved only those who do not gravely and persistently resist grace. So God adds others to this number, saving them by extraordinary means, according to the explanation given by St. Thomas in CG 3.161, as we saw earlier in this chapter.
53 Cf. § 233.
54 § 39.
55 Cf. §§ 6.8, 118-120.
56 Cf. also § 222.
57 Cf. § 82.

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243. After St. Thomas, many others wrote on our question. But throughout some centuries, no considerable new light was added towards the solution, or towards removing the obscurities left at the time of St. Thomas.

However, in the last part of the 16th century, two men of great genius stand out among those who attempted to propose new interpretations: Domingo Bañez, O.P., and Luis Molina, S.J.

I. The Opinion of D. Bañez

244. Because the opinion of Garrigou-Lagrange, on which we have already said so many things, and of which we have given a summary above¹ is practically the same as that of Bañez, we can treat his position more briefly now.

But it will be good to add a few things on the opinion of Bañez about the universal salvific will. As we saw² he thought that "much more

probably" the universal salvific will is only a signified will. However he did not deny that it might perhaps be a sincere will. Considering the hypothesis that it might be sincere, he wrote:³ ". . . even if that act is formally in God, it is not empty, but is a testimony of divine mercy. Nor is it a feigned will. For not without cause does God permit some to fail to reach the ultimate end . . . but the reason is, that the vindictive justice of God may be shown towards those who fell, and the greater abundance of mercy towards those who are saved. . . ." and he continues, and cites Romans 9.

Garrigou-Lagrange himself, however, explicitly says that the salvific will is sincere. But, as we have seen above,⁴ his opinion on predestination and the efficacy of grace cannot be reconciled with any true and sincere salvific will.

245. Conclusions on the opinion of Bañez: He sincerely tried, and tried ingeniously, to follow St. Thomas. In spite of that we must say:

1) He was right in holding that St. Thomas does teach negative reprobation before consideration of demerits in his commentary on Romans, and perhaps in some other passages as well.

2) Yet, there is no passage of St. Thomas which contains the theory of sufficient and efficacious grace proposed by Bañez, as we have already shown.⁵

3) Nor does St. Thomas have the opinion on divine foreknowledge solely through infrustrable decrees, as we shall see in chapter 22.

4) Bañez did not find the real teaching of St. Thomas in CG. 3.159-61, nor did he see the error in the interpretation of Romans 8-9. As a result, Bañez did not find the true revealed solution.

II. The Opinion of L. Molina

A. The problem of interpreting Molina

246. The words of Molina himself: Even the Molinists today dispute what is the real opinion of Molina on some points of major importance. Let us read what Molina himself says:⁶ He had proposed an objection as follows: "[It can be objected] that from this our opinion it follows that it is in the power of each adult to bring it about that he has been predestined from eternity by God. But this is very absurd, since the gift of predestination is to be referred solely to the free will of God." He tries to answer this objection as follows:⁷ ". . . we must deny that the conclusion follows: For although God so makes provision towards beatitude for all adults, both the predestined and the reprobate, He leaves them in the power of their own counsel making it a matter of free choice for them either to come to eternal life or to turn aside to extreme misery; that which follows from our view, in fact, that which we openly assert is this: Given any providential plan whatsoever of this sort, with certain definite means which God, for His part, has decreed to give to an adult-whether [this plan] has added to it the characteristic of predestination, because God foresees that this man through his liberty is going to come through these means to beatitude,

or whether [this plan] has reprobation added to it, because He foresees that the man, through the same liberty, will not come to eternal life but will finish his life in sins because of which he will be damned-it is always within the power of the will of such an adult to do the contrary [of what he actually will do]. But if, as could be, that [contrary] were going to happen, [then] just as God would have foreseen it [the contrary] from eternity instead of that which He [actually] foresaw, so that providential plan would have added to it the contrary characteristic or predestination or reprobation. However, before God established it [that providential plan for the man], He would have been fully able to choose, not that same order of things and plan of providence for the adult in question, but one out of an infinity of others, in which He foresaw that the opposite would happen, out of that same freedom of the man's will. Wherefore, it is not in the power of an adult human to bring it about that he has been predestined by God from eternity, but it depends solely on the free will of God, even though, in whatsoever order of things the man be placed, it is in his power to do the opposite of that which he really will do."

247. Comments on the words of Molina himself: Molina seems to openly deny that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who will or will not be reprobated depends on human conditions. Still, he is considered by many as the great patron of the opinion that says predestination is decreed after consideration of merits. To see how these two points can be reconciled, we need a distinction:

1) In one sense Molina says that God predestines, or reprobates, in as much as He freely-not because of foreseen merits or demerits-chooses one order of things and not another, from which choice of order differences will follow, e.g., God knows that Peter in order A will freely consent to the graces he will receive and will be saved, but He knows that the same Peter in order B would not consent, but would be lost. *Therefore, by choosing the order, God is said to predestine or reprobate inasmuch as the final outcome of salvation or ruin for Peter depends on the order which God chooses.* It is in this sense that Molina says: "It is not in the power of an adult human to bring it about that he has been predestined by God from eternity."

2) In another sense, Molina says that God predestines, inasmuch as, presupposing the choice of the actual order (which choice is made entirely freely by God, and not after foreseeing merits and demerits), *within this order*, merits and demerits are really the reason underlying the decision as to who will be reprobated or elected. Hence Molina says, speaking of the order of providence which God has actually chosen: "Whether [this plan] has added to it the characteristic of predestination, *because* God foresees that this man through his liberty is going to come through these means to beatitude, or whether [this plan] has reprobation added to it, *because* He foresees that the man, through the same liberty, will not come to eternal life. . . ."

If, then, we consider the whole process of predestination, in the fullest, most fundamental sense, it is entirely gratuitous according to Molina, nor is the outcome decided by human merits or demerits. But if we consider the difference between the reprobate and the elect within the present order, then this distinction depends entirely on the free will of man.

248. Molina's objection and reply in regard to human control:

But Molina seemed to see a further objection as possible, because he had said that an adult is predestined within the present order because God foresees that the man will have good merits. For someone might say: "If in the present order I am able to choose freely to live well or badly; and if in any order whatsoever the same is true so that, as Molina says, it is always in my power to do the opposite to what I might actually do, then, in whatsoever order God had wanted to place me, I always could do well, and so, I could do this in all orders, so that in no matter what order God might place me, I could bring it about that I would be saved. So, even in the first sense, I could bring it about that I would be predestined."

Probably with such an objection in view, Molina added, in the passage cited above: "However, before God established it [that providential plan for the man] He would have been fully able to choose, not that same order of things and plan of providence for the adult in question, but one out of an infinity of others, in which He foresaw that the opposite would happen, out of that same freedom of the man's will. Wherefore, it is not in the power of an adult human to bring it about that he have been predestined by God from eternity. . . ."

249. The efficacy of the order: In this reply of Molina, there is a certain clear presupposition, namely: *That which really is the outcome-salvation or perdition-depends, for all men, on the order chosen, for there is no one at all who, in some order which God could have chosen, would not live so badly that he would perish. And there is no one who would perish in this order, who would not have lived well in some other order.* Therefore, B. Beraza, SJ, concludes:⁸ ". . . in a hypothetical order there is no distinction or reason for distinction. You who are reading this, in [some] hypothetical order were the holiest of all the saints that are and will be in heaven; and simultaneously [in a different hypothetical order] you are the basest of all who are and will be in hell." Therefore, if Beraza has correctly interpreted the view of Molina about the orders, we must conclude that *not only the difference between salvation and ruin depends for everyone on the order chosen, but also the precise degree of holiness or wickedness that each will reach.*

250. The interpretation given by Father Aquaviva: This implication becomes still clearer if we consider the interpretation of Molinism given by Claudius Aquaviva, the General of the Jesuit order, in 1613:⁹ "For the future, let our [theologians] teach entirely, that

between that grace which really produces its effect, and is called efficacious, and that [grace] which they call sufficient, there is a difference not only *in actu secundo*, because it obtains its effect through the use of free will that has also a cooperating grace [while] another [grace] does not likewise [obtain its effect]; but even *in actu primo*, because, presupposing [God's] knowledge of conditional [futures], as a result of the efficacious purpose of God and [His] *intention* of most certainly accomplishing good in us He *deliberately* selects such means [graces] and confers them in such a manner and at such a time that He foresees they will infallibly be effective, [for] *He would employ other graces, if He had foreseen these would be ineffective.*"

251. To understand this most clearly, it is helpful to recall the historical background, as H. Rondet, SJ, reports it:¹⁰ "In the year 1613, the [Jesuit] General, Aquaviva, put an end to [the discussion within the Jesuits]. Less restrained than Paul V, he commanded the theologians of his order to teach that between sufficient and efficacious grace, there is a difference *in actu primo*, and he did this *in the intention of saving the traditional notions about the predilection of God for the elect.*" Therefore, according to Father Aquaviva, Molinism involves this tenet: *God has a special benevolence for the elect. If He did not have this, they would not be elect.* He has this benevolence not because of their works, for this benevolence *precedes* their good works. For this special benevolence is the reason why God "deliberately," as Fr. Aquaviva said, chooses graces *in actu primo* as efficacious for the elect. The absence of this special benevolence explains why the reprobates do not receive the efficacious graces (i.e., not to such an extent that they would be saved). Therefore, because all this depends in the first place on God alone, and since without an efficacious grace man will not actually, according to Molinism, do a good act, and since God does not give such efficacious grace to all-it is obvious that *there is a certain antecedent reprobation in this decision of God, towards those to whom He does not give the efficacious grace.* (The precise sense in which this is true will be made clearer below.)¹¹ So it seems that God, in choosing the order, acts according to the special benevolence He has for certain persons. In other words, God chooses the order precisely in order to save these special ones. By that very fact He passes by the others. *Those whom He passes by are negatively reprobated, before any prevision of demerits.*

252. As Rondet explained, Father Aquaviva issued his order precisely in order to provide for retaining the theory of the special benevolence of God for the elect. The same position is apparent from the words of Beraza. For Beraza, in the context from which the citation given above was taken, is replying to an objection based on 1 Cor 4:7: "Who distinguisheth thee" and he is labouring strenuously to show that *within the theory he defends no one can "distinguish himself," i.e., no*

one can determine whether or not he will be reprobated. Beraza adds elsewhere:¹² "So, all our doctors admit the predefinition of salutary acts; all admit the special benevolence of God for the predestined; . . . all teach that efficacious grace is given by God *as such*, that is, *out of a motive of efficacy* [with the intention that it may be efficacious]."

However, not all Molinists admit that Father Aquaviva has correctly interpreted the thought of Molina. For example, an outstanding Molinist, Father Lennerz, S.J. wrote:¹³ "We do not know why God chose the present order, and not a different one . . . However, from the thesis proved thus far, and from the present thesis, it is clear that God did not choose the present order as a result of an absolute decree of saving . . . certain men, and them alone, and of excluding the rest from eternal salvation."

We will need, then, to make two separate comparisons: one of the Aquavivan interpretation of Molina with revelation, one of the other interpretations of Molina with revelation.

B. Comparison of Father Aquaviva's interpretation with revelation.

There are chiefly two elements of his interpretation that we want to compare with the revelation on the salvific will, namely, the need of special benevolence for salvation and the predefinition of graces *in actu primo*. In regard to both we must ask: (1) Whether it can harmonize with any degree of a salvific will, even the minimum degree; (2) whether it can harmonize with the actual force of the salvific will, as it is known to us from revelation.

Before taking up these questions, it is good to note that the Molinists do not labour under the same difficulty as the older Thomists in regard to sufficient and efficacious graces. As we have seen,¹⁴ according to the older Thomists, man lacks a metaphysical element that is needed for the actual performance of the act (i.e., he lacks the application) even though he has a sufficient grace. But in the Molinistic theory, man can have, through sufficient grace, even the act itself.

253. The need of special benevolence in predestination:

1) *In comparison with a minimum degree of the salvific will:* The Molinists speak of a "special" benevolence as needed for salvation. We must ask in what sense it is to be called "special." Now it could scarcely be supposed that the same degree of benevolence would be required for each and every man. For this would be the case only if all men were precisely equal both in weakness and in malice. It would at least seem, on the basis of experience, that not all men are equal in these. But if the degree required for each varies with the individual, then what the Molinists call "special" benevolence will be a different degree in different cases. What then can be the common "special" characteristic that runs through so many varying cases? It is hard to see what it could be except the *intention* on the part of God to save. It is true that in Molinism, God is said to give to all such *means* that they

could be saved. But we are inquiring rather into the *intention* (or deficiency therein) that underlies the decision of God to give such varying degrees (graces according to varying degrees of benevolence). He does this with the outcome that many are lost, even though the recipients are so weak-almost impotent-in the face of the influence of the *order* chosen by God, that there is no one at all who would not reach any set degree of wickedness or of sanctity, according to the order assigned.

We wonder, then, about the non-special benevolence that is found in such varying degrees, and has no other identifiable common feature except that it never has saved nor ever will save even one soul from the beginning to the end of creation; a benevolence which is restrained from going further even though added graces would cost God nothing; and all this in spite of the fact that men are, as we said, so close to impotent in the face of the order assigned to them-Is perhaps the real difference between non-special and special benevolence found in a lack of intention to save in the non-special benevolence? At this point in our investigation we cannot say for certain.

However, thus far we have been working by speculation, in comparing Molinistic tenets with a minimum degree of the salvific will. We have clarified some possibilities, but have arrived only at a suspicion-not at certitude-that the Molinistic system does not fit with even a minimum degree of the salvific will. That suspicion will pass into a certitude soon¹⁵ when we consider Molinistic teaching on predefinition of graces. Meanwhile, we must compare Molinism with the actual vehemence of the salvific will as it is known to us by revelation.

2) *In comparison with the vehement salvific will made known by revelation:* Mere speculation can never tell us what benevolence God has for individuals, for He is sovereignly free in setting this measure. But God has graciously revealed His will in this matter. For God's benevolence for each man has its measure in the infinite objective titles¹⁶ which Christ established for each one in the infinite love of His passion, which He offered for each individual man, according to the authentic interpretation of Pope Pius XII and Vatican II¹⁷, so that St. Paul could say correctly:¹⁸ "He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will he not also give us *all things* with him?" That is, if God has benevolence to such an extent for *each individual* man that He even sent His only Son to a most horrible death for the salvation of *each individual*, there is no grace (except the extraordinary)¹⁹ that He will refuse if it is needed for salvation. Hence we can see the proper setting of the statement of Pope Pius XII that God at all times sends down to all "a rich abundance of divine graces."

But let us look into the matter more precisely. If, as Pius XII says, the passion of Christ was offered for *each individual*, then we can determine the degree of benevolence that God has for each one. For the passion provides a measure of the love of God, since love can be

measured by the obstacles it can surmount. The love of God was so immense that it could surmount even so great an obstacle, that is, it could send His only Son to a terrible death. Furthermore, God did all these things in such a way that He could really owe it to Himself to give graces. He cannot owe them strictly to man, but He can and does owe it to Himself, because of the covenant,²⁰ and the infinite objective titles that were established, titles that by their very nature (since all works of an infinite Person are of infinite value) are of infinite worth. The Father did all this in the first phase, the establishment of the infinite treasury, in the objective redemption. He did the same for the second phase, the dispensation of the same treasury in the subjective redemption, since the same infinite price is again presented in the Mass to obtain the dispensation of the treasury. He did it in the Mass, as we saw in chapter 4, for *each individual*. So it is in this setting that the words of St. Paul are to be understood:²¹ "Will he not also give us *all things* with him?" For St. Paul wrote these words precisely in such a context: "He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will he not also give us all things with him?" That is: If God loves to such an extent, has benevolence to such an extent for each man that He did not stop short even at sending His own Son for the salvation of each individual, most certainly, there is nothing else that could be needed for salvation that He will refuse: He will give all. For God does not change. If in the first phases of the process God not only spoke of, but proved such great benevolence towards each man; therefore, in the remaining stages of the same work, towards which the previous phases were ordered, God will not change His plan, nor diminish the benevolence He had for each man in the first phase. He has guaranteed that He will not change, for He has bound Himself by the infinite titles of the Mass, so that He owes it to Himself to offer to each man all that the redemption earned for him insofar as may be needed for salvation (except, as we have seen, extraordinary things, for the extraordinary cannot become the ordinary). In other words, St. John Damascene was completely right in saying that reprobation is decreed only when²² "after God has done everything to save, the man remains unreformed and not cured, or rather, *incurable*, as a result of his own resolve." For God, on His part, does not set limits, or hold back the graces that are, as it were, bought and paid for: the man who perishes does so because he makes himself incurable, incapable of perceiving graces.²³

In fact, the abundance of graces is not only rich enough for salvation, but is such that each man is obliged to strive for highest perfection, as we have seen.²⁴

Obviously, then, the truth is far other than the picture painted by Molinism, which teaches that God so tempers and holds back graces that many thousands of men perish: they perish by their own fault, but would not have actually perished if God had not held back the graces

that He bought for them at so great a price. Clearly, the Molinistic view on special benevolence does not arise from an exegesis of the sources of revelation.

Our conclusion is confirmed by the fact that, as we saw briefly above,²⁵ the Molinists arrived at their theory of predefinition of graces *in actu primo* as a result of their theory of special benevolence. We must now examine that theory of predefinition more fully. We shall see that it contradicts not just the revealed degree of the salvific will, but even the slightest conceivable degree of an universal salvific will.

254. Predefinition of graces in actu primo: As we saw above, Father Aquaviva taught that efficacious grace differs from sufficient grace,²⁶ "not only *in actu secundo*, because it obtains its effect through the use of free will that has also a cooperating grace . . . but even *in actu primo* because, presupposing [God's] knowledge of conditional [futures], as a result of the efficacious purpose of God and [His] intention of most certainly accomplishing good in us, He *deliberately* selects such means [graces] and confers them in such a manner and at such a time that He foresees they will infallibly be effective [for] *He would employ other graces, if He had foreseen these would be ineffective.*"

Therefore, according to this interpretation, if God has special benevolence for a certain man, e.g., Gaius, God will choose for Gaius such a series of graces that He foresees Gaius will cooperate with them, at least to such an extent as to be saved-but if, on the contrary, God has only ordinary benevolence for another, e.g., Mark, God will choose for Mark a series of graces such that Mark is foreseen as not going to cooperate, at least, not enough to be saved. By such a process God puts into effect the intention of predestining or reprobating which He had previously formed in regard to each individual man, when He decided whether to have special or only ordinary benevolence for various individuals.

255. So we must investigate, to see whether or not this explanation of graces can harmonize with any true universal salvific will. For the sake of clarity, we shall speak of single graces. It is obvious that all who are saved cooperate with many graces; nor do all those who perish reject every grace. However, if God really regulates the effect of graces in the way described by Father Aquaviva, it is clear that God can, in this way, determine who will or will not be saved. Hence it is sufficient to investigate the principles that apply to individual graces.

When they consider this question, the Molinists do as they did in speaking of special benevolence: they fix their attention on the fact that God gives even to the reprobate graces such that they could have cooperated with them if they wished, and so could have been saved. As a result, they conclude that God has a true salvific will even towards the reprobate.

256. But it is not enough to consider *only* this point. For we must consider also, the *intention* of God in acting as He does. We shall see that the universal salvific will cannot be true and universal if God *deliberately* (as Aquaviva said) so chooses graces that some will not be saved. There is a deficiency in the salvific intention precisely because, in this theory, God would choose or not choose efficacious graces *as such*. Nor can the difficulty be escaped by saying that even though God chooses efficacious graces as such, He does not choose ineffective graces as such. For in this theory, as we shall see, there is no room for *mere permission*. The reason is this: *If God foresaw that a certain grace would be effective in a case where He did not have special benevolence, "He would employ other graces."* For if God saw that, e.g., Mark would not resist, but yet God did not wish to exercise special benevolence towards him, God would choose another grace. *If He did not-then there could be efficacy without: special benevolence-but that cannot be admitted in this theory.* For, according to the Molinists, efficacious grace is a "greater benefit." But, a greater benefit does not come without greater, or special, benevolence. *If it could, some man for whom God would not have special benevolence could be saved by making good use of certain graces given without special benevolence on the part of God.*

This fact has not escaped the notice of the best Molinists. One cannot help admiring the great ingenuity they have shown in their attempts to escape this difficulty. But it is all in vain. For, as S. Gonzalez, SJ, admits about this predefinition:²⁷ "Now this divine decree *in whatsoever way it may be conceived*, shows forth an *absolute* divine will which, for such a man, is a true *predilection*." Therefore, the critical element, namely, the *need of special benevolence*, always remains in any attempt at explanation. Without this special benevolence or predilection, God "would employ other graces" if He saw that a man for whom He had no special benevolence would use them well (at least, to such an extent as to be saved-for the theory cannot admit a man could be saved without the special benevolence).

The same situation can be explained also as follows, picturing it in an anthropomorphic way, as many Molinists often do, for the sake of comparison: God chooses graces in two ways. In the first way: He chooses efficacious graces, as it were, inspecting them, to see if they are going to be effective in the cases for which He intends them and "He would employ other graces" if He saw they were not going to be effective. In the second way: God chooses ineffective graces. To attain this result, it would not be sufficient to merely choose graces without any special precaution or care, as if God merely took the first graces He happened upon. For in this way at least some graces should turn out to be effective, since graces chosen blindly, without special care, at least sometime should be such that a man would actually consent to them-unless we say that the human will has no power at all. Therefore,

the mere omission of special diligence would not always result in the choice of ineffective graces: in order that they be *always* effective, there is need of a *diligence no less special LEST effective graces be chosen*. Hence Beraza says openly:²⁸ "All our doctors . . . teach that efficacious grace is given by God *as such*, that is, out of a motive of efficacy [with the intention that it may be efficacious]." Similarly, other graces are necessarily given without the intention that they be effective.

257. We conclude: If in this way God *deliberately* so chooses a series of graces for a certain man, e.g., Mark, so that Mark perishes, and if God "*would employ other graces*" if He foresaw that Mark would be saved, then, even though Mark really could have been saved with these graces, yet it is also true that in God there is an intention of avoiding the salvation of Mark. Therefore, the theory of predefinition of graces *in actu primo* cannot harmonize with even the minimum degree of a true universal salvific will. It is not strange, then, that Father Dalmau, SJ, in explaining how the Thomists and Molinists differ in regard to predestination writes:²⁹ "The authors on both sides agree in the essential lines. The differences among those who hold the same opinion do not directly concern this question [predestination] but others more or less related to it. The chief difference between Thomists and Molinists is in the explanation of the efficacy of grace. . . ." since the Molinists teach that graces are only extrinsically efficacious, and that sufficient grace gives a man a true power of positive consent, while the Thomists hold that graces are intrinsically efficacious, and they say that a man cannot consent positively unless graces move him to do so. But in regard to predestination itself, both Thomists and Molinists teach that a man cannot "distinguish himself," and say that God decides the eternal fate of each man before any consideration of free conditions within man. We saw above that the opinion of the Thomists cannot fit with any true universal salvific will. We must say the same thing of the Aquavivan interpretation of Molinism.

258. The theory of reprobation by the choice of orders: We have already seen what the Aquavivan interpretation holds about the effect of the divine choice of the order. The force of the order chosen is so great that one must say with Father Beraza:³⁰ ". . . in a hypothetical order, there is no distinction nor reason for distinction. You who are reading this, in [some] hypothetical order were the holiest of all the saints that are and will be in heaven: and simultaneously [in a different hypothetical order] you are the basest of all who are and will be in hell." But if this is true, then it is difficult to believe that human freedom has any power at all, even in regard to negative conditions, the placing or omission of resistance. Therefore human freedom is at least much attenuated if not altogether extinguished, in this interpretation.

We shall consider other aspects of the choice of orders, below.³¹

C. Comparison of other interpretations of Molinism with revelation.

259. As we have just seen, at least two features of Molinism, within the interpretation of Aquaviva, must be rejected as contrary to revelation, namely, the theory of the need of special benevolence for salvation, and the theory of predefinition of graces *in actu primo*. But other interpretations of Molinism are possible which omit these two elements, but still involve a predefinition of graces *in actu secundo*, and predestination and reprobation through the choice of orders.

260. Predefinition of graces in actu secundo: It is clear that this theory does not contradict the universal salvific will. However, we must still ask a question about the power of positive consent which this theory gives a man. Since, however, in this second part of our investigation we are treating predestination, it will be more opportune to save the treatment of the problem of the positive power of consent for chapter 18, in the third part of this book.

262. Predestination and reprobation through the choice of orders: Before comparing this point with revelation, we need to review an important distinction. For, even though God is truly almighty, there are some things He cannot do without a miracle. For example, once God has wisely established the law of nature as a result of which no one can walk on the waters, even Christ Himself could not do so, except by a miracle. Similarly, as we saw above,³² God created human nature having the power of autonomous freedom in working out salvation. Hence, as we saw, if God wishes to move a man infrustrably, so as to forestall or cancel out free resistance, He can do this only by a grace that is rightly compared to a miracle: it is a grace that is by very nature extraordinary.³³ Still further, many sins will follow from this liberty that God has granted. Among these sins will be the sin of heresy. Later generations of those who fall into heresy are very likely to be in good faith. When members of these later generations were children, they were powerfully inclined to believe what their parents told them. As a result, many remain in heresy, in good faith.

262. So a critical question is this: Is it necessary from the very nature of things-so that only by an immense multiplication of miracles could things be otherwise-that God should permit, as it were by indirect voluntary, the eternal ruin of certain men? If we ask this question in referring to the effects of their own freedom in each man, of course the answer is "Yes." For unless God sends extraordinary graces,³⁴ many will persist in their sins, and so will perish. But our problem is about a different area, namely: From the fact that God has chosen order A for the whole world, does it follow that certain men, e.g., Peter and Paul, will perish, since they will be born in places without sacraments, or since in order A they will meet with sudden death at the precise time when they are not in the state of grace, even though through much of

their life they were in the state of grace? Will it be true that if God chooses order B, Peter and Paul will not perish, since the circumstances we mentioned will be different, but instead other men, e.g., Titus and Gaius, will perish, who would not have perished in order A?

If it is inevitable that whatever order God chooses, certain men will surely perish who would not have perished in a different order, and, conversely, certain ones will be saved who would not be saved in the other order-then clearly God can have a true and sincere universal salvific will which will include even the men we have spoken of-and He can have this whether He chooses order A or order B. For as it were by indirect voluntary He permits these undesirable effects (we must recall however the great force the Molinists attribute to the orders).³⁵ God could, of course, prevent these losses by multiplying miracles: but the extraordinary must not become ordinary.

263. Therefore, we must ask two questions:

1) Is it actually necessary that God permit men to perish in this way, as it were by an indirect voluntary (unless He multiplies miracles)?

2) If the answer to the first question is "No it is not necessary" then: Does God really and actually will to permit men to perish in the way described?

The *first question* is a purely *factual question*: whether or not by the very nature of things the case is such that God could not do other than permit some to perish, no matter which order He chooses, unless, of course, He should multiply miracles. We shall have to raise this factual question separately in considering various classes of conditions, below. The *second question* is a question about the *free decision of God*. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, so that God can do other than permit men to perish through assignment of the order, even without miracles, then it is not enough for us to ask what God is *bound* to do, in the very nature of things. Nor is it enough to say that God has given to those who will perish, graces with which they really could have been saved. Our chief question is this: *What did God freely will to do?* The answer to this question can be had solely through revelation. To find it, we must compare with the salvific will, the weight of the reasons to the contrary, i.e., the obstacles to be overcome if God would not will to permit these men to perish through the assignment of the order. If the reasons to the contrary, or the obstacles, are of much less weight than the revealed force of the salvific will, our conclusion will necessarily be that God does not will to permit men to perish in this way.

264. To make our investigation of this point as clear as possible, let us suppose that Mark is a man who is going to perish in the present order, and let us ask: *What changes would need to be made in order to save him?*

1) *A greater abundance of grace?* As we have seen above,³⁶ God refuses each man no ordinary grace without which he would actually perish. In fact, He gives more, for He obliges them to tend to perfection. For such is, as we have seen, the sense of the words of St. Paul, when considered in their immediate and remote context, by strict exegesis: "He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will he not also give us all things with him?"³⁷ We could not conceive what more God could do for Mark, in this respect. Rightly did Christ say:³⁸ "Greater love has no man than this. . . ."

2) *Different external circumstances?* (Different time of death will be treated separately below): We know that within the present order, God assigns places to men out of a most wise and most loving providence. Even the hairs of the head of Mark are all numbered. And even though the objective titles established by Christ refer by nature to graces of the internal economy and not directly to the external economy, nevertheless, the universal salvific will, which is so powerful that it willed to establish such great titles, rules always and everywhere, even in the external economy.

Now, even with our very finite minds we can find at least one way in which a most wise and most loving Father could so distribute external places that no one will perish by reason of the place assigned. This is explained in Appendix II.³⁹ In general, we said that God assigns places according to the needs of individuals. Perhaps God has even a better way of making assignments than that which we conjectured. (Let us recall also the compensations which we know God provides in the places that have less external means of grace).⁴⁰ We will speak about this in Appendix II, conjecturing chiefly about the care of Providence in regard to assigning places where there are all, few, or no sacraments. Of course, God also takes care of other circumstances.

So it is clear that God can-either in the way suggested, or in some other better way-so assign men to external places that no one will perish in one place who would not have perished in another. He can do this without any miracles. Therefore, according to the principle we already saw,⁴¹ since the difficulty of acting this way is much lesser than the difficulty that the salvific will actually surmounted in the Passion, God does will to so govern external assignments.

3) *A difference in temptations:* We need to distinguish two categories of temptations: (a) Temptations that depend on or come with the assignment of external place. Inasmuch as they depend on the place assigned, they fall under the principles we have seen for the assignment of place. (b) Temptations that do not depend on the assignment of place.-These cannot come except by permission of God. Now since the salvific will is most vehement, and is so great that God refuses no grace insofar as it may actually be needed for salvation,⁴² and since He governs all things according to this most vehement will-Who could hope for anything better in any order whatsoever? Actually,

as temptations increase, grace increases too. St. Paul says well:⁴³ "God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it." As we have already seen,⁴⁴ by the word "faithful" St. Paul recalls that God does all this because He has bound Himself by the covenant to act towards us as the next of kin, as our Father. But, if the temptations are regulated by our Father, then nothing better could be hoped for in any order.

4) *A different time of death?* Can God control the time of death without the use of a miracle? Or must He, if He does not use a miracle, sometimes permit the time of death to be determined by the blind operations of natural causes? The answer is that God can, by His providence, so govern the natural causes that He Himself-and not mere blind causes-determines the time of death. And, at least in general, He can do this without a miracle. For example, if Gaius is planning a trip by plane on a plane that is going to fall on that very day, from a mechanical defect, God can move Gaius not to take the trip on that day and hour and ship. He can do this at least in most cases without a miracle, for, as we have seen,⁴⁵ it is specially easy for God to move wills even by frustrable movements, in regard to natural things. Likewise, God can move the mechanics who work on the plane so that they find and correct the defect. Again, if Gaius is going to make a trip by auto in a car that will stall on a railroad crossing at the time when the train is due to pass, God can move the engineer to run just a trifle faster or a trifle slower, so that he will not reach the crossing at the moment when Gaius is stalled. Or, He can move Gaius to see the train in time. Or, if Gaius were about to die from a disease, God can move those who are caring for him to think of the better available natural means that will put off death for a while.

It is clear, then, that at least in general, God can regulate the time of death without the use of miracles. However, if someone wishes to say that at least in some few cases God cannot do so without a miracle, we must consider separately two alternatives:

a) In the cases in which God can control the time without a miracle: It is altogether proper that God should govern the time, for He is the Supreme Lord. He can do this without anything that is difficult to Him, and with no reason to the contrary that would be of greater weight than the force of the salvific will.⁴⁶ Therefore, God will, where it is possible without a miracle, govern all these things in accord with His Salvific will, nor will He allow that vehement will to be frustrated by mere blind causes. In other words: *God permits the salvific will to be frustrated only in those men who resist grace to such an extent that God decrees their reprobation because of and after consideration of this resistance.*⁴⁷ Short of this point, God does not reprobate nor allow blind causes to decide reprobation for Him. He predestines those

who do not resist that much and does not let blind causes ruin one who is predestined. So it is not blind causes, but God who governs all. Now since God in the present order decrees everything out of the highest generosity,⁴⁸ no one who perishes in this order would be saved in another order.

b) In the few cases in which it may perhaps be true that God could not regulate the time of death without a miracle: It is still not blind causes, but God Himself who determines the outcome. For God knows perfectly well what these blind causes are going to do in various combinations and circumstances. He does not assign anyone to a place and circumstances in which death will catch Him in sin except after foreseeing resistance that is such that, in whatever place the man might have been, God would have reprobated him.

It is good to note also that God, in His providential government, can often use the interval that comes between real and apparent death. Such an interval is especially likely to occur in cases of sudden death-and, if there are any cases in which God might not be able to control the time of death without a miracle, it would be cases of sudden death. In these cases there is a special opportunity for conversion. For we know that men in such a state are apt to be aware of what is happening. Their very fear will probably tend to make them specially receptive to the graces that will be sent, so that they can more easily be converted.

But someone may object: "Even if a certain number of sins-suppose we call the number 'Z'-would not suffice in itself for reprobation, yet, if death is about to come to Titus, from the effect of blind causes, and Titus already has Z sins, then, even though it is not difficult in itself to give Titus a different assignment of time of death, yet the sum total of reasons (the total of Z sins plus the difficulty of giving a different assignment of time of death) will be such that God will not will to interfere. Yet, if Titus had been in a different order, with Z sins, death would not have caught him in sin, and he would not have been reprobated."

There are two answers to this difficulty:

- 1) Before God assigned Titus to this place and circumstances, He clearly knew that death could catch Titus at this time. If, as the objection supposes, the sins of Titus would not of themselves be a quite sufficient reason for reprobation, then God would not have assigned Titus to such a place-or else He would govern the time of death even within that assignment of place so that blind causes would not determine reprobation for a man who had not sinned to such an extent that he would be reprobated *for those sins*.

2) The objection implies that God has fixed a definite number or measure of resistance after which He will be willing to do little or nothing to save a sinner. But there is no such measure, as we have already shown.⁴⁹ For the salvific will does not set limits: God is always disposed to act for our salvation. It is man himself, as St. John Damascene teaches,⁵⁰ who sets limits by making himself incurable through many sins. (The objection from the infinity of mortal sin has already been answered above).⁵¹ However, we must recall that a man must be really curable in order that God may act to save Him. For example, if Titus resists grace so persistently that throughout the greater part of his life he is in the state of sin, he cannot be cured or curable if he returns to the state of grace for a few days by the help of confession. Such a man is not really cured of his malice, nor is his life really changed. In fact, there may be doubt of the validity of absolution in view of his dispositions. It is not, then, necessary to suppose that God will so govern the time of death that it will come to Titus within the relatively short time in which he is (perhaps) in the state of grace. This would be practically extraordinary. We know that God does save some in this way, but that is by way of exception. If then such a man is in sin, and death is going to come by natural causes unless God arranges otherwise, the reason for reprobation will be his grave and persistent resistance-for such resistance makes a man really incurable.⁵² In whatever order he might be, such a man would be reprobated, since God decrees reprobation for persistent resistance in this order-and He would not be more generous than He is in this order. Now if Titus were in a place without the sacraments, he could not be converted except through perfect contrition. If he really made such an act, he would be truly, and not just apparently, cured. In regard to assigning Titus to a place that lacks the sacraments, we must make these observations: If Titus were going to perish in a place without sacraments, but not in a place with sacraments, God would have assigned him to a place with sacraments, as we have already seen.⁵³ Nor need we fear that the total number of places with the sacraments would be insufficient to permit this. First, we subtract from the needed number of places, the number of men who will not be saved even in places with the sacraments. For, as we conjectured, it is likely that, in general, God will put at least very many of them into places without sacraments so as to leave room in the more

favorable places for those who would not be saved without them, but will be saved with them. We can subtract too the large number of those whom God can put into places without the sacraments and they will still be saved. As we conjectured, He is likely to do much of this, at least to the extent needed to make the most favourable places open for those who would not be saved without them. Also, we should note that the opportunities of formal grave sin are much fewer in the places without sacraments.⁵⁴

So it remains true: The sole reason that determines reprobation is grave and persistent resistance to grace. Short of this, God does not reprobate, and so does not put a man in a place and circumstances where blind causes could determine his reprobation. We have already shown that resistance must be persistent, and so persistent that a man becomes incurable.⁵⁵ However, if someone would still wish to assert that God reprobates for a lesser measure of resistance, then-regardless of what that critical measure might be-it would still be true to say that it is God who decides on reprobation on account of this critical measure and who assigns places and circumstances and time of death in view of this critical measure.

The conclusion we have reached in regard to the determination of time of death is certain, on the basis of theological principles and the revelation on the salvific will. Moreover, it harmonizes excellently with everything that Scripture teaches us about the providential government of the time of death:

a) Through Ezechiel God said:⁵⁶ "As I live, says the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live."

b) The same divine attitude is shown again in the second Epistle of St. Peter:⁵⁷ "The Lord . . . is forbearing toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance." As the context shows, these words refer to a delay in the second coming of Christ. But they reveal the divine attitude, according to which He does not wish to catch sinners in their sins, but instead waits, that they may be saved. For if He is willing to differ even the time of the second coming for the salvation of men, much more easily will He differ or regulate the time of individual death.

c) From the book of Wisdom we learn that at least at some times, God sends death earlier precisely to

save a man who later would be corrupted:⁵⁸ "There was one who pleased God and was loved by him, and while living among sinners he was taken up. He was caught up lest evil change his understanding or guile deceive his soul."

d) In many Gospel parables, God has revealed that He vehemently desires the return of the prodigal, that He goes out to seek the lost sheep and the lost drachma. But, according to the authentic teaching of Pius XII, it is certain that⁵⁹ ". . . in the parables of mercy . . . the very Heart of God is manifested." Therefore, the attitude of God in regard to regulating the time of death is implicitly revealed in these parables.

e) However, in the parable of the ten virgins, Christ warned us against presumption, and told us to watch, for we know not the day nor the hour. And the warning was needed in spite of all we have said above, for even though God does not reprobate until⁶⁰ "after God has done everything to save, the man remains unreformed and . . . incurable," yet, as we saw above,⁶¹ it seems that God sometimes sends death to a man after his first mortal sin, or after a few such sins. So a man must fear and watch, lest he be found in that category. But even the sinner whom God does not cut off so quickly must fear, for by repeated sins he may, without realizing it, grow to be incurable.⁶² Hence he must watch, lest he pass the point from which no return is possible without a strictly extraordinary grace, which is not given to all. Since such a sinner deteriorates gradually, he may not perceive the point⁶³ at which he crosses the line of no return: after it, death may find him not watching, without oil in his lamp. For the virgins in the parable were without oil long before the actual coming of the bridegroom. For persons in such a state, death is unprovided for whatever time it may come. Death is always unprovided for in the case of the wicked; but it is never unprovided for in the case of the good. That is why we pray in the Litany of the Saints: "From a sudden and unprovided for death, deliver us." For a death that is sudden only in the chronological sense is harmless-it is harmful only if it is not only sudden but also unprovided for.

265. Conclusion on reprobation by choice of orders: By an application of our principles⁶⁴ to individual categories of possible

differences, we have found that there is no reprobation through choice of orders since: (1) It is not really necessary from the nature of things that whatever order God chooses, some men perish through their providential assignment who would not have perished otherwise. For God always is able, by wise providence and assignment of places and compensations, to bring it about that no one will perish in one place who would not have been going to perish also in a better place; (2) God is not only *able*, but *wants* to so govern things. We know this because the vehement force of the salvific will, which has its measure in infinite objective titles for each individual, far outweighs the difficulty of governing things in this way.

In other words, God reprobates only after and because of foreseen grave and persistent resistance: If He does not foresee this, He does not assign a man to a place, circumstances etc. in which he would perish.

We readily admit that God could have been much less liberal in other orders, so that many who are now saved would have perished. But in the present order He is so liberal-as the revelation of the infinite objective titles for each man shows-that we must conclude that reprobation is decreed only after and because of grave and persistent foreseen resistance. Therefore God does not permit men to be, as it were, negatively reprobated by the action of blind causes.

D. General conclusions on the theories of Molinism.

266. 1) The interpretation proposed by Aquaviva cannot harmonize with any degree of a true universal salvific will, not even with a minimum degree. So in regard to this point, his view does not suffer substantially from the view of the older Thomists.⁶⁵

2) A different interpretation of Molinism, which does not include the need of special benevolence for salvation nor predefinition of graces *in actu primo*, but which does include reprobation through choice of orders could harmonize with some degree of a true salvific will if, in the very nature of things, it were inevitable that, whatsoever order God would choose, certain men would perish who would not have perished in a different order, and vice versa. In fact, there could be *some* degree of a true salvific will even if God could avoid permitting them to perish but would still permit it, provided that He would give each man graces that really suffice (not in the older Thomistic sense) for salvation. However, even such a theory would fail to take into account the actual force of the salvific will, as it is known to us by revelation.

3) The Molinistic theories are the product of great ingenuity-but not of exegesis of the words of St. Thomas. They differ much from his teachings, especially in that St. Thomas has not one word about reprobation through choice of orders, nor (more probably) does he hold predestination after consideration of merits, nor does he make the distinction about predestination to glory considered separately.

Further, St. Thomas makes the omission of resistance the critical factor, and distinguishes it from positive consent.

4) The Molinists improperly appeal to many of the Fathers.⁶⁶

5) The picture painted by Molinism is far different from that given us by revelation. The Molinists do try to deduce their theory from revelation, inasmuch as the theories are made to reconcile certain revealed truths. However, at least many Molinists labour under an incorrect interpretation of 1 Cor 4:7.⁶⁷ Nor have they seen the true force of the salvific will, but instead, many hold a view that cannot be harmonized with even a minimum degree of a universal salvific will.

Actually, the Molinistic theories owe more to speculation than to revelation. For their theory of predestination and reprobation through choice of orders is speculatively constructed as a means of keeping the gratuity of predestination. But this gratuity can be kept better in a different way⁶⁸ and without diminishing the force of the salvific will and of human freedom. The second stage of Molinistic predestination was thought out to preserve human liberty: but it did not preserve it well.

6) We freely grant that God could have established other orders in which He could have been less liberal, and that in such orders, many who now are saved would have perished. But because of His supreme generosity and corresponding providence in this order, no one who now perishes would have been saved in another order.

7) We must still investigate the Molinistic view on the power of man to give positive consent to grace. We shall do this in chapter 18.

8) Many theologians charge that the Molinistic view of foreknowledge implies determinism. We shall investigate this point fully in chapter 19.

267. Objection 1: The Lord says in the Gospel:⁶⁹ "Woe to you, Chorazin! woe to you Bethsaida! for if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. . . . And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You shall be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day." Therefore, it is certain that if the Tyrians and Sodomites had been in another order, they would have been saved.

Reply: We must distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary favours. The miracles of Christ, of which He speaks here, certainly are extraordinary. So they do not pertain to the abundance of ordinary graces of which we spoke. Nor is it required that even a most vehement salvific will should include miracles. The extraordinary cannot become ordinary: that would be a contradiction.

We must notice also: It is not entirely certain that *all* Sodomites were damned. Our Lord does not say this. We know from the words of St. Peter that out of those who died in the deluge, some were really *not* damned:⁷⁰ ". . . [Christ, after His death] went and preached to the spirits in prison, who formerly did not obey, when God's patience waited in the days of Noah, during the building of the ark, in which a

few, that is, eight persons, were saved through water." Similarly it could be that some of those who were killed by the fire from heaven in Sodom were not damned. But hope is better for the Tyrians. For the Lord says that if they had seen the miracles, "they would have repented . . . in sackcloth and ashes." But many are saved who never have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. Perhaps the text means: If they had seen *miracles*, many Tyrians would have done *great* works of penance, greater than the Jews did, to whom Christ was speaking.

268. Objection 2: The assignment of places to men does not fall under the objective titles that Christ established in the redemption.⁷¹ For the assignment of places pertains to the external economy, which does not come under merit.⁷² Therefore it cannot be said that God assigns places in the manner claimed above.

Answer: It is true that the assignment of places, being a part of the external economy does not fall under the merits of men. But it falls indirectly under the merits of Christ. For He merited for the salvation of all. Therefore, insofar as a wise assignment of places is needed for salvation, He merited that it be done wisely. But the assignment does fall directly under the universal salvific will, for it retains its force in both economies. We know that this will is most vehement having its measure in the passion and in the infinite objective titles for each individual. Therefore it remains true that the most loving Father, out of this will, will provide well for each individual son of His.

269. Objection 3: Does not the argument from infinite objective titles prove too much? Does it not prove that God ought to give even miracles, or at least, that He ought to give equal graces to all? But this is not true. He who proves too much proves nothing.

Answer: It does not follow from the infinite titles that God must give miracles in all cases. For this would be contrary to Wisdom, since the extraordinary would become ordinary, an inherent contradiction. So God did not intend to bind Himself to give miracles to all.

Nor does the argument prove that God gives equal graces to all. First, because God, within ordinary providence, gives graces only on condition of the non-resistance of man.⁷³ But resistance and non-resistance vary. So, graces given vary. Further, God can give in some cases strictly extraordinary graces. He does this especially for great Saints. But still further, we must distinguish two things, namely, the rich abundance of graces that God *offers* to all, and other conditions that can promote receptivity in man.

In regard to the abundance of graces: It is certain, as we have seen, that God does offer such an abundance. The abundance is so great that, as we have seen above,⁷⁴ God refuses no ordinary grace without which a man would actually perish; in fact, it is so great that, as we saw in chapter 10, "absolutely all, with no exception" are bound by the law of perfection. Hence, as we saw also, the Church teaches that

"virtue . . . is . . . equally obtainable by high and low, rich and proletariat."

In regard to other conditions: We know that various conditions can promote better receptivity in man, and can give better opportunities, namely, the external place a man has, the varied conditions of life, the temptations and difficulties he meets, and other things. But these external things do not fall directly under the infinite titles, since they pertain to the external economy. Yet, they do fall under the universal salvific will. Hence we must make some distinctions:

1) As a result of the most vehement universal salvific will, which is effective in both economies, God never assigns men to a poorer external place in which they will perish, if they were not going to perish also in a better place. For the salvific will, as we said, is valid even in the external economy. Further, the wise assignment falls indirectly under the objective titles, inasmuch as these titles were established for men's salvation.

2) However, presupposing these things, which God does for *all*, He can wish in addition to promote in certain men not only salvation but may wish to lead them to extraordinary or heroic sanctity by special external assignments of external conditions, and even by miracles and by infrustrable graces, which He gives in some cases.

270. Objection 4: From the things said in this chapter, it seems to be implied that this is the best possible world.

Answer: We did not say that. We said merely that the generosity of God in granting graces and arranging all things for salvation could not be greater. For in the internal economy of personal salvation God will never deny any grace (short of the miraculous) without which a man would actually perish, except after and because of the man's resistance. We said that in the external economy, God so governs everything that no one perishes now in a poorer place who would not have perished also in a better place. But we admit there are many evils in this world, material evils, and voluntary evils, without which this world could be much better. By God's goodness and power, these very evils not infrequently prove to be occasions of gain towards salvation.

271. Objection 5: Suppose that Ivan is a boy who is born in atheistic Russia, of atheistic parents who from his earliest years not only do not teach him about God, but instead teach that there is no God. Will not Ivan probably be lost in this order, while in another order, in which he could have been born in different conditions, he might have been saved?

Answer: First, it is not certain that Ivan will perish even in this order. For God gives to each man, even this boy, a rich abundance of grace at least by interior means. Let us refer to a point about the salvation of infidels which we will develop in greater detail in Appendix II,⁷⁵ namely, that two things are required as a minimum for their salvation: faith in God the rewarder, and observance of the moral law as it is known to

each one. We will see too from the teaching of Pius IX that God does not permit anyone to be lost who does not sin through his own fault. Therefore, if Ivan does not sin gravely against the moral law *insofar as it is known to him*, God will certainly provide for the rest. But Ivan does not have so many and such great obligations in the moral sphere as Christians have. For Ivan thinks numerous things are permissible, in which other men who know the law, sin formally, and often. These things include some of the most difficult matters to observe. So the opportunities for grave sin are sharply reduced for Ivan. If, on this reduced basis, he remains clear of formal grave sin, we know from Pius IX that God will provide for him. We do not know the *how*, but we do know the *fact*. Ivan has lesser external opportunities; but he has also lesser obligations and dangers. So there is a certain compensation. So it is far from certain that Ivan will perish.

Further, in regard to the required faith in God, we not only know that God will provide for those who do not commit formal grave sins, but we can add that many in Russia do actually believe in God. From the very official battle against God, at least suspicions are bound to arise in many minds.

However even if, only for the sake of argument, we were to concede that Ivan would perish, we would still say: God, as we have shown,⁷⁶ assigns external places wisely and lovingly. He does not assign anyone to a poorer place who will perish there if the same one were not going to perish even in a better place. Therefore, by no means does the objection prove that the order chosen determines reprobation in this case. Rather, God Himself makes that decision, and assigns places according to His most wise, most merciful, and most just judgment.

III. The Congregations *De Auxiliis*

272. Because sharp disputes arose between the followers of Bañez and the followers of Molina, the disputants were summoned to the Holy See. At first, the Pope did not preside personally, but sent a Cardinal Legate; but later, beginning on March 20, 1602, Clement VIII began to preside in person. He died in 1605, before the debates were finished. The debates continued under Leo XI, and were finally closed by Paul V who, through a Decree of the Holy Office of Dec. 1, 1611 prohibited the publication of books on the subject, even when written on pretext of commenting on St. Thomas, unless they had first been submitted to the Inquisition.⁷⁷

Later, Clement XII, by a decree of Oct. 2, 1733, forbade all theologians⁷⁸ "to brand with any theological note or censure the schools that hold a different opinion . . . until this Holy See judges some definition or pronouncement should be made."

Conclusions on the Congregations *De Auxiliis*:

1) The Church herself, even after literally years of debates before the Pope himself, approved neither Thomism nor Molinism.

2) From the fact that the Church condemned neither opinion and from the fact that it forbade calling either opinion heretical, no dogmatic conclusion can be drawn on the orthodoxy of the views of Bañez and Molina. One cannot conclude that neither view is actually heretical, since the decree was disciplinary, not dogmatic. In the debates on the Immaculate Conception, something similar happened: Sixtus IV, by the Constitution, *Grave nimis*,⁷⁹ also prohibited calling either opinion heretical. Yet today we know that one of the two views really was heretical, even though it was not *formally* so at that time.

3) As the note in Denzinger informs us, the prohibition against publishing books on this matter has been removed by contrary custom. The prohibition against theological notes is still somewhat observed, although authors do not hesitate to say things that amount to theological notes; such as saying the opposite view contradicts a certain passage in Scripture, and similar statements. But, strictly speaking, all these prohibitions have been clearly abolished by the Code of Canon Law. For we read in Canon 6.6: "If any of the other disciplinary laws, which up to now have been in force, is contained neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Code, it is to be said to have lost all force . . ." Nonetheless, charity, the supreme law of the Gospel, should still apply even in this matter.

END NOTES

1 §§ 6-7.

2 § 55.1.

3 Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae, Romae, 1584. In I 16.7. col. 363.

4 §§ 51, 118-120 130-132.

5 Cf. §§ 222, 129.

6 "Epitome de praedestinatione," in: F. Stegmüller, Geschichte des Molinismus. Erster Band: Neue Molinaschriften (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, XXXII, Münster, 1935, p. 350).

7 *Ibid.*, p. 351.

8 B. Beraza, S.I., Tractatus de gratia Christi, Bilbao, 1929 p. 566. n. 13. Beraza is a Congruist. However, the Congruists profess to follow Molina on the major points, and certainly, Beraza seems to have correctly interpreted Molina on this point (*italics his*).

9 Cited by Beraza, *op. cit.*, p. 595 (emphasis mine).

10 Gratia Christi, Beauchesne, Paris, 1948, pp. 305-306.

11 §§ 253-257.

12 *Op. cit.*, p. 592, § 635 (emphasis mine).

13 De Deo uno, Universitas Gregoriana, Romae, 1948, 4a ed., pp 324-25.

14 Cf. §§ 6.4, 131-32, 309-22.

15 Cf. § 254 ff.

16 Cf. § 269.

17 Cf. § 48.

18 Rom 8.32.

19 Cf. §§ 55.2, 153.2.

20 Cf. §§ 41-48, especially the discussion on the covenant.

21 Rom 8. 32.

22 Cf. § 202.

23 Cf. §§ 153.2, 126-27, 229, 264.4.
24 Cf. chapter 10.
25 §§ 251-52
26 Cf. §250.
27 S. Gonzalez, SJ, "De gratia" in: *Sacrae Theologiae Summa*, B.A.C., Matriti, 1953, III. § 326.10.c. (emphasis mine).
28 *Op. cit.*, p. 592. § 625 (emphasis his).
29 I. Dalmau, S. I., "De Deo uno et trino" in: *Sacrae Theologiae Summa*, B.A.C., Matriti, 1952. I. § 254.
30 Cf. note 8 above.
31 §§ 261-265.
32 §§ 118-120.
33 Cf. § 120.
34 Cf. §§ 118-20, 126-27.
35 Cf. § 258.
36 § 253.b.
37 Rom 8:32.
38 Jn 15:13.
39 Cf. §§ 541-542.
40 §§ 539-540.
41 § 263.
42 Cf. § 253.b.
43 1 Cor 10:13.
44 Cf. note 12 in chapter 5 and the discussion of the covenant in chapter 4.
45 Cf. § 123.
46 Cf. § 263.
47 Cf. chapters 14 and 17.
48 Cf. § 253.b.
49 §§ 153.2, 253.b.
50 Cf. § 202.
51 § 153.2.
52 Cf. §§ 126-127, 153.2.
53 § 264.2.
54 §§ 539-540.
55 §§ 153.2, 292-293.
56 Ez 33.11.
57 2 Pt 3:9.
58 Wis 4:10-11.
59 Cf. § 56.
60 Cf. § 202.
61 § 153.2.b.
62 § 153.2, 253, b.
63 We note that there is a special danger for the man who sins after receiving many and great graces. For such a man can more easily and more quickly become hardened since his sin is greater after such graces, and since he who sins in spite of having seen with such clarity all the reasons for loving God and living well will not easily find greater and clearer motives to move him to repent: The motives that suffice to convert others have already spent their force on him, in vain.
64 § 263.
65 Cf. the words of Dalmau, cited above in § 257.
66 Cf. § 187.
67 Cf. § 252.
68 Cf. chapter 17.
69 Mt 11:21, 23.
70 1 Pt 3:19-20.

71 Cf. chapter 4.

72 Cf. §§ 14-15, 123-125.

73 Cf. §§ 118-120, 217-20.

74 § 253.b.

75 §§ 535a-542.

76 §§ 263-264, 541-542.

77 DB 1091. n. 1.

78 DB 1097. n. 2.

79 Sept. 4, 1483. Cf. A. Robichaud, S.M., "The Immaculate Conception in the Magisterium of the Church before 1854" in: *Marian Studies V*, Washington, 1954, p. 101.

"Pt. 2: Predestination and reprobation - Ch. 16: The teaching of St. Francis de Sales"

273. The special importance of the teaching of St. Francis de Sales: The thought of this Doctor of the Church is of special importance since the Pope himself followed the advice of St. Francis in putting an end to the debates *De Auxiliis*. Pope Pius IX reports it as follows:¹ ". . . our Predecessor of holy memory, Paul V, when the famous debate *De Auxiliis* was being held at Rome decided to ask the opinion of this Bishop on the matter and, following his advice, judged that this most subtle question, full of danger, and agitated long and keenly, should be laid to rest, and that silence should be imposed on the parties." The special importance of his teaching is even clearer from the words of Pius XI:² "But taking the opportunity, he lucidly explained the most difficult questions, such as efficacious grace, predestination, and the call to the faith."

274. Was St. Francis a Molinist? The Molinists, without objection from the other theologians, usually claim St. Francis, especially since he wrote as follows to Lessius, an important Molinist (who held predefinition of salutary acts *in actu secundo*, but was forced to change by the decree of Aquaviva, of which we spoke in chapter 15):³ ". . . I came upon [your] Treatise on Predestination in the library of the College of Lyons, and although I happened only to glance over it here and there, I learned that Your Paternity embraces and defends that view on predestination to glory after prevision of works, a view very noble by its antiquity, sweetness, and the native authority of the Scriptures. This certainly was very pleasing to me, for I have always considered it more in accord with the mercy and grace of God, truer, and more lovable, as I also indicated already in my little book 'On the Love of God.'"

Now these words do not prove that St. Francis was certainly a Molinist. For not all who hold predestination after prevision of works are Molinists. As we shall see presently, St. Francis disagreed with the Molinists on points of major importance. Nor it is entirely clear that he held predestination after prevision of merits. For he did not say simply that this view was true, but truer, that is, truer than the opposite view

(that of the older Thomists). We know that he actually recommended to the Pope to approve neither Molinism nor Thomism. It is true, he could have given this advice merely because he thought it more opportune not to approve Molinism then, but at least, it cannot be proved that he held even predestination after prevision of merits, although he seems to be inclined towards it.

275. The teaching of St. Francis himself: We shall read his views from three passages of his *Treatise on the Love of God*, and then, collect the principal points.

1) *Treatise 3.5*: St. Francis is speaking about the gift of final perseverance:⁴ "First he willed, with a genuine will that even after the sin of Adam all should be saved, but in a way and with means suited to the condition of our nature; that is, He willed the salvation of all who would give consent to the graces and favours which He would prepare, offer, and distribute for this purpose. Now among those favours, He willed that the call be first, and that it be so tempered to our freedom that we at our good pleasure could accept or reject it. And to those whom He foresaw would accept, He willed to give the sacred movements of repentance; and to those who would follow those movements, He decreed to give holy love; and to those who would have love He planned to give the means needed to persevere; and to those who would use these divine helps, He decreed to give final perseverance and the glorious happiness of His eternal love. . . . Without doubt, God prepared heaven only for those whom He foresaw would be His . . . But *it is in our power to be His: for although the gift of being God's belongs to God, yet this is a gift which God denies to no one, but offers to all, and gives to those who freely consent to receive it.*"

2) *Treatise 4.6*: In this chapter St. Francis is concerned principally with explaining that we owe it to God that we are able to love God:⁵ "So tell me, miserable man, what you have done, in all these things, of which you could boast? You have consented, I know it well: the movement of your will freely followed the movement of heavenly grace. But all that-what else is it but to receive the divine working and *not to resist*? And what do you have in this that you have not received? Yes, even, poor man, *you have even received the acceptance of which you boast, and the consent, which you brag about . . . Is it not the part of most insane impiety to think that you gave effective and holy activity to the divine inspiration because you did not take it away by resisting? We can hinder the efficacy of inspiration, but we cannot give efficacy to it. . . .*"

3) *Treatise 4.5*: In this chapter St. Francis vigorously insists that the sole cause of the lack of love is in us:⁶ "Just as it would be the part of impious boldness to attribute to the powers of our will the works of holy love that the Holy Spirit does in us and with us, so also it would be the part of impious boldness to wish to attribute the lack of love in an ungrateful man to the lack of heavenly help and grace. For the Holy

Spirit cries out everywhere, on the contrary, that our destruction comes from us . . . that divine Goodness wills that no one perish, but wills that all come to the knowledge of the truth: He wills that all men be saved. . . ."

276. *Synthesis of the teaching of St. Francis:* St. Francis insists that God wills the salvation of all "with a genuine will"(3.5). He does this "even after the sin of Adam." Therefore, there is no reprobation on account of original sin. Nor is there desertion before consideration of demerits, for "it would be the part of impious boldness to wish to attribute the lack of love in an ungrateful man to the lack of heavenly help and grace," (4.5) because even though "the gift of being God's belongs to God, yet it is a gift which God denies to no one, but offers to all, and gives to those who freely consent to receive it" (3.5). But so that we may not misunderstand these words about the consent, St. Francis adds that the very consent or acceptance of grace is the effect of grace: "you have even received the acceptance . . . and the consent" (4.6). Hence: "Is it not the part of most insane impiety to think that you gave effective and holy activity to the divine inspiration because you did not take it away by resisting? We can hinder the efficacy of the inspiration, but we cannot give efficacy to it."

It is obvious that St. Francis is describing the process of the granting of grace in precisely the same way as St. Thomas did in CG. 3.159; so he can hardly be called a Molinist. With St. Thomas, he rejects reprobation before consideration of demerits, as we have seen. What does he hold about the place in which the decree of predestination is made? Considering only the description he gives, we could come to the same conclusion as we reached about CG. 3.159-61, namely, that in his teaching, predestination could be put either after absence of resistance but before consideration of merits or after consideration of merits. However, St. Francis differs from St. Thomas in that elsewhere he shows an inclination towards placing predestination after consideration of merits, while, on the contrary, St. Thomas is probably inclined to put it before prevision of merits.

277. *Conclusions on St. Francis de Sales:*

1) His teaching about the process of conferring grace is just the same as that of St. Thomas in CG. 3.159.

2) St. Francis certainly rejects reprobation before consideration of demerits. He seems to incline to put predestination after prevision of merits, but he does not unequivocally affirm this.

3) St. Francis does not really teach Molinism, even though he said it is truer than the theory of the Thomists, for:

a) He says nothing at all about reprobation and predestination through choice of orders. Nor does he explicitly restrict his meaning to predestination to glory considered separately: on the contrary, the description he gives in *Treatise* 3.5 excludes such a

restriction since he gives the principles for the *whole* process from beginning to end.

b) He does not make foreknowledge of futuribles⁷ a necessary element in his system, as do the Molinists. He says nothing about futuribles.

c) The critical element in the process of granting of grace in the system of St. Francis is the absence of resistance (cf. 4.6), not positive consent.

4) However, St. Francis was not able to avoid all obscurity: he himself did not make a synthesis of all the elements as we have done. Nor did he take a clear stand on the precise place of predestination, before or after consideration of merits. Perhaps he saw the difficulties on both sides. Especially, it is likely that he thought predestination before consideration of merits was inseparable from reprobation before consideration of demerits-and he certainly and strongly rejected the latter.

But St. Francis is by no means to be blamed for such obscurities: for Divine Providence wisely ordained that revelation should be progressively clarified over the centuries. St. Francis, in spite of these obscurities, truly deserved the singular praise and recognition he received from the Holy See.

278. Objection: Does not St. Francis, in Treatise 4.7, cite many words from St. Augustine, saying that we do not know the reasons why God saves this man and not that man?

Answer: We must note the purpose of the chapter, as the title itself indicates. In that chapter, St. Francis wants to teach us "That we must avoid all curiosity and humbly acquiesce in God's most wise Providence." Hence, he confesses he does not know why God worked miracles in Chorazin and Bethsaida which He did not do in Tyre and Sidon. We too do not know why-but it is not required that we know, for these miracles belong to *extraordinary* providence.⁸ But St. Francis does not say he is ignorant of everything, nor is he to be presumed to be retracting everything he had said above, in the passages we have cited. Actually, what he seems to say he does not know is this: Precisely how great and of what sort are the reasons that are required for salvation? It is clear that St. Francis is doing this, from the words he quotes from St. Bonaventure, whose modesty and humility in investigating these reasons he says he admires:⁹ "But I neither know clearly nor wish to inquire what are those good deeds, whose prevision serves as a motive for God's will. There is no reason except some kind of fittingness." So in this way St. Francis urges us on to humility, without retracting the teaching he had previously given.

We can, however, admit the presence of some obscurity in chapter 7, especially in that he cites the Epistle to the Romans, and does not seem to know the true interpretation of the difficult passages in it. However, the same obscurity, in greater measure, was found in St.

Thomas too, as we have seen. But St. Francis in no place teaches reprobation before prevision of demerits.

In St. Francis then, we can see a further stage in the gradual progress of the clarification of revelation.

END NOTES

1 Dives in misericordia Deus, AAS 10, 411-12.

2 Rerum omnium perturbationem. AAS 15.56.

3 Aug. 26, 1618. Oeuvres, Tome 18, Visitation, Annecy, 1912, pp. 272-73.

4 Treatise on the Love of God 3.5.

5 Ibid., 4.6.

6 Ibid., 4.5.

7 Cf. § 396.

8 Cf. § 267.

9 Treatise 4.7.

"Pt. 2: Predestination and reprobation - Ch. 17: Solution of the problem from the sources of revelation"

I. Preliminary sketch of recent opinions

279. The removal of obstacles: For many centuries the true solution, which is found implicitly in the sources of revelation, was obscured by the presence of erroneous interpretations of Romans 8-9¹ which seemed to explicitly contradict the true solution; but today, thanks to the merciful design of Divine Providence, these misinterpretations have been removed and most helpful declarations of the Magisterium on implicit texts have been given. Hence, we are in a position to see clearly what was once obscured.

Some excellent theologians have prepared the way. We shall sketch the thought of only the principal ones.

First of all, in some related matters, the doctrine of theologians has shifted. For the older Thomists, especially Bañez, Alvarez, Gonet, John of St. Thomas, and others, had taught that God offers sufficient grace for conversion only inasmuch as He provides *general* means, sufficient in themselves; but they said that God does not *immediately* provide sufficient grace to all men. Substantially the same notion could be found in even some theologians of the opposing camp. Thus, Suarez wrote:² ". . . on God's part, sufficient helps are prepared for all. But that which happens in many cases, that such remedies, or the preaching of the faith does not reach them, is accidental, not caused by God, but foreseen and permitted. The permission is not unjust, for God does not owe the greater helps to anyone. In fact, as St. Augustine often says, since men were in original sin, this can be considered a just punishment in those who suffer it, even though by the mercy of God it was forgiven for others."

Today, on the contrary, we read these words of E. Hugon, OP:³ "To all infidels, even negative infidels, graces that are proximately or

remotely sufficient for the time and place are *given*. Although many theologians once contradicted, this conclusion is today almost general."

280. F. Marín-Sola, OP, and F. Muñiz, OP: Many prominent Thomists today have denied some of the essential elements of the older Thomistic view. Outstanding among these are Marín-Sola and Muñiz. In regard to negative reprobation before consideration of demerits, Muñiz writes:⁴ "That negative reprobation before prevision of sins seems to us to be, from every point of view, incompatible with the universal salvific will of God. It is true that glory is an entirely gratuitous benefit, which God can grant to whom He wills and refuse to whom He wills, but it is no less true, that God most freely and liberally, has decided to grant that benefit of glory to all men, without exception. If anyone remains without obtaining it, that is not by fault of God, but by his own fault. How, then, could it be maintained that God—even before man has placed resistance to grace by sin—should not elect that one to glory, or should seek to exclude him from heaven?"

In regard to predestination, Marín-Sola explains his opinion in three propositions (out of ten propositions on the Thomistic system on divine movement).⁵ Proposition 4: "Predestination, not only to grace but also to glory, is completely gratuitous, and has as its cause, motive, or foundation or condition no merit or anything else on man's part: it has no more reason for being than the pure *will of God*. But *merits* are one thing, and a very different thing are *demerits or sins*. Without going at all counter to Thomistic principles, it can be maintained that both predestination and reprobation *suppose* the prevision of *sins*." Proposition 5: "The question whether predestination to glory is *completely gratuitous*—a question which every Thomist must answer affirmatively—is essentially distinct from the question of whether it is *before or after* predestination to grace or to merits. As long as one affirms that merits come not from a versatile grace or indifferent concursus, but from a grace that is intrinsically efficacious, it is a matter of *small importance* whether one says predestination to glory is *before or after* [prevision of] merits." Proposition 6: "Both the imperfect acts which precede justification, and which some call merits *de congruo*, and the salutary acts after justification, which are merits *de condigno*, can be considered under two aspects: (a) *in themselves*, abstracting from whether they are persevering to the end or not; (b) *inasmuch as they are persevering* to the end. . . . Now then: when the Thomists assert that predestination to glory precedes prevision of *merits*, it is sufficient to understand merits in the second sense, that is, merits inasmuch as they are persevering to the end. . . ." That is, it can be held that the decree of predestination is made before merits inasmuch as they are persevering, but after merits, abstracting from perseverance. A decree of predestination made thus is gratuitous, because the gift of perseverance is gratuitous, and because the merits

are made through a grace that is intrinsically efficacious. Hence, because⁶ "grace, which is the root and font of merit, is a gratuitous gift of God, whatever good we do by grace is the fruit and effect of that same grace and is, thereby, gratuitous. If God predestines to glory through merits made with and through His grace, He does nothing other than predestine through merits which He Himself has mercifully and generously placed in us." So, a predestination made in this way is "after prevision of merits, but not out of prevision of merits; it is after prevision of merits, but out of the mercy and goodness of God." A grace that is frustrable, but intrinsically efficacious suffices for merits considered in themselves, but for persevering merits, an infrustrable grace is needed. Perseverance is given,⁷ "to him who with sufficient grace . . . does that little or much that he can do with it . . ."⁸

We note that Marín-Sola and Muñiz do not say flatly that predestination is decreed after prevision of merits, but rather, that it *can* be held within Thomism that it is so decreed. Marín-Sola himself explains the reason for speaking in this way:⁹ "To forestall an infinity of more or less subtle objections; and also to shorten the distance between Thomism and the middle systems, and principally because Thomists of the first rank have already pointed to it, we added that the above propositions [5-8]¹⁰ can be defended within Thomism." On the page immediately before, he had said that the propositions in question, "which probably are the ones that will be the more offensive to many Thomists, could have been omitted, since we do not consider them *absolutely* necessary for the purpose intended, that is, to clarify, simplify, and harmonize the Thomistic concepts on this subject, making all or the principal difficulties of the adversaries vanish, especially those in regard to liberty, sin, and reprobation."

281. It is regrettable that Marín-Sola did not speak more clearly. For he says in proposition 4 that "predestination . . . is completely gratuitous, and has as its cause, motive or foundation or condition no merit or anything else on man's part. . . ." He seems in these words to assert categorically that predestination comes before prevision of merits and excludes any kind of conditioning. Yet he adds in proposition 6 that, "When the Thomists assert that predestination to glory precedes prevision of merits, it is sufficient to understand merits . . . inasmuch as they are persevering to the end," so that predestination seems able to be put before merits inasmuch as they are persevering, but after merits "abstracting from whether they are persevering to the end or not."

Now it is difficult to see how proposition 6 even *could* be defended if proposition 4 is true. For if it can be flatly asserted that predestination is entirely without any condition (proposition 4) then predestination cannot *also* be after merits in any sense whatsoever. For even though he says (proposition 5) that "it is a matter of small importance" whether predestination be placed before or after merits, yet there is a

real difference: the two are formally different. Marín-Sola says it does not make much difference because merits infallibly follow in virtue of an intrinsically efficacious grace if man does not resist. But it still remains true: Predestination can be after prevision of merits only if merits are a *condition*, for words "before" and "after" can be used in reference to divine decrees only in the sense of a logical sequence. In a logical sequence, one thing comes before and another after only if the one thing is a cause or a condition of the other thing. Therefore, if merits are a condition, then predestination *is* after prevision of merits. But if they are not a condition (as proposition 4 says) then predestination *is not* after prevision of merits. Only one of the two propositions (4 or 6) can be true: both cannot be true. So, if predestination really is before prevision of merits, then it is not at all permissible to have recourse to a theory of predestination after prevision of merits in order "to clarify, simplify and harmonize the Thomistic concepts on this subject, making all or the principal difficulties of the adversaries vanish."

We can only conclude that Marín-Sola speaks thus because he is uncertain of the precise place of predestination. For if he were certain that it comes before merits, then there would be no reason to defend predestination after merits: it would not be permissible to do so. And for sure, he would have preferred not to defend predestination after merits, since he knew it so greatly displeased so many Thomists, so that as a result he felt it necessary to explain with great care in what way his view differed from Molinism. If he could have flatly asserted, and with certitude, that predestination comes before merits, he could have much more easily defended himself against charges of Molinism. The same incertitude appears also in some of the expressions employed by Marín-Sola and Muñiz when they make outlines of their views on predestination. Thus, in an outline made by Marín-Sola, we read that, in the first logical moment, God wills that all men be saved, and that He wills to give sufficient graces. In the second moment, He sees with the knowledge of vision,¹¹ "in those decrees . . . the actual defects or impediments placed or not placed by each man to those graces. In our fallen nature we can actually omit placing an impediment to those graces in the short and easy stretches; but we all will actually place them, without a special grace, in the long and difficult stretch which extends from the call to justification, and more, from it to death." Hence, in the third moment, there is a special providence "predestining *most freely* to glory whomsoever God wishes, and giving, as a result, for that purpose, grace that is efficacious and persevering to the end; and reprobating, similarly, whomsoever God wills, in merely *not giving* (in negative reprobation) the special and persevering grace. . . . Both the will to save and the will to reprobate are completely gratuitous or most free, so that His liberty has no other limit than that which God, *most freely* however, and out of *mere*

mercy, has imposed on Himself in promising us, through the merits of the passion of His Divine Son, to save or not to reprobate *everyone who, with His grace, does what he can and prays for what he cannot.*"¹² Now this description does not indicate precisely whether predestination is decreed before or after prevision of merits. It simply says that God predestines "everyone who, with His grace, does what he can and prays for what he cannot."

1) This description could stand for predestination *before* prevision of merits. For in saying that everyone is predestined who with grace "does what he can," Marín-Sola seems to mean essentially: he who does not place impediments is predestined. For near the end of the same article he writes:¹³ "God . . . never denies that infallibly efficacious and persevering grace to him who with sufficient grace does that *something* which he is able to do and does that praying that he is able to do; that is, he *does not place those impediments which he is actually able not to place.* . . ." But this description of the process of conferring grace is substantially the same as that of St. Thomas, which we saw in chapter 14 (except that Marín-Sola says that the grace of perseverance must be an *infrustrable* grace—a thing that St. Thomas does not say, and which does not agree with revelation,¹⁴ according to which the *internal* grace of perseverance is not infrustrable, even though the total effect is certain since, if it be needed, God will add a special providence governing the time of death so that death may not catch the predestined one in the state of sin). Being virtually the same as the description of St. Thomas, it could accord with predestination before prevision of merits—though, as we saw in chapter 14,¹⁵ it could also go with predestination after prevision of merits.

2) The possibility that the description implies predestination *after* prevision of merits is heightened by the fact that when a man "with . . . grace, does what he can," he actually gains merit. If predestination were decreed after only *one* grace, then it would be easy to say that the mere absence of an impediment would be the condition for predestination. But, as we explained above,¹⁶ when one realizes that predestination is not decreed after the outcome of *one* grace, but after the *whole series*, in which the grant of at least some later graces depends on the outcome of earlier graces, then it is difficult to see how God could do other than foresee merits before predestining, since in the series, merits will actually be present after at least one grace to which no impediment was placed. As we shall see below,¹⁷ this difficulty can be solved. But if one employs a *speculative* procedure (as Marín-Sola does) it is possible to show at most only that predestination could be before prevision of merits. It is only by the revealed analogy of the Father that it can be shown that predestination *certainly is* before prevision of merits. Marín-Sola probably felt this difficulty. If he knew even the speculative part of the solution, he at least gave no indication thereof. And certainly, he did not employ the

Father analogy which is, as we said, the only means of certainly proving that predestination is before and not after prevision of merits. Since then Marín-Sola was not certain, he quite properly wrote as he did. Further, if he had thought his description of the process of the grant of grace really *excluded* predestination after prevision of merits, then he would not and could not have defended predestination after prevision of merits as even a probable opinion.

Muñiz too, who followed Marín-Sola, speaks with similar indecision when he gives his schema of predestination.¹⁸

We must conclude, then, that Marín-Sola and Muñiz certainly hold reprobation after prevision of demerits, but they at least seem to be uncertain whether predestination comes before or after prevision of merits. They did very well in rejecting reprobation before prevision of merits. They are to be praised for so faithfully following St. Thomas in the description of the process of conferring grace. However, they should not have made perseverance an infrustrable grace in regard to its internal element.¹⁹ It would have been better if they had begun with revelation, instead of working almost exclusively by speculation, for then they might have found that predestination is certainly before prevision of merits and, at the same time, they could have found the means of easily solving all objections without the need of recourse to predestination after prevision of merits. They could not exclude this latter because they had correctly solved all speculative objections against it, but yet had not found the revealed solution which is the only means of excluding predestination after prevision of merits, as we shall see below.²⁰

We wish that in his schema Marín-Sola had not said that God "similarly" reprobates "whomsoever [He] wills" after saying that God predestines "most freely . . . whomsoever [He] wishes." In themselves these words at least *seem* to accord poorly with the salvific will. Marín-Sola actually does not deny the salvific will. It would have been better therefore to avoid such potentially misleading expressions. Actually, although Marín-Sola and Muñiz saw that the salvific will is sincere and universal, they did not come to see its true vehemence, which can be known only by revelation.²¹

282. Philippe de la Trinité, OCD: One of the most outstanding theologians of our day, Father Philippe de la Trinité, arrived at the principal conclusions of the true solution. We can present his thought more briefly, since he expressed it clearly, without obscurity. In the article "Notre liberté devant Dieu," he wrote:²² ". . . our merits are absolutely incapable of being the first cause of our predestination. . . . on the other hand, the demerits incurred in refusing graces are really the first *cause* of damnation. . . ." He does not fully explain the way these truths harmonize, but says:²³ "Let us hold both ends of the chain. The mystery remains. . . ." In regard to the efficacy of grace and human conditioning he says:²⁴ "There are not two graces

specifically distinct from one another, efficacious and sufficient graces. Grace is not *a priori* efficacious or sufficient independently of my resistance, but it is made efficacious or not in view of my resistance. . . ." However: "I by no means make grace efficacious, although I can make it ineffective. . . ." "Grace is intrinsically efficacious since it draws its efficacy solely from the divine omnipotence and *not* from the consent of our will which is totally the fruit of grace. . . ." And: "Inasmuch as *not to consent is to resist*, it is solely from me; inasmuch as *not to resist is to consent*, it is first of all from God, for it is entirely a gift of God."²⁵

283. Dom Mark Pontifex, OSB: This excellent theologian, in a recent book, *Freedom and Providence*, teaches, on the basis of metaphysical analysis, that everything positive in our actions is due to God, but that negatives or deficiencies have their first origin in us.²⁶

Charles Cardinal Journet: The true solution is also implied by one of our most brilliant theologians in his treatment of the divine call.²⁷

II. Solution from the revealed Father analogy

284. The analogy itself: The principal way in which Christ revealed to us the nature of God was in the name which He uses on almost every page of the Gospels: God is our Father.

The way was prepared for this revelation in the Old Testament. For, as we saw in chapter 4, through the old covenant of Sinai, God, out of the most intense love, willed to bind Himself to do good to His people, so that there existed between Him and them the relation expressed by the Hebrew word *hesed*. That is, God bound Himself to act as the next of kin, as a blood relative of the people of Israel. He willed also to be called the *redeemer* of the people whom He delivered from the slavery of Egypt and acquired as a people for Himself. "Redeemer" in Hebrew is *go'el*. Now the principal and usual meaning of this word is:²⁸ ". . . that next of kin to whom the Mosaic law gave the right or enjoined the duty of redeeming his kinsmen and protecting them in all their rights." He acted this way out of the love of a Father, as He said through Hosea:²⁹ "When Israel was a child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son," so that Isaiah lyrically exclaims:³⁰ "For thou art our Father, though Abraham does not know us and Israel does not acknowledge us; thou, O Lord, art our Father."

But under the new covenant,³¹ in which the true *go'el*, Christ, liberated us from the slavery of sin and acquired us as a people, God not only acts *as though* He were the next of kin, but, in the literal sense he becomes, by an added title, our Father, since the Son of this Father is our blood brother.

We have then, from direct revelation, an analogy from which we can learn much about God. It is to be regretted that so many theologians say little about this analogy-perhaps out of fear that someone might want to say: If God is our Father, surely he will damn no one. But that, of course, would be obviously false. However actually, if the analogy is

rightly understood, it not only does not lead to such an error, but instead, the very existence of an eternal hell can be proved from it, as we shall soon see. We need then to investigate the chief truths contained in this analogy.

285. In the ordinary human family, with which a comparison is made, the father loves and cares for all the children. He wants all to turn out well. But why does the father love and care for the children? It was not required that they do something so that he would begin to love them: He began to love them before the children could do anything. Nor is it required that the children do something, e.g., various chores around their home,³² so that the father may *continue* to love and care for them. For the love of the father continues by its own force, out of his goodness. Something grave would be required to *interrupt* his love (or its effects) but nothing is required from the children in order that it may continue in its course. However, even though the children neither can nor must merit that the love of the father should begin, nor need they do anything so that his love may continue (for it continues by its own force), still, they can merit to be deprived of this love and care. For they can really merit punishment if they are bad. And, if they are gravely and persistently bad, they can even merit that the father should, though sadly, disinherit them.

Similarly God, our Father, loves and cares for all His children. He wants all to turn out well, i.e., to be saved. But why does He love them? It was not required that we do anything so that He might *begin* to love us—He began to love us before we existed; or rather, if He had not done this, we would not have existed at all. Nor is it required that we do something so that He may *continue*³³ to love us, precisely because His love moves by its own power, out of His spontaneous unmerited goodness. However, we can merit punishment. And, if we are gravely and persistently bad,³⁴ we can merit to be cast out of the house of our Father forever. This disinheritance is the pain of loss, which is the principal pain of hell.

So, those who are gravely and persistently bad, will be expelled from the house of their Father, that is, they are *reprobated after and because of their demerits*. But all others—God continues loving and caring for them, and giving all that is needed for salvation, including predestination itself, not because these children are good, nor because they have merited it, but simply because the Father from the outset, of his own spontaneous unmerited goodness, wanted to do this. For He wanted from the outset to save all and so He also willed to predestine them. He who wills the end, wills the means. But there is no salvation without predestination. Therefore, in willing to save all, He also willed to predestine all. It is not required that the children place any condition in order that God may predestine them, because the will of the Father was from the outset freely so disposed that He wanted to give everything needed for salvation, including predestination. Since this

love and will of the Father moves by its own force, by force of His own goodness, nothing is required from man in order that it may continue, even though something serious would be required from man to interrupt³⁵ this will so that it would not continue but would instead reprobate and cast them out of the number of His children.

286. Predestination is before, not after, prevision of merits: It is clear from this revealed Father analogy that predestination is neither because of nor after consideration of merits. Predestination would be *because of* merits, if merits were required to *move* the Father: but nothing is required to move Him; in fact, nothing could move Him. Predestination would be *after*, though not because of, prevision of merits if merits were a *condition* which the Father would freely will to consider, and predestine after finding it. But, as we have seen, nothing at all is required from man, i.e., it is not required that a man place any condition so that the love and care of the Father may begin and may continue, and may, in its course, predestine. The reason is that His love and care start and continue out of His own goodness. As we saw, a grave condition would be required to interrupt His love (or, more exactly, the effects of His love); but *precisely because His love is spontaneous, self-moving, nothing is required from man that it may continue.*

287. But we must still raise a question: Even though, *by the nature of His love*, it is not required that His children place any condition so that the love and care of the Father may continue, still, it is possible that the Father for some reason, e.g., out of love of good order, might want to add something, as it were by positive decree, that is, to decree that merits must be the formal condition. (We could not, of course, suppose that He would be so disposed as to refuse predestination to a son who did not resist, but still did not have merits-if these two things were separable. Certainly, the vehement force of His self-moving love would not leave room for that. Our question is solely about the possibility of adding a formal condition out of a positive decision of God).

The answer is that such a possibility is excluded by the revealed Father analogy.

1) A good human father, who has strong love, at least actually does not make any work or merit on the part of his children a formal requirement for his love and care, as long as they are little. Actually, for such a father, it is enough if the children do not place a negative condition that calls for punishment. Now, God, our Father, is the best of all Fathers, and has most vehement love (measured by the passion and the infinite objective titles for each individual), and we are always small children in His sight, for no matter how old we are we depend much more on Him than do small children in a human family: we can do nothing, even in the natural order, without the constant support of the power of our Father. Therefore, since God has revealed that He

acts like a good Father to us, He has implicitly revealed that He does not add any such positive condition.

2) Furthermore, a human father simply would not be permitted to omit loving and caring for his small children precisely and formally because of the absence of a positive condition which he would demand from his child. The obligation of the father is imposed by the very nature of things from the very fact that he is a father. This obligation binds the father even though no positive condition is placed by the child. Only a gravely bad condition placed by the child will liberate the father from his obligation. It is true, a human father can order his children to do things to help in the home, and the children can merit punishment by disobedience. However, if a punishment is given, it is given formally because of disobedience, not formally because of a lack of a positive condition, i.e., the penalty of disinheritance and expulsion (if things reach such an extreme) is warranted precisely because of the evil condition of disobedience-not by the lack of a positive condition of earning the love and care of the father. Therefore God, from the fact that He acts as a Father to us, has implicitly revealed that He too acts in the way in which human fathers not only actually act but are bound to act. (If God wishes merits to be present for the sake of good order, this is sufficiently provided for in the order of execution, as we shall see below).³⁶

Therefore it is revealed in the Father analogy that predestination is not after but before prevision of merits.

288. If we were following strictly speculative procedure, instead of working by exegesis of revelation, we would find it necessary at this point to explain how God can so arrange things that predestination will not be after prevision of merits. Three difficulties would present themselves:

1) It could seem that to omit resistance to grace is the same as not to sin. But a decision not to sin is a meritorious act.

2) It could seem impossible to put predestination before prevision of merits if reprobation is put after prevision of demerits, since he who is not reprobated is predestined, and vice versa.

3) The problem of the placing of predestination after a *series* of graces, of which we have already spoken³⁷ would present itself.

We said these problems would have to be solved if we were following a speculative procedure, since in such a procedure, it is not possible to see *the fact* that a process takes place unless one is simultaneously able to see *how* it can take place. But when we proceed by the exegesis of revelation the situation is different: there we can and do learn from revelation *the fact* that many things are true, without being also told *how* they can be true. Hence, the explanations of the above mentioned problems are part of the essence of the solution, if one works speculatively. But if one proceeds by exegesis of revelation, they are only objections to be solved, not parts of the essence of the

solution. Now an objection against a revealed truth cannot shake that truth, even if the objection remains unanswered. Otherwise, a man who encounters an objection to his faith would be logically required to suspend his faith until he could find the answer.

So, by revelation we know *the fact* that God does not predestine after, but before, prevision of merits, even though we have not yet seen *the how*. For the revealed analogy shows, as we have seen, that merits are not a condition precisely because nothing at all is needed from man in order that the Father's love may start and may continue, since it started and continues by its own force, that is, by the spontaneous unmerited goodness of the Father. Something grave from man would be required to interrupt the effects of that love; nothing from him is needed that it may continue. The same analogy shows that God has not, as it were, by positive decree added merits as a condition.

Actually, we have already seen in chapter 7³⁸ the solution to the first of these problems, and shall see it more fully below in chapter 18.³⁹ We will see the answer to the second problem in the next section of this chapter. The third problem will be solved among the objections to this chapter.⁴⁰

289. Reconciliation of predestination before prevision of merits with reprobation after prevision of demerits: The way of reconciling these is clear from the Father analogy itself. We could present it in three logical moments:

1) Out of mere goodness and generosity, of His own accord, before any merit of creatures, the Father wills, most sincerely and vehemently, to love and care for all His children, and to give all that is needed for salvation, including predestination itself (without which there is no salvation): *the universal salvific will*.

2) He foresees certain ones gravely and persistently⁴¹ resisting grace. With regrets, He decrees to expel these from His inheritance: *reprobation after and because of grave and persistent resistance to grace*.

3) All others-He continues to love and care for them, and, in the execution and course of this love and care, He positively predestines as soon as He sees that *there is not* present a condition which would require their rejection. As we have said, it is not required that man place any condition in order that he be predestined for this decree is given out of the continuing love of God that moves by its own power and requires nothing else to stimulate it. A condition is required that God may reject; no condition is required in order that His love may continue: *predestination before prevision of merits*.

We could also, if we preferred, express the same things in a different way, namely:

1) The universal salvific will: as above.

2) In the continuation and execution of this love and care, the Father positively predestines all those whom He does not foresee as placing a

condition (grave and persistent resistance) which would require their rejection. It is not required that they place any condition at all in order to be predestined, since this is done out of the continuing love of the Father which moves by His spontaneous unmerited goodness and does not require any stimulus or condition.

3) Those whom He foresees resisting gravely and persistently, He decrees to reject and cast out of the number of His children.

The second arrangement is preferred by some since in it predestination is put in a logical moment before reprobation. But actually, even if reprobation be placed in the second moment, predestination is always the preferred thing and the primary thing, for it is a mere continuation and execution of the will that is present already in the first logical moment.

Others prefer the first arrangement, because it brings out better the fact that there is no condition that man must place in order to be predestined.

290. Predestination is gratuitous: This is obviously true in either arrangement, for even before God considers human merits, He predestines, and because the sole and total cause of predestination is the goodness and love of the Father which moves spontaneously without stimulus, merit, or condition. The absence of grave and persistent resistance in man is the mere absence of a cause that would call for reprobation: it is an *ontological zero*.⁴²

291. Conditions in predestination and reprobation: We have said that no condition needs to be placed by man in order that he may be predestined. For God reprobates all who resist grace gravely and persistently, but He predestines all others, not because they did something, but because He has always wanted to do so. In the predestined, at the logical moment in which election is made,⁴³ God does not see any condition that has been placed by them. He merely sees that they have not placed any bad condition: an ontological zero. He sees the absence of grave and persistent resistance. Now, as we have seen,⁴⁴ this absence of resistance is not a positive decision made by our will but the mere absence of an evil decision in the first logical moment after grace begins to move us. In that moment, the human will does not move itself. So in that moment, there is *nothing* in the human will that the man has placed there: only the effects of the motion of grace, which come from God alone, are present. So God sees the predestined man placing no condition, doing nothing. Therefore, as we have seen, the condition in man is *a nothing, an ontological zero*. It is only in the logical order, within the divine mind and will, that it would be possible to speak of a condition inasmuch as this proposition is formed by the divine mind itself:⁴⁵ "I see no resistance or decision made by this man." And in the divine will: "I have always wanted to predestine this man: I will do it unless I see in him grave and persistent resistance."

291a. From this we can draw a corollary for the spiritual life. We imagine for each person a ledger in which are written the values of his good acts. On the credit page I write the number for what I have contributed to my good acts. It is a metaphysical zero. So St. Paul writes to the Corinthians:⁴⁶ "What have you that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?" So my self-esteem goes to zero, seeing that I contribute only a zero. On the debit page I write the number for my sins. Seeing these, my self-esteem sinks belows zero. But on a secondary level, I know that I am wonderful-an adopted child of God, with a share in the divine nature. So I am simultaneously worse than worthless and marvelous.

292. Resistance must be grave and persistent, for reprobation:

It is quite obvious that resistance must be grave. For the salvific will would be very feeble if it were to reprobate for anything less. But we know it is most vehement.

It is obvious that it must be persistent at least in the sense that it must last to the end of the actual life of the man who is reprobated: If a man does not resist grace at the end, he will be saved. And, as we have seen, God said through the prophet Ezechiel, without qualification:⁴⁷ "As I live, says the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live."

But we need to investigate the matter more precisely. As we saw in chapter 4, Christ in His passion established infinite objective titles to grace and forgiveness for men. He established these titles for each individual man, as Pope Pius XII explained⁴⁸ ". . . and His voluntary holocaust is the supreme gift that He imparted to each individual man, according to the terse statement of the Apostles: 'He loved *me*, and gave *Himself up for me*.'" These titles are valid both for graces and for pardon since the work of Christ has an infinite value also in the category of satisfaction, and because the infusion of grace remits sins. Therefore, since God has established *infinite* titles for pardon and for grace for each individual, He has bound Himself to offer pardon without restriction to each individual. The fact that He established infinite titles for each man proves that His salvific will intends to *set no limits*⁴⁹ (within ordinary providence: for the extraordinary cannot become ordinary): limits are set only by men, in making themselves incurable.⁵⁰ So the restriction must be found on man's side⁵¹ in his *persistent* refusal of graces. This persistent refusal produces physical or moral incurability.⁵² (We have already answered the problem arising from the infinity of one mortal sin).⁵³

The conclusion that persistent resistance is needed is confirmed by the fact that the Father has given Mary to all of us as a Spiritual Mother and Dispensatrix of all graces. All graces are actually dispensed as it pleases the Heart of the best of Mothers.⁵⁴ Now, a special characteristic of maternal love is its *persistence*, even in the face of offences. This Heart of Mary is completely in accord with the Heart of her Son, and

with the Father. Therefore, in this way it is revealed that the love of God is also persistent in our regard. To overcome the effects of a persistent love, persistent resistance is needed.

Our conclusion is confirmed also in another way: If the Father were to reprobate for less than persistent resistance then the disciple would be above the Master. For the disciple is ordered to forgive seventy times seven times, i.e., always. It is for these reasons that the Church always teaches that God is ever ready to take back sinners, after howsoever great a number of howsoever great sins. Even in the Old Testament this attitude appeared in the words of God which we cited from Ezechiel, since God said, with no restriction as to number or magnitude of sins, that He wills not the death of the sinner, but his conversion.

We conclude that reprobation is decreed only after prevision of grave and persistent resistance.

293. It is to be noted that we said reprobation is decreed after *prevision* of grave and persistent resistance. For it is quite possible, even likely, that God sometimes sends death to a man after one, or a few, mortal sins that have actually been committed, if He foresees that the same man will resist gravely and persistently to the end of his life. To send an early death to such a man is an act of mercy, preventing the man from falling into a worse damnation. Certainly, justice is not violated because in itself, even one mortal sin deserves damnation. Nor does God violate in this way the obligation by which He bound Himself with the infinite titles of the redemption since He did not bind Himself to act not only in vain⁵⁵ (by offering so many opportunities to a man who certainly will not use them) but even to the harm of the recipient (for that man would abuse them to his greater damnation). Another reason for an earlier death in some cases might be to prevent the eternal ruin of others through the sins of the man who is given an earlier death.

Thus, as we have already shown,⁵⁶ the warning of Christ to watch is not made void by our position on the need of persistent resistance.

294. *Salvation through extraordinary means:* We must add, however: Even some of those who resist gravely and persistently are saved. We have already seen⁵⁷ that St. Thomas teaches that some are saved and converted even if they resist. This can be true even if they resist persistently, even if they become hardened. Now to convert a man in spite of his resistance by forestalling or cancelling out his resistance an extraordinary grace is required.⁵⁸ God can grant such graces, and certainly does grant them to some men, under conditions which He has freely set. Probably, at least in some cases, He works as follows: If other men will to fill up those things that are lacking to the sufferings of Christ for His Body (as St. Paul said and did), then there will be special objective titles for other men. Men who resist gravely and persistently lack even the minimum conformity to Christ which is needed to share in the claims He established, so as to be saved.⁵⁹ But

other men can compensate and supply for their deficiency. If they do, the Father with joy assigns these titles, through the communication within the Mystical Body, to men who are deficient in themselves. But we must notice an implication in this proposed system, namely, that the compensation will probably have to be truly great in order to provide an objective title for *extraordinary* graces-for such graces are needed to convert men in spite of their resistance. Hence it is clear how it happens that great saints can obtain the conversion of the most hardened sinners, while ordinary men, who do rather little, do not always obtain such conversions.⁶⁰

III. Solution through other passages of revelation

295. Solution through the revelation on the salvific will: Since this will is sincere and most vehement, it follows that no one is reprobated except after consideration of personal demerits. For if God were to desert⁶¹ a man without such demerits, He could not simultaneously say that He willed to save that same man. Hence, reprobation must be after and because of prevision of demerits. The demerits must be truly grave and persistent to overcome the effects of a salvific will so powerful that it willed to establish infinite titles for each man.⁶² But it is also clear from the revelation on the salvific will that God has that sort of disposition that we learned through the Father analogy, namely, that it was not required that man do anything so that God might begin to will his salvation. Nor is it required that man place any condition so that this will of God may continue, precisely because that will is spontaneous and moves by the goodness of God. Since God wills man's salvation, and since salvation cannot be had without predestination, therefore that will includes predestination (he who wills the end wills the means) and will continue even to the point of predestining, without the need of a condition being placed by man. A condition would be needed to interrupt the effects of this will; but no condition is required for this will to continue, since it continues by its own power, out of His spontaneous goodness.

However, the revelation of the salvific will does not give us the means of excluding the possibility of which we spoke above,⁶³ namely, that God might, by mere positive decree, will to make merits a condition. Hence we cannot prove by the revelation on the salvific will that predestination does not come after prevision of merits, even though it is truly probable that merits are not a condition, since the sort of will He has revealed is a self-moving spontaneous will that moves of its own force without the need of any condition from man.

296. Confirmation of the solution from the revealed doctrine on the purpose of creation: As we saw in chapter 3, the revealed doctrine on the purpose of creation excludes reprobation before consideration of demerits. But this same doctrine also shows that God began to will the salvation of men spontaneously, without man's having done anything. This same purpose of His will continues in its

course, since, as we saw in chapter 3, God bound together His glory and the salvation of men so that they are inseparable. Since this attitude and purpose of God continues of itself, no condition from man is needed so that it may continue, even though a grave condition from man would be needed in order that God might will *not* to save him.

However, the revelation on the purpose of creation does not give us any certain means of excluding the possibility we spoke of:⁶⁴ that God might, as it were by positive decree wish to make merits a condition.

297. Partial confirmation from Romans 6:23: St. Paul wrote to the Romans:⁶⁵ ". . . the wages of sin is death, but the free *gift* of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord." In this text, St. Paul is not speaking about predestination, but he seems to be speaking of the most basic conditions for salvation. We note an important distinction in his words. Death, or damnation, is called "wages," that is, something that man really can merit. Eternal life, however, is not called "wages" but a "gift." This does not prove that predestination is before consideration of merits, but it does fit well with it. Similarly, the text suggests that reprobation is after consideration of demerits.

IV. A partial suggestion of the solution from philosophy

298. Even though not only in this chapter, but in the entire investigation, we are trying to follow theological method very strictly, yet, particularly since many theologians are fond of a philosophical approach, it will be not inopportune to say a few things on the subject with the help of pure philosophy, abstracting from revelation.

St. Thomas expresses the situation this way:⁶⁶ "Now the principal reason why one should hope in Him is this, that we belong to Him as an effect to a cause. But nothing works in vain: it works for some certain end. Therefore it pertains to each agent to so produce an effect that it may not lack the things by which it can reach its end. . . . Now man was made by God like an artisan's product by an artisan . . . and so, just as an earthenware vessel, if it had intelligence, could have hope in the potter that he would dispose it well, so also man should have hope in God that he will be well governed by Him. . . . But this confidence that man has in God should be most certain. For it is said⁶⁷ that no agent fails in the right disposition of his work except out of some defect of his. But in God there can be no defect, not ignorance . . . nor inability . . . nor, again, a deficiency in good will. . . . And therefore the hope by which one trusts in God does not confound the one who hopes."

Therefore reprobation should be after consideration of demerits because the reason why the effect fails to reach the end cannot be in God the "artisan." It is clear also that predestination must be gratuitous, since the artisan owes nothing to his product, even though He owes it to Himself not to make it in vain. But the reasoning does not prove that predestination is not after consideration of merits.

Scholion on predestination after foreseen merits.

299. Several objections based on speculative grounds are commonly raised against predestination after prevision of merits. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary for us to answer them, since we are not defending predestination after foreseen merits. In general, we do think that Marín-Sola and Muñiz have solved them well, even though we do not agree with them in saying that perseverance always requires an infrustrable grace.⁶⁸ But the reason why we reject predestination after foreseen merits is not found in speculative objections, since all of them can be solved well. Nor is it found in the fact that St. Augustine rejected predestination after foreseen merits: for a single Father is not enough to prove a point. The morally unanimous consent of all the Fathers, speaking as witnesses of revelation, is needed. Further, St. Augustine arrived at his position out of an erroneous interpretation of Sacred Scripture.⁶⁹ Even though his conclusion is true, the foundation he thought he had in revelation is invalid.

Nor do we reject predestination after foreseen merits as contrary to the teachings of St. Thomas. For we think that all passages of St. Thomas (except those in which he is clearly speaking with Romans 8-9 as his starting point) at least can be interpreted in accord with predestination after foreseen merits. His passages need not mean more than the fact that predestination is *gratuitous*. But, as we have seen,⁷⁰ predestination can be after foreseen merits, and still be gratuitous. However, we think it probable that St. Thomas did favour predestination before foreseen merits.

Similarly, the many texts of Scripture and the councils that are often cited to prove that predestination is before foreseen merits are not conclusive, even though they seem to favour the view. We think that it is solely by the revealed Father analogy that it can be really proved that predestination is before foreseen merits.

We note that Marín-Sola and Muñiz go beyond the Molinistic view in this matter. For the Molinists say only that predestination to glory taken separately is after foreseen merits; but Marín-Sola and Muñiz say that predestination in the full sense, in the order of intention, either is or can be after foreseen merits. We think their view cannot be disproved except by the Father analogy.

300. Conclusions:

1) The revealed Father analogy not only contains the principles needed for the solution, but it also, implicitly, contains the solution itself. For from this analogy it is clear that *reprobation is after and because of foreseen demerits*; but that *predestination is before foreseen merits*, in such a way that the cause of predestination is the spontaneous unmerited goodness of the Father, who predestines as often as the effects of His goodness are not impeded by a human condition, namely, grave and persistent resistance. Inasmuch as the absence of resistance in the first logical moment is an ontological zero, there is no condition in the predestined man. *The point at which the decree of*

predestination is made is before foreseen merits, but after the foreseen absence of grave and persistent resistance. The resistance that brings on reprobation must be, in accordance with the will of God, grave, and persistent not only inasmuch as it must reach to the end of a man's life, but also inasmuch as reprobation is not decreed except after so many and such great sins that a man becomes physically or morally incurable.⁷¹ This does not mean that God cannot or will not ever send death after one or a few mortal sins, to a man who is foreseen as going to be incurable: He may do this out of mercy towards the man who is reprobated and/or towards others who would be harmed by the reprobate. It is certain, moreover, that some who resist much and are even hardened are saved by extraordinary graces. Probably, at least to some extent, God decides to save a hardened man on condition that other men fill up the deficiency in objective titles needed for him.

2) From the revelation on the salvific will and from that on the purpose of creation, it is clear that reprobation is after foreseen demerits, and also, it is clear from the salvific will that the resistance must be persistent in the senses explained in conclusion 1. It is probable, on the basis of these two *loci* in revelation, that predestination is before foreseen merits.

3) Even from philosophy it can be shown (following St. Thomas) that reprobation is after foreseen demerits, and that predestination is gratuitous.

301. Objection 1: At least in practice, the absence of resistance and consent are the same.

Answer: There are two senses in which we can speak of absence of resistance, as we have seen.⁷² In one sense, it necessarily includes a positive decision of will, made under the formality of abstaining from evil: this act is morally good and, if done under grace, is salutary and meritorious. But we are speaking of another sense, in which a man's will is moved but he himself does not move it at all, in the first part of the process, before grace moves to a positive consent: see the fuller treatment in chapters 7 and 18.⁷³

302. Objection 2: Is it not inevitable that God will foresee merits before predestining? If predestination were decreed after *one* absence of resistance to *one* grace, it could be decreed before foreseeing merits. But actually, it is decreed after many absences of resistances *in a series* in which at least some further graces depend on the outcome of previous graces. In foreseeing such a series, the merits, which will infallibly be present after each absence of resistance, will not be able *not* to be foreseen. Therefore predestination must be placed after foreseen merits.

Answer: First of all, to avoid any possible confusion, we must recall that we are speaking solely about a logical order or sequence, for it is only in a logical sequence that we can speak of "before" or "after" in

divine decrees (whether God predestines before or after considering merits). Now in a logical order, the sequence of one thing before or after another depends on the fact that one thing is a prerequisite for the other either as a cause or as a condition. Of course, merits could not be a cause of a divine decree. But neither are they a condition. For what is a condition for a gift depends solely on the positive will of the one who gives something on a condition. But, as we saw above from the Father analogy, according to the will of God, who gives predestination, merits are not a condition. Therefore, since in the logical order they are not prerequisites or conditions, *logically* they are not parts of the series at all, since they have no function in the series: neither as causes, nor as conditions. Therefore, predestination is not logically after foreseen merits.

303. Objection 3: No human will can, of itself, abstain from resistance throughout a whole lifetime. Therefore, God gives merits without any condition to whomsoever He wills. And predestination and reprobation are absolute, as the Thomists say.

Answer: Before coming to the direct answer, we must note that an unconditioned reprobation contradicts revelation, as we have shown many times. Therefore, even if we had no reply, we would still have to reject such a reprobation. We do concede, of course, that predestination is before foreseen merits, but not in the way in which the Thomists hold.

But, to come to the direct answer: Our explanation does not require that a human will be able *of itself* to abstain from resistance to grace for a lifetime:

1) We have already seen that resistance must be *persistent* or there will be no reprobation. But it does not follow from human weakness that men must resist *persistently*. As we have seen,⁷⁴ St. Thomas teaches that even a man in the state of sin will be incapable of omitting resistance only if left to himself *for a long time*. Therefore, even a sinner will not be incapable of stopping short of *persistent* resistance, unless he has become hardened by his own fault.

We do not say, however, that a man can, of himself, with no added help, persevere in omitting resistance even to the end of life. For it is one thing to say that a man can omit *persistent* resistance; another thing to say that he can omit *all* resistance, so as to persevere in good to the end. For a man to omit resistance even to the end, an added gift is needed, which is called the gift of perseverance. (Similarly, in saying that a man can omit persistent resistance, we do not say that he can omit *all* resistance for *long* without a special help. The inability to omit all resistance for a long time means that without a special help he will resist at least sometime: but to resist at least sometime over a long period is not the same as to resist persistently).

As we saw in chapter 8, there is more than one way to explain the action and nature of the gift of perseverance. Nor do all men require

precisely the same helps. But whatever way it be explained, it will be still true that this gift is given to those who do not resist persistently, since, as we saw in this chapter, God does not reprobate, but instead predestines, all who do not resist persistently. But if He predestines, He gives the gift of perseverance in the execution of predestination.

To make the matter clearer, let us recall what we said above about the nature of the gift of perseverance so as to see how it all fits in with what we have said about persistent resistance.

a) In many men, all that will be needed for final perseverance (or for perseverance for a long time) will be a special quality added to the usual actual graces (or another grace accompanying them) which is given at the times at which it is needed to overcome the, as it were, cumulative difficulty of not resisting which will finally be present. Such an added quality (or accompanying grace) need not be an infrustrable help: it is enough if it compensates for the difficulty we have mentioned, in such a way, however, that man can still resist if he wishes. This quality or accompanying grace can compensate precisely because that added quality or accompanying grace is of a special, different nature, so that the, as it were, cumulative difficulty that is found in omitting resistance to the usual graces is not felt in regard to the added element precisely because it is different either as to the type of attraction (the diversity obviates the quasi-cumulative nature of the difficulty) or as to the force of its attraction. As we saw in chapter 8, this added element is offered to all so that they may be able to persevere to the end (or, for the same reason, it is given for perseverance for a long period). Yet, as we saw, predestination still has an effect proper to it, since it includes many things in providential government, especially in regard to the time of death.

If a man, with this special interior help, actually perseveres to the end, it is obvious that nothing more is needed for him.

b) In some men, besides this internal element, there will be a need of a special government of the time of death, since even though by this internal element they really can overcome the quasi-cumulative difficulty of not resisting, and even though some actually do so; yet, some actually still resist grace at least in one temptation and fall. If death were to come to them while they were in such a state, they would perish. Therefore, for these, the gift of final perseverance will need to add also a special government of the time of death. But this cluster of gifts is given to all who do not resist persistently:⁷⁵ for those who do not resist persistently are predestined.⁷⁶ (In regard to those who do not persevere for the long periods even though they are offered the needed interior element, it is obvious that if they do not resist *persistently*, they will be converted by the graces that

God always offers in rich abundance. And, they will also be predestined if they do not resist persistently: therefore, God will also provide that death will not find them in the interval in which they are in sin).

c) From the fact that we said that the gift of perseverance is a *special* gift, it does not follow that it is *extraordinary*: otherwise, it would follow that no one could be saved without extraordinary means. Nor does it follow that it must regularly be an infrustrable grace. For we showed in chapter 8 that the grace of perseverance is not regularly an infrustrable grace.⁷⁷ However, as we explained above⁷⁸ if someone, in spite of these proofs, should still insist on holding that perseverance must be an infrustrable grace, we could comment: Such a view (if the words of St. Paul and of the Council of Trent did not stand in the way) could be harmonized with our explanation, which we gave above,⁷⁹ in regard to human freedom. But we would then have to say that God grants an infrustrable grace of perseverance to all who do not persistently resist the preceding graces.

2) But there is an important additional observation about the difficulty of omitting resistance. For it would be one thing to abstain from sin or from resistance to grace by a positive decision of will, made without grace; it is quite another thing to omit resistance in the sense we intend,⁸⁰ in which non-resistance is not a positive decision in which a man moves his will, nor a complete act, but is a mere absence of an action against the grace in the first part of the process of giving a grace: it is an ontological zero. As we explained in 82, grace itself sustains our non-resistance, for grace begins the process, moving our intellect to the simple apprehension of good, and our will to an initial complacency in the good. It does this with no cooperation from us, before we do anything. These effects in our intellect and will continue by virtue of the grace itself. Nothing from us is required in order that they may continue: not a movement of our will by ourselves, nor an additional advertence. But to interrupt these effects, something⁸¹ would be required.

What we have said does not prove, however, that an additional help is not required to persevere. It is required, as we said, precisely because of the quasi-cumulative difficulty of non-resistance which will eventually appear. But, just as the usual graces sustain the non-resistance to themselves, so this added internal help sustains non-resistance to itself, so that a more special resistance would be required to counter it. For, as we said above this internal element is of a special nature, and is different from usual graces (either as to kind, or as to force): hence, the quasi-cumulative difficulty of non-resistance is not present in regard to it.

304. Objection 4: That which can fail, will sometime fail.⁸² Therefore, every man will fail sometimes. God properly permits man to fail,

precisely because man is of a defectible nature. But God is not bound to restore the one who fails, but rather, He leaves some, so as to show His justice in punishing.

Answer: It is true that God permits sin: He gives a general permission by giving man autonomous freedom and, accordingly, by moving infrustrably only in extraordinary providence.⁸³ Furthermore, even the internal element of the gift of perseverance is frustrable.⁸⁴ But, it is one thing to grant permission to sin in these ways-quite a different thing so to *desert* men that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for them not to sin, as the older Thomists hold. We have already⁸⁵ shown that the system of the older Thomists cannot fit with revelation. In fact we have already seen briefly⁸⁶, and will see more fully later⁸⁷ that in the system of these Thomists, God is the author of sin.

It is true also that defectible man, if left to himself for a *long time*, *without grace*, will fail and fall into sin, and that he cannot persevere without a special help. But God, according to the infinite titles that He established for each individual,⁸⁸ provides a rich abundance of graces for each individual, with which he can not only avoid individual sins, but can also persevere.⁸⁹ This is true in the fullest sense, *in sensu composito*, and not only in the sense intended by the older Thomists: actually, with these frustrable graces many men do actually avoid sin and persevere.⁹⁰

In regard to reprobation: From the defectibility of man it does not follow that he must sin even *persistently*. But, as we have seen,⁹¹ only those who sin persistently are reprobated.

It is true, God is not bound *in the nature of things* to give such great and so many graces to men. But even so, He does love that much, and so has freely decreed to do this. In fact, He has *bound Himself* to do so, by infinite titles⁹² made in favour of each individual.⁹³

305. Objection 5: Both in the Old and in the New Testaments, God wanted to make a covenant with His people. Now the covenant was made in a sort of bilateral form, so that a positive condition was demanded from man. Furthermore, in the description He gave of the Last Judgments Christ showed that rewards and penalties are given according to merits. Therefore, predestination must be after foreseen merits.

Answer: In regard to the covenant, we must ask to what order the covenant conditions belong, that is, do they belong to the order of intention, or to the order of execution?⁹⁴ We must ask the question separately about reprobation, and separately about predestination. To solve the question, we need to recall the principle that we saw above,⁹⁵ namely, we saw that the fundamental or ultimate reason or explanation of a question about salvation must be found in the order of intention and not solely in the order of execution, since the order of execution presupposes decisions made in the order of intention. Hence

an ultimate and fundamental explanation could not be found solely in the order of execution.

Therefore, a reason that is not a consideration on the most fundamental level will not apply to the order of intention but to the order of execution.

What then about the evil condition, by which a man fails to observe the covenant? This condition is demerits, or resistance to grace. But, as we have often seen, resistance to grace or demerits are the ultimate explanation of why men are reprobated. Therefore, this condition does belong to the order of intention. What of the positive, good condition required in the covenant for God's favours after justification? Is this condition the ultimate reason for predestination? By no means. The ultimate reason is the spontaneous goodness of the Father. Nor does the Father, as we have seen, require any positive condition from man for predestination by positive decree. Therefore, positive conditions are not a consideration on the most fundamental level in the decision to predestine. Hence they belong to the order of execution. There they are reasons that make proper the grant of grace, in the way explained above.⁹⁶

So the positive condition asked in the covenant is required only for the order of execution, although the condition for reprobation comes even in the order of intention. Since the positive condition of the covenant is not in the order of intention, therefore it remains true that predestination is before consideration of merits, as we have proved above.⁹⁷

Nor is it impossible for the positive conditions to apply only to the order of execution while the conditions for reprobation apply even in the order of intention. The very analogy of the Father shows how these two facts are reconciled. In that analogy, the ultimate explanation of reprobation is the bad condition placed by man. But no positive condition enters into the explanation of predestination: only the goodness of the Father accounts for predestination.

Hence the reply to the problem about merits at the Last Judgment is also clear. Merits then are merely reasons that make proper the grant of reward, reasons which will be really present by that time. The Last Judgment is the terminus, the completion of the process of salvation: predestination is at the start of that process. Although merits are not considered at the start-they are not present then-yet they will be present and will be *fittingly* considered at the end of the process.

306. Objection 6: The solution given in this chapter is too anthropomorphic. God does not necessarily act as man acts.

Answer:

1) Christ Himself taught us about God and about the way in which God acts through such analogies, for He Himself gave us the Father analogy to teach us about Him. Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 6, the Heart of Christ is a fully human Heart, and yet is fully in accord with the

Heart of the Father. Christ is the Word, the perfect revelation of the Father. And in the parables of Christ, we are taught that God has the very same disposition we learned of in the Father analogy. As Pius XII wrote:⁹⁸ ". . . in the parables of mercy . . . the very Heart of God is manifested." *Most certainly, it is safer and better to learn of the nature and will of God from what Christ revealed to us, than to try to penetrate the counsels of God by merely human, metaphysical attempts.*

2) The solution we gave does not depend solely on the Father analogy, even though this analogy does both contain and prove our solution. Actually, the Father analogy is needed only for two things (for everything else can be had by other means, as we have seen in this chapter): (a) To *suggest* where to look in order to find the way of reconciling predestination before foreseen merits with reprobation after foreseen demerits. Once we have found the means, we see its validity as obvious even without further need of the Father analogy. (b) To prove that predestination is before, not after, foreseen merits. Everything else is clear and can be proved from other parts of revelation, i.e., as we have shown many times in the first part of this book, many parts of revelation exclude reprobation before foreseen demerits. From this it follows that predestination cannot be before foreseen merits in the way in which the Thomists propose.

So we do not depend entirely on the Father analogy. No one can say it is illegitimate merely to take a *suggestion* of where to look, from this analogy. And many theologians will concede to us that predestination is at least in some sense before foreseen merits.

But it is good to add this: John of St. Thomas once reproached the Molinist Lessius on a charge of anthropomorphism, saying:⁹⁹ "Why should we, most limited and wretched men, want to measure that immense sea of the judgments of God with our narrow and most uncertain providence: as if God would do better to act as we think He should act?" John of St. Thomas could say this because Lessius was appearing to argue from what he thought God should or would do, and did not seem to accept the conclusion that seemed to come from Romans 8-9. But today, now that we know that the interpretation of Romans 8-9 is quite different from what John of St. Thomas thought, we can say to those theologians who think they can work out the whole problem by metaphysics: "Why should we, most limited and wretched men, want to measure that immense sea of the judgments of God with our narrow and precarious metaphysical reasoning? We should accept the things that God Himself has taught us in revelation about His own decisions, and not try to deduce all from mere human reason."

END NOTES

1 There was also an obstacle from a misinterpretation of 1 Cor 4:7 and other passages: cf. § 18.

- 2 F. Suarez, S. I., *De gratia Dei*, 4.11.10. Opera 8. p. 316: cited from: H. Rondet, SJ, *Gratia Christi*, Beauchesne, Paris. 1948, p. 303, n. 2.
- 3 E. Hugon, OP, *Tractatus dogmatici*, ed. 8. Lethielleux, Parisiis, 1931, II, p. 228. *De gratia*, q. 5, a. 3.
- 4 F. Muñiz, OP, in his commentary in: *Suma Teologica de Santo Tomas de Aquino*, B.A.C., 2nd ed. Madrid, 1957, I, p. 704.
- 5 F. Marín-Sola, OP, "El sistema tomista sobre la mocion divina" in: *La Ciencia Tomista* 32 (1925) pp. 32, 34, 36-37 (all italics his).
- 6 Muniz, op. cit., p. 696 (italics his).
- 7 Marín-Sola, art. cit., p. 30.
- 8 Cf. §§ 334-35.
- 9 Marín-Sola, art. cit., p. 45, n. 1. (italics his).
- 10 We did not transcribe his propositions 7-8 since they merely evolve implications of propositions 5-6.
- 11 Art. cit., p. 48. n. 1.
- 12 Italics his.
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp. 53-53. (Italics partly his, partly mine).
- 14 §§ 151, 153.3.
- 15 § 233.
- 16 § 233.
- 17 § 302.
- 18 Muniz in his schema (cf. pp. 584-85, 702-03) speaks in a similar way about the previous logical moments. In regard to theological moment in which predestination is decided, he says (p. 703): "Out of those creatures, whose aptitude in the face of sufficient grace was known with certainty in the previous moment, God elects and chooses some, mercifully and kindly, to whom He decides, in His consequent will, to give glory." The imprecision appears especially in that he says God predestines some of those "whose aptitude in the face of sufficient grace was known. . . ." The word "aptitude" is not clear. Of itself it could mean something positive, or (less easily) the absence of an impediment. But, whatever the truth may be, the description of the process is the same as that given by Marín-Sola: hence the same comments are in order. We note also how greatly he strives to bring out the gratuity, in saying that "Out of those ... God chooses some. . . ."
- 19 Cf. §§ 151, 153.3
- 20 §§ 286-89, 302.
- 21 Cf. also their views on the efficacy of grace: §§ 334-35; and on foreknowledge: §§ 400-01).
- 22 *Etudes Carmelitaines*, (1958) p. 71 (emphasis his).
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 68, n. 3, 76 (emphasis his).
- 25 Cf. § 82.
- 26 Dom Mark Pontifex, OSB, *Freedom and Providence*, 1960, Hawthorn Books, 70 Fifth Ave. NY, pp. 74, 111-112.
- 27 Charles Journet, *The Meaning of Grace*, Kenedy, N.Y., 1960, pp. 43, 49. Cf. also the views of Msgr. Journet and of J. Maritain on the efficacy of grace, in § 368.
- 28 Cf. F. Zorell, SJ, *Lexicon Hebraicam et Aramaicum Veteris Testamenti*, Pontificum Institutum Biblicum, Romae, 1961, p. 136, s.v., *go'el* (emphasis mine).
- 29 Hos 11:1.
- 30 Is 63:16.
- 31 Cf. chapter 4, esp. note 34.
- 32 If the children do such things, probably the human father will give some extra favours, or will love them a bit more. But in order that the father may continue in his basic love and care, it is not required that the children do any such things, for his love continues by its own power: by the power of the father's goodness.

33 Cf. n. 32 above. Similarly, men cannot and need not earn the fundamental love and care of their Father in heaven, even though they can, after the gratuitous gift of first justification, earn increases of love.

34 Cf. § 292.

35 Actually, His love is not interrupted: only its effects are interrupted.

36 Cf. § 305.

37 Cf. §§ 233, 281.

38 § 82.

39 §§ 344-49.

40 § 302.

41 Cf. § 292 and Hos 11:9.

42 Cf. § 82.

43 Cf. § 302.

44 § 82.

45 Cf. §§ 482-83.

46 1 Cor 4:7.

47 Ez 33:11. Cf. § 264.4.

48 Cf. § 48.

49 Cf. § 48.

50 § 153.2.

51 In regard to the providential determination of the time of death, see § 264. 4.

52 Cf. § 126-27, 153. 2, 253. b.

53 C2 Cf. § 153.2.

54 Cf. Chapter 6, esp. note 7.

55 We say that God has not bound Himself to give graces in vain for a long period. But the same comment is not to be made about the offer of individual graces which He knows will be resisted.

56 § 153.2.b.

57 Cf. §§ 228-230.

58 Cf. §§ 118-120, 126-127.

59 Cf § 47.

60 In this way we could explain the words which the Blessed Virgin is said to have spoken in the Fatima apparition, urging us to pray and sacrifice for sinners since, as she is alleged to have said, many are lost because they have no one to pray and make sacrifices for them.

61 Cf. § 51.

62 Cf. § 292.

63 § 287.

64 § 287.

65 Rom 6:23.

66 Compendium theologiae II.2.

67 Ibid., I.112.

68 Cf. § 303.

69 Cf. §§ 206 and 12-13.

70 Cf. the explanations given by Marín-Sola and Muniz, in § 280 above; and P. Parente De Deo uno et trino, Marietti, Romae, 1955, pp. 232-33.

71 Cf. § 264.4.

72 § 82.

73 Cf. §§ 82, 346-49.

74 § 223.

75 § 153.2.

76 Cf. §§ 292, 264.4

77 From the words of St. Paul: § 151; and from Trent: § 153.3.

78 Cf. note 12 in chapter 8.

79 § 120.

80 § 82.
81 Cf. § 344.
82 Cf. CG 3.71; ST I 48.2 ad 3.
83 Cf. § 120.
84 §§ 151.153.3.
85 Especially in § 119.
86 § 132.5.
87 §§ 310-22.
88 §§ 48, 55.2.
89 Cf. chapter 8.
90 Cf. § 303.
91 § 292.
92 §§ 48, 55.2.
93 Cf. also § 319.
94 Cf. § 185.
95 § 186.
96 § 287.
97 Cf. §§ 42-44.
98 Haurietis aquas. AAS 48.330. Cf. § 55 above.
99 John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, Desclee, Parisiis, 1937, III, p. 443: In QQ. 22-24 I (ae) Disp. 28. a. 4. n. 24.

"Pt. 2: Predestination and reprobation - General conclusions from part two"

1) The revelation on predestination has been progressively clarified over the centuries. All the Eastern Fathers, and all the Western Fathers before St. Augustine, saw clearly that the fundamental reason underlying the decision as to who will or will not be reprobated is found in human conditions. For the most part, they did not even try to find the precise nature of that condition. St. Augustine however saw that predestination must be before foreseen merits. But neither St. Augustine nor the other Fathers saw the way of reconciling these truths. St. Thomas, because he was so faithful in following strict theological method, found the principal elements of the solution and gave a splendid description of the whole process of the granting of grace and of its principles. However he did not indicate clearly the precise point at which the decree of predestination is made, nor was he able to avoid all obscurity, because of the erroneous interpretation of Romans 8-9 which he thought he had to hold. St. Francis de Sales saw the same facts, and proposed them in less technical form, but with less obscurity from Romans 8-9. In more recent times, since the obstacles that formerly stood in the way from erroneous interpretations of Romans 8-9 and 1 Cor 4.7 have been removed, and since, by the ever increasing light of the Holy Spirit, the Church has been teaching certain truths with ever increasing clarity (especially the force of the salvific will) the true solution has appeared.

2) It is a revealed truth that there is no reprobation, positive or negative, before consideration of demerits. For reprobation, demerits must be grave and persistent.

3) It is a revealed truth (especially in the Father analogy) that predestination is decreed before consideration of merits. The cause of predestination is solely the goodness of the Father, who predestines those in whom the effect of His goodness is not impeded by a human condition, by grave and persistent resistance. Insofar as the absence of resistance in the first logical moment is an ontological zero, there is no condition in the man who is predestined. The point at which predestination is decreed is before foreseen merit, but after the foreseen absence of grave and persistent resistance. Short of this point, reprobation is not decreed, although God may at times send an earlier death, after one or a few mortal sins, to a man who is foreseen as going to be incurable. He does this out of mercy towards the man himself and towards those whom that man would have harmed.

"Pt. 3: The way in which grace is efficacious - Ch. 18: How does grace produce its effects"

I. Preliminary questions

307. *The relation between this question and predestination:*

The solution to the problem of predestination that we found in revelation does not restrict us to just one possible theory on the way in which grace can be efficacious. It merely limits the field within which the answer must be found. But more than one theory on the efficacy of grace could find room within this field.

In seeking the solution on the problem of the efficacy of grace, we will have to work somewhat more by human reasonings, since revelation is not so clear on this matter as it is on predestination. Therefore, all solutions will, in certain parts of them, be less firm and certain than the solution on predestination. For the solution we found on predestination is contained formally implicitly in the revealed Father analogy, and is immediately deducible from many other revealed truths. Revelation and those things that are immediately deduced from revelation are always to be preferred to theories that are worked out to a large extent by human reasoning. We do not, of course, deny that human reason can find truth, but yet, as the history of philosophy and theology shows, reason can err. All philosophers of all centuries have fallen into at least some errors. The majority have fallen into great errors. Even Aristotle and St. Thomas himself made some mistakes. But revelation itself cannot err; and the more immediately a truth is deduced from revelation, the less the possibility of error.

308. *The state of the question:* All theologians admit that actual grace does not always produce the effect of a good work in man. So the principal problem is this: Why does it not always produce an effect? By whom-God or man-is the logically first decision made out of which the outcome becomes not only possible, but *infallibly certain*.

Quite a large number of the elements of the response are contained in revelation, as we have seen above.¹ But we want to investigate the entire process as thoroughly as possible. We need to explore the nature of the graces that the theologians call *sufficient* and *efficacious* and the way they operate.

There are chiefly two older schools of thought, and several recent schools. All, or nearly all profess to follow St. Thomas. We shall review only the better known ones.²

II. The system of the older Thomists

309. Presentation of the system:

1) The older Thomists say that sufficient and efficacious grace differ *intrinsically*, that is, by the very natures of the two graces they are different. If only sufficient grace is given, no one will actually not resist; no one will ever do a good work. In fact, as Garrigou-Lagrange admits, if only sufficient grace is given, man will always sin, at least by a sin of omission. He had proposed and added a difficulty for himself in an objection, saying:³ "To fail or resist sufficient grace is not to consent to it, that is, to sin at least by a sin of omission. But, efficacious grace is required that a man may not fail [to cooperate with] sufficient grace, that is, that he may not resist. Therefore, a man sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace, that is, from the insufficiency of help." And he replies to this difficulty: "I concede the major; I concede the minor, but I deny that the conclusion follows, for the true conclusion is: 'therefore, that a man may not sin, but may consent to sufficient grace,' efficacious grace is required." The underlying reason is explained thus by John of St. Thomas:⁴ "The origin of sin . . . is . . . the weight of our defectibility, not sustained by the grace of God; just as the weight of heaviness in a stone is the cause of falling, when the sustaining power of a column is removed." Or:⁵ "For it is the same thing for [the will] to be weak and for it to be able to resist or to dissent; for that ability [to resist] arises from weakness. Therefore it is the same thing to say 'although [it is] weak' as to say 'although it can resist' . . . which surely [comes] from weakness."

2) Nevertheless, these Thomists say that through sufficient grace a man really can act well or has the ability to act well, even though it would be metaphysically inconceivable for him to really do a good act. John of St. Thomas explains this with lucidity:⁶ ". . . efficacious grace . . . is required as the application of the power to action, not as the power, or part of the power. . . ." Moreover, St. Thomas gives us a very helpful comparison:⁷ "Whatever applies the power of acting to acting is said to be the cause of that action: for an artisan applying the power of a natural thing to some action is said to be the cause of that action, just as a cook [is said to be] the cause of cooking which is [done] through fire." Therefore, just as the fire really does have the complete power or ability of cooking, similarly a man, with sufficient grace, really has the ability to act. However, just as the fire never can

or will cook anything unless the fire is applied to the food, similarly a man even with sufficient grace never will act unless God applies the will of the man to act. If someone should object that then it cannot be correctly said that man *can* act, if he cannot apply himself to acting, even though he has the complete *ability*, John of St. Thomas replies:⁸ ". . . although it is not in our power to have it [the application or efficacious grace] on the part of the principle that gives it, which is God, yet, absolutely, it is in our power to have it, for a twofold reason. First by reason of the act itself for which such a grace is given: for we do have the power and the sufficiency for that sort of act, depending however on God, without whom we can do nothing; but, *because the created ability in its own category can produce such an act* it is said to have it in its control and power; and consequently also the application to it, which is efficacious grace, not inasmuch as it comes down from God, but inasmuch as it terminates in the act which that created ability simply can do. Secondly, it is said to have efficacious grace in its power, because through God it can have it" Garrigou-Lagrangé moreover adds this:⁹ ". . . no one who has the use of reason is deprived of the efficacious grace required for salvation except for having, by his own fault, resisted a sufficient grace. . . ." However, John of St. Thomas adds that the reason for which God can and sometimes does deny efficacious grace can be even an inculpable inattention in man.¹⁰

3) It is clear therefore: If a man has only sufficient grace, he will sin. In fact, as John of St. Thomas explained, it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to do a good work with sufficient grace, since it is metaphysically impossible for a man to apply himself to the work. Hence he says:¹¹ ". . . given the [divine] permission [to resist grace or to sin] it is infallible that the privation or defect of sin will follow. [This is true] with a negative infallibility: just as, given the [fact of the] suspension of [divine] influence, it is infallible that the annihilation of the creature will follow. . . ." If it were not metaphysically inconceivable for a man to do a good work with sufficient grace, God could not infallibly foresee what man would do, given such a grace. Therefore the fundamental decision whether a man is to sin or not, and at what time, and what sort of sin he is to commit, and in what circumstances—this is decided first by God alone: for man will infallibly fall of his own weight. Hence a group of good Thomists openly say:¹² "Sufficient grace is certainly not of itself sufficient for salvation, because it cannot produce any acts by itself."

4) If efficacious grace is given, it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to resist: For God physically (not just morally) applies the will of the man to act. However, He does this in such a way that the man not only remains free, but also that the very freedom of his action comes from the divine motion.

It is evident that God can infallibly foresee through this sort of motion too.

Now in explaining the harmony between the infallibility of divine knowledge and human freedom, these Thomists employ the celebrated distinction between the *sensus compositus* and the *sensus divisus* [the combined sense and the separate sense]. John of St. Thomas explains this distinction as follows:¹³ ". . . the *sensus compositus* and the *sensus divisus* is understood, not as some think, in such a way that the *sensus compositus* refers to the situation when grace is given, while the *sensus divisus* refers to the situation when grace is taken away; but, even when grace is given, there is room for both senses, the *sensus divisus* and the *sensus compositus*, because grace has two references [or aspects]: one is that in which it looks to the act to be accomplished . . . the other is that in which it looks to the principle from which this grace descends, namely, the efficacious will of God. And including this reference, we have the *sensus compositus*; and as grace stands under this respect, it is not resisted, nor is it ever cast aside by the will, because God does not want it to cast it aside. . . ." He says, then, that in the *sensus divisus*, man can resist efficacious grace, but that in the *sensus compositus*, he cannot.

Opponents of this distinction commonly reply by saying that the distinction itself needs to have a distinction added to it: for, they say, a necessity [by *sensus compositus*] that is said to be present because of the relation to something that logically presupposes that the creature has already made a determination, does not destroy human liberty; but a necessity that is said to be present because of the relation to something that does not presuppose that the creature has made a determination, destroys human liberty. H. Lennerz, SJ, gives some examples:¹⁴ "In a sense combined with [i.e., taking into account the relation with] my own free choice, I am not able not to choose; or, in a sense combined with the fact that God knows it, I am not able not to choose: the first does not destroy liberty, but is its exercise; the second does not destroy it, because it supposes the free determination of the creature." And he concludes: "But a necessity in a sense combined with something that does not presuppose my own determination, and which is by nature previous to my determination, is an antecedent necessity, which destroys liberty." The opponents of the older Thomists add the claim that a physical motion from God destroys liberty, and they deny that the difficulty can be solved by saying that God confers the liberty itself by His very motion.

After many difficulties and replies to difficulties, the older Thomists finally, at the end, reply by appealing to the *transcendence* of the divine will. Hence D. Bañez says:¹⁵ "If someone does not understand how the use of the free will is free, and yet is a predefined effect of divine providence, he must [merely] believe." And he adds later:¹⁶ ". . . first of all, they should have believed that which they say they cannot understand. For we Catholics believe the mystery of the Trinity, even though we do not understand it."

5) Lest anyone try to say that, in this theory, God is the author of sin, John of St. Thomas explains.¹⁷ "God begins in man the physical motion of the entity of sin subordinating the inferior cause to Himself in that in which the inferior cause is effective, and not in that in which it is defective, and although a man [having only sufficient grace] can perform the act only defectively [because he cannot add the application needed for a good act], and although if God moves the man, it is inconceivable that the man will not be moved to act [because the divine motion is *physical*] nevertheless God does not move [the man] to sin . . . precisely because God moves [the man who does a bad action] to that which is physical and entitative in that action inasmuch as he moves physically, He prescind from the malice. . . ."

310. Difficulties against the older Thomist system:

1) The Molinists say that liberty altogether perishes in this system. It is plain that there is no autonomous liberty¹⁸ in this system; but we do believe that there is secondary liberty in good acts in it, even though in bad acts, God becomes the author of sin, as we shall explain at once below. (We showed above¹⁹ that the salvific will has no place in this system). We believe that there is room for secondary liberty precisely because the divine will is transcendent.

2) *God becomes the author of sin in this system:* We say this not because of the above mentioned problems about the existence of liberty in this system, but for other reasons. For in this system, God does far more than merely to permit sin. In sin there are two elements, namely, the bad specification or determination, and the exercise of the act. All Catholic theologians agree that God is the author of the exercise of the act, that is, of the ontological good that is present in every action, whether it is morally good or bad. But in the system of the older Thomists, as we are about to show, God is also the first cause of the evil specification or determination, since, before any decision on the part of the man, God alone initiates the process as a result of which this man, e.g., Mark, is moved from a state of indetermination as to the sin, into a process as a result of which, by metaphysical necessity, in the full and adequate sense, the man *cannot do other* than commit that sin which God has determined, at the time determined by God, in the manner determined by God, and in the circumstances determined by God. All these things, as we are about to see, are determined by God alone, both logically and chronologically before any act on the part of the will of Mark.

But, to make the case clearer, we need to go through all the stages of the precise way in which these things happen:

311. a) God decrees by a special individual decree-not merely by a general decree or permission contained in the very grant of free will-to permit Mark to commit this determined sin, at this determined time, in these determined circumstances. Before the

execution of this decree, the will of Mark had taken up no attitude, had made no determination at all relative to this sin. Perhaps he had not even thought of it. But after this decree's execution, the will of Mark will no longer be able to remain in this neutral indeterminate state, nor to do good, because of the following process:

b) In the execution of this decree of permission, God sends to Mark a sufficient grace. From this grace, the will of Mark really has the full *ability* to do a good act. There is nothing lacking to this ability *in itself* but the *application* is lacking. And without the application, nothing can be done.

Now Mark cannot apply himself any more than (to use the comparison given by St. Thomas) a fire can apply itself to food that is to be cooked. It is true, Mark is living, and the fire is inanimate, but Mark is unable to apply himself because he cannot cause himself to pass from potency to act.

Therefore, in one sense, Mark can do a good act, inasmuch as he has the full *ability, considered in itself*. But in another sense, in the complete and adequate sense, he cannot do a good act, since he lacks the *application*, and cannot give it to himself.

Can Mark obtain this application from God? He can do this in no way, unless God previously, independently of any dispositions of Mark, has decided to give it. This is clear from the following reasons:

1) The application (efficacious grace) could be obtained by prayer. But, in order that Mark may pray, there is required an efficacious grace of prayer. So the same difficulty is again, or still, present.

2) The application is given to those who do not resist sufficient grace. Hence Garrigou-Lagrange says, as we have seen:²⁰ ". . . no one who has the use of reason is deprived of the efficacious grace required for salvation except for having, by his own fault, resisted a sufficient grace." Yet it is still true, according to the same Garrigou-Lagrange:²¹ ". . . efficacious grace is required that a man may not fail [to cooperate with] sufficient grace, that is, that he may not resist." It is evident that again we have a vicious circle.

As to the reason why a man always resists unless he has efficacious grace, these Thomists sometimes explain by saying that man's fall comes from human defectibility. Hence John of St. Thomas said, as we saw above:²² "For it is the same thing for [the will] to be weak and for it to be able to resist or to dissent: for that ability [to resist] arises from weakness." And similarly:²³ ". . . the origin of sin is the weight of our defectibility, not sustained by the grace of God; just as the weight of heaviness in

a stone is the cause of falling, when the sustaining power of a column is removed."

312. In regard to this explanation, we must comment that, according to general moral principles, weakness diminishes responsibility in proportion to the weakness. But if a man is so weak that he is no more able to stand than a stone can when the sustaining column is taken away, then we must ask: If the weakness is so great, how does man still have so much freedom that he not only can sin, but can sin mortally?

313. However, the most basic reason because of which these Thomists say that it is metaphysically inconceivable for a man not to resist is a metaphysical reason. For they hold, as Garrigou-Lagrange says, that:²⁴ ". . . not to resist grace is already some good." Therefore, since, in their system, non-resistance is a positive good, it is necessary to say that man, by sufficient grace, has the *ability* of non-resisting but he does not have the *application* of the ability of non-resisting. So the same difficulty is still, or again, present. (Actually, the older Thomists have not found the distinction on the two kinds of non-resistance that we explained above,²⁵ an essential distinction. If there were only one kind of non-resistance, the kind they speak of, they would be right in saying it is beyond man's unaided power).

314. John of St. Thomas tries to prove that man can get the application:²⁶ ". . . absolutely, it is in our power to have it [the application, or efficacious grace], for a twofold reason. *First* . . . because the created ability in its own category can produce such an act. . . . *Secondly* . . . because through God it can have it. . . ."

But, the first reason he gives does not explain the case: For it is not enough that "the created ability in its own category can produce such an act." This means merely that man has the *ability*. But it does not explain at all how he can get also the *application*. He is no more capable of applying himself than a fire can apply itself to the food that is to be cooked, even though the fire too "in its own category can produce such an act," namely, the act of cooking. So, in spite of the first explanation, it still remains true that man, in the adequate, undistinguished sense, *cannot* apply himself.

The second reason given seems to contradict what John had said in the first part of the same passage. For in the first part of the passage he had said: ". . . although *it is not* in our power to have it [the application] on the part of the principle that gives it, which is God." But now he says: "through God it *can* have it."

And we must not forget, in spite of any assertions of John of St. Thomas, that we have already seen from his words and the words of Garrigou-Lagrange, that in this system man does not

have it in his power to obtain the application either by prayer or by non-resistance. So the vicious circle remains.

And we must add this too: The same John says, as we saw above²⁷, that God actually can, and sometimes does, refuse the application because of even an *inculpable* inattention on the part of man. *Therefore, with no fault of man, that is denied without which man cannot remain inculpable.*

315. All this is easy to understand when we recall that the Thomists insistently teach negative reprobation before foreseen demerits. They thereby implicitly teach that in no way can a man control whether or not he gets the application or efficacious grace. For, *if he could control it, then even a man who had been negatively reprobated could, if he wished, have many efficacious graces and with these graces he would be most certainly saved-but that would wipe out negative reprobation. In other words, negative reprobation cannot be put into effect if man can control when and whether he gets efficacious grace.*

We can easily see now why these Thomists insist²⁸ that a man is totally incapable of "distinguishing himself"-in regard to doing evil or not doing evil, or in regard to being reprobated or not.

316. c) But we must return to Mark. God, knowing that Mark lacks the good specification in his will, since Mark cannot do other than resist good, because he lacks the application, yet moves Mark to an act that cannot have other than a bad specification, since Mark is metaphysically incapable of having a good specification. In other words, God moves Mark to sin. Then, as John of St. Thomas says:²⁹ "Although a man [having only sufficient grace] can perform the act only defectively [because the application is lacking that would make a good act], and although if God moves the man, it is inconceivable that the man will not be moved to act [for the divine motion is physical], nevertheless God does not move [the man] to sin . . . precisely because God moves [the man who does a bad action] to that which is physical and entitative in that action. . . . He prescind from the malice. . . ."

317. We can easily accept the premises of this statement: It is true that man cannot do other than perform the act defectively, i.e., so as to sin. And it is true that if God moves, the man cannot omit the action. But John says in vain that God can still prescind from the malice. For *everything comes from God: both the bad specification and the exercise of the sinful act.* For God moves the will of Mark, which before had been in an indeterminate state, out of that indifferent position as regards the sin into a process in which at no point can Mark do other than what he does, since God always withholds the application to good, and yet does not let Mark stay in his previous indeterminate state.

Therefore the Thomists say rightly that Mark will infallibly sin *as a matter of fact*. This is true, but they ought to add that not only as a matter of fact will Mark infallibly fall: *Mark is metaphysically incapable of doing otherwise*, since at every point of the process he *lacks the application*, which he cannot give to himself, nor can he obtain it from God in any way; nor can he remain in a neutral state, as John of St. Thomas himself explains. Therefore, God becomes, in the full sense, the author of sin in this system.

318. But the authors of this school, perhaps because they see that after a "permission" of this sort, Mark can no longer not sin, often add that the *permission is given according to the previous dispositions of the man*.

To make the situation clearer, it will be helpful to distinguish between the various states in which the man can be, namely:

1) Men who have just received grace in baptism (or the sacrament of penance) and who have not yet committed a new mortal sin.-To these men the words of the Council of Trent apply:³⁰ "God . . . with His grace, never deserts those who have once been justified, unless He is first deserted by them." But, the men we are talking about are such: they have just been justified, and have not yet sinned again. They have not yet deserted God. Therefore, according to Trent, God will not desert them. Now if God were to give such a permission that he would move the will of a man out of a state of indifference or neutrality into a process in which the man is metaphysically unable not to sin, or to omit the action, then God would do much more than desert: He would move the man infallibly to sin. But the council teaches that God does not do this.

319. Nor could the difficulty be evaded by saying that perhaps God moves men to sin because of the inclination to sin that remains even in those who are justified. For the Council teaches that God does not desert unless He is deserted: But desertion is an *action*, while an inclination is *not an action* but an habitual disposition. Therefore, this inclination is not a sufficient reason for desertion. Furthermore, the same council also teaches that by baptism³¹ "everything is taken away that has the true and proper characteristic of sin," so that it is true to say that "in those who are reborn . . . God hates nothing." So, if God hates nothing in them, then, even though they have left an inclination to sin, that which God does not hate is not a rational cause for precipitating men into that which *God does vehemently hate*, namely, sin. Also, in the same passage, the same council also teaches that³² concupiscence "has been left [to provide material] for a

struggle [and that] it cannot harm . . . those who do not consent." But if God, because of concupiscence to which man has not yet consented, were to initiate the process that infallibly moves a man into sin, then the words of the council would not be true. For the council teaches that concupiscence does not harm those who do not consent. If concupiscence, before a man consented to it, were a sufficient reason for God to so desert the man, then concupiscence would be really harmful indeed.

Therefore, at least in many cases [i.e., in the case of men just justified] God does not move men to sin because of their previous dispositions. So in these many cases the older Thomists' system does not hold. But, since the system is said to be founded on metaphysical necessity, if in so many cases the metaphysical necessity does not hold, the system cannot be metaphysically necessary. So it must collapse.

Nor could these Thomists escape the problem by saying that man is naturally defectible and so it is proper to permit him to fall at times.-Such a reason would be valid for a mere permission in a system in which a man can really "distinguish himself"³³ in regard to sinning or not sinning, but it does not hold for a desertion such as the Thomists propose, which is, as we saw, far more than a mere permission. Furthermore, defectibility is merely a *state* or condition of man, not an *action* of man: and so, it is not the same as a desertion of God by man. But Trent says, as we have seen, that God "never deserts those who have once been justified, unless He is first deserted by them." Therefore, He does not desert merely because man is defectible.³⁴

2) Men who have committed at least one mortal sin after justification, or men who have never received justification-But even then, a sufficient reason for the Thomistic desertion is lacking. For is there not enough evil in one mortal sin? It is not credible that Infinite Holiness, with no need whatsoever, merely because a man has committed one mortal sin, would want, by a "permission" of this sort, to move the man to a second sin. And, out of the second sin, He would have a reason for a third-and so on to infinity!

320. But it is important to notice this also: In this system of these Thomists, absolutely no reason can be assigned as to why God decrees to permit this particular sin in this particular case, rather than to permit a different sin, in a different case. For even if we were to concede (for the sake of argument solely) that the

previous sin was a reason for a second sin, we still could not explain why the particular kind of sin would be chosen by Infinite Sanctity in the second case. For men do not always continue to commit precisely the same species of sins. An outstanding Thomist, J. H. Nicolas, O.P., though he differs from the views of Garrigou-Lagrange on some points, still admits:³⁵ "That which remains impenetrable, since it depends solely on infinite liberty is the reason why such a particular sin is permitted rather than a different one. . . ." The reason why an explanation cannot be given is this: Man, in the older Thomistic system, is not really in control of his own acts, and cannot "distinguish himself"³⁶ in regard to sinning or not sinning. The problem can be solved only if, as St. Thomas says, a rational creature is truly³⁷ "the master of his own actions."

Hence it is that even Garrigou-Lagrange himself had to admit that his explanation of sin did not really explain everything, but left a mystery remaining.³⁸ "This solution contains a *clear obscure*. . . . The obscurity . . . remains in the *intimate manner* in which God, in permitting sin, concurs in the ontological good in it, and perfectly prescinds from the malice. This intimate manner is hidden from us, and this is not strange, since it is a properly divine manner, which we know only analogically in this mirror here."

But St. Thomas, as we shall explain later in this chapter, can really solve the difficulty, since he fully admits that man is the master in control of his own actions, and that the beginning of the whole process of sin is in man, not in God.

321. If we do not take this attitude of St. Thomas, then a sad reflection is cast on Infinite Sanctity, because every single sin, in every age of this world, with all its foul circumstances and detestable malice—all these happen only according to the grand plan which has been determined by God alone, logically and chronologically before any human decision, so that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for powerless man to determine or act otherwise. For man in the older Thomistic system is totally incapable of "distinguishing himself."³⁹ Hence, in this Thomistic system, the will of man, which had been in a neutral state in regard to a given sin, is moved infallibly into a process in which at no point does he have or can he obtain the application. And yet, although not only as a matter of fact man does not rise to a good act of will, but he is even metaphysically incapable of rising since he cannot give himself the application, still, God infallibly and physically moves that same man to the exercise of an act that cannot be other than a sin. Such a man is less capable of "distinguishing himself" than a man who is playing with a hand of

stacked cards, stacked against him. He plays freely. He freely but infallibly loses the game.

322. 3) *The system of the older Thomists contradicts various revealed truths:* Already in the first part of this book we saw, more than once, that the system of the Thomists cannot harmonize with several revealed truths, especially,⁴⁰ the universal salvific will.

323. 4) *The system of the older Thomists contradicts many teachings of St. Thomas:* We readily admit that the Thomists in their system do agree with St. Thomas on many points. However, there are other points of conflict:

a) The system cannot agree with St. Thomas's views on predestination, which we saw in chapter 14, especially with his stand against negative reprobation before foreseen demerits.

b) The definition and distinction of sufficient and efficacious graces are not found at all in St. Thomas, as we have already shown.⁴¹

c) St. Thomas says:⁴² "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition, because they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the incarnation within themselves. . . . For freedom of will, by which he can adhere or not adhere to the incarnate God, was not to be taken away from man, lest the good of man be forced, and so rendered meritless and unpraiseworthy." As we have already⁴³ shown, these words entirely exclude the system in which everything is ruled by infrustrable decrees.

d) The words of St. Thomas explaining why prayer for others sometimes does not have its effect cannot harmonize with the system of these Thomists, as we have already shown.⁴⁴

324. e) *St. Thomas also teaches:*⁴⁵ "Although He is almighty and supremely good, yet God permits some evils in the universe which He could prevent, lest, in taking them away, greater goods be taken away, or even, [lest] greater evils follow." Now if all things, even sins, in their least elements and circumstances were controlled by infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions, there would be no need of permitting lesser moral evils lest greater moral evils follow, since the limits of evil would always be fixed by these decrees. If God wanted lesser evils, it would be enough to modify His permission. He would not need to ward off greater evils by permitting lesser evils: He could prevent all. But if we say with St. Thomas, that man is really the master in control of his acts, then the words just quoted are easily explained. For God, by the very fact that He wants and makes man the master of his own actions, gives permission for many evils, which would be avoided if man were not the master of his own action. But a greater evil would follow if man were not the

master of his actions, namely, there could be no free salvation and universal salvific will.⁴⁶ However, although God gives a general permission of sinning in the fact of making man free and not moving man infrustrably in the course of ordinary providence, yet we can also speak of a more special permission, e.g., even when God could, without an infrustrable motion, move superiors of the external order to impede a certain sin, He could decide not to move them, but rather, to permit men to sin in that way lest they freely decide to sin in a worse way. Of course, the words of St. Thomas we have just cited apply also to physical evils.⁴⁷

325. f) Very often, in practically all his major works, St. Thomas employs a comparison of the sun and plants to explain contingency. Now this comparison, as we shall see, does not easily fit with the system of these Thomists:

1) *1 Sentences d. 38, q. 1, a5, c.*: ". . . the power of the first cause is received in the second cause according to the mode of the second cause. For that effect proceeds from the first cause only according as the power of the first cause is received in the second cause: as is evident in the blooming of a tree, whose remote cause is the movement of the sun, but the proximate cause is the generative power of the plant. Now the blooming can be impeded by an impediment of the generative power, even though the movement of the sun is unchangeable."⁴⁸

2) *De veritate 2.14 ad 3*: ". . . an effect follows [is in accord with] the necessity of the proximate cause . . . it is not, however, necessary that it follow the necessity of the first cause since the effect [of the first cause] can be impeded by the second cause if it is contingent; as is evident in the effects that are produced in things that can be generated and corrupted, by the movement of the heavenly bodies, through the mediation of inferior powers: for they are contingent effects because of the defectibility of the natural powers, even though the movement of the heavens is always of the same sort."

3) *Contra gentiles 1.67*: "An effect cannot be necessary, whose cause is contingent. . . . There is both a proximate and a remote cause of the ultimate effect. If then the proximate cause is contingent, its effect must be contingent, even if the remote cause is necessary; just as plants do not necessarily fructify, even though the movement of the sun is necessary, since the intermediate causes are contingent."

4) *Summa theologiae 1.14.13 ad 1*: ". . . even though the supreme cause is necessary; yet its effect can be

contingent, because of a contingent proximate cause: just as the germination of a plant is contingent because of the proximate cause, even though the movement of the sun, which is the first cause, is necessary."

326. Comments on the above-cited four texts on contingency: St. Thomas has two ways of explaining how there can be any contingent effects, in spite of the supreme efficacy of God: (a) By divine transcendence, (b) By the use of contingent proximate causes. Hence he says in the *De veritate*:⁴⁹ "According as He has disposed that some things should occur in one way or another [i.e., necessarily or contingently], He provides for them causes in the manner He has planned; however, He could produce this mode in things even without those causes as intermediaries." So two things are clear: (1) God does not need the contingency of a secondary cause in order to produce a contingent effect: He can do this directly, since He is transcendent. (2) However, He does not (ordinarily) bring about contingency in the first way. For St. Thomas does not say that God *does this*, but instead says that "He *could*" do this.

327. But we need to notice especially the comparison that St. Thomas employs so often: the movement of the sun is without variation, always the same. So the decision as to when, and in what way the blooming of the plant should fail does not originate in the sun—for its action is always the same for all—but it originates entirely in the plant itself. So we seem to have at least an implication that the decision by which God permits sins is a *general* permission rather than an infallible permission given for each individual sin. For the movement that comes from God through grace is invariable at least inasmuch as there is no grace so intrinsically ineffective that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for a man to do good with it. In other words God acts like the sower in the Gospel parable: No sower deliberately sows a seed that he knows will accomplish no good. (Cf. also the words of St. Jerome and of St. Francis de Sales, cited below⁵⁰ in this chapter: they also employ the comparison of the sun in the same sense). On the contrary, according to the system of the Thomists, the comparison should imply that the movement of the sun is *not* invariable so that certain plants would not fructify because the sun would send to them only ineffective rays.

g) Later in this chapter we will show in a positive way what is the real opinion of St. Thomas on this point, and we will see thereby that it is quite different from the opinion of the older Thomists.

327a. 5) It is clear that the teaching of the older Thomists differs little from that of Martin Luther. Luther gives his teaching in what he considered his most important theological work,⁵¹ *The Bondage of the Will*. The main points of his system are:

a) Necessitating foreknowledge in God:⁵² "It is, then, fundamentally necessary and wholesome for Christians to know that God foreknows nothing contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to his own immutable, eternal and infallible will. This bombshell knocks 'free-will' flat, and utterly destroys it."

b) The inability of man to distinguish himself:⁵³ "So man's will is like a beast standing between two riders. If God rides, it wills and goes where God wills . . . if Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan wills. Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, or which it will seek. . . ."

c) God is the cause of sin (though He does not Himself commit the sin):⁵⁴ "Here you see that when God works in and by evil men, evil deeds result; yet God, though He does evil by means of evil men, cannot act evilly Himself, for He is good, and cannot do evil; but he uses evil instruments, which cannot escape the impulse and movement of His power. The fault which accounts for evil being done when God moves to action lies in these instruments, which God does not allow to be idle. . . . Hence it is that the ungodly man cannot but err and sin always, because under the impulse of Divine power he is not allowed to be idle, but wills, desires and acts according to his nature."

d) Those who are damned are undeserving:⁵⁵ "You man be worried that it is hard to defend the mercy and equity of God in damning the undeserving, that is, ungodly persons, who, being born in ungodliness, can by no means avoid being ungodly, and staying so, and being damned, but are compelled by natural necessity to sin and perish."

III. The Molinistic systems

328. Presentation of the system: Even though the Molinists differ among themselves in many things, yet all Molinists agree that sufficient and efficacious grace differ only *extrinsically*, that is, not by their very nature; rather grace becomes efficacious or inefficacious by the consent or dissent of man.

According to Father Aquaviva, as we saw in chapter 15, Molina taught that efficacious grace was such even *in actu primo*. According to other Molinists (fewer in number), grace is efficacious only *in actu secundo*. We shall speak later⁵⁶ of the Molinistic views on the good specification needed in performing a good act.

329. Difficulties against the Molinistic system:

1) We have already⁵⁷ seen that the predefinition of graces *in actu primo* cannot be reconciled with any universal salvific will, not even with the minimum degree of it. We saw that predefinition *in actu secundo* does not in itself contradict some degree of the salvific will. However actually, as we saw,⁵⁸ the Molinists who hold this view do not take into account the revealed force of the salvific will.

2) The Molinists would not deny that the absence of resistance⁵⁹ is at least logically presupposed before positive consent, but they do not speak of this absence as the first critical condition on which all else depends. They admit that man cannot of himself, by his natural power, make a positive salutary consent, but they say that he can do so by the help of the grace that is offered him, i.e., that grace at once, when it comes, confers this power on him. In this way they avoid the error of the Semipelagians, who said that the beginning of the process of salvation could be carried out by merely natural powers. But the Molinists do not say this: In their view, grace makes the beginning by giving man the power of positive consent. Only after this comes the consent.

We concede that this explanation does not, at least not clearly, contradict the sources of revelation. However, it does not harmonize with them so fully and readily as does the explanation we saw briefly in chapter 7, and which we will see more fully in this chapter. For in Molinism, even though it is grace that gives the power to consent, and cooperates with man, the work of the man himself seems to be the chief thing in consent. But St. Paul says that:⁶⁰ ". . . for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure." These words at least seem to give a lesser role to man in the consent. Similarly, the Council of Orange says that⁶¹ "in every good work, we do not begin." Certainly, as we shall soon see, St. Thomas does not agree with the Molinists on this point.

3) Human freedom seems to be greatly reduced in Molinism, as we saw in chapter 15.⁶²

4) As we saw in chapter 15,⁶³ the first essential step in the process as described by Molinism is God's foreknowledge of futuribles, i.e. what Mark would do if placed in such an order in such circumstances, and with such a grace. Now although it is probable that St. Thomas did not deny that God knows these futuribles, actually, he says nothing about them at all. So we could hardly suppose that an element on which he is totally silent could be the first essential step in his explanation.

Later in this chapter we will show in a positive way what is the real opinion of St. Thomas on the efficacy of grace and we will see that it is quite different from Molinism.

IV. The system of the Augustinians

330. Presentation of the system: The Augustinians hold a theory very similar to that of the older Thomists inasmuch as they say that sufficient and efficacious grace differ intrinsically by their very nature. But they have in common with Molinism the belief that the motion of grace is moral rather than physical: the theory of the victorious pleasure.

331. Difficulties against the Augustinian system:

1) As we shall see below,⁶⁴ merely moral motion seems to fit less well with revelation.

2) It is not true that grace always moves by way of pleasure or delight. It can move in other ways too.

3) If this system is understood in such a way that there is a predefinition of graces *in actu primo*, as in Aquavivan Molinism, it cannot harmonize with even a minimum universal salvific will. As we saw in chapter 13,⁶⁵ St. Augustine himself, whom the Augustinians wish to follow, actually did, in many passages, deny the universality of the salvific will, and held the theory of the *massa damnata*, which is incompatible with the universal salvific will.

V. The Syncretistic systems

332. Presentation of the system:

1) The syncretism of St. Alphonsus and the Sorbonne: This system holds that for easier works an extrinsically efficacious grace will be enough (the grace would be efficacious *in actu secundo*), but for the more difficult works there is need of an intrinsically efficacious grace. The efficacy comes, however, not from a physical but from a moral motion. This efficacious grace can always be obtained by prayer and an extrinsically efficacious grace is enough for prayer. To prove their system, these theologians make more use of the sources of revelation than of metaphysics.

2) More recent Syncretisms: There are several. An outstanding example is that of His Excellency, Archbishop P. Parente:⁶⁶ "In a free act, we must distinguish the *exercise*, or the actuation of the faculty itself, and the *specification*, which [comes] from the intellect proposing a good object. The divine motion or grace *efficiently* and *immediately* determines the exercise of the act; but for the specification of the act [grace] can concur only *mediately*, namely, by moving the intellect and illumining it so that it may judge rightly about the objects to be desired." This system holds that sufficient grace is frustrable both intrinsically or psychologically, and extrinsically. It really does suffice for the easier works. However efficacious grace is "a more powerful movement, and so [it is] apt not only for actuating the will, but also for restraining the passions and for overcoming obstacles, so that the salutary act certainly follows. The efficacy is *intrinsic* to the grace itself, but [is] not violent. Rather, it acts in the line of exercise, strengthening the will. But in the line of *specification*, grace illumines the intellect so vividly that it presents the object to the will under the light of the Supreme Good, and closely connected with it. Then the will, whose adequate object is the *Supreme Good*, is spontaneously and infallibly borne along to the particular object, in which a certain characteristic of the Supreme Good shines forth."

333. Difficulties against the Syncretistic systems:

1) They seem subject to the same difficulties as Molinism in regard to the power of positive consent.⁶⁷

2) There is no need to distinguish easier and more difficult works. Grace can equally accomplish all works.

3) As we shall see later⁶⁸ in this chapter, St. Thomas seems to hold that the motion of grace is physical, and this view harmonizes most readily with revelation.

These authors are much to be praised in that they try to follow strict theological method, beginning with revelation and the Magisterium rather than with metaphysics. They deserve praise too for retaining a true universal salvific will, since even efficacious grace is within man's power inasmuch as he can always obtain it by prayer, for which sufficient grace really does suffice.

VI. System of Marín-Sola and Muñiz

334. Presentation of the system: As we have already seen,⁶⁹ these excellent theologians taught that every grace is intrinsically efficacious, and that it moves man physically, not just morally. Yet they still taught that not every grace is infrustrable, incapable of being impeded. In regard to an impedible movement they taught:⁷⁰ "An impedible and frustrable motion does not mean a motion that always is impeded and frustrated, or a motion that never accomplishes anything; but [it means] a motion that . . . can be impeded even though as a matter of fact it is not impeded." They held that a man really can resist an impedible motion, but that if he does not, grace itself will move him further, to positive consent. However, as we saw above, they held that impedible movements do not suffice for perseverance: unimpedible motions are needed for that. But they held that perseverance is given to those who do that which they can with the previous graces.

335. Difficulties against this system: These theologians deserve great praise because in almost every respect they have faithfully followed the description St. Thomas gave (as we saw it in chapter 14) of the process of granting grace. However, as we saw in chapter 14, St. Thomas at least probably does not say that an infrustrable grace is needed for perseverance, since he puts that grace under the same general principle as other graces: he says it is given to those who do not resist. His words do not strictly exclude the view of these theologians but neither do they teach it: one would have to add a distinction that St. Thomas neither expresses nor implies. Also, they speak of sufficient and efficacious graces: St. Thomas, as we have seen,⁷¹ does not have such a distinction.

It is clear from revelation⁷² that the gift of perseverance (its internal element) is not infrustrable.

VII. The Teaching of the Sources of Revelation

336. The chief principles: We saw already in chapter 7 many things from Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils that should enter into the solution, namely:

- 1) Man by himself, without grace, cannot do any positive salutary good. He cannot even make the beginning of a salutary work.
- 2) Yet man can, by his own power, decide when and whether he will do evil. For he can fail by his own power. And he can resist grace.⁷³ It is

clear especially from the Council of Trent that man can actually and effectively resist the ordinary graces of the internal economy.⁷⁴

3) Man can also, in the sense explained⁷⁵ in chapter 7, omit resistance to grace, even if he is a sinner (at least if he is not hardened).

4) The councils distinguish, as we have seen, between the beginning of good work, and the further course of the same work. For as the Council of Orange teaches, it is not we who make the beginning: grace does that alone, and we do nothing. But in making the positive consent, as Trent teaches, we truly, actively cooperate.

5) God can, when He so wills, move the hearts of men infrustrably, so as to forestall or even cancel out resistance. But to do this belongs to extraordinary providence.

337. Deductions from the principles:

1) *The critical condition:* We must ask where is the first, most fundamental and critical condition on which the outcome depends, if God offers grace? We saw above⁷⁶ that the Molinists put it in the positive consent itself. But it is possible to find a better answer, which will escape the difficulties under which Molinism lies. For the critical condition should meet the following requirements: (a) It should come before any other condition, (b) it should be able to control or condition the whole outcome so that, given this condition, everything else follows infallibly. (c) It should not be a salutary work in itself.-But, there is such a condition: the absence of resistance in the first part of the process of the grant of grace (as described in chapter 7).⁷⁷ For this condition (a) comes before any other condition, before man does anything, (b) it can and does control the outcome, because, once it is had, God, who works in us both the will and the accomplishment, certainly will work the positive consent (otherwise, He would not have given grace, if He did not will to do so). And most certainly God will work that consent if we do not resist. (c) It is not a salutary work in itself, simply because it is not an act, but the mere absence of a bad act, as we saw above.⁷⁸ It is an ontological zero: man *does nothing*.

2) *Passivity:* However, when Scripture says that God works in us both the will and the performance, it certainly does not mean to say that we are merely passive, like inanimate things. We are certain of this fact from the interpretation of the Council of Trent, as we saw above.⁷⁹ And yet, we must hold, from the teaching of the Council of Orange that⁸⁰ ". . . in every good work, we do not begin." So we must make a distinction between the beginning of a good work and the further course of the process up to and including the consent.

338. 3) *General schema:* All the above mentioned elements can be easily arranged as follows:

a) God offers a grace to a man and begins to move him by it, bringing it about that the man, in his mind, sees the goodness of the thing that grace proposes. Grace also moves his will to be favourably disposed to that goodness. In this beginning, the man

does not move himself: grace makes the beginning, as the Council of Orange teaches.

b) However, even after these things have been done the man can resist if he wishes. But he is also capable of omitting resistance, of merely doing nothing (without a positive decision to do nothing). This omission of resistance is the first fundamental, basic critical condition since, as we said above, when it is had, God will work the will (the positive consent) in us.

c) If man does not resist, God works in him both the will and the accomplishment, but in such a way that the man himself, in making the positive consent, really and actively cooperates with grace. For even though he can do nothing without grace, yet with grace he can do anything. Our ability and our contribution in making the consent come partly from our permanent faculties that God gave us in advance and conserved in being, partly from the very power of the grace that is then moving us.

339. We are obviously far from Pelagianism and Semipelagianism in this explanation, for in the fullest sense we say that we can do nothing positive and salutary without grace and that it is not we who make the beginning. Grace comes first. Then there is room still for resistance or the absence thereof. Finally, if we do not resist, God Himself moves us to consent, in such a way however, that we truly and actively cooperate with grace. Therefore we can say in the full sense with St. Augustine:⁸¹ "He works, then, without us, so that we may will, but when we do will, and will in such a way as to act, He cooperates with us. . . ."

VIII. The Opinion of St. Thomas

A. General Principles

340. Positive salutary good: In regard to first justification St. Thomas teaches, with the Council of Orange, that God does not need to wait for⁸² the consent of our will: instead, this consent is the effect of grace:⁸³ ". . . when we are being justified, we consent to the justice of God by the movement of our free will. However, that movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect of grace . . ."

It is not only in the first justification that we are not able to make a positive salutary consent by ourselves: the same is true of other graces. St. Thomas says: "There is in us a twofold act. First, *the interior act of the will*. In that act, our will is moved, and God is the mover. . . . And so inasmuch as God moves the human soul to this act [grace] is called *operating grace*. The other act is the *exterior act*: since this act is commanded by the will . . . it follows that an operation is attributed to the will towards this act. And because even in this act God helps us . . . in respect to this act [grace] is called *cooperating grace*.⁸⁴ Hence . . . St. Augustine says:⁸⁵ 'He operates so that we may will: but when we will, He cooperates with us so that we accomplish.'"

We notice the distinction St. Thomas makes between the interior and the exterior act. We must admit that he does not speak with all

desirable clarity. For at first sight, his words might be taken to mean that we do nothing even in the positive consent, so that it would be only in the execution after the consent that we would do anything. Of course, St. Thomas cannot mean this, for then he would say that we would be altogether passive in the consent itself, like an inanimate thing. But this would contradict the definition of the Council of Trent:⁸⁶

"If anyone says that the free will of man . . . does not cooperate at all in assenting to God who arouses and calls . . . and that he could not dissent if he wishes but that like a sort of lifeless thing he does nothing at all and is purely passive, let him be anathema."

So it is clear that St. Thomas does not mean that we do nothing at all in producing the positive consent itself.

But it is likewise clear that the "interior act" of the will (in regard to which St. Thomas says that in it "our will is moved and God is the mover") is not lacking in any decision. For it is not only in the first justification that there is such an interior act of the will. Nor is it true only of the first justification that at the start our will is merely moved while God alone is the mover, since the Council of Orange teaches that "in every good work, we do not begin." We gather the same conclusion from the words that St. Thomas cites from St. Augustine: "He operates so that we may will: but when we will, He cooperates with us so that we accomplish." For in every decision, it is not we who make the beginning: grace begins. But after that, "when we will", i.e., in the very act of making the positive consent, we are not "like a sort of lifeless thing." Rather, the operation is attributed, in part, to the human will and grace cooperates.

Therefore, even though St. Thomas, in speaking of operating grace, did not have in mind solely the first part of the process (for in some instances the entire process, even after the absence of resistance, is carried on by operating grace), yet, in the reception of every grace there is a first stage of which it is true to say that our will is moved; and God alone is the mover: for in every good work, it is not we who begin, but grace. Further, in every instance in which our will makes a positive consent, there is also a second stage in which we are no longer passive but we too work and grace works with us.

It is plain that this teaching of St. Thomas is the same as that of the Councils of Orange and Trent.⁸⁷ For Orange teaches that "in every good work, we do not begin." And Trent adds that we are "not like a sort of lifeless thing [that] does nothing at all." So, Orange teaches that in the first stage we do nothing, i.e., do not move ourselves: we do not make the beginning. But Trent adds that in the second stage we really cooperate in making the positive consent. It is clear too that after grace makes the beginning,⁸⁸ we are still able to resist or to merely do nothing to omit resistance.

341. The negative conditions: St. Thomas explicitly teaches that we can resist and omit resistance and he holds that this resistance or its

omission is the condition according to which every grace is either received or rejected.⁸⁹ ". . . although a man, by the movement of his free will, can neither merit nor obtain divine grace, yet he can impede himself from receiving it. . . . And since this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace, not undeservingly is he charged with a fault who sets up an impediment to grace. For God, so far as He is concerned, is ready to give grace to all, 'for He wills all men to be saved. . . .' but they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, when the sun illumines the world, he is charged with a fault who closes his eyes, if any evil comes of it, although he cannot see unless he first has the light of the sun."

The context of this passage shows, as we saw in chapter 14,⁹⁰ that St. Thomas is speaking about *all graces*, including the grace of first justification (in regard to which he says simply that our consent is the effect of grace), and the grace of final perseverance. And in regard to all he says that we are able to impede or not impede grace.

Hence Cajetan says well that even in the first stage, when our will is moved by God alone and does not move itself at all,⁹¹ ". . . [our will] is free *because it can dissent* from such a volition." And similarly, P. Lumbreras, OP, says:⁹² ". . . when the presentation [of the good object] has been made by the intellect, the will can dissent or resist. Since it is moved freely, the will is said to consent; it [the will] elicits the act of free will, to which however, it does not move itself but is merely moved [by grace]." Hence St. Thomas himself says that in the infusion of virtue, we do not act, but yet we consent:⁹³ ". . . infused virtue is caused in us by God, without our acting, but not, however, without our consenting. . . ." For, even though our will does not move itself, yet, it really does condition the whole outcome inasmuch as it does not resist when it really could resist.

It becomes clear at what point the resistance or non-resistance occurs of which St. Thomas speaks.⁹⁴ As Father Lumbreras says: ". . . when the presentation [of the good object] has been made by the intellect, the will can dissent or resist." That is, at first, grace shows something to our mind as good. Before grace does this, we could not speak of resistance to this grace, since there is not yet anything to resist. At once, before any deliberation on our part, there follows an effect in the will, for as soon as our mind sees some good, our will cannot fail to have at least an indeliberate movement of initial complacency. Grace itself moves the will to this. Hence St. Augustine says of the first stage: "He [God alone] operates so that we may will."

So, when we have perceived that grace, without us, has caused our mind to see good, and our will to have an initial indeliberate complacency, we can still resist, or not resist. If we resist, then, according to St. Thomas, grace does not complete its work, and the positive consent does not follow. But if we merely do nothing (do not

resist), grace is accepted or received, in the full sense, for then the positive consent takes place. Grace moves us to this positive consent in such a way that we are simultaneously being moved by grace and moving ourselves by the power received from grace.

B. General conspectus of St. Thomas's solution

342. The first logical moment: Both by a movement of the natural order and by grace in the supernatural order, God begins to move a man towards good. As the Council of Orange says: ". . . in every good work, we do not begin." Grace proposes to this man, by way of his intellect, a specified⁹⁵ good and moves his intellect to a simple apprehension of the good so as to produce also in his will an indeliberate initial complacency in that good. In this logical moment, the human will really elicits a good act, (or, if one prefers, God elicits the act from that will), but the will does not move itself: it is moved by God alone. The will does not yet have the power of positive consent. But it can impede or not impede this grace. If it impedes, the movement of the grace terminates (unless it is an extraordinary, infrustrable grace⁹⁶) and goes no farther.

But if man merely does not resist, does nothing: the movement of grace continues in the second logical moment.

343. The second logical moment: The divine movement, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, continues, since the condition of non-resistance is present. As a result of this movement, the man becomes active: he is both moved and moving himself by divine power, so that his intellect deliberates and makes the practical judgment and his will positively chooses the good.

Is it one and the same grace that acts in both the first and the second moments? We see no reason for supposing two graces.⁹⁷ However, to do so would have no consequential effect on our explanation.

C. Detailed study of the various elements of the solution

344. Resistance: We have already seen from our study of the sources of revelation in chapter 7 that man can really resist grace (and omit resistance, in the sense explained previously).⁹⁸ But revelation does not tell us precisely *how* resistance can be explained. We must, then, proceed by speculative means.

Since the good apprehended by the intellect is not the beatific vision, but is something less (and it may not be entirely good, for even though moral goodness may be present, pleasurable or useful goodness may be lacking), it is possible for the will not to will *this* moral good *at this time*.⁹⁹ So, while the will is still in the first logical moment, during which it does not move itself, but is moved only by grace, while the will is in act (the act of complacency), it can freely cease from or drop out of this act. In resistance, first of all the will ceases from this act of complacency; then, the will orders the intellect to cease to attend to the moral goodness.

We said that the *first* thing that takes place is the cessation from act on the part of the will: (1) Because the intellect cannot *freely* cease to attend, since it is not a *free* faculty. Nor could it, as it were, mechanically fail, running out of energy: for it is moved to the apprehension of good by grace; (2) Because it is necessary to suppose that at least the principal part or initiating factor in the decisive condition, according to which God will or will not move the man to the exercise of the sinful act, must be in the will. Otherwise, sin would be altogether or at least largely error or inadvertence, and so the fault would be more in God than in man.

In the explanation we have proposed, there is error or inadvertence involved in the act of sinning, but the first error is contained and implied in the very cessation of the will from act, and is inseparable from that cessation. After that, the error is increased by the inconsideration to which the will commands the intellect. These defects come before the positive evil movement of the will by which the sin is completed. So, in this way, sin does presuppose error or inadvertence.

In commanding the intellect to cease attention to the moral goodness, the will does need a divine movement (since that command involves ontological good). But the will does not need a divine movement *in ceasing from or dropping out of act*. To cease from act is not to pass from potency *to act* (which would require a divine movement) but is the opposite: a falling away *from act*. Now since God moves the will from within, as the author of nature, without violence, the complacency is really elicited by the will as *its own* complacency: so the will can merely discontinue that which is its own, without the need of a divine movement towards ceasing. Nor is there any need to work against a force coming from without: the will merely ceases *its own* complacency, its own motion. No divine motion is required to cease a motion.

St. Augustine, then, says well:¹⁰⁰ "Let . . . no one seek for the efficient cause of evil will; for [the cause] is not efficient but deficient; for that is not efficiency but deficiency." And St. Thomas, alluding to this passage of St. Augustine, says:¹⁰¹ ". . . Augustine says that the will is the cause of sin inasmuch as it is deficient; but he compares that defect to silence or darkness, since that defect is solely *negation*." Now man has a negation within his power without the help of God. Hence, as we have seen, in the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas explicitly teaches that,¹⁰² "this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace . . ." Hence St. Thomas also says:¹⁰³ ". . . the *first* cause of the lack of grace is from us. . . .", that is, in resistance to grace. Still earlier, in his commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas had explained the same point more fully:¹⁰⁴ "Now this lacking of grace comes about as a result of two things: both because [the man] himself does not will to receive [it], and because God does not infuse it into him, or does not will to infuse it into him. But the

sequence of these two is such that *the second does not happen except on condition that the first has happened*. . . . It is clear, then that the *absolutely first cause* of this lack [of grace] is on the part of the man who lacks the grace; but on the part of God there is no cause of this lack, except on condition of that which is the cause on the part of man." So human resistance comes in absolutely the first place.

345. By resistance we take away from the good specification. As John of St. Thomas explains:¹⁰⁵ ". . . a privation is specified by the form from which it takes away." Or, in a passage of St. Thomas himself, we read:¹⁰⁶ "For when something is in the due disposition for receiving the movement of the first mover, a perfect action follows according to the intention of the first mover; but if it is not in the due disposition and aptitude to receive the movement of the first mover, an imperfect action follows; and then, what action there is, is attributed to the first mover, as its cause; but what defect there is, is not attributed to the first mover. . . . Whatever deordination or deformity is there does not have God as its cause, but *solely* free will."

The good specification begins to be taken away when the will ceases from complacency. For the divine movement that had been given to the will was already in itself specified to a particular good.¹⁰⁷ Then, as we said above, the will commands the intellect to cease to attend to the moral goodness (in this command it needs divine movement for the exercise of the command). In this way the goodness is removed from the specification, and a defective specification remains. This being done, God moves the man to the completion of the sinful act.

346. *The absence of resistance:* As we have already seen,¹⁰⁸ there are two kinds of non-resistance. One type is a positive decision, a complete act, done with the formal intention of abstaining from resistance or from sin. This first kind is a positive salutary good act, and, as such, requires the movement of grace.

But we are speaking of the absence of resistance in another sense, of a non-resistance that is not a decision, nor an act of the will, but the mere absence of a bad decision in the first part of the process of conferring a grace: man merely does nothing, an ontological zero. This is a mere negative condition, and is in our own power.

347. The matter will be clearer from a more detailed description of the entire process. We could depict it this way: In the first logical moment, God begins to move a man by grace. Even before the man deliberates, grace comes, and causes him to perceive some good in his intellect, and to have an initial complacency in the good in his will. Grace makes this beginning alone, as we said, before man does anything or deliberates. However, we do not say that man does not perceive the good. Grace itself does cause the intellect to perceive the good and causes the will to feel an initial complacency in it. Since these effects began and continue by the power of grace, it is not required that the man do anything in order that they may continue. So they continue by

the power of the grace until the man either resists or (if he does not resist) until grace moves further, even to positive consent in the second logical moment (in which man actively cooperates, by power received from grace). It cannot happen that these effects would leave before man would resist, for grace is not withdrawn unless the man does resist. (Nor could we suppose that the grace itself would remain, but its effects would cease—for then man would perceive nothing to resist, since he does not perceive the grace directly, but only the effects of grace. So if he did not perceive anything to resist, he would surely not resist. And if he did not resist, grace would continue and move him to consent).

So these effects in the intellect and the will continue by the power of grace. Something from us¹⁰⁹ would be required in order to interrupt these effects, for if nothing happens against them, they continue by the power of grace. But nothing is required from man in order that they may continue, neither a new advertence, nor a decision—since they continue by the power of grace. St. Thomas says well:¹¹⁰ ". . . [something] can be voluntary without any act; sometimes without an exterior act [but] with an interior act, as when one *wills not to act*; sometimes however without even an interior act, as when one *does not will*."

It is not necessary that these effects in the intellect and will remain for a long time. Everything can be done in an instant. For immediately after grace causes us to see the good and to have a complacency in it, we can resist, or can do nothing. If we do nothing (do not resist), the grace continues, moving us to the positive consent. It is true, though, that there is sometimes a long struggle. For grace does not always give us at once the power of a full victory, but may give us first the power for various acts and decisions against a temptation (e.g., the power to pray or to distract ourselves from the temptation), and may only later give us the full victory. And even after an explicit decision against the temptation, the temptation can come back, so that a new decision may be needed. But in carrying out each of these, there will be the process we have described, in which the omission of resistance in the first stage is the critical condition. We may feel difficulty because we do not conquer fully at once and because in doing these things we really cooperate (after the omission of resistance in the first stage of each decision).

348. It is evident that if a man omits resistance in the sense just described he does not perform a morally good act, nor does he act well: he simply does not act. A positive decision to abstain from resistance would be a morally good act. But no decision at all is neither good nor bad. It has no moral goodness by reason of its object: nothing is done. Nor by reason of the end: for the will proposes no end or goal for itself: it merely does nothing.

349. But let us add a speculation: Even if there were a positive decision made not to do anything against grace, this decision would probably not be morally good *if it came in the first part of the process* which we have described. To see this, we must consider the matter very strictly and carefully. First, for the exercise of the act of this decision, a divine motion would be required. But even in a bad decision this is required, and it is always provided. We must ask next: Would a divine motion be needed for the specification of the act? Probably not, since such a specification would be neither good nor bad. For a moral act is determined by its object, end, and circumstances. We can, of course, omit mention of circumstances in a general discussion. The object would be by nature neutral: man would neither choose good (grace) nor would he choose evil by rejecting grace. The end would be similarly neutral: the man would still not will good nor would he will evil. For there would not be a formal intention such as: "I will to abstain from sin." The formality would be solely: "*I do not wish to do anything now.*" In other words, the decision would not be made under the formality of moral good, but solely under the formality of pleasurable good: it would please him to do nothing. Or it might come out of mere inertia.

But the objection may be made that if there is a real decision of the will, then, since all concrete acts must be either good or evil, if the act is not evil, it is by that fact good. We reply to this objection: St. Thomas himself gives us the principles that lead to the conclusion that no concrete act can be indifferent.¹¹¹ But let us notice the reason he gives. It is this: Man is *obliged* to order his acts positively towards his ultimate end. If man does not do this, by that very fact he turns aside from the end. But, in our case, the man has not yet received the positive power of ordering his act toward his ultimate end, since he is still in the first logical moment of the action, and the act is not yet complete. If the act were complete, it would have to be either good or evil. But in the first moment, there is still no complete act nor does the obligation of directing the act to the ultimate end bind yet, precisely because the power of directing the act to the ultimate end has not yet been given. St. Thomas makes a similar comment on a rather similar case:¹¹² ". . . the non-use of the rule of reason and divine law is presupposed in the will before an inordinate choice. It is not necessary to seek for any cause of this non-use of the afore-mentioned rule; for the very freedom of the will, by which it can act or not act, suffices for this. And the very non-attention to such a rule, considered in itself, is neither culpable nor punishable evil." But certainly, St. Thomas would not say that the non-use of the rule of reason is good.

350. The good specification: Both theologians and philosophers dispute whether man can or cannot produce the good specification, even in the natural order. The older Thomists say that the will in itself is indeterminate. They say that in producing the good specification,

there is a passage from potency to act: man does not suffice of himself to bring this passage about. Hence it is required, they say, that God remove the will of man by a specified movement. The Molinists reply that¹¹³ ". . . the indifference of the will is active and eminent, containing eminently the perfection of its act . . ." Both sides cite various texts of St. Thomas for their view.

We hold that the specification is already contained in the grace itself. (We are speaking of the simplest kind of case, and of a case in which there is no choice made between several alternatives. We do not, of course, deny that God can make use of secondary causes in this process. At the end of this section we shall speak of the choice between several alternatives). We find reasons for our view both in the sources of revelation and in St. Thomas:

1) *In the sources of revelation:* No good decision of will is made unless it is preceded by a good thought. Now this good thought contains at least some good specification. For even in a general resolution such as "I want to do better," there is some good specification. Furthermore, most usually a more precisely specified thought comes, at least before the outward act follows.

Now according to St. Paul:¹¹⁴ "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our sufficiency is from God." And again, the Council of Orange taught:¹¹⁵ "If anyone asserts that we, by the good vigour of nature, are able to think anything that pertains to the salvation of eternal life as is expedient . . . without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit . . . he is deceived by a heretical spirit . . ." Now the very goodness of a good thought lies precisely in the good specification. Without it, the thought would not be good. If then we, by our own power, were able to produce this good specification, we could produce the goodness of a good thought.

But especially, if we have correctly interpreted the words of the councils, then, as we saw above,¹¹⁶ in the first stage of the process, before we do anything-for we do not make the beginning-God without us produces in our mind a simple apprehension of good and an indeliberate complacency in the will in the same good. But this simple apprehension of good is the same as the good thought or the beginning of the good thought, in which there is already at least some good specification. God works this good specification in us without us, inasmuch as He inspires us with this thought and inasmuch as He begins to move our will towards the same good, producing the indeliberate complacency in our will in the same specified good

2) *In the teaching of St. Thomas:* The conclusion is still clearer in the writings of St. Thomas. For, as we saw above, St. Thomas holds that in the first stage,¹¹⁷ "our soul is moved but does not move itself, since only God moves it." This, as we have seen, applies to both the intellect and the will, for at that point we have not yet moved ourselves at all. So it is plain that St. Thomas holds that God alone, without us, works

this good thought, in which is contained the good specification. And he holds that God alone moves our will to the initial indeliberate complacency in this specified good.

This conclusion is strongly confirmed by many other passages of St. Thomas. We shall see many of these below¹¹⁸ and will consider and explain also some texts that at first sight seem to teach the opposite.¹¹⁹

Whenever a man makes a choice between several alternatives: God could send him, even in the first logical moment, several specified graces; so that the intellect would see several goods, and the will would have initial complacency in each. Man could then resist all, or all but one.

Or, both in such a case of choice among several alternatives, and in a case in which man comes by a process of discursive reasoning to consider one alternative, grace could move the reason of man to deliberate, and by deliberation to come to see one or more specified goods. Grace would cause the will to have an initial complacency in the one or more goods. Then the man could resist all or all but one (if several are seen).

Of course, God can, and often does, make use of secondary causes in making our mind see a good.

351. What is the source of the efficacy of grace: In our explanation, grace is intrinsically efficacious. For in it a man cannot and does not make grace to be efficacious, even though he can make it ineffective, by his resistance. For it is one thing to have the power of producing positive good; another thing to have the power of doing evil or of doing nothing against grace by non-resistance. So we can say in the fullest sense with St. Augustine:¹²⁰ "He works, then, without us, so that we may will, but when we do will, and will in such a way as to act, He cooperates with us. . . ." And we can say wholeheartedly with St. Paul:¹²¹ ". . . for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure."

The fact that a decision is good comes from God, since in the first decisive, critical moment (i.e., in the non-resistance, after which all else flows infallibly, since God then physically moves the will to the positive consent)¹²² man's contribution is a mere negative, doing nothing, an ontological zero. But in negatives there is no good—neither ontological nor moral good.

352. Sufficient and efficacious grace: From what we have already said it is obvious that there are not two graces specifically different from one another, of which one, either extrinsically or intrinsically, would infallibly produce no good act, while the other always would produce a good act. Every grace is efficacious in itself, and the entire efficacy comes from the grace. We can see now why St. Thomas himself, although in the *Prima Secundae* he gives so many divisions and subdivisions of grace, never divides grace into sufficient and

efficacious. For as far as their nature is concerned, in the ordinary providence of the internal economy, sufficient and efficacious graces are absolutely the same.¹²³

This conclusion fits excellently with so many things that we said in the first part of this book about the love of God. For how could one explain why God, who so vehemently loves men, and gives to all¹²⁴ "a rich abundance of divine graces," out of the infinite titles established for each individual, would deliberately and purposely want to give a man an inefficacious grace as such? Well did Our Lord in the Gospel compare our Father with a sower of seed: for no sower knowingly and purposely sows ineffective seed.

In regard to the names "sufficient" and "efficacious"-if one wants to employ them, he can certainly do so within our system, provided that he means by them no more than a grace that actually, in a concrete case, does or does not produce a good work, and provided that he does not say that efficacious graces are chosen by God as such *in actu primo*. But it is really better to imitate the example of St. Thomas, and abstain entirely from the use of these two terms.

353. Physical premotion: In our explanation, there is a true physical motion, not just a moral motion.

1) This at least seems to be contained in the words of St. Paul ". . . for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure." The words "at work" would seem to fit poorly with a merely moral movement.

2) It is perfectly clear that St. Thomas holds that the movement is physical. For, as we have seen, he says of the first stage that in it¹²⁵ "our soul is moved but does not move itself, since only God moves it." Now if the will *does not move itself*, and God alone moves it, it is plain that a physical movement is required. For in a moral movement, the will at least to some extent would move itself, under the attraction of the good proposed to it. Similarly, St. Thomas says of the second stage that in it¹²⁶ "our soul is both moved and moves itself." Now the word "is moved" certainly has the same sense in this second citation from the same sentence of the same body of the same article. Therefore, if in the first stage God moves physically, as we have seen, then it is clear that in the second stage God not only gives us the power of moving ourselves, but also, at the same time, physically moves us. (We shall see more, confirmatory texts of St. Thomas below).¹²⁷

But the motion we hold can also be called a premotion inasmuch as the beginning of the divine motion (a motion already specified in itself)¹²⁸ precedes our consent, and the whole process is begun by God in the stage in which the man does not move himself. For as the Council of Orange teaches:¹²⁹ "In every good work, we do not begin."

However, since St. Thomas himself does not use the term "physical premotion" but simply speaks of the motion from God, we are content to follow his example.

We notice too that in our explanation, there is no problem about reconciling a physical motion with human freedom, not only because the power of God is altogether transcendent, but also because God, within ordinary providence,¹³⁰ permits man to resist or not resist even *in sensu composito*¹³¹ if man so wishes. For the physical movement from God in the first stage stops short, temporarily, after producing the simple apprehension of good in the man's intellect, and the initial complacency in his will. And the physical movement that produces the positive consent is given only on and after the condition of non-resistance.

D. Infrustrable grace, and vehement frustrable graces

354. The existence of infrustrable grace: We hold that God can, when He so wishes move the will of man physically and infrustrably in such a way as to forestall or even cancel out the resistance of that man, without taking away *secondary*¹³² freedom. We say this because of the transcendence of God. We saw above¹³³ the reasons from revelation.

There are many passages in St. Thomas that make it clear that he holds this view, e.g.,¹³⁴ "in the supposition that God moves a [human] will to something, it is impossible to simultaneously suppose that the will would not be moved to it." In fact, St. Thomas holds that the transcendence of God is such that He can produce a contingent effect infallibly, and do so even without the use of secondary, intermediate, contingent causes:¹³⁵ "According as He has disposed that some things should occur in one way or another [i.e., necessarily or contingently] He provides for them causes in the manner He has planned; however, He could produce this mode in things even without those causes as intermediaries."

355. The divine use of infrustrable grace: As we saw in chapter 7,¹³⁶ God does not move men infrustrably within ordinary providence.

356. The explanation of infrustrable grace: If by an infrustrable grace we mean one that is such that from the very intrinsic nature of the grace itself it is impossible that it would not have the intended effect (in contrast to a grace that is infallible only inasmuch as God foresees and plans that it will produce that effect), then the sole sufficient explanation of such a grace will be this: The transcendent power of God can so move a man that, within the process, described above,¹³⁷ a man will freely but infallibly not resist and yet will retain secondary freedom.

357. Vehement frustrable graces: It is plain that God could very often move men so that they actually would not resist, if He were to employ truly vehement movements, even though the movements would not be strictly infrustrable. For just as men are freely moved by the sex drive, but nevertheless, find the greatest difficulty in resisting, even with the help of the fear of hell and the promise of eternal reward, similarly, if God were to send a very vehement movement in a

matter that is *permissible*, so that no prohibition would stand in the way, few if any humans would resist.

So we must ask how it happens that God does not often use such movements.

In speaking of infrustrable graces, we said that God would contradict Himself if He were to regularly move men in this way, for He would then act regularly against or beyond the natural condition of the nature that He had created, instead of respecting it.¹³⁸

But there are also other ways in which God could contradict Himself and not respect the natural condition of the nature He had already decreed to make.¹³⁹ To make the situation clear, we need to make some preliminary considerations on certain conditions of human nature.

It is in accord with human nature that material and bodily things can be perceived more easily, clearly, and vehemently than spiritual things, precisely because the bodily things are the natural objects of our senses and are present to those senses. The body readily feels the objects that are naturally suited to its appetites. The movement of the human will towards these objects tends not to exceed in vehemence a certain proportion to the force of these perceptions. But spiritual goods, on the other hand, are not perceived by any sense. It is true, moral goods are perceived by our intellect by mere reason even in the natural order. But the perception is not so vehement, since they are perceived only by way of reason, and the perception receives no intensification from direct sensory perception of the moral goodness. The motion of the will naturally tends not to exceed in vehemence a certain proportion to the strength of this rational perception.

Now man's receptivity to movements of grace is affected by bodily conditions, since the body and the spirit are so united that they form one individual, one person, in whom whatever takes place on one side is tied, as it were, to a sort of resonance on the other side. For example, even though the soul has a spiritual intellect, yet, there will be no thought in this spiritual intellect if the bodily brain is damaged severely by disease or in any other way. Even the very virtue of faith has a somatic resonance. This is evident from a theoretical consideration of the relation we have just described. It also appears strikingly in a case described by Father T. V. Moore, the noted Carthusian Psychiatrist. A certain patient, who suffered from manic-depressive insanity, seemed to himself, in the depressive phase, to be losing his faith. Dr. Moore explained it as follows:¹⁴⁰ "Throughout all his depressions there remains a steady blind faith that is unaffected. It is the resonance of faith that disappears because God allows it to cease." So, the insanity was not really able to destroy the virtue of faith that the man previously had, though it was able to impede the activity of faith. In a similar vein, St. Thomas explains how it is that God sometimes sends to a man some special foreknowledge that He might

not have sent otherwise, on the occasion provided by apt somatic conditions that are present either in sleep or in sickness:¹⁴¹ "[The human mind in such a state] is helped by some superior spirit, created or uncreated, good or evil . . . for [the mind] is weighed down by the weight of the body, and, while it applies itself to things of sense, it is less capable of higher things; and so, when it is withdrawn from the senses either by sleep or by sickness, or in some other way, it becomes thereby more apt for receiving the impression of a higher spirit."

Therefore, since, as we have seen, moral and spiritual goods are not normally and naturally perceived with great vehemence, nor is the will vehemently carried towards them since the vehemence of the will's motion normally does not exceed the vehemence of the perception in the mind, it is clear that if God were to vehemently move a man to a spiritual object, He would not be respecting the natural condition of the man. So, *motions of grace that are vehement (in comparison to the condition of the receiver) are by their very nature extraordinary.*

Of course, to understand this conclusion properly, we must note that the somatic receptivity varies from person to person, and varies much within a given person. It varies especially as a man grows in the spiritual life. Spiritual progress is and must be, in general, gradual since human nature does not take great leaps in the development of its receptivity and other characteristics. So a man can gradually become better disposed both in his soul and in his somatic resonance. Hence the vehemence of the motions that would be extraordinary, as not respecting his natural condition, will vary. A movement that would be quite fitting and which would harmonize with natural somatic resonance in a great saint who is in the highest part of the unitive way would be quite different, much greater than that which would be suitable for a man in the lower parts of the purgative way.

There is also possible a deterioration in the somatic resonance, when a man becomes gradually hardened. For by his repeated sins, the man affects not only the state of his soul, but also his somatic resonance. If he continues in repeated sins, he can so change, for the worse, his conditions of soul and his somatic resonance that he will be almost entirely incapable of perceiving an ordinary grace.¹⁴² Then he will perish, unless an extraordinary grace comes. But, it is evident that a man cannot fall into such a state without a grave cause, namely, his own repeated grave faults. (Grave illness at the end of life might also sufficiently alter his state of resonance so that he could then perceive even an ordinary grace).

We notice especially that somatic resonance can change more rapidly at times of great trials or great sickness, since these upset the entire somatic complexion. Perhaps this is, at least in part, the explanation underlying the words of Christ Himself to St. Paul:¹⁴³ ". . . power is made perfect in weakness."

E. Confirmations from other passages of St. Thomas

358. Practically all schools of theologians think they can find passages of St. Thomas to support their position. But it is not hard to see that some theologians prefer some texts, and seldom if ever cite certain other texts, while still others prefer others, and seldom if ever cite those preferred by the other theologians

There are two principal series of passages in St. Thomas. The older Thomists cite mostly the first series; the Molinists, the second. In our explanation, we can without difficulty embrace all texts of both series.

359. First series of texts: in this series, St. Thomas stresses the action and power of God:

1) *De potentia* 3.7.c.: "God is the cause of every action in as much as any agent is the instrument of the divine power at work. . . . Thus, then, God is the cause of any action inasmuch as He gives the power of acting and inasmuch as He conserves it, and inasmuch as He applies it to the action, and inasmuch as every other power acts by His power. And when we add to the aforesaid the fact that God is His own power, and that He is within each thing, not as a part of its essence, but as holding the thing in being, it follows that He works immediately in every [creature] that works, not excluding the operation of the [created] will and nature."

Comments: Our explanation readily admits that God gives us our faculties and conserves them. It also teaches that God applies them to action, and explains how He works immediately, without excluding the operation of the created will and nature. For in the first logical moment, man has only the ability of impeding or not impeding. He is moved by grace, but does not yet move himself, nor does he yet have the power of making a positive acceptance of the divine grace that has begun to move him. But in the second logical moment, on condition that the man has previously merely done nothing against the grace, God works in him the consent, and does so physically, in such a way, however that he gives to the man also the power of moving himself so that he is not¹⁴⁴ "like a sort of lifeless thing," that "does nothing at all and is purely passive."

2) *Contra gentiles* 3.88-89: "Only . . . God can move the will as an agent and without violence. Hence it is written:¹⁴⁵ 'Like a stream is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord; wherever he wills, he directs it,' and ¹⁴⁶'it is God who in his good pleasure works in you both the will and the performance.' But some, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will, have tried to explain these texts badly: namely, in such a way as to say that God causes in us the will and the performance inasmuch as he causes in us the power of willing, but not in such a way that He causes us to will this or that. . . . This is, obviously, in opposition to the texts of Sacred Scripture. For it says:¹⁴⁷ 'O Lord . . . it is you who have

accomplished all we have done.' Hence, we have from God not only the power of willing, but also the operation [of that power]."

Comments: It is evident that in this text St. Thomas teaches the same as in the passage from *De potentia* cited above. It is equally evident that we teach the same.

3) *Contra gentiles* 3.92: "Always . . . does man choose this thing, according as God works in his will."

Comments: In this text St. Thomas speaks of the infallible efficacy of the divine will. But it is obvious that he does not intend to deny that which he says in the same book of the same work:¹⁴⁸ ". . . this is in the power of free will [namely] to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace. . . ." So the meaning is clear: In ordinary providence, God does not move the will as far as consent except on condition of human non-resistance. However, as often as God actually does move the will—whether He does it with or without (in extraordinary providence) the condition of absence of resistance—the will is infallibly moved, so that the man always chooses that to which God moves his will.

4) *Quodlibet XII, q.4*: ". . . [the providence of God] by which all things are predetermined. . . ."

Comments: All things are predetermined, but not in such a way that God never permits man¹⁴⁹ "to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace," but they are predetermined in the sense in which St. Thomas says in the *Summa* 1.19.6.c.: ". . . it is impossible for the divine will not to obtain its effect. Hence, that which seems to recede from the divine will according to one order, falls back into it according to another order: just as a sinner, who, so far as in him lies, recedes from the divine will by sinning, falls into the order of the divine will when he is punished by His justice." So we sum up: All things are predetermined; some things after prevision of resistance or non-resistance (within ordinary providence); some (in extraordinary providence) even without this prevision, or without respect to this prevision.

5) *Summa theologiae I-II.10.4. ad 3*: ". . . in the supposition that God moves a [human] will to something, it is impossible to simultaneously suppose that the will would not be moved to it."

Comments: These words are to be understood in the same sense as the passage from CG. 3.92 cited above.

6) *Summa theologiae I-II.112.3.c.*: "If God who moves so intends that the man whose heart He is moving, should obtain grace, man infallibly obtains it. . . ."

Comments: Again, the sense is the same as that of CG. 3.92 above.

7) *Summa theologiae I-II.9.1.c.*: ". . . a thing needs to be moved by another to the extent that it is in potency to many things. . . ."

Comments: St. Thomas says this in explaining that it is the intellect that moves the will in the process of specifying an act. But the intellect itself is not sufficient of itself for a good salutary thought: its

sufficiency is from God, as St. Paul says. For the intellect itself is also in potency to many things. Secondary causes can present specified objects to the intellect, but the process cannot go on in an infinite chain: so finally we must come to the First Cause, that is, to God. Similarly, St. Thomas says in another place:¹⁵⁰ ". . . it [the will] moves itself inasmuch as from the fact that it wills the end, it reduces itself to willing the things that are means to that end. But this presupposes deliberation. . . . the chain cannot go on to infinity. Hence it is necessary to say that the will makes its first movement under the influence of some exterior mover . . ."

360. Second series of texts: In this series, St. Thomas stresses human ability:

1) *2 Sentences d.25, q.1 a.1, ad 3*: ". . . the determination of the action and the end is placed in the power of free will; hence it retains its dominion over its act, though not in the same way as does the first agent."

2) *2 Sentences d.39, q.1, a.1*: ". . . for the power of the will itself, so far as it is concerned, is indifferent in regard to many things; but the fact that it goes forth to this determined act or that, comes not from someone else who determines it, but from the will itself."

3) *De potentia 3.7 ad 13*: ". . . the first cause does not so act in the will as to determine it necessarily to one alternative, as it determines nature; and so the determination of the act is left in the power of the reason and will."

4) *De potentia 1.4 ad 3*: ". . . even though the first cause has the greatest influence on the effect, yet, its influence is determined and specified by the proximate cause."

5) *De veritate 22.4.c*: "The closer any nature is to God, the more express the likeness of divine dignity that is found in it. Now this pertains to the divine dignity, that it moves all things, and inclines and directs [them, while] it itself is moved or inclined or directed by no other. Hence, the nearer any nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another, and the more it is made to incline itself. . . . The rational nature, which is the closest to God . . . has in its power the very inclination so that it is not necessary for it to be inclined to a desirable thing that it perceives, but it is able to be inclined or not to be inclined; and so the very inclination is not determined for it by another, but by itself."

6) *Summa theologiae. Prologue of I-II*: "Since, as St. John Damascene writes, man is said to be made to the image of God, inasmuch as 'image' means 'an intellectual being, with free will, and in its own power' . . . it remains for us to treat of His 'image,' that is, of man, according as he himself is the principle of his own works, as having free will, and power over his own works."

7) *Summa theologiae I-II-1.1.c*: ". . . [man] is the master of his own acts."

Comments: The words of St. Thomas in the texts cited above are very forceful. Over and over again he says that man can really determine what he will or will not do. He does not say this only in a relative sense, so that all a man could do would be to freely act out the part written in advance for him by God. Even in relation to God St. Thomas says, "even though the first cause has the greatest influence . . . its influence is *determined* and *specified* by the proximate cause." For man is truly "the master of his own acts" and is "in [his] own power," in the image of God. But in our explanation, all these things are most fully true, for within ordinary providence, man has not only secondary liberty, but autonomous liberty since he is truly able to condition and thereby control the whole outcome by his resistance or non-resistance. Man can do this even *in sensu composito* with all ordinary graces. Nor is the power of man limited to merely deciding to exercise an act or not to exercise it, for he can also, as we explained, choose between several alternatives.

We conclude that our explanation can, without any difficulty, embrace every text of St. Thomas, in the fullest sense of each text. The interpretation of the older Thomists can explain the first series very well, but does not so easily accord with the second series. The explanation of the Molinists explains the second series well but scarcely, if at all, will fit with the first series.

IX. Added confirmations from the Fathers, Doctors, and Theologians

361. We already saw, in general, what the Fathers and the Magisterium of the Church teach in this respect. It is obvious that the explanation that we took from St. Thomas fits very easily with everything in revelation. In fact, it is to a large extent drawn from revelation. But it is good to add the following:

A. The Fathers of the Church

362. St. Augustine: We can say in the fullest sense with St. Augustine:¹⁵¹ "It is certain that we will when we will, but He brings it about that we will good. . . ." And again:¹⁵² "What then is the merit of a man before receiving grace, in accordance with which he receives grace, since it is only grace that makes every good merit of ours, and since when God crowns our merits, He crowns nothing other than His own gifts?" And even:¹⁵³ "He works, then, without us, so that we may will, but when we do will, and will in such a way as to act, He cooperates with us. . . ."

363. St. Jerome: We can also see with St. Jerome:¹⁵⁴ ". . . the heat of the sun is one, and *according to the kind of thing that lies beneath it*, it liquifies some, hardens others, loosens some, constricts others. For wax is melted, but mud is hardened: and yet, the nature of the heat [that each receives] is the same. So it is with the goodness and clemency of God. . . ." For all the heat (efficacy) comes from the sun (from God). Nevertheless, the effect of the heat varies according to the

kind of beings that lie beneath. For man is truly the master of his own acts. (Cf. the similar comparison given by St. John of the Cross).¹⁵⁵

B. The Doctors of the Church

364. St. Francis de Sales: He teaches the following:¹⁵⁶ "Several travellers, about noon on a certain summer day, reclined to sleep in the shade of a tree . . . the sun, coming over them, sent its powerful light to their eyes . . . and by its heat, . . . forced them to wake up. . . . Some of them, on waking up, gladly went their way to home; but others not only did not get up, but turning their back to the sun, and putting their hat over their eyes, spent the day in sleeping until, caught by night, and yet still wanting to return home, they wandered there in a forest, exposed to wolves, boars, and other wild animals. . . . But now see, Theotimus, what I mean. All men are travellers in this mortal life. Almost all of us have voluntarily fallen asleep in iniquity, and God, the Sun of justice sends over all, truly sufficiently, or rather, abundantly, the rays of inspirations . . . How does it happen that these attractions attract so few? . . . Those who have slept in the sleep of sin . . . have no reason . . . to complain except against themselves, who have despised, or rather, fought back against the light."¹⁵⁷

365. St. Robert Bellarmine:¹⁵⁸ "Another way of reconciling human liberty with divine cooperation, and perhaps even a more probable way, is according to the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches that the divine cooperation concurs in such a way with the secondary causes, even free causes, that it not only has given and conserves their faculties, but that it also moves them and applies them to the work. . . . We must recognize that the influence or power of God, by which the will is moved and applied to the work, is received in the secondary causes according to their disposition (as the same St. Thomas teaches in question 3 of *De malo*, article 2). . . . Now that mode or condition in the will according to which the movement of God is received in it is nothing other than a certain negative determination that precedes both the divine influence and the elicited act of the will. Namely, the fact that the will permits itself to be moved by the object presented to it by reason, or does not permit [itself to be moved]. This determination is called *negative*, because it does not consist in a positive act, but in the *negation of an act* . . . in question 3 of *De malo*, article 2, the same St. Thomas says that a certain disposition in man is required for receiving the divine influence and that according to that influence, a good or bad act is produced. Now no *positive* disposition can be required before the divine influence, since nothing positive can be done without God. So solely a *negative* disposition is a prerequisite. And so it happens that the will is truly free, and determines itself, even though God moves it and applies it to the work. . . . And so St. Thomas in I-II. question 10, article 4 ad 3 concludes that, in the supposition that the divine movement is given, it is impossible that the will not be

moved but that, absolutely, it is not impossible. Namely, because the will cannot dispose itself by the *negative* determination for receiving the divine movement."

C. Modern Theologians

366. Father Philippe de la Trinité, OCD: Several modern theologians, working independently of each other, have come to practically identical conclusions. Among them is the outstanding theologian Father Philippe de la Trinite, who in the article we cited above,¹⁵⁹ wrote:¹⁶⁰ "Grace is not *a priori* efficacious or sufficient, independently of my resistance, but it is made efficacious or not in view of my resistance, with God remaining always the master of the situation. . . . I by no means make grace efficacious, although I can make it ineffective." And again:¹⁶¹ "Grace is intrinsically efficacious since it draws its efficacy solely from the divine omnipotence and *not* from the consent of our will which is totally the fruit of grace, in any hypothesis. Grace really suffices and so is efficacious when we do not resist or when God surmounts our will to resist by a more abundant grace. . . ." He also cites the words of Jacques Maritain expressing much the same thought.¹⁶²

367. Dom Mark Pontifex, OSB: Still another excellent theologian came independently to substantially the same conclusions in his book, *Freedom and Providence*.¹⁶³ He says that a human choice is always one between a greater and a lesser good (inasmuch as even in a bad choice a man chooses a true, though disordered good). Everything that is positive is from God; but everything that is defective, is from man himself.¹⁶⁴

Cardinal Charles Journet:¹⁶⁵ This truly outstanding theologian of our day also teaches the same sound system.¹⁶⁶

Jacques Maritain: Maritain approaches the problem as a philosopher rather than as a theologian, but his implications in theology are plain, and he himself points them out. The broad lines of his solution are identical to ours, even though there is a considerable difference in some respects.¹⁶⁷ He finds the point of entry for evil in non-consideration¹⁶⁸ of the moral rule.¹⁶⁹

X. General conclusions of chapter 18

369. 1) All the efficacy of every grace is intrinsic to it, for we give no efficacy at all to it, even though we can, by resistances block the efficacy of all frustrable graces.

2) Frustrable graces belong to ordinary providence; infrustrable graces belong to extraordinary providence.

3) Infrustrable grace takes away autonomous liberty, but leaves secondary liberty.

4) The motion of every grace is physical, not only moral, but autonomous liberty is retained under frustrable graces since, within ordinary providence, the physical movement does not move a man as far as positive consent without the condition of non-resistance in the

first part of the process of the granting of a grace, immediately after grace has produced the simple apprehension of good in the intellect and the initial complacency in the will. This type of non-resistance is such that man does not move his own will, but rather, does nothing: it is an ontological zero. As such, it is in our power. There is another type of non-resistance that comes at the end of the process, in which a positive act of the will is made, with the formality of not resisting grace, or of not doing evil. This second type of non-resistance requires the movement of grace.

5) Grace is not versatile so as to give a general power which man turns to a specific use. Grace is in itself specified to one effect (when there is question only of a decision between doing or not doing one thing). When there is a choice between several things, God either sends several specified graces, so that man can resist all or all but one, or else, the grace itself causes a man to come, by deliberation, to see various specified goods. After they are seen, grace produces an initial complacency in the will of the man. This done, the man resists or does not resist.

6) Sufficient and efficacious grace-if one wishes to use such a distinction at all-differ in ordinary providence only inasmuch as a good effect follows as a matter of fact from the one and not from the other. There is no intrinsic difference. Nor do they differ by reason of a divine predefinition *in actu primo*. To avoid errors, it is better not to use such a distinction of graces.

XI. Objections

370. Objection 1: Not to impede is the same as to initiate. But, a man cannot of himself initiate a good act, since the Council of Orange teaches:¹⁷⁰ ". . . in every good work, we do not begin. . ." and again: "If anyone contends that God waits for our will . . . he resists the Holy Spirit." So it is not in the power of man to non-impede, nor does God wait for this.

Answer: It is not true that not to impede is the same as to initiate. In the actual process of granting of grace, the divine motion comes first, both logically and chronologically, and it produces a simple apprehension of good in the intellect and an initial complacency in the will before the recipient moves himself at all. After this the man can resist or omit resistance in the sense described.¹⁷¹ Nor do we say that God waits for our will, i.e., the movement of our will. We say that God waits for *nothing* in our will: for the absence of resistance in the sense we speak of¹⁷² is ontologically nothing: it is merely doing nothing against grace in the first phase of the process. The council said nothing about this. We say, therefore, merely that God does not will to continue the process in us if we resist.

371. Objection 2: In this explanation, God becomes passive, and is determined by man.

Answer: The objection was solved at the end of chapter 7.¹⁷³

372. Objection 3: In the concrete, non-resistance is the same as consent, and leads to the same effect.

Answer: The objection was solved at the end of chapter 17.¹⁷⁴

373. Objection 4: St. Thomas says that non-resistance is not in the power of man.

Answer: The objection was solved at the end of chapter 7.¹⁷⁵

374. Objection 5: The will can act only under the appearance of good. So non-resistance is good, and if it is good, it is not in the power of man unless God moves him to it.

Answer: Non-resistance in the sense we intend¹⁷⁶ is not an act. It is ontologically nothing. Furthermore, not everything that is done under the appearance of good is good. Even a sinful decision is taken under the appearance of good.

375. Objection 6: In the concrete, every action must be morally good or evil. Therefore, if non-resistance is not evil, it must be good. If it is good, it is not in man's own power.

Answer: The principle cited holds for concrete, complete acts. But non-resistance is not an act, but the absence of an act.¹⁷⁷ It is an ontological zero. Nor could it be said that it is equivalent to the omission of evil and so is positively good. For the omission of evil is morally good only when there is a positive decision or act of the will to omit it. But in non-resistance in the sense we intend,¹⁷⁸ the man does not move his will. Non-resistance is the mere absence of a decision, it is a mere metaphysical part of a process that will terminate in an act. Furthermore, the principle about the non-indifference of concrete act is founded, as we explained above¹⁷⁹ on the obligation of directing one's acts to the ultimate end. But in the first logical moment of an act, man does not yet have the power of positively ordering his act to the ultimate end: this power is given him only after the condition of non-resistance. Therefore, if he does not yet have the power, the obligation does not yet bind. And if the obligation does not yet bind, the fundamental reason for saying that all concrete acts must be good or evil is not yet present.

Furthermore, as we have often seen, St. Thomas himself says, in CG. 3.159, that non-resistance is in the power of the human will.

376. Objection 7: An act produced under operating grace is meritorious. But in such an act, the will does not move itself, but merely does not impede. Therefore, non-resistance is meritorious; and if it is meritorious, it is not in human power.

Answer: In an act done under operating grace, the human will is truly moved, but is moved by God alone, and it does not move itself. However, since the will really does elicit a good act, and has grace, the act is meritorious. We grant all this. However, precisely where does the merit and moral goodness lie? The merit and goodness are formally in the good movement of the will. There is no formal goodness or merit in the non-resistance itself, because in this sense,¹⁸⁰ it does not include

any act at all. In fact, the non-resistance is not precisely a good condition, but the absence of a bad condition. So, if merit and goodness are present they are not found *in* the non-resistance itself. They follow after it. So in itself, non-resistance is not meritorious, nor does it contain any good, ontological or moral. So the objection is invalid.

Perhaps it will be helpful to consider an explanation that St. Thomas makes in a matter that is not entirely dissimilar. For he teaches that not to attend to the rule of morality is, in itself, neither good nor evil:¹⁸¹ ". . . the non-use of the rule of reason and divine law is presupposed in the will before an inordinate choice. It is not necessary to seek for any cause of this non-use of the afore-mentioned rule; for the very freedom of the will, by which it can act or not act, suffices for this. And the very non-attention to such a rule considered in itself, is neither culpable nor punishable evil." But it is equally clear that this non-use is not morally good. Therefore it is neither morally good nor evil in itself, even though *to act* with such a non-use is evil. Similarly, in itself, non-resistance is neither good nor evil, even though to act after such non-resistance is meritorious.

Continuation of objection: But in a concrete case, non-resistance is in order to a good act. For this reason it is good.

Reply: We must distinguish: Non-resistance can be said to be in order to a good act only inasmuch as a good act actually follows. But the will does not direct it to a good act: for the will does nothing at all, it does not act. Now morality is determined by the object, end, and circumstances. We can, of course, ignore circumstances in a general discussion. Now the *object* is neither good nor evil: it is merely a nothing. There is no *end* or goal, for the will merely does not act. A positive decision of abstaining from evil, made under the formality of abstaining from evil would be morally good. But *no* decision is neither good nor evil: non-resistance in the first part of the process is just that, no decision, no act of the will.

Similarly, in the case St. Thomas speaks of in the passage just cited, the very non-use of the rule is, in the same way, in order to an evil act. Yet St. Thomas says that that non-use is not evil: he says only that *to act* with such a non-use is evil. Similarly, non-resistance is in itself neither good nor evil, even though to act after it is good. But the reason why to act after it is good is not found in the non-resistance, but in the good specification which grace brought.

377. Objection 8: Both by original and by personal sin, man is inclined towards evil. Therefore he cannot omit resistance.

Answer: To say that man is *inclined* towards evil is not the same as to say that he is *incapable of doing anything* but evil (by resisting grace). Further, in non-resistance man is sustained by grace itself. For, as we have shown,¹⁸² grace itself begins the process, producing in the intellect a simple apprehension of good, and in the will, an initial

complacency. These effects continue by the power of grace: nothing is required from the man in order that they may continue, but something definite¹⁸³ from him would be required to interrupt them. So the very action of grace itself sustains the non-resistance.¹⁸⁴ It is enough to avoid persistent resistance in order to be predestined.

378. Objection 9: St. Paul says:¹⁸⁵ "For who can resist his will?" A will of God that man could resist would be imperfect. But there is no imperfection in God.

Answer: St. Paul does not deny that God can, if He wishes, permit man to resist. Every man who sins does this. Nor is such a will an imperfection in God. It would be an imperfection if a man could resist even if God did not want to permit the resistance, but there is no imperfection if God wills to *permit* man to resist. The Thomists say that man actually resists all sufficient graces.

Furthermore, in resisting, only the evil, the non-being, is from man. The exercise of the act is from God.

379. Objection 10: There cannot be two wills in God about one object: for then the distinction would be in God, not in the object.

Answer: The objection implies a denial of the reality of the antecedent will in God, and so, a denial of the reality of the universal salvific will, which pertains to the antecedent will. St. Thomas, however, with theologians in general, teaches that there is a true antecedent will even though Bañez, and some of his followers, in speaking of the salvific will, say that "much more probably" that will in God is not sincere.¹⁸⁶

Certainly, as we saw in chapter 5, revelation does show that the salvific will is sincere.

But there really is a distinction in two aspects of the same object. For God can sincerely will that this particular man, even in these concrete circumstances, should perform this good act, and yet He can also will to permit the same man to impede grace if the man so wills. Under one aspect of the object, i.e., if the object is considered merely in itself, prescindendo from the resistance of the man, God can sincerely want this action to take place: He really wills this good. Yet, under another aspect, namely, when the fact is added that this man here and now resists, God can be willing to permit this man not to perform the good act. For God wills men to have autonomous freedom,¹⁸⁷ and so permits men to resist ordinary graces if they wish.

380. Objection 11: An impedible motion could not exist in the creature: it would do nothing.

Answer: As we saw above,¹⁸⁸ an impedible motion always does do two things, namely, it produces in the intellect a simple apprehension of good, and, in the will, an initial complacency.

381. Objection 12: An impedible movement would have to be indifferent.

Answer: It is indifferent only in the sense that man is permitted to resist if he wishes. But in the sense that really matters, it is not indifferent. For the impediible grace does have in it the good specification.¹⁸⁹

Continuation of objection: Then if the man resists, he imposes a new specification. But he cannot do that.

Reply: In resisting, man takes away goodness or part of the goodness of the specification that is already present in the grace, as John of St. Thomas says in the passage cited above.¹⁹⁰ The evil specification as such is a deficiency. To be deficient is in human power. The movement for the exercise of this evil specification comes from God.

382. Objection 13: Freedom can really coexist with an unimpediible motion, as is evident from the case of Christ and Mary. So there is no need to suppose the existence of impediible movements to save freedom.

Answer: Secondary liberty¹⁹¹ can coexist with an unimpediible movement, but not autonomous liberty. We have proved above that a sincere universal salvific will cannot coexist with a system in which man cannot "distinguish himself" because everything is controlled by inimpediible movements so that the man has no autonomous freedom to distinguish himself as regards reprobation.¹⁹²

383. Objection 14: St. Thomas says:¹⁹³ ". . . man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except through the gratuitous help of God who moves interiorly." Therefore man is incapable of non-resistance.

Answer: Non-resistance, in the sense in which we intend it¹⁹⁴ does not come before grace, but is had after grace has already produced its initial effects in the intellect and the will of man. And non-resistance itself is sustained by grace.¹⁹⁵ Therefore it is not a preparation *before* grace.

We concede, of course, that every positive preparation before grace comes must be made by grace, but no one would deny that there can be a sort of negative preparation before grace comes, i.e., no one would say that before grace comes, a man is incapable of not having in him all evil dispositions that would be indispositions to all graces. For if a man can lack even one evil disposition without grace, then he is negatively disposed in regard to at least one grace that can come. But, since not all men are altogether perverse in every respect, they are negatively disposed towards at least some graces.

384. Objection 15: St. Thomas says:¹⁹⁶ "God . . . by His own judgment, does not send the light of grace into those in whom He finds an obstacle. Hence the cause of the lack of grace is not only he who places an obstacle to grace, but also God, who by His own judgement does not give grace." So the reason for the denial of grace is not solely the resistance of man, but merely that God does not want to give grace to some, by His own judgment.

Answer: It is necessary to study the context. In the body of the same article, St. Thomas compares the action of God to the illumination by the sun. He makes a distinction: ". . . the sun in illuminating acts *by necessity of nature*; but God acts *voluntarily*. . . . The sun . . . if it finds . . . any impediment in some body, leaves it dark. . . . But yet the cause of that darkness is in no way the sun, for the sun does not act *by its own judgement* in not sending light." And he continues: "But God . . . *by His own judgement*, does not send the light of grace into those in whom He finds an obstacle."

So all that St. Thomas says is that God does not act in a necessary, unfree manner, like the sun, but that He acts freely. St. Thomas does *not* say that God ever deprives a man of grace where He finds no obstacle, for St. Thomas holds that God does want to grant grace wherever He finds no obstacle:¹⁹⁷ ". . . they only are deprived of grace who set up an impediment to grace in them."¹⁹⁸

The same explanation holds for another passage of St. Thomas:¹⁹⁹ ". . . the merit of Christ, as far as its sufficiency is concerned, is the same towards all, but not as far as efficacy is concerned. This happens partly as a result of free will, partly from divine choice, by which to some the effect of the merits of Christ is mercifully conferred but from some it is withheld by just judgment." We note too that he says that grace is withheld "by just judgment"-which presupposes human demerits, for there can be no just judgment without a consideration of demerits. These demerits must be personal demerits, unless one should wish to suppose that in this passage St. Thomas is writing under the influence of the *massa damnata* theory from the erroneous interpretation of Romans 9. But then the passage would need correction, for when the foundation, the erroneous interpretation, collapses, the superstructure collapses too.²⁰⁰

Much light on this passage is shed by the words from St. Thomas's commentary on *1 Sent*, cited above.²⁰¹

See also the objections and answers at the end of chapter 7.

END NOTES

1 Cf. §§ 118-120.

2 Cf. the summaries in the introduction: 6-9.

3 R. Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, *De gratia*, Marietti, Taurini, 1947, pp. 179-180.

4 *Cursus Theologicus* in I(am)-II(ae), *De gratia*, Laval, Quebec, 1954. In Q. 111, Disp. 24, a. 2, § 1142.

5 *Cursus Theologicus*, Desclée, Parisiis, 1937, III. In I. 2. 19, Disp. 25, n. 9, p. 219.

6 In I-II. q. 111, Disp. 24, a. 3, § 1221.

7 CG 3. 67.

8 In I-II. q. 111. Disp. 24, a. 3, §§ 1224-1226.

9 Cf. n. 18 on the introduction.

10 Cf. note 140 on chapter 7.

11 *Cursus Theologicus*, Desclée, Parisiis, 1934, II. In I. q. 14 Disp. 20, a. 5, n. 27, pp. 507-508.

12 Cf. note 15 on the introduction.

- 13 In I-II. q. 111. Disp. 24, a. 2, § 1125.
- 14 De Deo uno 4a ed., Romae, 1948, p. 243. § 346. (I have translated, in this citation, *sensus compositus* by: "sense combined with. . .")
- 15 D. Bañez, *Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae*, Romae, 1584. In I. 23. 5. col. 434.
- 16 D. Bañez, In II-II, Venetiis, 1586, q. 10. a. I. Tertium documentum. Col. 574.
- 17 In I-II. q. 111, Disp. 24, a. 3, § 1243, 1246.
- 18 Cf. § 118.
- 19 §§ 119-120.
- 20 Cf. n. 9. above.
- 21 Cf. n. 3. above.
- 22 Cf. n. 5 above.
- 23 Cf. n. 4 above.
- 24 De gratia, p. 190.
- 25 § 82.
- 26 Cf. n. 8 above.
- 27 Cf. note 140 on chapter 7.
- 28 Cf. § 6.8.
- 29 Cf. note 17 above.
- 30 DS 1537 (DB 804).
- 31 DS 1515 (DB 792).
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Cf. § 6.8.
- 34 Cf. § 304.
- 35 Cf. note 46 on chapter 14.
- 36 Cf. § 6.8.
- 37 ST I-II 1.1.c; I-II Prolog. and § 360 below.
- 38 De Deo uno, Desclée de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 350 (emphasis his).
- 39 Cf. § 6.8.
- 40 Cf. § 119.
- 41 § 129.3.
- 42 CG 4.55.
- 43 Cf. § 121.
- 44 ST II-II. 83.7 ad 2. Cf. § 122 and ST I-II. 114. 6. c.
- 45 ST II-II. 10.11.c.
- 46 §§ 118-20.
- 47 Cf. § 39.1.
- 48 Cf. also De veritate 2.12 ad 7.
- 49 De veritate 23.5.c.
- 50 Cf. §§ 363-64.
- 51 Martin Luther, *The Bondage of the Will*, J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston, eds., Fleming H. Revill Co., Westwood, NJ, 1957, p. 40.
- 52 Ibid., p. 80.
- 53 Ibid., p. 103-104.
- 54 Ibid., p. 204.
- 55 Ibid., p. 314
- 56 § 350.
- 57 Cf. §§ 254-57.
- 58 Cf. §§ 261-65.
- 59 Cf. § 82.
- 60 Phil 2.13.
- 61 DS 397 (DB 200).
- 62 Cf. § 258.
- 63 Cf. § 254.

64 § 353.
65 Cf. § 206.
66 *Antropologia supernaturalis: De gratia et virtutibus*, ed. 2a, Marietti, Romae, 1943, p. 144 (emphasis his).
67 Cf. § 329.2.
68 § 353.
69 §§ 280-281.
70 The citation is from the notes of F. Muñiz in: *Suma Teologica de Santo Tomás de Aquino B.A.C.*, 2a ed., Madrid, 1957, p. 689. Muñiz and Marín-Sola hold that the divine motion is not versatile: cf. F. Marín-Sola, "El sistema Tomista sobre la moción divina" in: *La Ciencia Tomista*, 32 (1925) p. 28: "When we say that sufficient grace is a fallible, physical premotion, by fallible we do not mean a versatile or indeterminate premotion of a Molinistic type . . ." (emphasis his).
71 § 129.3.
72 Cf. §§ 151, 153.3.
73 Cf. §§ 344-345.
74 Cf. §§ 107, 112.
75 Cf. § 82.
76 Cf. § 82.
77 *Ibid.*
78 *Ibid.*
79 Cf. §§ 106, 110.
80 DS 397 (DB 200).
81 *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 17.33. PL 44, 901.
82 Cf. DS 374 (DB 177): "If anyone contends that God waits for our will, so that we may be purged from sin, and does not confess that the very fact that we even will to be cleansed takes place in us by the infusion and work of the Holy Spirit, he resists the same Holy Spirit. . . ."
83 ST I-II. 111.2 ad 2
84 ST I-II. 111.2.c
85 Cf. note 81 above.
86 DS 1554 (DB 814).
87 Cf. §§ 110-11.
88 Cf. §§ 82-87, 108-09, 114-15.
89 CG 3.159. Cf. *De veritate* 14.11 ad 1: ". . . for this pertains to divine providence: to provide the things necessary for salvation for each one, provided there be no impediment from his part."
90 Cf. § 217.
91 In I-II.111.2.
92 *De gratia, Angelicum*, Romae, 1946, p. 67.
93 ST I-II, 55.4 ad 6.
94 Cf. § 82.
95 Cf. § 350.
96 Cf. §§ 118-122.
97 In the article in which he takes up operating and cooperating grace, St. Thomas says, without making any restriction or distinction (ST I-II.111 2 ad 4): ". . . operating and cooperating grace is the same grace, but is distinguished according to its diverse effects."
98 § 82.
99 Cf. *De malo* 6.1.
100 Cf. n. 112 on chapter 13.
101 *De malo* 1.3. c
102 CG 3.159
103 ST I-II.112. 3 ad 2.

104 1 Sent. d. 40, q. 4, a. 2, c. Cf. also 1 Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3: ". . . God wills the non-occurrence of moral faults in His antecedent will, but not in His consequent will except in the case of those whom He knows do not will to commit moral fault: because the consequent will takes in [consideration] the condition of the creature."
105 Cursus Theologicus, Desclée, Parisiis, 1934. II. In I. q. 14 Disp. 17, a. 4, n. 9 bis, p. 396.
106 De malo 3.2.c.
107 Cf. § 350.
108 § 82.
109 Cf. § 344.
110 ST I-II.6.3.c.
111 ST I-II.18.9.c.
112 De malo 1.3.c.
113 I. Hellin, S. I., "Theodicea" in: Philosophiae Scholasticae Summa, B.A.C., Matriti, 1952, III, p. 286, § 592.c.
114 2 Cor 3:5. Cf. note 3. on chapter 7.
115 DS 377 (DB 180).
116 Cf. §§ 338, 340, 110-11.
117 Cf. §§ 340, 114.
118 § 359.
119 § 360.
120 Cf. note 81 above.
121 Phil 2:13.
122 Cf. § 353.
123 Cf. § 129.3.
124 Haurietis aquas. AAS 48. 337.
125 Cf. §§ 340, 114.
126 Ibid.
127 § 359.
128 Cf. § 350.
129 DS 397 (DB 200).
130 Cf. §§ 120-22.
131 Cf. § 309.4.
132 Cf. § 118.
133 § 116.
134 ST I-II.10.4 ad 3
135 De veritate 23.5.c.
136 Cf. §§ 120-22.
137 §§ 82, 342-43.
138 Cf. § 120.
139 Cf. ST I.83.1 ad 3: ". . . He works in each one according to one's property."
140 T. V. Moore, Carthusian, Heroic Sanctity and Insanity, Grune & Stratton, New York, 1959, p. 102. n.
141 De veritate 8.12 ad 3.
142 Cf. §§ 126-127.
143 2 Cor 12.9.
144 Cf. § 106.
145 Prv 21.1.
146 Phil 2.13.
147 Is 26.12.
148 CG 3.59. Cf. § 341.
149 CG 3.159.
150 ST I-II.9.4.c
151 De gratia et libero arbitrio 16.32. PL 44.900
152 Ep. 194.5.19. PL 33.880

153 De gratia et libero arbitrio 17.33. PL 44.901.
154 Ep. 130 10. PL 22.1000.
155 Cf. § 173.
156 Treatise on the Love of God 4.5.
157 Cf. the other citations in chapter 16.
158 De gratia et libero arbitrio 4.16. Opera omnia, Neapoli. 1872. IV, pp. 377-378, (emphasis mine).
159 "Notre liberté devant Dieu" in: Etudes Carmelitaines (1958), pp. 47- 76.
160 Ibid., pp. 67-68. Cf. n. 24 on chapter 17.
161 Ibid., p. 68 note 3.
162 J. Maritain, Court Traite de l'existence et de l'existant, ed. Hartmann, 1947, pp. 162 and p. 160 note.
163 Cf. n. 26 on chapter 17.
164 Ibid.
165 Cf. §§ 334-335.
166 Charles Journet, The Meaning of Grace, Kenedy, N.Y., 1960, p. 25-26, 28.
167 Cf. chiefly §§ 44-48. Cf. p. 92 of J. Maritain, Existence and the Existent, tr. L. Galantiere and G. Phelan, Pantheon, N.Y., 1948.
168 Maritain, op. cit., p. 90.
169 Ibid., from a note starting on p. 94, and pp. 98-99.
170 DS 397 & 374 (DB 200 & 177).
171 Cf. also § 383.
172 Cf. §§ 346-348.
173 § 144.
174 § 301.
175 §§ 133-138.
176 Cf. §§ 346-348
177 Cf. §§ 346-349
178 Cf. §§ 346-348
179 § 349.
180 Cf. §§ 346-48.
181 De malo 1. 3. c. Cf. ibid., ad 13 and CG 3.10.
182 § 347.
183 Cf. §§ 344-45.
184 Cf. §§ 82 and 303.
185 Rom 9:19.
186 Cf. § 55.1
187 Cf. § 119
188 Cf. §§ 346-48.
189 Cf. § 350.
190 § 345.
191 Cf. § 118.
192 Cf. § 119.
193 ST I-II.109.6.c
194 Cf. §§ 82, 346-48.
195 Cf. § 82.
196 ST I-II.79.3.c.
197 CG 3.159.
198 Cf. also the passage from 1 Sent. cited above in § 344.
199 veritate 29.7 ad 4.
200 Cf. chapter 1 and §§ 137-38, 215.
201 Cf. § 344 above and also note 104 above.

"Pt. 4: Divine foreknowledge - Ch. 19: The opinions of the principal schools"

I. Preliminary observations on divine transcendence

385. *The disagreement of the schools over transcendence:* As we saw in chapter 18, the older Thomists finally, after the last attempts to explain infrustrable movements, clearly admit that they cannot go further to a completely full explanation. So they appeal to the transcendent power of the divine will. The Molinists oppose them by pressing the arguments from reason by which they think they can show that infrustrable movements cannot be reconciled with human free will.

But the Molinists, for their part, admit that they cannot fully explain divine foreknowledge. For example, H. Lennerz, SJ, to reply to the difficulty that the older Thomists raise about the independence of the knowledge of God from its object, explains that all our knowledge about God is analogous:¹ "Now since we form our concepts of dependence and cooperation according to dependence and cooperation as they are in creatures . . . we have to think of the cooperation of God with a creature in those concepts that we form from creatures . . . then we reject the imperfections that are proper to the cooperation of creatures. But in this very rejection, our concepts remain essentially the same." Hence, he says that the problem "must remain, as long as we have to think about the cooperation of God in such concepts; it cannot directly be solved, unless when we perceive the dependence of the creature on God and the cooperation of God with the creature, immediately, and in themselves."

As we shall see below, at least many Molinists really appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect. But the older Thomists oppose them with arguments from reason by which they try to show that God necessarily must know everything solely by infrustrable decrees, so that He cannot know in any other way.

So, both camps want to appeal to divine transcendence to defend their own system, but each one refuses to allow the other to appeal to transcendence for the needs of the other's system. For the Molinists appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect, but are unwilling to allow an appeal to the transcendence of the divine will to explain how there can be such a thing as an infrustrable decree. But the older Thomists, on the other hand, appeal to the transcendence of the divine will, but say it is illegitimate to invoke the transcendence of the divine intellect in regard to foreknowledge.

386. Actually, as all admit, both the divine will and the divine intellect are transcendent. If the question is explicitly put as to whether they are or are not transcendent, both Thomists and Molinists readily assent. However, each fails to see one application of the divine transcendence.

387. The older Thomists' counter charge: These Thomists will at once defend themselves and say that the transcendence of the divine intellect cannot be invoked in solving the question of foreknowledge, since before God can know or foreknow anything, that thing must exist. But, no being has been, or is, or will be except through a decree of the divine will.

This argument of theirs does not hold. For the critical and decisive factors in human freedom are found in *non-beings*, that is, in non-resistance and in the evil specification in resistance. But, for non-beings, divine causality is not required. It is required, of course, for the creation and conservation of the creature in which these non-being factors occur. Further, divine causality is also needed to begin a motion in them (in the process we described in chapter 18). But once God has provided this much, the non-being factors can occur without the need of additional divine causality. Nor can an objection be raised on the ground that non-being is not knowable in itself: for it is knowable by relation to the being in which it occurs-the non-being of resistance is knowable in the fact that it deprives the motion of its effect; non-resistance is knowable in the fact that a motion is not deprived of its effect: the effect continues (a more complete explanation will be given in chapter 23, § 483). In this vein St. Thomas says:² "Hence, by the fact that God knows His own essence, He knows the things that are from Him, and through them He knows their defects [non-beings or privations]. But if He knew only His own essence, He would know no evil or privation except in a general way."

Furthermore we must not forget that it is one thing to say that divine causality is a *prerequisite* for the *existence* of beings-it is quite another thing to say it is the *means*-and at that, the sole means-He has of *knowing*.

388. We do not wish to give a false impression, however, from the fact that we agree with the older Thomists in saying that divine transcendence can account for the existence of infrustrable decrees. For this does not mean that we agree with them in saying that *everything* is ruled by such decrees. It is one thing to say, because of divine transcendence, that God truly *can*, when He so wills, move men infrustrably; it is quite another thing to say that *actually* God *always* moves men in this way, so that He would be *totally incapable* of moving them to consent in any other way. The divine transcendence does not prove that the power of God is *so limited*! Furthermore, as we have shown in chapter 18, the system of the older Thomists contradicts many revealed truths, especially the universal salvific will.³ Further, their system makes God fully the author of sin.⁴

389. So the conclusion still stands: It is legitimate to appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect to explain foreknowledge. Really, if one says that foreknowledge can be explained only by infrustrable decrees, he seems to imply that the divine intellect is practically

impotent to know anything at all by itself: it could know only by causing. But that would be a great imperfection in God if the divine intellect could know nothing without the help of the divine will.

390. The need of strict method in this question: We have already seen that many difficulties came into discussions on predestination because many theologians used a method more philosophical than theological. It is important to guard against such a mistake in treating of foreknowledge. Therefore, we must first of all investigate and heartily accept everything in revelation that has a bearing on foreknowledge, even though these facts are relatively few. Only afterwards will sound method send us to seek the help of metaphysics.

391. The fact that, as all admit, there are mysteries in this question, makes strict method all the more necessary.

Divine providence, for our good, has left mysteries in various parts of theology. Some of these really were not mysteries but were only problems that seemed insoluble in ancient times and are now solved. For example, the ancient Hebrews had to hold two tenets, without knowing how to reconcile them: (1) From revelation they had to believe that God rewarded each one according to his works; (2) Yet human experience showed that the good are often enough in misery, even, in some cases, to the end of their lives, while the wicked often enough have prosperity, even to the end. We today know the means of reconciling these points: retribution in the future life. But the Hebrews seem to have had no clear knowledge of this future retribution until about the middle of the second century B.C.

The Hebrews were not permitted to reason: "Experience does not deceive, so we must explain the revelations about retribution in another sense"-and so to distort the doctrine of retribution as to, almost if not entirely, deny it in actuality.

Similarly we must shun the temptation of saying: "Reasonings that must be true force us to say that God can know only by infrustrable decrees. So we must reinterpret the universal salvific will," and do it in such a way that it becomes a mere metaphor. (We recall that Bañez thought it "much more probably" not sincere).

Just as the problem of retribution once seemed insoluble-but we now see its solution was very easy; and just as once the dilemma on predestination seemed insoluble but we have easily found the solution in revelation; so also the problem of foreknowledge does have an answer. Perhaps it will be found in future ages; perhaps divine providence reserves the answer for the beatific vision. But for now, we must hold to all revealed truths that directly or indirectly touch on it. And we can legitimately appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect. As we shall see in chapter 21, all the tradition of the Church does so. Furthermore, as we shall see in chapter 23, we can give metaphysical answers to the metaphysical objections.

392. Furthermore, it would be a great mistake to lose sight of the fact that in the very middle of the field in which the question lies there is a great mystery, whose existence no one, from any school, can doubt. That is: the knowledge of God is certainly eternal. In eternity all things are present: nothing is past or future. So things that appear to us as solely in potency, since they are still future, present themselves to God as already in act. Even infrustrable decrees cannot account for this. Therefore, since in the middle of the field we have so great a mystery, it is not strange to find other things in the same field that cannot be solved.

393. Further, it is helpful to recall that there is still a great unsolved mystery about the very decrees themselves, namely: How can God act *freely* at all? For a free act of God, *inasmuch as it is immanent in God*, is really identified with the divine essence. How then could there be any chance for it to be other than what it actually is? How can such an act be free? Many theologians merely admit candidly that they cannot explain the question, e.g., I. M. Dalmau, after reviewing various proposed solutions, ends by confessing:⁵ "The difficulty . . . is rightly considered as among the greatest in all theology; nor do great theologians fear to frankly admit that nothing has yet been found to positively solve it. . . ." Garrigou-Lagrange however tries to solve it by saying:⁶ ". . . the *entity* of a free act of God is indeed intrinsic to Him, but its *defectibility* is only extrinsic. More explicitly: a free act of God is nothing other than a necessary act of love of divine goodness, inasmuch as it means a relationship to creatures that is not necessary, [and] so it is only extrinsically defectible by reason of the defectible thing that is willed." But the solution does not really solve the problem. For the question is not about the "*extrinsic defectibility*," but about the *intrinsic freedom*, which seems to conflict with the truth that the act of the will of God is intrinsically identified with His essence, which is immutable.

Because we cannot solve this problem should we say that God is not free? Of course not. Neither are we forced to say that God cannot foresee without infrustrable decrees simply because without them we must appeal to the transcendence of God.

II. The opinions of the principal schools

A. The older Thomists

394. Presentation of the system: As we have already seen,⁷ the older Thomists hold that God *always* in *all* cases, moves the wills of men by infrustrable decrees. If God physically premoves a man to good by an infrustrable premotion and efficacious grace, it would be metaphysically inconceivable for the man not to do a good act. If God does not move in this way, but gives only a sufficient grace, it would be metaphysically inconceivable for man not to commit that sin that God has decreed to permit. They say that only by such decrees can God know what a man will do.

They explain the foreknowledge of God about futuribles in a similar way, i.e., how God knows what this man would do if these graces should be given, in these circumstances. They say that God knows the futuribles through many decrees-almost infinite in number-by which He has decreed how He Himself would move men in these circumstances etc.

395. Difficulties against the older Thomists' view:

1) As we saw in chapter 18,⁸ the system of decrees on which the Thomists' explanation of foreknowledge rests, cannot be reconciled with any true universal salvific will, not even with the least degree of such a will. Therefore the foundation of their explanation must fall, since it contradicts explicit divine revelation.

Nor could their system be saved by an appeal to divine transcendence. For transcendence shows that God *can* move men infrustrably when He so wishes, but by no means shows that God *cannot* move men in any other way when He so wishes. Rather, transcendence itself leads us to say that God can move in other ways if He so wills.

Furthermore, the system of these Thomists makes God the author of sin, as we saw in chapter 18, and it cannot be reconciled, as we saw there also, with the teachings of Trent on the effects of baptism, on concupiscence, and on the divine policy of not deserting creatures once they have been justified unless they first freely desert God.

Therefore, even though no other explanation for divine foreknowledge could be thought up, we would still be obliged to abandon the explanation of these Thomists since, on the one hand, nothing can stand against divine revelation and, on the other hand, the fact that we, feeble men, could not think out any other explanation, would by no means prove there could be no other explanation.

Actually, as we have said, these Thomists arrived at their explanation not from an exegesis of revelation, but from metaphysical reasoning.⁹

2) A lesser, but not-to-be-scorned difficulty, is found in the application of their system to the futuribles. For in this system it is necessary to suppose that God has made an almost infinite series of decrees that have no effect, and has done so merely in order to be able to know what creatures would do in various circumstances. Further, their explanation leads to some absurdities, e.g., as I. Dalmau points out well:¹⁰ ". . . if the theory of predetermination were true, the reproach of Christ to the people of Bethsaida and Corozain [to whom He said that if the Tyrians and Sidonians had seen His miracles they would have done great works of penance] would have approximately the following meaning: 'If the miracles that were done among you had been done among the Tyrians and Sidonians, they would have done penance, a fact that I know since I have decreed that I would have given them a predetermination [to do penance] in this case; which predetermination I am unwilling to give to you.'"

3) It is clear that the explanation of these Thomists cannot be reconciled with the explanation of predestination which we established earlier in this book from Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium.

4) Nor can the explanation of these Thomists be reconciled with many teachings of St. Thomas:

a) It cannot fit with the teaching of St. Thomas on predestination (cf. chapter 14). In the explanation given by St. Thomas, there is no reprobation before consideration of demerits. But that reprobation is a necessary factor in the system of decrees on which the Thomists' explanation of foreknowledge is built.

b) St. Thomas does not hold the definition and distinction of sufficient and efficacious graces that is needed in the explanation of these Thomists.¹¹

c) In chapter 18¹² we explained many passages of St. Thomas which either exclude the system of Thomistic decrees, or positively establish a different system.¹³

d) Later, in chapter 22, we shall show that the explanation of these Thomists does not harmonize with the many passages in which St. Thomas explicitly speaks of foreknowledge.

B. The Molinists

396. Presentation of the system: Molina himself says:¹⁴ ". . . we hold that the reason why God certainly knows which alternative of any group of alternatives that depend on a free created will will take place, is not the determination of the divine will bending and determining the free created will, but that it is the free decision [on the part of God] by which He decided to create this free will in this or that order of things and circumstances but [we hold that] this decision is not the only [reason why God foreknows] but [that the reason is] this divine decision together with His understanding, in His essence, of any free created will whatsoever, by His natural knowledge, by which knowledge He knows with certitude before that created will makes its decision, what that particular will would do, in its freedom, in the supposition and condition that He would create it, and place it in that particular order of things, although yet [the free will of man] could, if it willed, do the opposite; and if it were going to do [the opposite] as it can, God by that same knowledge and understanding of the free will, in His essence, would have known [it]. . . ."

So there are two stages, according to Molina, in the foreknowledge of a future free act: 1) God knows what this man would do if he should be placed in various circumstances or positions with various graces, etc. He knows this by "His understanding, in His essence of any free created will whatsoever." 2) God decides to place this man in such and such a combination of circumstances, position, and graces.

The knowledge in the first stage is called *middle knowledge* (*scientia media*). For, according to Molina, there are three kinds of divine knowledge, namely: (1) Merely natural knowledge, or knowledge of

simple intelligence, by which God knows all things that are *merely possible*. (2) Merely free knowledge, or knowledge of vision by which God, after the free decision of His own will to place a man in a certain combination, knows without condition or hypothesis the things that *actually were, are, or will be*. (3) Middle knowledge, by which God knows the things that are possible and actually will be if He should place this man in these circumstances, with these graces, etc., that is, the knowledge of *futuribles*.

The Molinists explain this middle knowledge in various ways. Some stress God's comprehension or supercomprehension of the created cause. Others prefer to say that the objects of this knowledge are reached in their objective truth. Others speak not too clearly.

397. Difficulties against the Molinists' views: Inasmuch as some theologians unjustifiably deny the legitimacy of the appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect in explaining foreknowledge, and then base objections on that unjustifiable denial, many objections against Molinism are invalid. However, other objections seem to have more or less validity. We must consider each one separately.

1) Some Molinists seem to wish to explain the middle knowledge by way of God's comprehension or supercomprehension of the free cause, e.g., St. Robert Bellarmine says:¹⁵ "God, then, since He knows all the inclinations and the whole character of our soul . . . infallibly gathers in which direction the soul is going to incline itself." Even many Molinists object to this explanation, e.g., H. Lennerz quotes this passage of Bellarmine and then says:¹⁶ "In this opinion, it is either supposed that a free act is to such an extent determined in that complex of causes so that the act will follow with highest probability or moral certitude, or it is supposed that it is metaphysically impossible for the act not to follow. *In the first supposition*, it remains metaphysically possible for the act not to follow: hence, error is possible. . . . *In the second supposition* . . . the act would be already determined in its causes, and so one could no longer understand how it could still be free and undetermined before it proceeds from its causes."

But it is not certain that either St. Robert or Father Lennerz have rightly interpreted the thought of Molina on God's comprehension or understanding of the free created cause. For Molina himself writes on this point:¹⁷ "But we say that the certitude of that middle knowledge comes from the *loftiness and unlimited perfection of the divine intellect*, in virtue of which it knows with certitude *that which in itself is uncertain*, and [it does] this most eminently by the comprehension, in its divine essence, of any created will whatsoever that its omnipotence could create." So Molina seems to deny that there is any determinism or determination whatsoever within man, in that he says that God knows "that which in itself is uncertain." Rather, he seems to be merely appealing to the transcendence of the divine intellect without trying to explain *how* that intellect can know. He seems to mean that the

futuribles are not determined by their own nature nor by divine determination antecedent to the human determination and that they are not yet determined by man-but that yet God, by "the loftiness and unlimited perfection of the divine intellect", knows what determination a man is freely *going to make* even though that determination considered in advance is still "in itself . . . uncertain." We notice too that Molina explicitly says that God knows this "in [the] divine essence."

2) Other Molinists say that God knows the futuribles¹⁸ "in their objective truth, or in themselves."

We need to notice that even though one says that God knows these in their objective truth, this does not necessarily imply a denial that God knows the futuribles through His essence. For St. Thomas himself at times uses similar expressions, and yet does not deny that God knows through His essence. For example, he says that God looks on a future contingent (i.e., an absolutely future contingent-for he says nothing at all about futuribles):¹⁹ "Not only as it is in its causes, but as it is in its determined reality . . . God from eternity not only sees His own relation to the thing . . . but He looks upon the very being of the thing." And similarly:²⁰ ". . . by the fact that God knows His own essence, He knows the things that are from Him, and through them He knows their defects [non-beings or privations]. But if He knew only His own essence, He would know no evil or privation except in a general way." Therefore, just as by these expressions St. Thomas did not deny or wish to deny that God knows all things through His own essence, so it is not necessary to conclude that the Molinists, by their similar expressions, deny that God knows all through His essence. On the contrary, as we saw above, Molina explicitly teaches that God does know all in His own essence. Actually, we need to draw a distinction between:

(a) Knowledge through the divine essence as the *medium quo*, that is the divine essence²¹ "inasmuch as it contains the likeness of things other than Himself."

(b) Knowledge through the divine essence as the *medium in quo*, that is, the divine essence as the object known which, because of the connection it has with other things, cannot be known without these other things being also attained in the same knowledge.

So the Molinists deny only that the divine essence is the *medium in quo*; but they do not deny that it is the *medium quo*. They make this denial chiefly because they hold that the divine will cannot physically and infrustrably move a created will without destroying freedom. As we explained above, we think that the Molinists are in a way inconsistent in this matter, since they appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect to explain foreknowledge, but refuse to allow a similar appeal to the transcendence of the divine will. However, the Molinists are right in saying that God does not know solely by infrustrable decrees: for if that were true, as we have shown above,²² there could be no sincere

universal salvific will, unless God were to reprobate no one at all. But we know from Scripture (the Last Judgment scene) that some are reprobated.

From the fact that these Molinists say that God knows the futuribles in their objective truth or reality, it seems to be implied that²³ "contingent conditional futures [futuribles] *have determined truth in them*. For, on the fulfilment of a condition, the [human] will will bring about *one determined* [alternative] out of the possible alternatives."

Does this last statement contradict the statement of St. Thomas that²⁴ future contingent things do not have determined truth until they are realized in the present, so that eternity is needed to make them knowable to God? We reply that the statement of the Molinists does seem to contradict the "futurible" view of St. Thomas, i.e., the view that he *would have* expressed if he had given an opinion on futuribles. However, St. Thomas *actually* said nothing at all about futuribles. Perhaps it was because He knew for certain, from Scripture, that God knows the futuribles, but yet, since he held that future contingent free acts are entirely unknowable if considered *as future* (i.e., unless eternity makes them *present*), he decided prudently²⁵ to keep silent since he was entirely unable to explain how to reconcile these two points. But, whatever may be the truth about what St. Thomas would have said, we must admit that perhaps all the Molinists mean to say by this explanation is that even though there is no determination within man, and even though God has not yet *actually* determined the futuribles, nevertheless, the transcendent divine intellect can know *what determination a man freely would make*.²⁶

3) Objections from Scripture are raised by Garrigou-Lagrange against all types of Molinism:

a) He appeals to the words of St. Paul in 1 Cor 4.7: "Who distinguisheth thee?" and comments:²⁷ "According to the above mentioned words of St. Paul, the distinction of one man from another ultimately must be found not on the side of the human will, but in God who distinguishes one from another by His grace. But, middle knowledge supposes that one man . . . distinguishes himself from another by his own will."

But the objection is invalid, since it rests on an erroneous interpretation of the words of St. Paul, as we saw in chapter 1.²⁸

b) He says likewise:²⁹ ". . . all Thomists . . . affirm, as revealed, the principle that can be called 'the principle of predilection,' namely: no one would be better than another if he were not more loved and helped by God. This principle is stated many times by St. Paul, e.g., Rom 9.15: 'He says to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy. . . .'"

But again, the argument rests on an erroneous interpretation of St. Paul, as we saw in chapter 1. Garrigou-Lagrange, in the same passage, refers the reader to the words of St. Thomas in ST

I.20.3 ad 3. We have already explained these words of St. Thomas³⁰ and have shown that they have a different meaning.

c) Garrigou-Lagrange also asserts that by middle knowledge³¹ "the supreme dominion [of God] over created freedom would be taken away; God could not, in such circumstances, convert a certain will if it wanted the opposite. For Molina says, in the passage cited: 'It was not in the power of God to know something different, but He would have known something different, if the free created will had been going to do something different.' But this contradicts the words of Sacred Scripture: Prov 21.1: 'Like a stream is the king's heart in the hand of the Lord; wherever it pleases him, he directs it.'-Sir 33.13: 'Like clay in the hands of a potter . . . so are men in the hands of their Creator.'-Phil 2.13: 'It is God who of his good pleasure works in you both the will and the performance.'"

But the texts cited do not prove what Garrigou-Lagrange intends to prove. For, as we have seen³² the words of Proverbs show that God *always can* incline human wills so that they actually consent. But they do not prove that God inclines wills infrustrably (we believe that He can do so, because of His transcendence-not because of this text). And most certainly, the words of Proverbs do not prove that God *always* moves men in this way so that He is *totally incapable of* moving them to a good act in any other way. The words of Ecclesiasticus, as the context shows, refer to divine assignments in the *external economy*. The same Ecclesiasticus also says vigorously, referring to the *internal economy*:³³ "It was he who created man in the beginning, and left him in the power of his own inclination. If you will, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice. He has placed before you fire and water: stretch out your hand for whichever you wish. Before a man are life and death, and whichever he chooses will be given to him." As to the words of St. Paul to the Philippians:³⁴ the Molinists could say that St. Paul is only teaching the need of divine concurrence (we however prefer to explain these words of a true physical motion, as we did in chapters 7 and 18, without, however, accepting Garrigou-Lagrange's position on "distinguishing oneself").

Nor do the words cited from Molina prove that Molina thinks God is incapable of bringing about what He wills. For Molina, in the context, is speaking of the foreknowledge of futuribles, not of foreknowledge of future contingents that will actually come to pass. But in the foreknowledge of futuribles, according to Molina, God knows what this man would do if placed in these circumstances and *with these graces*. In the order of actual futures, God always can, by various graces, bring it about that man does what God wills. For Molina says, in the same disputation from which Garrigou-Lagrange quoted:³⁵ "God by His

omnipotence can bend our free will wheresoever He wills, except into sin. . . ."

The words of Garrigou-Lagrange imply also the objection that the Molinist theory would make God passive. However, Molina can appeal to divine transcendence. We will discuss the problem more fully below, in chapter 23.

4) Garrigou-Lagrange also says:³⁶ "Middle knowledge *diminishes the need of prayer*. . . . [Molina] cannot say in this profound sense, as we read in the Mass: 'Make me adhere to your commands. . . .' But, according to his theory, the Molinist asks of God only that God may place him in those circumstances in which He foresees that he [the man] will consent to grace."

The Molinists can reply that in their system, the outcome depends not only on circumstances, but on the graces given. In their system, God can always give such a grace that a given man will actually be moved to consent.

Further, the Molinists can turn the argument back on Garrigou-Lagrange, for his view really takes away from man the true power of praying. For, as we saw in chapter 18,³⁷ in his opinion, man can pray only if God gives efficacious grace to pray. If God gives only sufficient grace, man lacks the application, efficacious grace. Man cannot apply himself. Nor does it depend on man's decision whether or not he gets the application from God, since, according to Garrigou-Lagrange, man cannot "distinguish himself" in regard to resisting or not resisting. Yet, the application is not given to those who resist. Actually, Garrigou-Lagrange's insistence that man cannot "distinguish himself" in regard to praying or not praying, sinning or not sinning, etc. leaves man without the power to decide at all whether he will pray or not.³⁸

5) Garrigou-Lagrange also charges:³⁹ "This theory *does not seem to keep sufficiently far from Semipelagianism*, according to which 'the beginning of salvation is from us, not from the grace of God.' . . . Molinism does indeed admit a prevenient grace, even an interior one, but it holds that it moves the will only objectively and not infallibly, in fact according to Molina, 'it can happen that, with equal helps, one of those who are called would be converted, and another not;' in this way, the true beginning of salvation seems to be only in him who is converted. . . ."

But Garrigou-Lagrange himself provides the answer to his own objection: "Molinism does indeed admit a prevenient grace, even an interior one," that is, a grace that comes *before* human activity. But, if such a grace makes the beginning, then it is not man who makes the beginning, and there is no Semipelagianism. Actually, the error of holding that man cannot⁴⁰ "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation underlies this objection. Such a theory is completely incompatible with any true universal salvific will, even the minimum degree of such a will, as we have already shown.

6) Garrigou-Lagrange also argues *from various texts of St. Augustine*. In the first passage he cites,⁴¹ St. Augustine is giving the same erroneous interpretation of 1 Cor 4.7 that we saw above.

Garrigou-Lagrange then cites:⁴² "So this grace, which is given secretly to human hearts by divine generosity, is rejected by no hard heart, for it is given precisely in order that hardness of heart may be taken away." At most these words show that St. Augustine believed that God always can so move hearts that as a matter of fact, a man will not reject grace. They do not prove that St. Augustine held that God moves *infrustrably*, and especially, they do not prove that St. Augustine believed God cannot move a man to consent by any other means than by an infrustrable grace. Even Molina can say that God always can so move that as a matter of fact a man will not reject grace.

Garrigou-Lagrange also quotes these words:⁴³ "Out of two infants, equally bound by original sin, why this one is taken [by God] and that one is left, and out of two mature wicked persons, why this one is so called that he follows [God] who calls, but that one is either not called, or is not called in such a way [that he follows]-the judgements of God are inscrutable." But Molina too can say the same thing, since he teaches, as we saw,⁴⁴ that no one, not even an adult, can bring it about that he be predestined by God. We disagree with Molina on this, as we explained in chapter 15. Further, we note that the theory of the *massa damnata* seems to underlie these words of St. Augustine. We refuted that theory above.

Finally, Garrigou-Lagrange cites St. Augustine saying:⁴⁵ "The predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and the preparation of benefits by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated. . . . In His predestination God foreknew the things that He Himself was going to do." Having cited these words, Garrigou-Lagrange comments: "On the contrary, Molina says: 'There is a condition, on the part of the use of free will, to the foreknowledge which predestination includes, on the side of the intellect; without this [condition] it would not have pre-existed in God'"-In themselves, the words cited from St. Augustine could be understood of an infallible, but not necessarily an infrustrable predestination. And his idea of foreknowledge, as we shall see,⁴⁶ is far different from that of Garrigou-Lagrange. However, if St. Augustine, in this passage, really has in mind the *massa damnata* theory, we have already shown that it contradicts revelation. Further Garrigou-Lagrange does not seem to have understood Molina rightly, for, as we have seen,⁴⁷ Molina holds, in the most basic sense, that it is not in the power of an adult to bring it about that he be predestined by God.

Besides, we must not forget that nothing can be proved from the opinion of just *one* Father, howsoever great he may be. Proof requires the morally unanimous agreement of all the Fathers, speaking as witnesses of revelation.

7) Many theologians object, against all forms of Molinism, that it contradicts the opinion of St. Thomas, especially in regard to knowledge by way of causality.

We shall comment on this later, in chapters 22 and 23. For the present, we can notice that Molina and St. Thomas both agree in holding the transcendence of the divine intellect, although Molina seems not to be willing to apply divine transcendence to movements from the divine will, while St. Thomas does make the application. Also, Molina bases his theory on the knowledge of futuribles, while St. Thomas says nothing at all about futuribles. Further, St. Thomas always has recourse to eternity to make future contingents present to God; in Molina's theory, there seems to be no need of such recourse.

C. The Scotists

398. Presentation of the system: Certainly many Scotists, and perhaps Scotus himself, held that God foresees all by infrustrable decrees. But the later Scotists after Mastrius contend that God foresees by codetermining or by concomitant and not determining decrees. In this way they try to avoid the difficulties that come from the system of infrustrable decrees, for they say that the decrees are not prior to the free determination by man.

399. Difficulties against the Scotist position:

1) That form of Scotism in which nothing is foreseen without predetermining infrustrable decrees is subject to the same difficulties as the system of the older Thomists, and so is to be equally rejected.

2) That form of Scotism in which everything is known by codetermining or concomitant decrees does not seem to explain the problem. For if the decrees are the means of knowing, and yet are not at least logically prior to the things that are known, nothing can be known through them.

D. F. Marín-Sola and F. Muñiz

400. Presentation of the system: These excellent theologians hold that God does not foreknow everything by way of decrees, but that He foreknows some things in another way. Hence Muñiz wrote:⁴⁸ "The Thomists have always recognized two media or ways, valid and sufficient in themselves, on which to base a certain and infallible knowledge of the future: *the way of causality or of the decrees, and the way of eternity.*" He adds:⁴⁹ "... the way of eternity is more universal, more extensive than the way of causality or of the decrees." However:⁵⁰ "... the way of eternity always and necessarily supposes the divine causality and divine decree. . . . It is the divine action that puts things in time, and eternity that makes them present to God." We need to note that he does not say that the way of eternity presupposes the way of causality, but rather, that it supposes "divine causality." For knowledge through causality is not a prerequisite for knowledge by way of eternity. Nor is divine causality needed for the defects of men, for non-beings.

Marín-Sola explains the prevision of sin in four logical moments:⁵¹ "*First*. Decrees of the *antecedent* will or *general* providence. . . . It is not to be forgotten that these promotions and these decrees have, just as the antecedent will . . . a *conditioned* character. . . . That condition is 'If the human will does not place an impediment by its *defect*'. . . . *Second*. Knowledge of vision, in those decrees themselves inasmuch as they are *decrees*, of the *beginning* of the action by the creature since that beginning is always and infallibly placed; and at the same time, knowledge of vision, in those decrees inasmuch as they are *eternal*, of the defect or impediment actually placed by the creature to the *continuation* of the act. *Third*. Decrees of the *consequent will* . . . by which God freely determines not to impede the *formal sin* from following, or . . . not to give the *special* grace or movement to remove the *defect* already placed by the creature. *Fourth*. Knowledge of *vision* of the formal sin of the creature in those decrees of *not giving* the special grace or movement. . . ." And he adds: ". . . the infallible connection between the divine decrees and the defect of the creature is not a *causal* but a logical connection. . . . To say that the infallibility of that connection comes not from *God* but from the *creature* is the same as to say that the infallibility is found in the decree not inasmuch as it is a decree, but inasmuch as it is *eternal*."

401. Difficulties against this view: Some have accused Muñiz of holding that eternity is a *medium* of divine knowledge. He did say, in the passage cited above: "The Thomists have always recognized two *media* or ways. . . ." But he probably meant this in a broad sense, not in a technical sense. Certainly, he would not mean to deny that the divine essence is the *medium quo*. Nor would he wish to say that eternity is something that is known which because of the connection it has with other things, cannot be known without these other things being also attained in the same knowledge (*medium in quo*). Actually, Muñiz explicitly explains the role of eternity in a different way, in the passage cited above: "eternity . . . makes them present to God." So he seems to mean only that eternity makes things knowable by making them present. St. Thomas, as we shall see in chapter 22, says that eternity is needed so that future contingent free acts may become knowable, for he holds that these acts, *as future*, are unknowable, since, as future, they are not yet determined. St. Thomas supposes that the transcendent intellect of God can know whatever is knowable and present. Muñiz seems to suppose the same thing.

Marín-Sola seems to hold the same view, even though he did not express his thought in the most felicitous way when he said that the defect of a man who sins is known in the divine decree⁵² "not inasmuch as it is a decree, but inasmuch as it is eternal." This way of speaking seems to refer everything to the divine will, and to leave out of consideration the divine intellect's power of knowing, for he says that this defect is known *in a decree* of the will.

END NOTES

- 1 De Deo uno, Universitas Gregoriana, Romae, 4a ed., 1948, pp. 256-257.
- 2 1 Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a 2, c.
- 3 Cf. also §§ 119-120.
- 4 Cf. §§ 310-322.
- 5 "De Deo uno et trino" in: Sacrae Theologiae Summa, B. A. C., Matriti, 1952, II, p. 153, § 192.
- 6 De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 402. (*italics his*).
- 7 Cf. § 309.
- 8 And in §§ 119-20.
- 9 Cf. §§ 6, 309.
- 10 Op. Cit., p. 137, § 171.
- 11 Cf. § 129. 3.
- 12 Cf. §§ 323-27.
- 13 Cf. §§ 340-53.
- 14 Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis . . . , q. 14, a. 13, disp. 50, Parisiis, 1876. p. 302.15. De gratia et libero arbitrio 4.
- 15 Opera omnia, Neapoli, 1872, pp. 376-77.
- 16 Op. cit., pp. 237-38.
- 17 Op. cit. q. 14, a. 13, disp. 53, memb. 3, p. 365.
- 18 Dalmau, op. cit., p. 135, § 170.
- 19 1 Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 5 c.
- 20 Ibid., d. 36, q. 1, a. 2 c.
- 21 ST I. 14. 5. c.
- 22 §§ 119-20.
- 23 Dalmau, op. cit., p. 138, § 171 (*emphasis his*).
- 24 Cf. § 463.
- 25 Cf. § 484.
- 26 Cf. §§ 483-85.
- 27 De Deo uno, p. 363.
- 28 § 18.
- 29 De Deo uno, p. 363.
- 30 Cf. § 143.
- 31 De Deo uno, p. 365.
- 32 Cf. §§ 116-20.
- 33 Sir 15:14-17. We recall too that normal Hebrew modes of speech spoke as if God directly caused even evils.
- 34 Cf. M. Brunec, S.D.B., "Cum timore et tremore vestram salutem operamini" in: Verbum Domini 40 (1962) pp. 270-75.
- 35 Op. cit., q. 14, a. 13, disp. 52, p. 318.
- 36 De Deo uno, p. 366.
- 37 § 311.
- 38 Cf. § 6.8.
- 39 De Deo uno, p. 366.
- 40 Cf. § 6.8.
- 41 De Deo uno, pp. 363-64.
- 42 De praedestinatione sanctorum 8.13. PL 44.971.
- 43 De dono perseverantiae 9.21. PL 45.1004.
- 44 § 248.
- 45 De dono perseverantiae 14.35. PL 45.1014; De praedestinatione sanctorum 10.19. PL 44.975.
- 46 Cf. §§ 429-37.
- 47 § 248.

48 In his notes in: Suma Teologica de Santo Tomas de Aquino, B.A.C., 2a ed., Madrid, 1957, p. 684. (*italics his*).

49 *Ibid.*, p. 687.

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 688-69.

51 "El sistema Tomista sobre la mocion divina" in: La Ciencia Tomista 32 (1925) pp. 47-48 (*italics his*).

52 *Ibid.*, p. 49 (*italics his*).

"Pt. 4: Divine foreknowledge - Ch. 20: The teaching of Sacred Scripture on foreknowledge"

402. Since absolutely no one denies that Scripture teaches that God knows all things, even the hidden thoughts of minds, even future contingent free acts, it will be enough to cite one passage from the Psalms:¹ "O Lord, thou hast searched me and known me! Thou knowest when I sit down and when I rise up; thou discernest my thoughts from afar. . . . Even before a word is on my tongue, lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. . . . Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain it. . . . Thy eyes beheld my unformed substance; in thy book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them."

The Psalmist does not even attempt to explain *how* God can foreknow. He admits he does not know: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me. . . ." Nor does any passage of Scripture attempt to explain God's foreknowledge.

403. Texts of Scripture on the futuribles: Scripture makes it equally clear that God knows even the futuribles:

1) When David was fleeing from Saul, he came into the city of Keilah. But, on hearing the report that Saul was going to come there, he consulted the Lord:² "Will the men of Keilah deliver me into his hands? Will Saul come down, as thy servant has heard? . . . And the Lord said: He will come down. Then David said: Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the Lord said: They will surrender you."

2) The Lord Himself said in the Gospel:³ "Woe to you, Chorazin! woe to you, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. . . . And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You shall be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day."

3) The constant teaching of Scripture that God provides wisely for all men implies that He knows the futuribles. For if He did not know what this man would do in these circumstances etc., He could not wisely provide for him; and especially, He could not wisely grant or deny petitions in prayer. For He will not give us what we ask if He knows it would be harmful if given. Hence, the faithful, following the ordinary

teaching of the Church, believe that God acts this way in granting or denying the things asked in prayer.

404. Comments on the Scriptural texts:

1) Perhaps someone might wish to try to explain God's reply to David by saying that Saul had *already made* a decision of coming to Keilah, and that the men of Keilah, having heard that Saul was coming, had *already made* a decision to give up David-and that out of this knowledge of *already present* dispositions, God knew that if David remained, Saul and the men of Keilah would carry out the plans they had already formed. But the explanation does not suffice, because out of a knowledge of a present decision in the hearts of Saul and the men of Keilah, it would not be *infallibly* certain that they would carry out these plans if David remained. For men can always change their minds, or even be impeded from without in carrying out their plans. And, most certainly, this sort of explanation would not hold for the words of Christ about Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom, nor would it explain how God can wisely grant and refuse things asked in prayer.

2) Nor could the words of Christ about Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom be explained by saying that the resistance of all the men of whom He speaks is either past or present, and so is definite, so that out of a knowledge of this resistance, Christ could know *how much or how strong* a grace would be needed to overcome such resistance. A knowledge gained in such a manner would be conjectural knowledge. Even if the explanation would suffice in cases where there is question only of a stronger or more intense grace (as it were in a quantitative category), it certainly would not explain the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians. For in that case, the grace of which Christ spoke would differ not only in intensity of power, but also in *kind*, from the grace actually given to the Tyrians and Sidonians. The latter had received *internal* graces of *ordinary* providence, but the miracles of Christ are *external* graces of *extraordinary* providence. External grace affects a man in a much different way than does internal grace. So, from a knowledge of the resistance of a man to internal grace, no infallible conclusion could be reached about the grace required in a different category. Further, such an explanation would not hold for the reply of God to David, nor would it explain how God can wisely grant or withhold things asked in prayer. For things that are denied in prayer are not always denied because of a present resistance or other present disposition, but often because of a resistance or other disposition that merely would arise if a thing were given.

3) Nor would it be permissible to say that God has and manifests, in these cases, only a conjectural knowledge. For that would be an imperfection which we cannot suppose in God.

Conclusion: Scripture shows that God truly knows both future contingent free acts and futuribles, but does not explain how.

END NOTES

1 Ps 138:1-2, 4, 6, 16.

2 1 Sm 23:7-12.

3 Mt 11:21, 23; Lk 10:13.

"Pt. 4: Divine foreknowledge - Ch. 21: The teaching of Tradition on divine foreknowledge"

I. Preliminary observations on the view of some pagan philosophers

405. Before turning to the tradition of Christian writers and the views of Christian theologians, it will be worthwhile to look briefly at the opinions of two outstanding pagan philosophers. A helpful light can be gained on the statement of the problem.

406. Aristotle:¹ "[divine thought], then, thinks of itself, for that is best, and its thinking is a thinking on thinking."

Comments: In this passage Aristotle seems to say that God thinks of nothing but Himself. Thus He would not know anything outside Himself. But, some commentators follow the interpretation of St. Thomas, who wrote:² "However, it does not follow that all other things besides Himself are unknown to Him; for in knowing Himself, He knows all other things."

Many other commentators hold that Aristotle really did deny that God knows anything outside Himself. For example, W. D. Ross, who is eminent among Aristotelian commentators today, though he admits that Aristotle did say some few things which seem to contain "traces" of a different view, yet concludes:³ "Aristotle has no theory either of divine creation or of divine providence. . . . But there are traces in him of a way of thinking less arid than that which we have seen to be his deliberate theory. . . . in criticising Empedocles for excluding part of reality from God's knowledge, he, in effect, criticises his own limitation of God's knowledge to self- knowledge." F. Copleston, an outstanding historian of philosophy, writes:⁴ "Moreover, [according to Aristotle] God cannot have any object of thought outside Himself, for that would mean that He had an end outside Himself. God, therefore, knows only Himself. St. Thomas and others, e.g., Brentano, have tried to interpret Aristotle in such a way as not to exclude knowledge of the world and the exercise of Divine Providence, but, though St. Thomas is right as to the true view of God, it does not follow that this was the view of Aristotle."

It seems, then, more probable that Aristotle did deny that God knows anything outside Himself. For even though a few passages contain "traces," as Ross says, of another view, yet Aristotle does *explicitly* state that God thinks only on Himself and the reasons that Aristotle gives are such as to exclude the deduction St. Thomas wants to make. For Aristotle says:⁵ "It [is] out of place [for God] to think about some things." Therefore, for an *a priori* reason, as being unworthy of God,

Aristotle excludes these things from the scope of divine knowledge. St. Thomas showed that Aristotle *logically could have* come to the true view, but it does not follow that Aristotle *actually* did so.

If, then, God knows nothing outside Himself, of course He does not foresee anything outside Himself.

407. Plotinus:⁶ "Then if the First thinks it will have something [added to it], then it will not be [solely] the First, but also the Second, and not the One, but also many other things, and all things, as many as it thinks. For even if it [thinks] only of itself, it will be more than one thing."

Comments: As the eminent Plotinian commentator, E. Bréhier, explains,⁷ Plotinus, in *Enneads* 5.6.2-6 presents ten arguments to prove that God does not think even of Himself. Especially, Plotinus says that if God thinks even of Himself, there will be multiplicity and distinction in God. But God is the One. Therefore, God does not know even Himself. Of course, it would be clear that He could not know or foresee anything outside Himself if He did not even know Himself.

408. Conclusions from the views of the pagan philosophers: We have seen that two of the best minds of antiquity—certainly, Aristotle is easily the greatest of pagan philosophers—found the problem of God's knowledge (not to mention foreknowledge) so difficult that Aristotle himself (at least probably) fell into the error of denying that God knows anything at all outside Himself; while Plotinus went so far into error as to deny that God knows anything at all, even Himself. Yet, all these conclusions were reached for reasons that seemed to them to be metaphysically necessary and inescapable.

We do not conclude from this object lesson that the human mind cannot reach truth by reasoning, but we ought to learn a sobering lesson: For if even such great minds erred so badly on the matter of divine knowledge, we should be warned against letting mere human reason stand against the transcendence of the divine intellect.

II. Note on a principle of interpretation of certain Patristic texts

409. As we saw in chapter 13, very many Fathers teach that God does not reprobate before foreseeing demerits. But, if God does not reprobate before foreseeing demerits, it is evident that He foresees before making the decree of reprobation. Now the Fathers could not mean that God foreknows demerits by infallible decrees to permit individual sins, as the older Thomists hold, for that system of infallible decrees necessarily implies reprobation before foreseeing demerits, as these Thomists themselves say.⁸ But, the Fathers reject reprobation before foreseeing demerits. Hence, they also reject foreknowledge explained through the system of older Thomists decrees.

As a result, we can arrive at a helpful principle of interpretation: *If any Father rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits, that same Father also holds that God can foresee at least sins without the use of*

infrustrable decrees as the means of knowing. We will briefly note below the Fathers for whom this is the case; the appropriate quotations and commentary can be found above in Chapter 13. (Of course, we do not suppose the Fathers would deny that divine causality is a prerequisite for the existence of beings and good things: but it is one thing to say that it is a *prerequisite for the existence of beings*-quite another thing to say that *causality is the sole means of foreseeing everything*).⁹

III. The tradition of the Fathers of the Church

A. The Greek Fathers

410. St. Justin Martyr: We have already seen¹⁰ that St. Justin rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

411. Athenagoras:¹¹ "But since we know that God is present day and night to those things which we think and speak, and since we are convinced that since He is all light, He sees the things that are in our hearts . . . it is not likely that we will willingly sin, under these conditions. . . ."

Comments: Athenagoras, as the context shows, is trying to prove that Christians do not live wickedly but well, since they know that God is always present and sees all, even the secrets of their hearts. He does not speak explicitly about foreknowledge. But he gives the reason why God can know even the secrets of hearts: the fact that He is *present*, and "since He is all light," He can see all things. So it at least seems that, according to Athenagoras, the reason why God sees the secrets of hearts is not that he always moves hearts infrustrably, but rather, because He is "all light" and is always *present*. He at least seems to attribute the power of seeing to the divine intellect rather than to the causality of His will.

412. St. Theophilus of Antioch:¹² ". . . it pertains to the most high and omnipotent and true God not only to be everywhere, but also to see all things, and to hear all . . ."

Comments: St. Theophilus does not speak explicitly about foreknowledge. However he at least seems to suppose that God can know all things, even the secrets of hearts, because He is *present* everywhere. If He knew because He caused all things, St. Theophilus would speak in a different way. Especially the words, "see all things . . . hear all . . ." are in themselves more apt to suggest that God knows through the transcendent intellect rather than through causality.

413. St. Irenaus: We have already seen¹³ that St. Irenaus rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

414. Clement of Alexandria:¹⁴ "For God knows all things, not only the things that exist, but also the things that will be, and how each one will be; and foreseeing individual movements, 'He surveys all things

and hears all things,' seeing the soul bare within; and through eternity He has the thought of each thing individually. And what is true of theatres and of the parts of each object in looking in, around, and at all together, is true also of God [i.e., of God's vision]. For in one look He sees all things together and each thing individually. . . ."

Comments: It is difficult to be sure of precisely all the implications of the theatre comparison. Clement seems to suppose that God sees all things at once because He is eternal, for he says that "through eternity He has the thought of each thing" and that "in one look He sees all things." But in the explanation of foreknowledge by eternity, there is no need of infrustrable decrees, as we shall see later.¹⁵

We have already seen¹⁶ that Clement rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

415. Origen:¹⁷ ". . . a thing will be not for the reason that God knows it will be; but because it is going to be, it is known by God before it happens."

Comments: Some theologians accuse Origen of teaching that God is passive in His knowledge. But Origen does not teach this. As St. Thomas himself explains:¹⁸ "Origen spoke having in mind the nature of knowledge [in itself] to which the characteristic of causality does not belong, unless the will be added. . . . But as to the fact that He says that God foresees some things for the reason that they are going to be: this is to be understood in respect to causality of consequence, not in respect to causality of [that produces] being. For if any things are going to be, it follows that God foreknows them: but yet the future things are not the cause of God's knowing."

It is especially clear that Origen holds that reprobation does not come before prevision of demerits, if we consider the context of his words. He was answering opponents who tried to prove from the words of St. Paul that free will contributes nothing to deciding our salvation so that God would be unjust and even the cause of sins if He reprobates anyone. Origen wants to show that free will really is decisive in determining whether one will or will not be reprobated. Hence he says:¹⁹ "So, in this way, neither does the cause of our salvation or ruin lie in the foreknowledge of God, nor does justification depend only on the call, nor is glorification totally removed from our control." Therefore, since he teaches that a man can "distinguish himself" in regard to reprobation, he makes clear, according to our principle of interpretation, that he holds that God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

416. Eusebius of Caesarea:²⁰ "If it is necessary to speak, we will say that foreknowledge is not the cause of the things that happen (for God does not lay hold of the one who is foreseen as sinning when he does sin) but [we will say] a thing that is more unexpected but true: that the

future thing is the cause of the foreknowledge of itself being such [as it is].

Comments: Eusebius says the same as Origen, and uses very similar words. Cf. the comments on Origen, above.

417. St. Cyril of Jerusalem:²¹ "Just as those who are about to make a military campaign scrutinize the ages and bodies of the soldiers, so also the Lord, enlisting souls, considers their free choices; and if He finds a hidden hypocrisy, He rejects the man as unfit for the true service; but if He finds [him] worthy, He readily gives him grace."

Comments: At first sight it might seem, especially in the first passage cited above, that St. Cyril teaches that God can foresee even positive things, beings, without decrees, as if man were able to accomplish positive goods of his own power. But this does not necessarily follow: he only wanted to teach that reprobation is in some way conditioned by human conditions. He did not investigate precisely the nature of the condition.²²

We have already seen²³ that St. Cyril rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

418. St. Gregory of Nazianzus: We have already seen ²⁴ that St. Gregory rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

419. St. Gregory of Nyssa:²⁵ "It is likely that He who knows the future as well as the past, prevents the progress of the life of the infant to full maturity, lest the evil which He foresees by His power of prevision²⁶ be accomplished by the one who would have lived in that way. . . . We conjecture this about the death of newborn infants, that He who does all things reasonably, in His love of men,²⁷ takes away the opportunity for evil, not giving to the [human] will the opportunity, that is known by His power of prevision. . . ."

Comments: In the citation given above, St. Gregory clearly teaches that God knows the futuribles, and he says that God knows these "by His power of prevision." He does not, then, give any reason to suppose that He thinks God knows these by way of decrees. Rather, he implies the contrary, for he teaches that God sends death early to some precisely so they will not live wickedly. But, if whether and when and what sins a person would commit were completely determined by infrustrable decrees, so that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for men to do otherwise,²⁸ then there would be no need to send early death to prevent a man from sinning: all things would be controlled by the decrees.

We have already seen²⁹ that St. Gregory rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

420. St. Epiphanius:³⁰ "For we do not do these things because Scripture predicted it; but Scripture predicted it because we were

going to do them, on account of the antecedent knowledge of God. . . ."

Comment: The words of St. Epiphanius seem to have the same meaning as the words of Origen, cited above. See the comments on Origen.³¹

421. St. John Chrysostom:³² "So His prediction [that scandals would come] did not bring scandals. Banish the thought! Neither did they happen for the reason that He foretold them; but He predicted them for the reason that they were definitely going to happen. . . ."

Comments: In the passage cited above, St. John teaches the same as Origen. See the comments on Origen.³³ We have already seen³⁴ that St. John rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.³⁵

422. St. Cyril of Alexandria: We have already seen³⁶ that St. Cyril rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

423. Theodoret:³⁷ "'Those whom He predestined, them also He called. . . .' Those whose purpose [Greek *prothesis*: which Theodoret interprets to mean men's dispositions] He foreknew, these He predestined from the beginning. . . . But let no one say that foreknowledge is the cause of these things. For foreknowledge did not make them such, but God, as God, foresaw far in advance what would be."

Comments: We have already seen³⁸ that Theodoret rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees. But we note also that Theodoret says: "God, as God, foresaw far in advance. . . ." So he seems to attribute foreknowledge to God's transcendence. And since, as we have just seen, he attributes foreknowledge not to divine causality but to the divine intellect, we gather that he attributes foreknowledge to the transcendent divine intellect.

424. St. John Damascene:³⁹ "It is necessary to know that God foreknows all things, but does not predefine all things. For He foreknows the things that are in our power, but does not predefine⁴⁰ them. For He does not will that evil be done, nor does He compel virtue. So predefinition is the work of the divine foreseeing command. He predefines the things that are in our power according to His foreknowledge." And again:⁴¹ "On the one hand, the power of prevision of the powerful God does not have its cause from us, but, on the other hand, the fact that He foreknows what we are going to do is from us. For if we were not going to do [this thing] neither would He foreknow [it] nor would it be going to be. And the foreknowledge of God is true and inviolable, but it is not at all the cause of the future coming to be; but because we are going to do this or that, He foreknows."

Comments: In the first passage cited above, as we have already shown from a fuller citation,⁴² St. John teaches that God does not

reprobate before foreseeing demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees. In the second passage cited above he says the same as Origen.⁴³

B. The Latin Fathers, Doctors and Theologians before St. Thomas

425. St. Cyprian:⁴⁴ "...the Lord commanded us to pray secretly . . . so that we might know that God is present everywhere, that He hears and sees all, and that, by the fulness of His majesty, he penetrates even into hidden and secret things. . . ."

Comments: St. Cyprian does not speak explicitly about foreknowledge, but he does explain God's knowledge of the secrets of hearts by God's *presence*. In speaking of knowledge through causality, there is no need to speak of presence. Further, he says that God penetrates all "by the fulness of His majesty." Probably, therefore, he has in mind the transcendence of the divine intellect. At least, he gives no reason at all to suppose he thinks God cannot know anything at all except through infrustrable decrees.

426. St. Hilary: We have already seen⁴⁵ that St. Hilary rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

427. St. Ambrose: We have already seen⁴⁶ that St. Ambrose rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

428. St. Jerome:

1)⁴⁷ "A thing is not going to be for the reason that God knows it is going to be; but because it is going to be, God knows it, since He foresees the future."

2)⁴⁸ "Not that the foreknowledge of God brought the cause of the devastation, but that the future devastation was known in advance to the majesty of God."

3)⁴⁹ "For Adam did not sin because God knew it would be so; but God, as God, foresaw that which he [Adam] was going to do by his own will."

Comments: In the first three citations above, St. Jerome, in various ways, repeats the opinion of Origen: he does this even though he himself is the great opponent of Origen in general! In fact, the first citation uses almost the very words of Origen. The comments, then, are the same as those given on Origen, above.⁵⁰ We must add that St. Jerome does not attribute foreknowledge to the will of God, for he says that these things do not happen because God foreknew. So he attributes foreknowledge to the divine intellect, and to the *transcendent* intellect, for he says that "God, as God, foresaw" and that the devastation "was known in advance to the *majesty of God*."

We have already seen⁵¹ that St. Jerome rejects reprobation before foreseen demerits. Therefore, he holds that God can foresee without infrustrable decrees.

429. St. Augustine:

1)⁵² ". . . there is one wisdom, in which are certain immense and infinite treasures of intelligible things, among which are the invisible and unchangeable *reasons* [principles] *for things* . . . that were made through it [wisdom]. For God did not make anything without knowing it—a statement that is true of any human *artisan*. Now if He made all things knowingly, He surely made the things that He knew. From this there comes to mind a certain wonderful but yet true thing: that this world could not be made known to us unless it existed: but unless it were known to God, it could not exist."

2)⁵³ "Now it is *not because they are*, that He knows all His creatures, both spiritual and corporal; but *they are because He knows them*. For He did not fail to know what He was going to create. Therefore, because He knew, He created; He did not know because He created. Nor did He know the things created otherwise than He knew the things to be created: for nothing was added to His wisdom from them. . . ."

3)⁵⁴ ". . . these gifts of God, [to begin to believe, to persevere, etc.], I say are not foreseen by God if the predestination we defend does not exist; but they are foreseen; this, then, is the predestination we are defending."

4)⁵⁵ ". . . for the sake of brevity, we say only this to those [who follow the opinion of Porphyry] . . . : that *Christ willed to appear to men at the time when and in the place in which He knew there would be those who were going to believe in Him*. For at the times and in the places in which His Gospel was not preached, He foreknew that all would be such [in attitude] towards His preaching, as, not indeed all, but many were during His bodily presence. . . . And so those to whom it [the salvation of the Gospel] was not announced at all, were foreseen as not going to believe. . . . For what is more true than that Christ foreknew who would believe in Him and when and in what places? But whether, when Christ was preached to them, they would be going to have faith of themselves, or by God's gift, that is, whether God merely foreknew them, or also predestined them, I did not think it necessary to seek and discuss at that time. So that which I said: 'Christ willed to appear to men at the time when and in the place in which He knew there would be those who were going to believe in Him;'—this could have been stated also in the following way: 'Christ willed to appear to men at the time when and in the place in which He knew there would be those who had been chosen in Him before the foundation of the world.'"

5)⁵⁶ ". . . there can be no [predestination] without foreknowledge: but there can be foreknowledge without predestination. For in His predestination, God foreknew the things that He Himself was going to do. . . . But *He is able to foresee even the things that He does not do*; such as all sins. . . ."

6)⁵⁷ ". . . God would have willed to keep the first man in that salvation in which he was made . . . if He had foreseen that he would have a perpetual will of remaining as he was made, without sin."

7)⁵⁸ "Let us not dare to say: How does God know? Lest perhaps you expect of me, brothers, that I explain to you how God knows. I say only this: He does not know like a man, He does not know like an angel. And *how He does know, I do not dare to say, since I am unable to know.* I know one thing, however: that even before all the birds of the sky existed, God knew what He was going to create. . . . So great, then, is the knowledge of God, that they were with Him *in some inexpressible way* before they were created."

8)⁵⁹ "Just as you, by your memory, do not force the things that are past to have happened: So God by His foreknowledge does not force the things that are to be done."

9)⁶⁰ "For what is foreknowledge, except the knowledge of the future? But what is future to God, who walks above all times? For if the knowledge of God includes these things, they are not future to Him, but present; and so it can be called not foreknowledge, but only knowledge."

10)⁶¹ ". . . He is that which He has. And so He does not have knowledge in such a way that the knowledge by which He knows is one thing, and His being is another thing; but both are one."

430. Comments on the texts of St. Augustine: The opinion of St. Augustine is of great importance in this question not only because of his general eminence, but because, as we have seen, he not only taught, but is the very father of the theory of the *massa damnata*, of negative reprobation before prevision of demerits.

Now if one holds that God does not or cannot foresee in any way except through infrustrable decrees, he necessarily must hold also that God reprobates before foreseeing demerits, as we have already seen.⁶² But the converse is not true: For if one holds that God reprobates before foreseeing demerits, he could still hold that God can foresee by other means than through decrees. As we shall soon see, St. Augustine does hold this.

St. Augustine does hold that God foresees by means other than decrees, even though he had, in his very hands as it were, the premises out of which the older Thomists regularly draw the conclusion that foreknowledge is by way of decrees. For example, in the first citation above, St. Augustine compares God to an artisan who knows what he is going to make, and he adds: "unless it were known to God, it could not exist." In the same text he speaks of the reasons or principles of things in the divine mind. Again, St. Augustine explicitly rejects and contradicts Origen's famous dictum about foreknowledge (in the second passage above), probably because he wants to deny that God can be passive in His knowledge: "nothing was added to His wisdom from them." Nevertheless, as we shall soon see, St. Augustine

does not follow the older Thomists' pattern, by drawing from such statements the deduction that God cannot foresee in any way other than by decrees.

Likewise, in text 3, St. Augustine seems to say that God would not foresee a man's perseverance if He had not predestined that man. But all he really means to say by these words is this: That which will not exist cannot be foreseen; and perseverance would not exist without predestination. Yet, as we shall soon see (from texts 5 and following) it does not follow from these words that God cannot foresee in any other way than by causing. Similarly, in text 4, he adds an explanation to a statement he had previously written, commenting that faith could not be foreseen unless God had decreed to give faith. But he does not infer that God can foresee only by the decree to give faith.

431. In text 5, he explicitly teaches that God can foresee without causing. For he says: "He is able to foresee even the things that He does not do; such as all sins. . . ." We notice that he not only says that God can foresee *sins*, which He does not cause, but he says: "*such as all sins.*" So there is an implication that God can know *even other* things besides sins, which He does not make, without the use of decrees as the means of knowing (though, of course, not without the decree needed for the existence of positive things that are to be foreseen). What these other things are, St. Augustine does not say. But we especially-when we recall what we have already seen⁶³ of St. Augustine's second theory on predestination-can explain that God is able to know both the evil specification in resistance, and the absence of resistance in man, even though God is the cause of neither of these.

432. Could we or should we suspect that perhaps St. Augustine really holds that God can foresee positive goods only by infrustrable decrees, and evils by infallible permissions, as the older Thomists hold? By no means. As we shall see, St. Augustine excludes this solution in several of the following texts. For, in text 6, St. Augustine speaks of God's foreknowledge of Adam's perseverance or lack thereof before Adam's fall. If St. Augustine were speaking of men *after* the fall, and following the theory of the *massa damnata*, he could have said that God deserts men because of original sin, before foreseeing their personal demerits, so that they infallibly fall-and that by such a permission, God can foresee the outcome, their sins. But such a train of thought does not apply to Adam before the fall. Instead, as we have seen above⁶⁴ St. Augustine holds that God had given to Adam before the fall the help by which Adam could have actually persevered, if he had wanted to. Therefore, it was entirely in Adam's power to persevere or not to persevere, nor was anything additional required from God, beyond what God had already given to Adam. Nevertheless, speaking of Adam in such a situation, St. Augustine says in text 6 that God did not keep Adam in grace precisely because He could and did foresee that Adam would first fall of his own accord: "God would have willed to keep the

first man in that salvation . . . if He had foreseen that he would have had a perpetual will of remaining as he was made, without sin." So it is obvious that St. Augustine believed that God actually foresaw the fall of Adam entirely without any infallible permission to fall, since God had already given Adam, in advance, all that was needed to persevere without a fall, so that the decision was entirely under Adam's control.

433. Text 7 confirms the fact that St. Augustine does not hold that God can foresee only through infrustrable decrees. For there, St. Augustine *flatly admits that he does not know at all how God foresees*: "How He does know, I do not dare to say, since I am unable to know." Furthermore, we must notice that in this text 7, St. Augustine is talking not about future free acts, but about future birds! Therefore, if he admits that he does not know even how God can foresee futures that are not free, all the more is he ignorant of how God foresees future free acts. And yet, in that same passage, St. Augustine had said that "God knew what He was going to create"-the very type of expression from which the older Thomists would deduce that God knows all by decrees. St. Augustine, in spite of that, simply confesses he cannot explain, and says that God knows "in some inexpressible way." We can gather, however, that this way, which he does not try to explain, must be through the divine intellect, since, as we saw in other texts above, St. Augustine does imply that God can foresee without the use of decrees of the will as means. Because he does not know *how* the divine intellect does it, he says he cannot explain: it is the divine transcendence that he cannot explain. He does, however, in text 8, make a comparison, saying that God's foreknowledge no more compels future free acts than the memory of man forces things that have happened. So the knowledge of God, as such, seems to St. Augustine to be independent of the line of causality, except that, as we gather from text 3, he knows well that no positive thing would exist without divine causality: and if it would not exist, it could not be foreknown. But it is one thing to say that causality is a *prerequisite* for foreknowledge inasmuch as things that will not exist cannot be foreknown-quite a different thing to say that causality is the *means*, even the *only* means, of foreknowing.

434. From text 9 we see that St. Augustine knows that all things are present to God's eternity. However, he did not add, as Boethius did later, that eternity is necessary to make the free futures knowable, since (according to Boethius) future free contingents do not have definite determined truth before they take place in the present. What St. Augustine would say about such a comment we cannot guess. He merely admits that God's knowledge is eternal. In text 10, he again shows that he realizes well that there is mystery in God's knowledge: God is His knowledge.

435. So St. Augustine is well within the line of tradition inasmuch as he clearly shows he holds that God can foreknow by His intellect even

without the use of decrees of the will as means of knowing. He makes this clear in two ways, namely: in the texts in which he speaks of knowledge that is not by way of decrees, and in his explicit confession that he does not know how God can know even unfree futures. And he holds this position even though-often in the very texts in which he speaks of knowledge without the use of decrees as a medium-he uses some expressions which, when they occur in St. Thomas, lead the older Thomists to conclude to a theory of foreknowledge by means of decrees. We have, then, an excellent object lesson: Such expressions of themselves do not at all prove the theory of decrees.

436. But St. Augustine makes an advance over the previous witnesses of tradition when he says: "He is able to know even the things that He does not do, such as all sins." For these words seem to imply a distinction between positive goods, which require divine causality for existence as a prerequisite to foreknowledge, and non-beings, which do not, as such, need divine causality.

437. Further, we can add this: If, as we tried to show above,⁶⁵ it is true that St. Augustine has a second theory on reprobation, placing it after foreseen demerits, then, following our principle of interpretation given above, we can deduce from that second theory the conclusion that St. Augustine held that God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

438. St. Prosper:⁶⁶ "And because they were foreseen as going to fall, they were not predestined."

Comments: As one would expect, St. Prosper agrees with his master, St. Augustine, on foreknowledge. In the citation given above, he flatly teaches that some were not predestined "because they were foreseen as going to fall." From this we reach the same conclusion as we did from the texts of the second theory of St. Augustine, namely, that St. Prosper holds that God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

439. St. Cassian:⁶⁷ "When God sees in us a certain beginning of good will, He at once illumines it [our will] and strengthens and arouses it to salvation, granting the increase to that which either He Himself planted, or which He saw has emerged by our effort."

Comments: It is admitted that St. Cassian taught Semipelagianism; and the text above provides an example of it. The orthodox Fathers rightly objected against this error. However, they never did make an objection against the other teaching implied in the passage cited, namely, that God can know in us even the things He has not caused. For this is merely the teaching found in the other Fathers as well: God can know even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

440. Boethius⁶⁸

1) "Therefore, in regard to contingents of this kind [free future contingents] if, in [regard to one of two alternatives referring to] the future, one is always true, and the other always false, if one is

determinately true, and the other determinately false, and if the realities are in accord with the words [of these future propositions], [then] it is necessary that all things be or not be; and whatever happens, happens by necessity; . . . neither will there be free will, nor any chance in things, for necessity rules in all."

2)⁶⁹ "Neither do I approve that reasoning by which some [Origen and his followers] think they can dissolve the knot of this question. For they say that a thing is not going to happen because Providence foresees it will happen, but rather, on the contrary, that since the thing is going to happen, it cannot escape divine Providence. . . . But let us try to show this: that in whatever way the order of causes be, the outcome of the foreseen things is necessary, even if foreknowledge does not seem to impose the necessity of happening on future things. For if any one sits, the opinion that holds that he is sitting is necessarily true: and again, conversely, if the opinion be true of anyone that holds he is sitting, it is necessary that he is sitting. So in both there is necessity: in the one, the necessity of sitting, but in the other, the necessity of truth. Yet, the man does not sit for the reason that the opinion is true, but rather, this opinion is true since the man is already sitting. So although the cause of the truth comes from the other direction, yet necessity is common to both. We should reason similarly about Providence and future things. For even if they are foreseen because they are going to be and do not happen because they are foreseen; nevertheless it is necessary that future things be foreseen by God, and that foreseen things happen. This, alone, is enough to destroy free will. But how preposterous it is to say that the outcome of temporal things is the cause of eternal foreknowledge."

3)⁷⁰ "For there are two [kinds of] necessities: one is simple [necessity] for example, it is necessary that all men are mortal; the other a [necessity] of condition [a conditional necessity], for example, if you know that someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking. For what anyone knows, that cannot be other than it is known to be. But this conditional necessity by no means entails that simple necessity. For it is not the nature [of things] that produces this [conditional] necessity, but the addition of the condition. For no necessity forces a man to walk who is walking voluntarily, even though when he is walking, it is necessarily true that he is walking. Therefore in the same way, if Providence sees anything as present, it is necessarily true that it is so [as Providence sees it], even though by nature it is not necessary that it be so [i.e., as Providence sees it]. But God sees those future things that come from free will *as present*. These things, then, in relation to the divine view, become necessary by the condition of divine knowledge [i.e., *if* God knows them as present, they must be true]: but considered in themselves, they do not lose the absolute liberty of their nature."

4)⁷¹ "Eternity, then, is the perfect possession, all at once, of interminable life."

5)⁷² "Similarly, human reason does not comprehend that the divine intelligence looks on future things differently than it [human reason] does."

441. Comments on Boethius: The thought of Boethius is of special importance because of the influence it exercised on later theologians. In it we find many older teachings repeated but also some new elements.

In text 1, he holds that future contingents as future do not contain definite or determined truth before they happen. Therefore, *as future*, they are completely unknowable even to God. He takes this view from Aristotle, not from revelation.

In text 2, he rejects the view of Origen who tried to explain how a man can be free in spite of God's foreknowledge. Boethius says that Origen's view would make the creatures the cause of divine knowledge. Boethius is right in excluding passivity from God. However, as we saw above in the comments on Origen himself, Origen actually did not teach that God is passive in His knowledge. Boethius also says that even if the opinion of Origen were true, there would still be a certain necessity.

In text 3, he distinguishes between simple or absolute necessity, which comes from the nature of things, and hypothetical or conditional necessity by which if someone really knows that another is walking at the same time, it is necessarily true that the other is walking even though he walks freely. Boethius says that only this second necessity, conditional necessity, is present when God foresees. For God sees all things, even future things, *as present* and *not as future*. For in the present, when a man walks freely (as far as absolute necessity is concerned) it is still necessarily true (as far as conditional necessity is concerned) that he is walking while he is walking, even though before he walked, while his walking was still in the future, the truth about his walking was not yet definite or determined (text 1). God can see all things as present because the life of God is eternal, that is, it is the perfect possession, *all at once*, of endless life (text 4). We human beings find it hard to conceive this because we think about divine foreknowledge in a human way. But, just as our human senses cannot form a universal concept nor can they understand how our rational mind can do so, similarly, human reason cannot understand how the divine mind foreknows since it can think of the divine operation only in a human way (text 5).

442. We notice that two new elements have entered Christian speculations with Boethius: 1) The opinion that future free contingents, as long as they remain in the future, contain no determined or definite truth; 2) The opinion that precisely because of this, we must conclude that even God could not foresee future contingents without imposing

necessity on them, if He did not know them as *present* to His eternity rather than as future. For in the present, even free acts are necessarily true while they are going on by conditional, not absolute, necessity.

It is important to note that these two elements come not from revelation but from philosophy. The first is taken from Aristotle; the second is an inference drawn by Boethius himself, to save liberty, given the fact the first element is true. If the first were not true, it would not be necessary to have recourse to eternity to explain the reconciliation of foreknowledge and human freedom.

443. Most of all we need to notice that infrustrable decrees have no place in the opinion of Boethius. For he merely supposes-without trying to explain the fact at all-that God can know whatever is present to him. In this view he seems to assume, as do all previous witnesses of tradition, that God is capable, in his divine intellect, of knowing everything precisely because His intellect is transcendent. If Boethius had had in mind infrustrable decrees, he could have said that precisely in virtue of the transcendence of the divine will, even though future contingents are not yet determined *in themselves* while they are future, yet they can be known by God by infrustrable decrees. For by such decrees He intends to move the wills of men so that they freely but infallibly will do the things He has decided on. Therefore, if Boethius had had these decrees in mind, he would not have needed to have recourse to eternity.⁷³ So we gather that Boethius did not have these decrees in mind, not only because he never mentions them, but-and much more-because if he had based his explanation on them, he would not have found it necessary to have recourse to eternity. The older Thomists would like to say that Boethius had to have recourse to eternity even so, in order that the knowledge of God might be *intuitive*. But Boethius does not say he has recourse to eternity to make God's knowledge intuitive. He, as his reasoning itself shows, has recourse to eternity precisely because he knows no other way to reconcile foreknowledge and freedom. If he had thought of and held a system in which all would be ruled by infrustrable decrees, eternity would not have been necessary.

The earlier witnesses of tradition probably knew that nothing is future to God. St. Augustine, as we have seen, certainly knew this. But none of them seems to have drawn from this point the conclusions that Boethius drew.

444. St. Gregory the Great:⁷⁴ "And because He sees those things that are future to us, which, however, are always present to Him, He is said to be foreseeing, although He really does not see as future what He sees as present. For whatever things are, are not seen in His eternity because they are, but they are because they are seen [in His eternity]."

Comments: It is well known that St. Gregory follows St. Augustine faithfully. In this text he simply repeats what we have seen in texts 2

and 9 of St. Augustine. Hence, they are to be interpreted in the same way as those texts of St. Augustine. We can presume that St. Gregory also holds the other teaching we saw in St. Augustine. Therefore, it seems that St. Gregory holds, with St. Augustine, that God can foresee without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

445. Rhabanus Maurus:

1)⁷⁵ "There is a predestination which cannot be without foreknowledge; but there can be foreknowledge without predestination: for in predestination He foreknew the things that He himself was going to do, whence it is said: 'He made the things that are going to be.' But He is able to foresee even the things that He does not do: such as all sins. . . ."

2)⁷⁶ "Those whom He foreknew would be to Him, He chose to receive the promised rewards . . . nor did He predestine anyone except those whom He foreknew would believe and follow His call whom He also calls elect. . . . In this way, neither does the cause of our salvation or of ruin lie in the foreknowledge of God. . . . For . . . a thing will be, not for the reason that God knows it will be; but because it is going to be, it is known by God before it happens."

Comments: Rhabanus Maurus is noted for transmitting the teaching of previous tradition. The first citation is almost word for word from text 5 of St. Augustine.⁷⁷ So in it he must hold, with St. Augustine, that God can foresee at least sins in some other way than by decrees as means of knowing. In the first part of the second citation, he clearly teaches the same as does the second theory of St. Augustine⁷⁸ and St. Prosper's interpretation of St. Augustine⁷⁹ (except that Rhabanus speaks of positive and not only negative conditions). Therefore, since he holds that God does not reprobate before foreseeing demerits, it is clear, according to our principle of interpretation, that he believes that God can foresee without the use of decrees as means of knowing. In the last part of the second citation, Rhabanus merely repeats the words of Origen, even though St. Augustine, in text 2,⁸⁰ rejected that view of Origen. Yet this is not too strange, for the words of Origen can be understood so as not to imply passivity in God, as we have seen from the comment of St. Thomas.⁸¹ If we take the words of Origen in the sense in which St. Thomas explains them, they not only do not contradict the views of St. Augustine on foreknowledge, but instead really express the same teaching as St. Augustine himself gave in many of the texts we cited from him, especially in texts 5, 6 and 7.

446. St. Peter Damian:⁸² "Clearly, he who sits in a theatre does not see all things at the same time; for when he looks ahead of himself, he does not see what is behind him. But he who sits not in the theatre but far above it takes in, in one gaze, the whole compass of the interior of the theatre, on all sides. So almighty God, because He is incomparably above all things that go on [below] sees *all things at once* presented to His gaze *in a present manner*."

Comments: St. Peter seems to give the same explanation of foreknowledge as does Boethius, since He says that God foresees all things because all things are present at once to Him. We have already seen that Boethius excludes foreknowledge through decrees. Therefore it is at least probable that St. Peter also holds that God can foresee without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

447. St. Anselm:

1)⁸³ ". . . and I, in going over it often, was not able to find that I had said anything in it that did not harmonize with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and especially, blessed Augustine."

2)⁸⁴ "It remains now for us to consider . . . whether His knowledge is from things, or whether things have being from His knowledge. For, if God has knowledge from things, it follows that they are prior to His knowledge, and so are not from God. . . . But if whatever things exist take their being from the knowledge of God, God is the maker and author of evil works, and so He is not just in punishing the wicked. . . . However this question can be easily solved, if we first note that good . . . is really some being; but that evil . . . lacks all existence."

3)⁸⁵ ". . . when I say that if God foresees something it is necessary that it be going to happen, it is the same as if I should say: If it will be, it will be necessarily. But this [kind of] necessity does not compel, nor does it prohibit, anything from being or not being. For it is said that it necessarily is for the reason that it is supposed that the thing is; . . . not that [this kind of] necessity compels or prohibits a thing to be or not to be. For when I say: If it will be, it will be necessarily, in this statement, the necessity follows on the fact that the thing is, and does not precede [the fact that the thing is]. . . . For this necessity means nothing other than that that which will be, cannot *simultaneously* not be. . . . A piece of wood is not always necessarily white, because at one time, before it became white, it was able not to become white, and after it is white, it can become not white. But a white piece of wood is always necessarily white; because neither before it [became white] nor after it became white, could it happen that it would be simultaneously white and not white."

4)⁸⁶ "Thus without any contradiction, we say that some thing is changeable in time before it is [before it becomes what it is], which remains unchangeably in eternity-not unchangeably before it is, or after it is; but constantly, since nothing is there [in eternity] according to time. For this very thing is there eternally because temporally it is something, and before it is, it is capable of not being. . . . I think it is sufficiently clear . . . from these things, that the foreknowledge of God and free will are not contradictory. The force of eternity brings this about, which encloses all times and the things that are in all times."

448. Comments on St. Anselm: In text 1, St. Anselm shows that he wants to follow tradition most faithfully, and especially, St. Augustine.

Therefore, from these words there arises the presumption that St. Anselm will hold the same view as tradition, including St. Augustine, holds namely, that God can foresee without the use of decrees as means of knowing. The presumption passes into certitude from the following texts. For in text 2, St. Anselm proposes the question: Is the knowledge of God from things, or are things from His knowledge? He at once rejects any notion of passivity in God, but still holds that not all things are caused by God's knowledge. For evil is not being, it is the absence of being, and so does not, as such, require divine causality. Thus in these words he teaches the same as St. Augustine states in text 5, namely: "He is able to foresee even the things that He does not do; such as all sins. . . ." As we saw above, St. Augustine does not, in these words, present the theory of foreknowledge by infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions! Therefore St. Anselm, who follows St. Augustine, is to be presumed to mean the same in text 2.

In text 3, he draws a distinction between simple necessity and necessity of condition or supposition. This distinction comes from text 3 of Boethius (cf. the comments on Boethius). Similarly in text 4, he gives Boethius' explanation that God can foresee without destroying liberty because all things are present to God by eternity. St. Anselm explicitly says that eternity explains the possibility of the simultaneous existence of free will and foreknowledge: "The force of eternity brings this about." Now as we saw in the comments on Boethius, such a theory leaves no room for the view that foreknowledge is possible only by infrustrable decrees.

Therefore it is clear that St. Anselm does faithfully follow tradition especially, St. Augustine and Boethius, and that he holds that God can foresee without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

449. Peter Abelard:

1)⁸⁷ "Therefore, just as God cannot be ignorant of what He foreordains about the future, so neither can He not foresee the outcome."

2)⁸⁸ "Now that we have considered [God's] power and its effects, let us discuss a bit about [His] wisdom. So in wisdom there is included providence or, what is the same thing, foreknowledge and predestination. For by His wisdom He foresees and foreknows all things before they happen or are. This providence can in no way be deceived. For when this thing has been foreseen, it cannot not happen. Hence, some, misunderstanding [this], have thought that all things happen necessarily. They are refuted both by reason and by the authority of philosophers. . . . For providence imposes no necessity on the outcomes of things, but things are foreseen to be in relation to the alternatives in the [same] way in which they are; [in relation to the alternatives]. . . . Since He, then, is such that no change of time hinders Him; since there is nothing between His eternity and the last movement of time; since, I say, this is the case, whatever has been or is or will be, is completely present to him. Notice then that providence

or foreknowledge and the divine arrangement deal with both good and evil things, but predestination only with good things."

3)⁸⁹ "Since, then, He foresaw that this man, who happens to be going to commit adultery, is going to commit adultery, it is necessary that he commit adultery. But if it is necessary that he commit adultery, this is inevitable; it is no longer in his power or free will to avoid this sin. . . . We, however, [to solve this objection] grant that he who is going to commit adultery is necessarily going to commit adultery, since God has foreseen it; but not for that reason is it proper to say *simply* that he will necessarily commit adultery. For this modal [necessity] does not entail that simple [necessity] with determination. . . ."

Comments: Although Abelard fell into some theological errors in other matters, for which he was rightly criticized by theologians, yet in this matter he follows the view of tradition, and was not criticized. In text 1, he shows that God can foresee because He foreordains. However, it does not follow from this that he thinks God cannot foresee in any way other than by decrees, as we learn from the following texts (and we already knew that other writers had made similar statements without meaning to restrict the means of foreknowledge to decrees). In text 2, Abelard opens by saying: "Now that we have considered God's power and its effects, let us discuss a bit about His wisdom." In the previous chapter he had spoken about the power and the *will* of God. Thus he makes clear that in this chapter he turns to the divine *intellect*, the wisdom of the divine intellect. He continues: "So in wisdom there is included providence or what is the same thing, foreknowledge and predestination. For by His wisdom He foresees and foreknows all things. . . ." Hence we see that he attributes foreknowledge not precisely to the divine will and power, but to wisdom or to the divine intellect. He explains foreknowledge, as does Boethius, by eternity, for he says: "Whatever has been or is or will be, is completely present to Him." He makes the same distinction as St. Augustine between foreknowledge of good and evil saying: ". . . providence or foreknowledge and the divine arrangement deal with both good and evil things, but predestination only with good things." The reason is that in evil deeds there is no need for the exercise of divine power so that negatives or non-beings may occur. In text 3 he presents the same distinction of two kinds of necessity that we saw above in Boethius, that is, in the foreknowledge of sin, sin is necessary in modal necessity, i.e., by conditional necessity (as Boethius said) or by the necessity that follows on the fact that the thing is (as St. Anselm expressed it).

Therefore, Abelard agrees with the other witnesses of tradition in teaching that God can foreknow without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

450. Hugh of St. Victor:⁹⁰ "Sometimes [the word] *knowledge* is understood of good pleasure [i.e., as knowledge coupled with God's will of good pleasure], and then it is the cause of future things, but only of good things: St. Augustine, [in the passage cited above], took it in this sense. But sometimes it means mere knowledge or cognition, and then it is not the cause of future things, and it has the same relation to both good and bad things; and Origen took it in this sense, and in this way, foreknowledge is not the cause of future things, nor are future things [the cause] of foreknowledge, unless it be said that [they are] the cause without which there would not be [foreknowledge]."

Comments: Hugh had raised the question of whether St. Augustine and Origen contradict each other on foreknowledge. He replies by distinguishing between a foreknowledge that is the cause of things, and foreknowledge that is mere knowledge without causality. But he also notes, with St. Augustine (text 5), that God "is able to foresee even the things that He does not do, such as all sins. . . ." In speaking of mere knowledge, without causality, he says that future things are not the cause of God's foreknowledge but he adds that it is proper to say that before anything can be foreseen, it must *be*, so that, in this sense, the future thing is the "cause without which there would not be [foreknowledge]."

Therefore, since Hugh teaches the existence of non-causal knowledge in the same sense as St. Augustine, he certainly holds also, with St. Augustine, that God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

451. Richard of St. Victor:⁹¹ "But, although His foreknowledge is wonderful in both, yet it appears more wonderful in [foreseeing] evil things than good things. For we know that the things that are evil . . . happen merely by His permission, never by His working. Think also, if you can, how marvellous it is that He was able to foresee even those things which He left to another's will, and at that, to a will that did not yet exist, and which He was never going to make [evil]. For He never makes a will evil, although He permits it. Certainly, we marvel less that He is able to foresee from eternity the things that He Himself was going to produce. . . ."

Comments: Richard says that foreknowledge of evil is more marvellous than foreknowledge of good. The reason is evident: God makes all good things, even good will. So it is easy to see *one* way in which He can foresee good things. But He does not do evil things; He leaves them to another's will. Hence it is evident that Richard holds the same distinction that we have seen repeatedly in the tradition after St. Augustine. Now St. Augustine, as we have seen, certainly did not believe in foreknowledge of evil by way of decrees and infallible permissions. Therefore Richard, who follows him, did not either.

Furthermore, if the fall of a man were infallible as a result of divine permission, then, the foreknowledge of evil would be no more

marvellous than the foreknowledge of good, for it could be easily foreseen through an infallible permission. But Richard says foreknowledge of evils is more marvellous, hence we see that he, in accord with all previous tradition, has no notion of such infallible permissions.

452. Peter Lombard:

1)⁹² "Here there arises a question that we cannot escape, namely, whether knowledge or foreknowledge is the cause of things; or whether things are the cause of the knowledge or foreknowledge of God. For the foreknowledge of God seems to be the cause of the things that lie under it and to impose on them the necessity of happening; for neither would any future things have been going to be if God had not foreseen them; nor can they not happen when God has foreseen them. . . . And so it seems that the knowledge or foreknowledge of God is the cause of the things that He knows. But if that is so, therefore He is the cause of all evils, for all evils are known and foreknown by God. But this [that God is the cause of evil] is far from the truth. . . . But neither are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge. For even though they would not have been going to be if they had not been foreseen by God; yet they are not foreseen *because* they are going to happen. For if this were the case, then something other and different from Him would be the cause of that which is eternal; and the knowledge of the Creator would depend on creatures. . . . Desiring, then, to remove this apparent contradiction, we say that future things are by no means the cause of the foreknowledge or knowledge of God; nor are they foreknown or known because they are going to be or have happened. In this way we explain the statement of Origen: 'Because it is going to be, it is known by God before it happens,' that is: that which is going to be, is known by God before it happens; and it is not known if it is not going to be; [but, we say this] in such a way that hereby no cause is designated except the cause without which there would not be [foreknowledge]. So also we say that the knowledge or foreknowledge of God is not the cause of the things that happen, except [that it is] such [that] without it they do not happen. [This is true] if by *knowledge*, we mean mere knowledge. But if in the term *knowledge* we include also [God's] will of good pleasure and arrangement, then it [His knowledge] is correctly said to be the cause of the things that God makes. For [the word] *knowledge* is understood in these two ways: as mere knowledge, or as knowledge together with [God's] will of good pleasure. Perhaps Augustine meant it in this way when he said: 'They are because He knew [them], that is, because it pleased Him the knower, and because knowingly He arranged [that they should be such].' And this interpretation is confirmed from the fact that in that passage Augustine is speaking only of good things, that is, of creatures and of those things that God makes, all of which He knows not only by [mere] knowledge, but also by will of good pleasure and

arrangement. . . . But God knows and foreknows evil things before they happen: but [He does it] in mere knowledge, not with will of good pleasure."

2)⁹³ "But they still press the question, saying: 'Either a thing can happen in a different way than God foresaw, or not. If not, then all things happen necessarily. But if [it can happen] in a different way, then the foreknowledge of God can be deceived or can change.' . . . In reply we say that such sayings as 'can happen in a different way than God foresaw' can be understood in more than one way. For example: 'That which God has foreseen, can fail to happen.' And: 'It is impossible that what God has foreseen fail to happen.' And: 'It is impossible that all things that happen be not foreknown.' And so on. For the two things can be understood together, so that there is an implied condition, or separately. For if you take the statement: 'It cannot happen in a different way than God foreknew' to mean: 'Both cannot *simultaneously* occur, namely, that God foreknows in one way and it happens in another way,' you understand correctly. But if you take them separately, so as to say that this cannot happen in a different way than it does and than the way in which God [actually] foresaw, [you understand] incorrectly. For this thing could have happened differently than it did, and yet, God would have foreseen the future in this way [in the way in which it actually would have happened]."

453. Comments on Peter Lombard: In text 1, Peter begins by proposing a dilemma: If things cause God's knowledge, God is passive. If His knowledge causes things, then everything is predetermined, and liberty perishes. He solves the difficulty by explaining the statement of Origen in the same way as St. Thomas does, and by means of several distinctions. First, he distinguishes between mere knowledge and causal knowledge. Following St. Augustine, he says that God has mere knowledge, i.e., knowledge without causality, of all things, both good and evil; but that God has causal knowledge or knowledge with will of good pleasure only of good things. Thus, speaking of good things, he says: "all of which He knows not only by [mere] knowledge, but also by will of good pleasure and arrangement." While he says of evils, that God knows them "in mere knowledge, not with will of good pleasure."

It is clear that he is proposing the same view as did St. Augustine (in his text 5). But, as we have seen, St. Augustine holds that God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing. Therefore the presumption is that Peter holds the same, since he follows St. Augustine.

In text 2, he distinguishes between two kinds of necessity. He at least seems to say the same as Boethius and St. Anselm, who spoke of the distinction between simple necessity and conditional necessity. However, Peter does not speak about eternity.

We conclude that he held the same view as St. Augustine and previous tradition, namely: God can foresee without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

454. Alain de Lille:⁹⁴ ". . . it is impossible that what God has foreseen should not happen; not that God's providence imposes necessity on the outcome, but because this cannot happen, namely: that He foresee and it not happen: not that divine providence is a cause touching the outcome, but [it is] the cause accompanying the cause without which [it would] not [happen]. Hence this rule follows: It is necessary that what God has foreseen should happen, by consequent necessity, not [by necessity] of [the outcome] that follows. For that which is foreseen as going to happen, does not happen necessarily: but only this is necessary: that what has been foreseen will happen, so that there is a necessity of consequence, not [a necessity] of inability of the part [to be otherwise]. Just as this entire statement is necessary: that Socrates move if he runs. But yet it is not necessary that Socrates move or run."

Comments: Alain proposes the same distinction of kinds of necessity that we have already seen in Boethius, St. Anselm, and Peter Lombard. So he seems to follow the view of tradition in this matter. In the words "not that divine providence is a cause touching the outcome, but [it is] the cause accompanying the cause without which [it would] not [happen]" there seems to be implied the traditional view that God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.

455. St. Albert the Great:

1)⁹⁵ "God does not know through a medium other than Himself, but by Himself inasmuch as He is the principle by which all things are constituted both in substantial and in accidental being. He knows all things as an artisan knows all the works of his art by his art (which is the principle and rule that constitutes the works of his art)."

2)⁹⁶ ". . . it is to be said that He knows through Himself, the cause. For Aristotle says, in the first [book] of Physics, that the principles of being and knowing are the same. Hence, knowing or understanding Himself inasmuch as He is the principle of being for all, He knows all things, and so, through Himself, the cause, He knows all things."

3)⁹⁷ ". . . even in art, the art is not the cause of a defect, but it can foreknow it; just as art [i.e., an artisan] working on a knotty piece of wood, knows that the wood is not obeying [so as] to [produce] the beauty of the image to be impressed; and yet, he does not cause that defect but it happens from the defect of the wood. But there is a difference to this extent, that it is in the power of free will to remain in a defect, or to obey the artisan [so as to attain] to perfect beauty, and so divine knowledge knows both, but causes only the one."

4)⁹⁸ ". . . the knowledge of God surpasses all knowledge. For even though an artisan preconceives the form of the whole work, and does not take it from the work; yet many things happen contrary to the [planned] work, from the operation of the instruments, and the

inequality of the material, which he is not able to know except through the effect; but the supreme artisan transcends all knowledge in this, the fact that He foreknows everything that He will do, and whatever will happen to it from the mutability and defect of the secondary causes that operate under Him: for otherwise His knowledge would be imperfect. . . . the artisan cannot know the actual result and outcome of his work, but God knows all this, because of his infinite power in knowing."

5)⁹⁹ ". . . the foreknowledge of God is in such a way over future things that it is not their cause, nor does it take away from secondary causes the proper characteristic of their causality, as Anselm says in his book on the agreement between foreknowledge and free will. Hence the things that are going to come from the [human] will remain contingently future. But the light of the divine intelligence, which is of infinite power and penetrates . . . into hidden parts, I mean, hidden in themselves and in [their] cause, as are singular contingents about the future, which are known to us neither in themselves nor in their proximate cause: it penetrates through all necessary things, and contingent things that have [already] come to be, and through things that are contingent [and not yet settled in regard] to both alternatives. So that, as Boethius [says] in his book on the consolation of philosophy, He foreknows and knows in which direction you are to turn yourself both in good and in evil. . . . And there is an example that Boethius gives: Just as if I see that you are walking, you necessarily are walking: for if it is granted that you are not walking, it follows that I see that you are not walking. . . ."

6)¹⁰⁰ "'Whether the foreknowledge of God imposes necessity on things.' The solution of this question is to be taken from Boethius and Anselm. Boethius deciding it speaks thus. . . . 'For there are two [kinds of] necessities: one is simple [necessity], for example, it is necessary that all men are mortal; the other, a [necessity] of condition [a conditional necessity], for example, if you know that someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking. For what anyone knows, that cannot be other than it is known to be. But this conditional necessity by no means entails that simple necessity.' . . . Anselm also intends to say this, in different words. . . . What the Masters say comes to the same thing, [namely], that there is a necessity of, [that compels] the thing that follows, and a necessity of consequence. And it is readily conceded that God's foreknowledge causes the necessity of consequence, but not the necessity [that compels] the thing that follows. . . . For God foresees all things, and produces even the things that naturally come to be: but because they do not receive the properties of His causality, nothing prevents them from being contingent and mutable in themselves. And the fact that God's knowledge of these mutable things can be certain, comes not from His taking away changeability

from them, but rather from [His] infinite power of foreseeing whithersoever that which is mutable may turn itself. . . ."

7)¹⁰¹ "As the Master says in 1 Sent. 38 dist. . . . 'foreknowledge' has two meanings, just as 'knowledge' does, namely: the foreknowledge of simple understanding, and the foreknowledge of approbation or of [God's] will of good pleasure. In the first sense, foreknowledge extends to both good and evil things and so it cannot include causality towards the things that come under it. But foreknowledge of [God's] will of good pleasure or of approbation extends only to good things: for it includes a disposition for the work, and includes causality towards the things that come under it."

8)¹⁰² ". . . foreknowledge takes away from no being that works under it the characteristic of causing, and so some thing is done by these beings that work under foreknowledge that is not done by it [by foreknowledge]."

456. Comments on the texts of St. Albert the Great: In texts 1 and 2, St. Albert teaches that God knows all things through His essence, and He shows that God can know all beings precisely because He is the cause of all beings: just as an artisan can know the things that he makes or is going to make, so also God. However, as we shall see from the following texts, it does not follow from these statements that St. Albert denies that God can know also in another way than through the use of decrees as means of knowledge. This begins to appear in text 3, in which St. Albert makes the same distinction that we have seen in the texts of tradition, beginning with St. Augustine. For, just as St. Augustine had said: "He is able to foresee even the things that He does not do, such as all sins. . . ." so St. Albert said: "Even in art, the art is not the cause of a defect, but it can foreknow it: just as an art [i.e., an artisan] working on a knotty piece of wood knows that the wood is not obeying [so as] to [produce] the beauty of the image to be impressed and yet he does not cause that defect . . . divine knowledge knows both [good and defect] but causes only the one." Therefore, St. Albert restricts foreknowledge through causality to foreknowledge of good. Nor could it be said that St. Albert really means that God knows good things through infrustrable decrees and sins through infallible permissions. The permission will not be infallible because, as St. Albert points out, man is not like a piece of wood. Man can determine whether he will fail or not: "It is in the power of free will to remain in a defect, or to obey the artisan. . . ." In addition, it is at least to be presumed that St. Albert does not hold that all things are explained *solely* through causality and infallible permissions, since in the distinction that he draws between foreknowledge of good and evil, he clearly is following the tradition that begins with St. Augustine. But, as we have already seen, St. Augustine, and those who came after him, did not hold a theory of foreknowledge of evil by infallible permissions. This presumption that

St. Albert is following tradition passes into certitude from the consideration of the following texts of St. Albert.

In text 4 he adds that the comparison of the artisan does not fully and satisfactorily explain the knowledge of God, since the knowledge of God is transcendent: "The knowledge of God surpasses all knowledge. . . . the supreme artisan . . . transcends all knowledge. . . ." And he explains more fully, saying that the artisan cannot foresee everything that will happen to his work, since there can be defects in the operation of the instruments and in the material. Hence it is only "through the effect" that the artisan will be able to know what may happen as a result of these defects. But God's knowledge transcends such knowledge, for it is able to foreknow even "whatever will happen . . . from the mutability and defect of the secondary causes that operate under Him." However-and this is specially important to note-even though, in such a context, it would have been completely easy to say: "God can know these because, even though the will of the human artisan is not always efficacious, God's will has transcendent efficacy," yet, St. Albert does not say this. Instead, he gives a different reason: God can foresee "because of His infinite power *in knowing*"-not in causing.

In text 5, St. Albert's position becomes still clearer. For *he explicitly says that he is teaching the same as St. Anselm and Boethius-who, as we have already seen, taught that God can know even without the use of decrees as means of knowing.* And he not only says that "the foreknowledge of God is in such a way over future things, that it is not their cause," but He gives the reason why God can foreknow even though His foreknowledge is not the cause: "the *light* of the divine *intelligence* which is of *infinite* power . . . penetrates . . . into hidden parts . . . as are singular contingents about the future. . . ." Therefore, *foreknowledge is explained by the light of the divine mind-and not only by the causality of the divine will.* For the divine intellect is "of infinite power," i.e., he appeals to the transcendence of the divine intellect.¹⁰³

He asserts the same thing at the end of text 6, where he explicitly gives the explanation of foreknowledge: "The fact that God's knowledge of these mutable things can be certain, comes . . . from [His] infinite power of foreseeing whithersoever that which is mutable may turn itself." He does not say: it comes from the infinite efficacy of the divine will. Instead, since he is following St. Augustine (as we saw in text 3) and Boethius and St. Anselm (as we saw in text 4), he says that God's knowledge comes "from [His] infinite power of foreseeing," for "the light of the divine intelligence, which is of infinite power, penetrates" (text 5) all things and "transcends all knowledge" (text 4). In the first part of text 6, he shows that he holds the traditional distinction between simple or antecedent necessity (which destroys freedom) and conditional, consequent, or modal necessity (which does not harm freedom). Hence, in text 7, he explains the distinction

between knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of approbation or of will of good pleasure. The first kind extends to both good and evil things, and "so it cannot include causality towards the things that come under it." But knowledge of the will of good pleasure "includes causality towards the things that come under it." Hence he can say, in text 8, that "something is done by these beings that work under foreknowledge, that is not done by it [foreknowledge]." So again, as in text 3, he is following the view that we saw was established in tradition since St. Augustine. But, in this traditional view, God can foresee even without the use of decrees as means of knowing. From all texts, then, it is clear that St. Albert holds the traditional view that God can foresee without the use of decrees. It is important to notice that St. Albert holds this even though he also says that God knows all things by His essence, and even though He compares the knowledge of God to that of an artisan-in such a way, however, that the knowledge of God transcends that of an artisan. For the comparison to the artisan expresses-defectively, according to St. Albert, in text 4-only one way of knowing, the way of causality. It does not exclude the other way: that through the transcendent divine intellect.

C. Conclusions from tradition before the time of St. Thomas

457. 1) God can know and foreknow *through the divine intellect* so that the decrees of the divine will are not required as a *means* of knowledge, even though they are required for the existence of beings (but not, of course, for the occurrence of non-beings, among which are the bad specification in resistance, and non-resistance).¹⁰⁴-Absolutely all Fathers and theologians, both in the East and in the West, who speak on the subject, teach this at least implicitly. There are no dissenting voices at all.

The reason underlying this assertion seems to be the fact that the divine intellect is transcendent. For example, they say that God can know¹⁰⁵ "by the fulness of His majesty" (St. Cyprian), and that¹⁰⁶ "God, as God foresaw" (St. Jerome) and:¹⁰⁷ "from [His] infinite power of foreseeing" since "the light of the divine intelligence . . . is of infinite power" (St. Albert the Great).

Therefore, since they seem to attribute this power of foreseeing to the transcendence of the divine intellect, the Fathers seem to be speaking as witnesses of revelation.

Further, the number, importance, and unanimity of the Fathers who speak thus seems incapable of being explained unless we suppose that they reflect the true belief and tradition of the Church. For when the Fathers cited are very numerous, and include the greatest Fathers, and when, in addition, *absolutely no one throughout so many centuries is found contradicting*-it would be incredible to suppose that the Church held a different view.

Therefore, *on the basis of this tradition* it is at least highly probable that it is divinely revealed that God can foresee by His transcendent intellect, even without the use of the divine decrees as *means* of knowing (even though, of course, His causality is needed for the existence of beings-though not for the occurrence of non-beings).

The same conclusion is *certainly revealed implicitly* in the revelation on the salvific will and on predestination, since as we have seen the system of infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions cannot be reconciled with any true universal salvific will, nor with the explanation of predestination which, as we saw, is implicitly revealed.

2) A few writers seem to speak of another way of knowing: through causality. In this regard, we must notice:

a) All who do so, still also teach the first conclusion given above.

b) All who speak of knowledge through causality explicitly restrict it to knowledge of good things. Nor do they explain foreknowledge of sin through infallible permissions. Not even St. Augustine speaks of infallible permissions, even though they would have fitted in perfectly with his theory of the *massa dammata*. Rather, as we have seen, this theory is implicitly excluded.

c) These writers sometimes, though rather seldom, speak of God as being like a craftsman or artisan. But these expressions are not always necessarily used to explain the *manner* of foreknowledge, for they could be used only to *show the fact* that He does foreknow. This is especially likely to be the case with St. Augustine, who, though he does use such expressions, yet explicitly says: ". . . how He does know, I do not dare to say, since I am unable to know." But even St. Albert, who seems to intend by these expressions to explain the *manner* of foreknowledge (of good, not of evil things), still, in spite of this comparison, also teaches that God can foreknow without the use of decrees as means of knowing. St. Albert points out explicitly (text 4) the deficiencies of the artisan analogy.

The statement that God can know the things that He makes or does, does not seem to be precisely a revealed truth, but rather, a deduction from a revealed truth, i.e., from the fact that it is revealed that God causes all good things, we can deduce that He can know what He Himself does.

3) Absolutely no one of the witnesses of tradition pretends to be able to *fully* explain foreknowledge. On the contrary, many clearly admit that they cannot. However, certain *partial* explanations are found, especially in regard to certain elements of the problem:

a) The distinction between foreknowledge of good and evil is quite helpful towards the solution. It first appears explicitly in St. Augustine.

b) The distinction between simple or antecedent necessity, which destroys freedom, and conditional necessity or consequent necessity appears in many western writers beginning with Boethius. This distinction is clearly the work of philosophy. It was worked out to reconcile the revealed truths that God can foresee and that man still is free.

c) The use of eternity to explain foreknowledge first appears clearly in Boethius. It is not found in all writers after him, nor do all seem to have understood him well. Three things are chiefly to be noted about this explanation:

1) Recourse to eternity is required in the opinion of Boethius because he holds that future contingent free acts are indeterminate or unsettled as long as they are future and so are not knowable by any knowledge, not even by divine knowledge, until they become present. Eternity is needed to make these contingents present to God. When they are present, they are necessarily true as long as they are going on. Thus one way is provided in which to explain how these things can be necessarily true, without destroying created liberty.

2) The explanation through eternity is only partial. It does seem to explain well how infallible knowledge could be reconciled with created freedom. However, eternity is a condition rather than a means of knowledge. Eternity makes a thing knowable, even infallibly knowable, without destroying contingency and freedom. But, it is one thing to make something *knowable*; another thing to make it *known*. Eternity does not explain how the knowable thing becomes known. Boethius and those who follow him do not try to explain this: they seem merely to suppose that God, by His transcendent intellect, can know any thing, provided that it is knowable and present. As we have seen, the explanation of Boethius implicitly excludes foreknowledge by way of infrustrable decrees.

3) It is obvious that the explanation by way of eternity comes from philosophy rather than from revelation.

4) Some theologians think it is not necessary to have recourse to eternity. Bañez thinks this¹⁰⁸ because he holds that free future contingents are determined in the First Cause, even before they happen. His theory that God can foreknow *only* by infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions is accepted by the Thomists, but it certainly conflicts with the revelation of the universal salvific will, as we have seen. Many other theologians, chiefly the Molinists, appeal to the transcendence of the divine intellect, and say that it can foresee what determination

the creature is going to make, even though the creature is going to make it freely, and even though there is no determinism in the creature. In this explanation, eternity is not needed. Other Molinists say that the transcendent intellect can reach the future contingents in their objective truth. These explanations of the Molinists do not contradict revelation.

END NOTES

- 1 Metaphysics 12.9.4; 1074 b.
- 2 In XII Metaph. 12.1.2614.
- 3 Aristotle, 5th ed., Methuen, London, 1949, p. 184. Cf. p. 185; "When God is compared to the captain of any army to whom the order in the army is due, or to a ruler of a people, or when the universe is compared to a household in which functions more or less definite are assigned to all members . . . it is difficult not to suppose that Aristotle is thinking of God as controlling by His will the main lines of development of the world's history."
- 4 A History of Philosophy, Newman, Westminster, 1946. I, pp.316-17.
- 5 Loc. cit.
- 6 Enneads 5.6.2.
- 7 E. Bréhier, Plotin, Enneades, "Les Belles Lettres," Paris, 1931 V, pp. 109-111.
- 8 Cf. §§ 118-120, 310-322.
- 9 Cf. § 387.
- 10 § 193.
- 11 Legatio pro Christianis 31. PG 6.962.63
- 12 Ad Autolyicum 2.3. PG 6.1050.
- 13 § 194.
- 14 Stromata 6.17. PG 9.387, 390 (internal quote from Homer).
- 15 §§ 443, 446.
- 16 § 195.
- 17 In Rom. Lib. VII.8. PG 14.1126.
- 18 ST I 14.8 ad 1.
- 19 Cf. § 17 above.
- 20 Praeparatio Evangelica 6.11. PG 21.491.
- 21 Catecheses 1.2. PG 33.371-74. Cf. § 91 for comments.
- 22 Cf. §§ 184-89 and comments in § 91.
- 23 § 196.
- 24 § 197.
- 25 De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur. PG 45.183, 186.
- 26 Greek: prognostike dynamei.
- 27 Greek: hypo philanthropias.
- 28 Cf. § 309.
- 29 Cf. § 198.
- 30 Adversus haereses 38.6. PG 41.661.
- 31 § 415.
- 32 In Matt. Homil. 59.1. PG 58.574.
- 33 § 415.
- 34 Cf. § 199.
- 35 Cf. § 94.
- 36 Cf. § 200.
- 37 In Rom. 8.30. PG 82.142-43.
- 38 Cf. § 201.
- 39 De fide orthodoxa II.29-30. PG 94.967-71.

- 40 Greek: proorizei.
- 41 Dialogus contra Manichaeos 79. PG 94.1578.
- 42 Cf. § 202.
- 43 Cf. § 415.
- 44 De oratione Dominica 4. PL 4.538.
- 45 Cf. § 205.
- 46 Cf. § 204.
- 47 In Jerem. 26. PL 24.877.
- 48 In Isaiam 16. PL 24.178.
- 49 Dialogus adversus Pelagianos 3.6. PL 23.602.
- 50 Cf. § 415.
- 51 Cf. § 203.
- 52 De civitate Dei 11.10.3. PL 41.327
- 53 De Trinitate 15.13.22. PL 42.1076.
- 54 De dono perseverantiae 17.47. PL 45.1022.
- 55 De praedestinatione sanctorum 9.17.18. PL 44.973, 974.
- 56 Ibid., 10.19. PL 44.975.
- 57 Enchiridion 104.28. PL 40.281.
- 58 Enarrationes in Psalmos 49.18. PL 36.576-577.
- 59 De libero arbitrio 3.4.11. PL 32.1276.
- 60 Ad Simplicianum 2.2.2. PL 40.138-139.
- 61 In Ioannis Evangelium 99.4. PL 35.1887.
- 62 §§ 118-20.
- 63 Cf §§ 210-212.
- 64 Cf. note 91 in chapter 13.
- 65 Cf. §§ 210-12.
- 66 Resp. ad cap. obiect. Vincent. 12. PL 51.182. Cf. § 212.2.
- 67 Collationes 13.8. PL 49.912-13.
- 68 In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione, maiora commentaria, Lib. III. PL 64.496.
- 69 De consol. phil. Lib. V. Prosa 3. nn. 325-36. PL 63.839-40.
- 70 Ibid., Lib. V. Prosa 6. PL 63.861.
- 71 Ibid., PL 63.858.
- 72 Ibid., Prosa 5. PL 63.855.
- 73 Cf. § 470.
- 74 Moralia 20.32.63. PL 76.175-76.
- 75 In Rom. Lib 5. cap. 8. PL 111.1467.
- 76 Ibid., PL 111.1468, 1470, 1471-72.
- 77 Cf. § 429.5.
- 78 Cf. § 210.
- 79 Cf. § 212.2.
- 80 § 429.
- 81 Cf. § 415.
- 82 Opusculum 36. De divina omnipotentia 7. PL 145. 605-06.
- 83 Monologium, Praefatio. PL 158. 143.
- 84 De concordia praescientiae et praedestinatione cum libero arbitrio, 2. 1, c. 7. PL 158. 517.
- 85 Ibid., 2.1, c.2. PL 158.509-10.
- 86 Ibid., 2.1, c.5. PL 158.515.
- 87 Introductio in theologiam. Lib. 3, cap. 7. PL 178.1109.
- 88 Epitome theologiae Christianae 21. PL 178.1728-29.
- 89 Expositio in Epist. Pauli ad Rom. Lib. 3, cap. 8. PL 178. 907.
- 90 Quaestiones in Epist. Pauli ad Rom. 217. PL 175. 484.
- 91 De gratia contemplationis, Benjamin Maior, Lib. 2, cap. 21. PL 196.102.
- 92 Liber Sententiarum 1, dist. 38.1-4. PL 192.626-28.
- 93 Ibid., 38.5. PL 192.628-29.

- 94 Theologicae regulae 64-65. PL 210.652.
 95 Summa Theol. I. tr. 15, q. 60, membrum 2. Solutio, Lugduni 1651, p. 330.
 96 Ibid., tr. 15. q. 60 membrum 2, p. 331.
 97 In 1 Sent. d. 38, a. 1 ad 3, Lugduni, 1651, p. 567.
 98 Ibid., d. 38, a. 3 ad 1, p. 570.
 99 Summa Theol. I, tr. 15, q. 61 membrum 5. Solutio, pp. 343-44.
 100 In 1 Sent. d. 38, a. 4, pp. 571, 572.
 101 Summa Theol. I, tr. 15, q. 61, membrum 2, Solutio, p. 341.
 102 In 1 Sent. d. 38, a. 1 ad 1, p. 567.
 103 Cf. St. Thomas, ST I.79.10.c.
 104 Cf. § 387.
 105 Cf. n. 44.
 106 Cf. n. 49.
 107 Cf. n. 99.
 108 Cf. § 470.

"Pt. 4: Divine foreknowledge - Ch. 22: The opinion of St. Thomas on divine foreknowledge"

A. Passages in which St. Thomas speaks of causality

458. The texts themselves:

1)¹ ". . . just as conclusions are known in [their] principles, so things made by art are known in the ends. It is evident, then, that God can have knowledge of some non-beings. Of some of these, He has as it were a practical knowledge, that is, [of those] that are, or were, or will be: which come forth from His knowledge according to His plan. But of others He has a speculative knowledge: [that is, of those] which neither have been, nor will be, nor are, which He has never planned to make. . . ."

2)² "Thus God, in knowing His own essence, knows other things, just as by the knowledge of a cause, [its] effects are known. Therefore God knows all things to which His causality extends, in knowing His own essence. . . . However, the dominion that the [created] will has over its acts . . . does not . . . exclude the influence of the higher cause, from which it has being and operation. And there still is causality in the first cause, which is God, in respect to movements of the [created] will; so that thus God, in knowing Himself can know things of this sort."

3)³ ". . . there is a knowledge of God about all things, through [their] cause: for in knowing Himself, who is the cause of all things, He knows other things as His own effects. . . ."

4)⁴ "For the knowledge of God is related to all created things, as the knowledge of an artisan is related to the works of his art."

5)⁵ "But God is not the cause of all the things that are known by God; because evil things are known by God, but are not from Him. Therefore neither is the knowledge of God the cause of all the things that He knows. . . . We grant the fifth [objection]."

6)⁶ "Evil . . . is not known by God through a likeness of it, but through the likeness of its opposite; hence it does not follow that God is the cause of evils because He knows evils; but it follows that He is the cause of good, to which evil is opposed."

7)⁷ ". . . the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but it is the cause of the good, through which the evil is known."

459. Comments on St. Thomas's texts on causality: In texts 1-4, St. Thomas compares the knowledge of God to the knowledge of artisan. Thus he seems to teach that God can know all good things through decrees. In text 2 he applies this even to movements of the human will. In texts 5-7 however he explains that God's knowledge is not the cause of all things: for it is not the cause of evils.

The older Thomists wish to infer from these and similar texts not only that St. Thomas holds that God can know all things through decrees, but that he holds that God *can know nothing except through decrees*. But all the texts really prove is that God *can know good things, beings, through His causality. They do not prove that God cannot know anything by any other way.*

Actually, everything that St. Thomas says in all the above texts is found in tradition. Many of the earlier witnesses of tradition—among whom St. Augustine and St. Albert the Great stand out—said precisely the same things, and in almost identical language (cf. especially texts 1-3 of St. Augustine, and texts 1 and 3 of St. Albert. We note especially the words of St. Albert in text 3, on the artisan: ". . . it is in the power of free will to remain in a defect, or to obey the artisan [so as to attain] to perfect beauty. . . ."). Yet, as we have seen above, in spite of such statements as these, the same theologians taught equally that God can know not only through decrees, but also in another way, namely, through the transcendent divine intellect. Furthermore, St. Thomas himself places a limitation on causal knowledge in texts 5-7. In these, he teaches the same as the previous witnesses of tradition, beginning with St. Augustine, who wrote: ". . . He is able to foresee even the things that He does not do; such as all sins. . . ." As we saw above, St. Augustine did not intend by these words to imply a theory of infallible permissions of sinning, even though such a view would have fitted in wonderfully with his theory of the *massa damnata*. Instead, he frankly confessed that he did not know how God can foresee not only sins, but even things that are not free! Similarly St. Albert the Great, the teacher of St. Thomas, who spoke in the same way as St. Thomas about sins and about the artisan, taught as we have seen, that God can foresee through "the light of the divine intelligence, which is of infinite power." In these and similar other ways he showed that he believed that God can foresee not only through decrees, but also through His transcendent intellect.

Therefore, it is at least to be presumed that St. Thomas, who says the same things as tradition and in practically the same words, means the

same. The presumption passes into certitude from the fact that we have already shown in chapter 18 that St. Thomas does not hold the theory in which all things are controlled by infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions to sin. We also have shown that the system of such decrees and permissions contradicts revelation.

Therefore even the words cited above from St. Thomas on causality do not presuppose the use of infrustrable decrees: for God can exercise His causality also through frustrable decrees which, in the present of eternity, suffice to foresee by way of causality. As we shall see presently, St. Thomas, in absolutely every text in which he treats *ex professo* of foreknowledge of future free contingents, has recourse to eternity.

460. In text 2, St. Thomas speaks specially about God's knowledge through causality "in respect to movements of the [created] will." It is obvious that we must not interpret these words in such a way as to contradict what St. Thomas also says⁸ in the same work, namely, that God does not, regularly at least, move wills to positive consent except on the condition of non-resistance. So it remains true that God knows the movements of the human will by His causality within eternity: but logically before this kind of knowledge comes God's knowledge by which, without the use of causality as a means of knowing but through His transcendent intellect, He knows the absence of resistance in the human will (in good acts). In bad acts of the human will, He knows through His transcendent intellect the evil specification (which comes before the exercise of the act of resistance), which He in no way causes. Just as in good acts God does not move the human will to positive consent until after man's non-resistance, so in evil movements, God does not move to the exercise of resistance and of the complete evil decision until after the evil specification which comes from man alone.⁹ Otherwise, God would be the author of sin.

461. Nor is God passive in knowing things in this way, as we will explain more fully in chapter 23. For the present we might note briefly: God does not receive truth from the evil specification, nor from the absence of resistance (in the first part of the process),¹⁰ because truth cannot come from non-being. Nor is there an image of evil in God, but rather, the absence of a good image (cf. text 6 above). Rather, God by His transcendent intellect sees that the positive good which He has already produced in man either remains (if man does not resist) or is no longer present (if man resists) because of man's defect, of which defect God is in no way the author.

462. It is good to note also that St. Thomas *could have* written texts 1-4 not to explain *how* God foreknows, but to prove the *fact* of His foreknowledge. We have already seen that St. Augustine speaks in this way, since he explicitly says that he does not know *how* God foreknows, even though he employs the comparison of the artisan. So Ferrariensis comments well on text 3: "Notice that in this passage

there is being investigated not the manner of the knowledge of non-beings, but the fact of their knowledge. So the preceding reasons prove absolutely that God does know non-beings, whether He sees them in themselves, or in [their] cause."

We conclude therefore, that in the texts cited above, St. Thomas is merely holding traditional views. Thus, there is nothing to prevent him from holding what is also a traditional view, namely, that God can foresee also without the use of decrees as means of knowing. This conclusion will become much clearer from an analysis of the passages in which St. Thomas treats *ex professo* of the foreknowledge of future free contingents.

B. Ex professo texts on the foreknowledge of future free contingents

463. The texts themselves:

1)¹¹ ". . . contingency seems . . . in a twofold way to escape the divine knowledge. First, because of the relation of the cause to the thing caused. For the effect of a necessary and immutable cause seems to be a necessary effect; hence, since the knowledge of God is the cause of things, and since it is immutable, it does not seem that it can include contingents. Secondly, because of the relation of knowledge to the thing known; for since knowledge is knowing certainly, from the very note of certitude, even excluding causality, [knowledge] requires certitude and definite determination in the thing known. Contingency excludes these. . . . In regard to the first, the explanation is quite clear. For when there are many causes in ordered sequence, the ultimate effect does not follow the first cause in regard to necessity and contingency, but [it follows] the proximate cause. For the power of the first cause is received in the second cause according to the mode of the second cause . . . as is evident in the blooming of a tree, whose remote cause is the movement of the sun, but the proximate cause is the generative power of the plant. Now *the blooming can be impeded by an impediment of the generative power, even though the movement of the sun is unchangeable*. . . . But there remains a greater problem about the second. . . . For it cannot be that God would know that this one is going to run, and yet, at the same time, that he should fail to run; and *this is because of the certitude of knowledge, and not because of His causality*. We must recognize, therefore, that before a thing comes to be, it does not have being, except in its causes. Now there are some causes from which an effect follows necessarily. . . . But there are other causes which are not determined; and an effect that is to come in the future [while it still is] in these causes, has no certitude or determination. . . . But when these effects have already been produced in the nature of things, then they do have determination in themselves; and so, when they are in act, they can be known with certitude, as is evident in the case of one who sees Socrates running: for while Socrates is running, it is necessarily [true] that he is running and there can be knowledge with certitude about it. I

say, therefore, that the divine *intellect* views from eternity each and every contingent thing, not only as it is in its causes, but as it is in its determined reality. . . . It is evident also that God from whose power the thing was going to be, from eternity not only sees His own relation to the thing, but He looks upon the very being of the thing. How this happens, Boethius clearly teaches towards the end of *De consolatione*. . . . Since then, God is eternal . . . His knowledge views all the things of time . . . as present to Him . . . as it were from the tower of eternity."

2)¹² ". . . God knows all future things; but this does not prevent some things from happening contingently. To make this clear, we need to know that there are in us certain powers and cog- noscitive habits in which there never can be falsity, such as the senses, and knowledge, and understanding of principles; but [there are] certain ones in which there can be falsity, such as imagination, and opinion, and estimation. . . . Now a necessary thing, before it comes to be, cannot be impeded from coming to be, because its causes are immutably directed to its production. Hence through habits of this sort, that are always true, necessary things can be known, even when they are future. . . . But a contingent thing *can be impeded* before it is brought into being: for then [before it is brought to being] it exists only in its causes, and an impediment can befall them . . . but after a contingent has already been brought into being, it can no longer be impeded. And so there can be a judgment about a contingent, according as it is present, on the part of that power or habit in which falsity is never found, e.g., our senses judge that Socrates is sitting when he is sitting. From this it is clear that *a contingent, as future, can be known by no knowledge that is not subject to falsity*; hence, since divine knowledge is not and cannot be subject to falsity, *it would be impossible for God to have knowledge of future contingents, if He knew them as future*. . . . wherefore, since the vision of divine knowledge is measured by eternity, which is all at once . . . it follows that He sees whatever goes on in time not as future, but as present. . . . Hence just as our sight is never deceived in seeing contingents as present, and yet this does not prevent them from happening contingently; so God infallibly sees all contingents . . . since to Him they are not future, but He sees them when they are; so this does not prevent them from happening contingently. [Our] difficulty, however, occurs in this way [namely] that we are not able to depict the divine knowledge except according to the mode of our own knowledge. . . ."

3)¹³ "A contingent is incompatible with certitude of knowledge only according as it is future, not according as it is present. . . . So any knowledge that bears on a contingent as it is present, can be certain. Now the *gaze* of the divine *intellect* bears, from eternity, on each contingent thing that happens in the course of time according as it is

present. . . . It remains then [to conclude] that nothing prevents God from having, from eternity, infallible knowledge of contingents."

4)¹⁴ "Thus, then, God, who views all things from the loftiness of eternity, looks in a present way over the whole course of time and all things that happen in time. Therefore, just as when I see that Socrates is sitting, my knowledge is infallible and certain, but yet no necessity is thereby imposed on Socrates as he sits; so God, seeing as present all things that are past or future or present to us, knows them infallibly and with certitude yet in such a way that no necessity of existing is imposed on the contingents."

5)¹⁵ ". . . our knowledge is in time . . . But the divine knowledge is above time, and is measured only by eternity; and so it does not know things as they are in time, but as they are in eternity, that is, as present. . . . Therefore, since even our intellect knows present things with certitude, much more does God know with certitude all the things that are present to Him: [yet] from this no necessity is imposed on the things that He knows, just as we see that someone who is situated in a lofty eminence, sees with certitude the order of those who are coming and going through the streets . . . and yet no necessity is imposed on men thereby: for *this is only from the fact that*, being in a high place, he sees as present all the things that are past . . . present . . . and future to one who is going about on the ground. . . ."

6)¹⁶ "But if divine providence is of itself the cause of all the things that happen in this world at least of the good, it seems that all things happen by necessity. First, in regard to His knowledge: for His knowledge cannot be false; and so it seems that what He knows must necessarily happen. . . . in regard to His knowledge it is to be considered that a power of knowing that is in any way contained in the order of time is in a different situation towards knowing the things that happen according to the order of time, than [a power of knowing] that is entirely outside the order of time. . . . God is entirely outside the order of time, as it were, standing on the peak of eternity, which is all at once, beneath which lies the whole course of time in one simple gaze; and so at one gaze He sees everything that is done according to the course of time, and each thing as it is existing in itself, not as future to His gaze, as it is in the mere order of its causes (although He does see that order of causes) but altogether eternally. He sees each thing that belongs to any time, as the human eye sees Socrates sitting actually, and not [this sitting as it is] in its cause. Now from this fact that a man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his [sitting] is not destroyed . . . yet most certainly and infallibly does the human eye see Socrates sitting while he is sitting, because *each thing as it is in reality* [i.e., when it is present] *is already determined*. So then [the conclusion] remains, that God most certainly and infallibly knows all things that happen in time; and yet the things that happen in time are not and do not happen out of necessity, but contingently."

7)¹⁷ ". . . [God] has certain knowledge of contingents, because even before they happen, He sees them as they are actually in their reality, and not only as future, and virtually [contained] in their causes . . . For although contingents, as they are virtually future things in their causes are not determined to one [alternative], so that certain knowledge could be had of them, yet, according as they are actually in their reality, they are already determined to one [alternative], and certain knowledge can be had of them. For we can know through the certitude of sight that Socrates is sitting while he is sitting. Similarly God knows with certitude all things that happen throughout the whole course of time. [He does this] in His eternity: for his eternity touches the whole course of time as present, and goes beyond it transcendentally, so that we should consider God in His eternity as knowing the flow of time, just as one who, being stationed on the height of a watch tower, sees in one gaze the whole line of passing travellers."

8)¹⁸ ". . . any contingent can be considered in two ways. In one way, in itself, *according as it is already actual*. And in this way it is not considered as future, but as present . . . as determined to one [alternative]. And so it can be the subject of infallibly certain knowledge, e.g., of the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting. In the other way, a contingent can be considered *as it is in its cause*. And in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent not yet determined to one [alternative]. . . . In this way, a contingent is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whosoever knows a contingent effect only in its cause, has only conjectural knowledge of it. But God knows all contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them is actually in itself. . . . For His knowledge is measured by eternity. . . . Hence all things that are in time, are present to God from eternity, not only in that way in which He has the reasons of things present before Him, as certain [writers] say: but because His gaze bears on all things from eternity, as they are present. Hence it is evident that contingents are known infallibly by God, inasmuch as they are subjected to His divine gaze as present: and yet they are future contingents, in relation to their causes."

464. Comments on St. Thomas's texts dealing ex professo with foreknowledge: As we can see from the above texts, St. Thomas gives an *ex professo* treatment of the problem of foreknowledge of future free contingent acts in all his major works, and in several minor works. *But in all these passages, he always solves the problem in one and the same way,*¹⁹ *namely: He presents the explanation of Boethius.* This is clear both from the content of his teaching and from his explicit statement in text 1 that he is following Boethius. *Therefore, St. Thomas's explanation follows tradition in these texts, just as he also follows tradition in his texts on the knowledge of the artisan or causal knowledge, as we saw above. Therefore, it is at least to be presumed that St. Thomas, together with all tradition, holds that God can foresee*

in a different way than through the use of infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions. This presumption passes into certitude from the fact that, as we saw in chapter 18, St. Thomas does not hold that system of decrees. The presumption also passes into certitude from a more minute analysis of the text cited above.

Let us make such an analysis. We begin by noting that *in the texts cited above, he explicitly considers only two alternatives: (1) An explanation through proximate causes, and (2) An explanation through eternity. Of these two alternatives, he at once rejects the first. He could have considered a third alternative, namely, the explanation through a system of infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions to sin. As we shall see, he implicitly rejects this third possible alternative.*

465. 1) *The first alternative: foreknowledge through proximate causes.* In practically all the texts cited above, St. Thomas explains that God could not have infallible knowledge of future contingents through a knowledge of their proximate causes: such a knowledge would and could be only conjectural, because causes that are not necessary causes can be impeded before producing their effect. Therefore, the first alternative is insufficient.

466. 2) *The second alternative: explanation through eternity.* Therefore St. Thomas always, without exception, has recourse to the second alternative, that is, to the explanation by way of eternity. This explanation starts with a principle that St. Thomas took from Boethius and Aristotle, namely:²⁰ ". . . in [statements] about present and past things, it is necessary that one of the alternatives be definitely true, and the other false, in any subject matter; but in the case of singular [statements] about the [contingent] future, it is not necessary that one be definitely true and the other false." From this principle, Boethius and St. Thomas deduce that:²¹ "a contingent, as future, can be known by no knowledge that is not subject to falsity; hence . . . it would be impossible for God to have knowledge of future contingents, if He knew them as future." This principle, being metaphysical, suffers no exception, not even in God, as St. Thomas says in text 2.

467. To clarify this last point, we need to ask: What does it mean to say that a contingent is unknowable "as future"? St. Thomas himself gives the needed explanation, in text 8: ". . . any contingent can be considered in two ways. In one way, in itself *according as it is already actual*. And in this way it is not considered as future, but as present . . . as determined to one [alternative]. . . . In the other way, a contingent can be considered *as it is in its cause*. And in this way it is considered *as future, and as a contingent not yet determined to one [alternative]*. . . ." So it becomes clear that the distinction, according to St. Thomas, is not only not a distinction in the temporal order (which is not in God) nor is it only in the order of knowledge, but it is in the ontological states. That is, that which is *not yet actual*, in act, and which *has not yet definitely gone to one particular alternative*, is a

thing that is to be considered *as future*. That which is actual, or is in act, and so has settled on one particular alternative, is to be considered as present. St. Thomas speaks similarly elsewhere:²² "Even though a contingent is not yet determined as long as it is future, yet once it has been brought forth in the nature of things, it does have determined truth. . . ." And again:²³ ". . . each thing is knowable according to this: inasmuch as it is in act."

Therefore a contingent *as future* is unknowable, because it is not yet determined, that is, no decision has yet been taken that settles it on one alternative rather than on another. But even God cannot know that which is in itself unknowable.²⁴ Therefore, in order that God may be able to know the future contingents, it is necessary that He know them not as future but as present. He can do this because He is eternal, for in eternity all things are present.

468. It is evident that eternity is a condition of knowability, but not a means of knowing. St. Thomas simply assumes, as does all tradition, that if anything is knowable and is present, the transcendent divine intellect knows it.

469. 3) *The third alternative*: foreknowledge through infrustrable decrees: Already in chapter 18 we saw an absolute proof that St. Thomas does not accept this third alternative, for there we showed that St. Thomas does not hold the system in which all things are controlled through infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions to sin (even though St. Thomas does not deny that God *at times*, by way of exception,²⁵ does move men infrustrably to good. Of course, when God actually does move a man infrustrably, He obviously can know the future through such a decree).

But we can show in many other ways that St. Thomas does not accept the third alternative:

470. a) Because St. Thomas always has recourse to eternity, he shows that he does not explain foreknowledge through the system of decrees proposed by the older Thomists. For, the reason why he has recourse to eternity is precisely in order that the future contingents may become knowable: as future, they are not knowable, since, as we have seen, they are not yet settled towards one alternative, and so are indeterminate.²⁶ But, if God controlled everything through the system of decrees proposed by the Thomists, then future contingents would be knowable *even as future*, i.e., before they actually came to be, things would be determined in the First Cause. Thus it would not be necessary to have recourse to eternity to make things knowable.

The older Thomists generally reply that eternity is required so that foreknowledge may be *intuitive*. But the explanation is insufficient, because St. Thomas, as his very argument shows,

has recourse to eternity to make things knowable, not so that foreknowledge may be intuitive.

Bañez himself frankly teaches that eternity would not be required in his system of decrees:²⁷ "The infallibility and certitude of the divine knowledge of future contingents is judged not only from the fact that they are known by God as they are present in eternity, but also according as they are known in their causes according to the sense explained in the preceding conclusion ["inasmuch as the particular causes themselves are subject to the determination and disposition of the divine knowledge and will, which is the first cause"]. And so *even if God did not know the future contingents as present in His eternity*, but only in their causes, His knowledge would be certain and infallible."

It is obvious that Bañez is right in saying that eternity is not required for foreknowledge in his system of infrustrable decrees. But it is equally obvious that Bañez is flatly contradicting St. Thomas. For St. Thomas says that future contingents as future are unknowable: but Bañez says they are knowable even as future, for he writes that they would be knowable, "even if God did not know the future contingents as present in His eternity." The reason why St. Thomas did not arrive at the same conclusion as Bañez is clear: St. Thomas did not admit that *all* contingents are controlled by such infrustrable decrees (though he did admit that God can and does use such decrees at times, by way of exception, as we saw in chapters 14 and 18).

There is another way to show that St. Thomas's recourse to eternity excludes the system of infrustrable decrees. St. Thomas says that future contingents are not knowable and so are not known by God—before a determination is made. Now it is clear that he thinks this determination is made by the creature.²⁸ (Were it not, there would be no need of eternity to make things present: God could previously determine to premove a creature by an infrustrable decree, and could so determine before the creature made a determination.) So, in St. Thomas's explanation, this determination made by the creature is *logically prior* to God's knowledge. But, if foreknowledge were explained by the infrustrable decrees, the determination made by the creature would be *logically posterior* to God's knowledge, because He would have had knowledge by the decrees prior to the determination made by the creature. Of course, St. Thomas holds that,²⁹ ". . . the knowledge of God is prior to natural things. . . ." This prior determination made by the creature is only a *negative* (the evil specification in resistance, or non-resistance). These negatives are *non-beings*. Therefore, no *being* is logically prior to God's knowledge.³⁰ The *positive* determination is not made by the creature until *after* the divine movement, so that it comes

logically *after* God's knowledge. (We will deal with the objection of passivity in God later, in chapter 23).

471. b) Because St. Thomas never has recourse to infrustrable decrees to explain foreknowledge, he shows that he does not accept the third alternative. The older Thomists try to contradict this statement in three ways:

1) They say that St. Thomas, in other passages, chiefly those which we cited above³¹ on causal knowledge, gives a fundamental principle according to which we ought to understand what he says when he treats of foreknowledge of future contingents.—But, as we have shown above, in such passages, St. Thomas says no more than did previous tradition. Similar statements, both as to content and as to wording, are found in earlier witnesses. Yet, in spite of such statements, absolutely all the earlier witnesses of tradition—including St. Augustine and St. Albert the Great, the very teacher of St. Thomas—still teach that God can know and foreknow without the use of decrees as means of knowing: He can know through His transcendent intellect. *Therefore St. Thomas, who in all passages—both in those on causality and in those on eternity—makes absolutely no assertion that is not found in at least many witnesses of tradition, but rather, always follows tradition, is not proved to have departed from tradition on a point in which he never says anything against tradition, but instead always repeats traditional statements.* Actually, in the explanation he gives through eternity, St. Thomas always supposes, as we have seen,³² precisely that which all tradition asserts, namely: God can know, through His transcendent intellect, whatever is present.

Of course, we do not deny that St. Thomas held, with many witnesses of tradition, that God knows many things also through causality: He knows what He does. But to see how St. Thomas understands this, let us do what the older Thomists ask, that is, let us join a presupposition of causality to the explanation through eternity (we do this merely for the sake of argument: we do not admit that St. Thomas really presupposes the use of causality as a means of knowing in his explanation through eternity). It would run this way: In the present of eternity, God knows that He is causing the things that He is causing. He knows this not only through His transcendent intellect, but also through causality. *But*, even in knowledge through causality, eternity is required, for before God can know anything, that thing must be knowable. That it may be knowable, it must be determined to one alternative. God Himself, as Bañez

says,³³ could have made the determination by an infrustrable decree and so could have foreseen future contingents even as future. But St. Thomas supposes that God does not act this way, for if He did, eternity would not be needed. So, since God acts without infrustrable decrees, there is no determination made until it is made in the present, by the creature, in a negative way,³⁴ that is, through the evil specification in resistance, or through non-resistance (before a good act). Now since God, according to St. Thomas,³⁵ does not exercise His causality to move a creature as far as positive consent except after the creature's non-resistance, therefore, before the creature makes this negative determination, God does not exercise His causality to move the creature to consent. And, if God does not yet exercise His causality to this extent, He cannot yet know the consent through causality. Hence, in St. Thomas' view of causal knowledge, both eternity and causality are needed. We conclude: if we do join causality and eternity, there is knowledge by way of causality, but not by infrustrable causality.

2) The older Thomists also assert that in text 8, cited above, from the *Summa*, St. Thomas proposes an explanation for foreknowledge through a system of infrustrable decrees in these words: "Hence all things that are in time, are present to God from eternity, not only in that way in which He has the reasons of things present before Him, as certain [writers] say: but because His gaze bears on all things from eternity, as they are present." The system of decrees is implied, these Thomists say, in the words "in that way in which He has the reasons of things present before Him."

472. In regard to these words of the *Summa*, even Garrigou-Lagrange does not dare to say more than that³⁶ ". . . in our article, St. Thomas *alludes* to the decree of the [divine] will."—But: Can we really believe that St. Thomas intended to propose a new theory, totally unknown to all previous tradition, through a mere allusion (even if we add the traditional assertions of St. Thomas on causality), and that he intended to do this in a work which he wrote for beginners in theology? Actually, in these words, St. Thomas was not presenting his own view, but was rejecting the view of others. First of all, we can gather this from the very way he speaks, since he says "as certain [writers] say." He is not accustomed to propose his own view in such a way—and especially this is hardly the way to present a new opinion, unknown to previous tradition (since it is unknown,

who could the certain writers be?). But especially, the source of this statement is quite clear; for, as the Dominican Fathers of Canada, in their splendid Ottawa edition of the Summa indicate in their commentary, in these words St. Thomas is rejecting the opinion of Avicenna and Algazel, who held that God does not know particular futures except in a general way.³⁷

473. 3) The older Thomists also assert that St. Thomas presents the new opinion in part of text 1, cited above: ". . . God, from whose power the thing was going to be, from eternity not only sees His own relation to the thing, but He looks upon the very being of the thing."—But, in these words, St. Thomas says nothing beyond what tradition says. He does not say that God knows all things through causality. He does not say that the causality is exercised in infrustrable decrees. And, most certainly, he does not say that God cannot know in any other way than by infrustrable causality. If he really is thinking of causal knowledge in this passage, nothing indicates that he has in mind a causal knowledge such that eternity would not be needed with it for the knowledge of free contingents. But if he is thinking of causality within eternity, then a frustrable causality is enough, as we have already shown.³⁸

The context confirms our interpretation. For in this article he wants to solve two difficulties. He had said that, ". . . contingency seems . . . in a twofold way to escape the divine knowledge. First, because of the relation of the cause to the thing caused. For the effect of a necessary and immutable cause seems to be a necessary effect; hence since the knowledge of God is the cause of things, and since it is immutable, it does not seem that it can include contingents. Secondly . . . because there can be a first necessary cause even though there is a defect in the second cause, but the knowledge of God cannot coexist with the failing of the second cause [to do what God foresees] . . . and *this is because of the certitude of knowledge, and not because of His causality.*" Therefore, if St. Thomas really had wanted to propose a new explanation of foreknowledge by causality, the suitable and opportune place would have been in his solution of the first part of the difficulty, in which he is expressly treating causal knowledge, and not in the second part where the difficulty of reconciliation is "because of the certitude of knowledge, and not because of His causality." Yet, the words to which these Thomists point come from the second part. In the first part, where he explicitly takes up

causality, it would have been easy to solve the difficulty he had proposed by saying that the divine causality, since it is transcendent, transcends the order of necessity and contingency,³⁹ and that God can know and foreknow through such infrustrable causality. Yet, he not only does not say such a thing, but, on the contrary, he proposes a comparison in which he says that the movement from the First Cause is like the movement from the sun, which is invariable, so that the failure of blooming in a tree in no way comes from any difference in the causality of the sun, but from an impediment in the tree. As we have seen above,⁴⁰ this comparison does not fit with the system of infrustrable decrees; it supposes instead a different explanation, the one we gave in chapter 18.

Furthermore, it is hardly to be supposed that St. Thomas would intend to propose a new theory, completely unknown to previous tradition in a few words, said in passing,—and to do this in a place where the context is unsuitable, right after passing up a very suitable context.

474. c) From the summaries St. Thomas gives on foreknowledge, we have a confirmation of the fact that he does not accept the third alternative, i.e., he does not explain foreknowledge by the system of infrustrable decrees. In these summaries, which he gives while treating of various topics, he always has recourse to eternity, and not even once alludes to foreknowledge through infrustrable decrees:

1) *De veritate* 12.6.c.: "*For this reason* it is proper to God to know the future with certitude, as present, as Boethius says: because His gaze is measured by eternity, which is all at once, so that all times, and the things that happen in them, lie beneath His gaze."

2) *Contra gentiles* 3.154: "... future contingents ... are subject to divine knowledge alone, *because* He sees them in themselves, since they are present to Him by reason of His eternity. ..."

3) *De malo* 16.7.c.: "... future things can be known in two ways: one way in themselves; the other way, in their causes. Now they can be known in themselves by no one except God. The reason is that futures, as futures do not yet have reality in themselves ... whence ... it is impossible for any knowledge that looks on future things as future to know them in themselves. ... but [to know futures in themselves] is proper to God alone, whose knowledge is elevated above the whole order of time ... the whole course of time and the things that are in all time lie under His gaze ... as present ... to know the

future in its cause, is nothing other than to know the present inclination of the cause. . . ."

4) *ST 1.57.3.c.*: ". . . a future thing can be known in two ways. In one way, in its cause . . . not with certitude but by conjecture. . . . In the other way . . . in themselves. And so it is proper to God alone to know future things . . . because God sees all in His eternity. . . ."

5) *ST 1.86.4.c.*: ". . . future things can be known in two ways: one way is in themselves, the other way, in their causes. Future things can be known in themselves only by God, to whom they are present . . . inasmuch as His eternal gaze bears all at once over the course of time. . . . But as they are in their causes, they can be known even by us . . . through a certain conjecture. . . ."

6) *ST II-II, 171.6, ad 1*: "The certitude of divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of particular futures, *because* it bears on them according as they are present and already determined to one [alternative]."

475. d) From the way in which St. Thomas solves objections, we have a confirmation that he does not accept the third alternative, i.e., he does not explain foreknowledge through a system of infrustrable decrees. For many times, in giving the solution to an objection, he could have had an easy answer by appealing to the system of infrustrable decrees, particularly in contexts in which he is speaking of divine causality. Nevertheless, in all passages, he always gives the same solution by way of eternity—never by the decrees. We will not cite all passages in which he does this: *objection 1 and solution*: [objection] ". . . in singular future contingents there is no determined truth. . . ." [answer] ". . . once it has been brought forth in the nature of things, it does have determined truth; and the gaze of the divine knowledge is borne over it in this way."—It would have been so easy to say: "It is not determined in its proximate causes, but in the transcendent will of God it is determined, in such a way, however, that liberty will not be destroyed, but produced by the very divine motion."

2) *De veritate 2,12, objection 10 and solution*: [objection] ". . . a future contingent is in no way determined, neither in itself, nor in its cause. Therefore in no way can there be knowledge of it." [answer] ". . . the future is present to God, and in this way is determined to one alternative; but while it is future, it is undetermined."—How easy it would have been to reply to the words "[it] is in no way

determined" by the distinction: "It is not determined in its proximate cause, but it is determined in the First Cause, inasmuch as God, even before it is produced in reality, intends to send an infrustrable decree to produce it." In fact, St. Thomas really owed it to his readers to make this distinction, if he had it in mind, so as not to lead his readers into error by the flat statement "[it] is in *no way* determined, neither in itself, nor in *its cause*." He should have distinguished at least the last expression saying: "not determined in its *proximate cause*, but it is determined in the *First Cause*."

3) *ST I. 14. 13. objection 3 and solution*: [objection] ". . . everything that is known by God must necessarily be [so]: because even everything that we know is necessarily so. . . . But no future contingent is necessarily so. Therefore, no future contingent is known by God." [answer] ". . . those things which are reduced to act in the course of time, are known by us successively in time, but they are known by God in eternity, which is above time. Hence, they cannot be certain to us, because we know future contingents inasmuch as they are such: but [they are certain] to God alone, whose intelligence is in eternity, above time."—Could not St. Thomas have easily said, if he had held the system of infrustrable decrees, that which he actually did say elsewhere (for a different purpose, not to propose the system of decrees):⁴¹ "The divine will is to be viewed as existing outside the order of beings, as a certain cause that pours forth all being and its differences. Now 'possible' and 'necessary' are differences of being. . . . the first cause . . . transcends the order of necessity and contingency." But, this transcendence of the divine will could explain foreknowledge of future contingents only if God *always* worked through infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions to sin. As we have seen,⁴² St. Thomas does not hold that God works in this way always (though he does hold that God uses infrustrable decrees, for good, at times, by way of exception). Hence we can see why St. Thomas did not make such a statement to solve the objection 3 of ST I.14, 13.

476. e) From the fact that St. Thomas does not appeal to the transcendence of the divine will even in contexts in which he speaks of both that transcendence and of foreknowledge, we have a confirmation of the fact that he rejects the third alternative, and does not explain foreknowledge through the older Thomists' system of decrees. In some passages, such as those in texts 4, 5 and 6 above, immediately after giving the

solution of the problem of foreknowledge by way of eternity, St. Thomas takes up the transcendence of the divine will. At such a point he could have easily applied that transcendence of the will to foreknowledge, *if* he held these Thomists' system of decrees. But even in such contexts, he does not do so. For example, in his *In Peri hermeneias*⁴³ (cf. text 6 above), he proposes a twofold difficulty about divine providence: "But if divine providence is of itself the cause of all the things that happen in this world, at least of the good, it seems that all things happen by necessity. First, in regard to His knowledge: for His knowledge cannot be false; and so it seems that what He knows must necessarily happen. Second, in regard to His will: for the will of God cannot be inefficacious; it seems, therefore, that everything He wills, happens necessarily." After these words, he first takes up the difficulty in regard to God's knowledge, and solves it in the way we have already seen above in text 6. Then he takes up the difficulty in regard to the will, and solves it in the words we cited above, at note 41. It would have been so easy at such a point to add that foreknowledge can be explained by the transcendence of the divine will, *if* he had held these Thomists' system of decrees. But he did not.

477. f) From the interpretations of early Thomists, we have a confirmation of the fact that St. Thomas rejects the third alternative, that is, he does not explain foreknowledge by a system of infrustrable decrees. For the interpretation we have given of St. Thomas's views was rather general in the Dominican order before Bañez. We quote the principal examples:

1) *Didacus Deza*:⁴⁴ "If anyone should object that, even though the strength and power of God, in itself and absolutely, does not have a necessary relation to the realization or non-realization of future contingents, yet, considering the disposition and determination of the divine knowledge and will, from eternity, in regard to producing the future contingents, it seems that there was from eternity a necessary and determined order in the strength and power of God for their realization and production: from which it follows that future contingents could be known in their first causes, with certitude and determination, from eternity, by the divine intellect. But to these things we reply, that just as the will of God has determined from eternity that some future contingents should be produced in reality, so it also determined that they were to be produced contingently and fallibly, and so it provided for them contingent, impedible, and defectible proximate causes. . . . Now from such a determination as from their cause, no other knowledge can be had than that the future

contingents will happen contingently and uncertainly and fallibly. From such a [divine] determination, only contingent and fallible causes are prepared for them. For the power and causality of the first cause is not received in the second cause except according to the mode of the second cause. . . ."

Comments: Deza begins by proposing an objection. The objection is practically a statement of the system of infrustrable decrees as a means of knowledge. But he considers it only an objection. He says that God really sends only such a motion that the "contingents will happen contingently and *uncertainly* and *fallibly*." Such a motion is obviously a frustrable, not an infrustrable motion. He obviously does not hold that God knows (and can know) only through infrustrable movements and infallible permissions.

2) *Melchior Cano:*⁴⁵ ". . . there is no other way to retain the knowledge of God, the infallibility of the knowledge of God about future contingent things, except by supposing the existence of things. And this St. Thomas holds. In *De veritate* 2.12 he shows that there is no other way in which we could retain the infallibility of the knowledge of God about future contingent things, except by supposing that things are present in God. . . ."

Comments: If "there is *no other way*" except by the fact that things are present in eternity, then Cano implicitly denies that there could be *another way*, a way through the system of infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions to sin. For such a system, as Bañez himself explains,⁴⁶ would suffice even if things were not present in eternity.

3) *Mancio:*⁴⁷ ". . . certainly, one could hold such an opinion [i.e., that they could be explained through infrustrable decrees, as Scotus does] about the contingents that are produced by God alone, but about those [contingents] that He produces with free [human] will, it is not so easy to understand [how such an opinion could be true]. For why does the divine will determine itself to concur with you and not with me, except because He knows that you will will that He concur with you, but I will not. For the concursus of God does not necessitate, but it is in my control that God should concur with me or not."

Comments: Mancio takes up and rejects the opinion of Scotus about the use of infrustrable decrees to explain foreknowledge. Contrary to such a view, Mancio holds that I can decide whether or not God will move me.

4) *Bartholomew de Medina*:⁴⁸ ". . . as it is in power to use or not to use the general concursus [of God] in fact, it is even in my power that God should give me concursus or not. And yet God would not be frustrated, because He gives concursus only to him who He knows will use it. So also we must say about special concursus. . . . It is in your power to be moved or not to be moved by God, [and it is in your power] whether God gives you concursus or not."

Comments: It is obvious that Medina, like Mancio, rejects the system of infrustrable decrees.

478. Conclusions on the opinion of St. Thomas: *In general:* It is obvious that St. Thomas followed tradition with great fidelity. He reaffirmed every assertion that was sufficiently founded in previous tradition; he made no assertion that was not found in previous tradition. Again, like the previous witnesses, he did not attempt to put all points on foreknowledge into one synthesis. This appears, for example, from the fact that he said nothing at all about the futuribles. Similarly, although he affirms, with several previous witnesses of tradition, that the knowledge of God can be compared with the knowledge of an artisan, yet he never explicitly makes use of this affirmation in passages in which he explains foreknowledge of future free contingents *ex professo*. *Therefore, it is impossible to suppose that he who never said anything except what tradition had already said, really not only proposed a new theory (foreknowledge through infrustrable decrees) that was unknown to tradition, but that he simultaneously also deserted the view that all tradition held, namely, that God can foreknow through the transcendent divine intellect, without the use of any decrees, frustrable or infrustrable, as means of knowing.*

479. In particular, therefore:

1) He held that God can foresee through His transcendent intellect, even without the use of any decrees, frustrable or infrustrable, as means of knowing. (Of course, he taught that divine causality is required for the existence of beings, though not for the occurrence of non-beings as such). This conclusion is divinely revealed, as we have already shown.⁴⁹

2) He holds that God can know through causality the things that He does. But nowhere does he explicitly apply this point to foreknowledge of future free contingents. Doubtless, however, He knew that God could foresee even through frustrable causality the things He does in the present of eternity. Doubtless also, He knew that God could foresee through infrustrable decrees, whenever He actually uses them. However, he held⁵⁰ that God does not regularly use infrustrable decrees.

3) Always, without exception, both in passages in which he treats it *ex professo*, and in summaries, St. Thomas explains the foreknowledge of

future free contingents through eternity. However, he does not hold that eternity is the *medium quo* or *medium in quo* of foreknowledge. Rather eternity is a condition needed to make things knowable by making them present. For St. Thomas holds that future contingents, as future, are altogether without determination, and so are metaphysically unknowable even to God. Therefore the explanation through eternity, since eternity is not a medium, always presupposes that God can, through His transcendent intellect, know all things that are knowable and present.—In the explanation through eternity, St. Thomas explicitly follows Boethius. Therefore this explanation is philosophical, not revealed.

END NOTES

1 De veritate 2.8.c.

2 CG 1.68. cf. 3.56.

3 CG 1.66.

4 ST I.14.8.c.

5 1 Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, object 5 and ad 5.

6 De veritate 2.15 ad 1.

7 ST I.14.10 ad 2.

8 CG 3.159-61. Cf. cap. 14.

9 Cf. §§ 344-45.

10 Cf. §§ 82, 346-48.

11 1 Sent. d. 38. a. 1, a. 5. c.

12 De veritate 2.12.c.

13 CG 1.67.

14 De rationibus fidei 10. § 1025.

15 Quodlibet XI. q. 3, a.3.

16 In Peri hermeneias 1.9.14.17-21.

17 Compendium theol. 1.133. § 272.

18 ST I.14.13.c.

19 Below, in § 472, we will investigate whether in ST I. 14. 3 the words "reasons of things" could imply another explanation.

20 In Peri hermeneias 1.9.13.6.

21 Cf. § 463, text 2.

22 De veritate 2.12 ad 1.

23 ST I.5.2.c.

24 Cf. ST II-II.171.3.c.: "future contingents . . . are not knowable in themselves. . . ."

25 Cf. §§ 121-22.

26 Cf. n. 24 above.

27 Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae, Romae, 1584. In I.14.13. Conclusio 4a, Col. 313.

28 Cf. Cajetan on I. 14. 13: ". . . it is one thing for the knowledge of God to receive certitude from the sitting of Socrates, another thing for the sitting of Socrates to be incapable of being the term of certain divine knowledge except inasmuch as it is certain in itself. For the first is unsuitable, but the second is necessary."

29 ST I. 14. 8 ad. 3.

30 We note that these non-beings are not prior to the action of God by which He creates, conserves, and begins to move the creature.

31 § 458.

32 § 468.

33 § 470.

34 Cf. § 470.

35 Cf. chapter 14.
 36 De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 357, n. 2. (emphasis mine).
 37 St. Thomas rejects their view in ST I.14.11 and in 1 Sent. d.36, q. 1, a.1.c.
 38 § 471.2. a.
 39 Cf. § 475.3, the citation of n. 41 and § 476.
 40 Cf. §§ 325-327.
 41 In Peri hermeneias 1.9.14.22.
 42 Cf. §§ 121-122.
 43 Ibid, 1.9.14.17.
 44 Novaram defensionum doctrinae . . . B. Thomae de Aquino quaestiones, Sevilla, 1517. p. 274. v. Cited from: F. Stegmuller, Francisco de Vitoria y la Doctrina de la Gracia en la Escuela Salmantina, in: Biblioteca Historica de la biblioteca Balmes Serie II, vol. X, Barcelona, 1934, p. 12. n. 9. Cf. also: Defensiones doctrinae doctoris beati Thomae Aquinatis, Hispali, 1517, In 1. d. 38, q. 1, a. 3: ". . . a future contingent in its causes does not have necessary or determined and infallible being, and hence, [it follows] that it cannot be known in its causes with certitude and determinately and infallibly. And, according to the mind of St. Thomas, this is true not only in regard to the second and proximate causes of the future contingent, but also in regard to the first cause, which is God." Cited from Lennerz, De Deo uno., Univ. Gregoriana Romae, 4a ed., 1948, pp 218-19.
 45 Cited from Stegmuller (cf. n. 44), p. 28, n. 51 (Ottob. lat. 286. 217 r).
 46 Cf. § 470
 47 Cited from Stegmuller (cf. n. 44), p. 31, n. 59 (Ottob. lat. 1058. f. 56 v.).
 48 Cited from Stegmuller (cf. n. 44), p. 113. n. 94.
 49 Cf. § 457. 1.
 50 Cf. §§ 121-22.

"Pt. 4: Divine foreknowledge - Ch. 23: Synthesis of conclusions on divine foreknowledge"

480. Since we have, up to this point, seen so many elements of the problem and solution in so many sources and authors, it will be worthwhile to try to make a synthesis of those points that are sufficiently established. At the same time, we will be able to see that God is not passive in His foreknowledge.

I. Foreknowledge of futures

It will be easiest to compose a synthesis by presenting a concrete example, in which God foresees what Mark is going to do at a certain time.

481. Prevision of the beginning of the movement: First, God decreed to create Mark, and to conserve him in existence, and to send to Mark, at a set time, a movement in the natural order, and a specified grace in the supernatural order, e.g., a grace to move Mark to visit the Blessed Sacrament at 3 P.M. on March 25, 1963.

God knows the existence of Mark, and the conservation of Mark, and the beginning of the natural and supernatural movement in Mark, that is, the simple apprehension of good in Mark's intellect, and the initial complacency in Mark's will. God knows these things in two ways:

1) *Knowledge through causality*: By the very decree of creating and conserving Mark, God knows the creation and conservation of Mark. By the very decree of sending the natural and supernatural motion to Mark at this time with this specification, He knows the effects in the intellect and will of Mark. For these effects are produced by a physical motion sent by God, and infallibly without Mark's having done anything at all up to this point. Certainly, there could be no question of passivity in God up to this point.

2) *Knowledge through the divine transcendent intellect*: God knows the same things through His transcendent intellect. This way of knowing presupposes the divine decrees mentioned above, but not as *means of knowing*. They are solely *prerequisites* for the existence of beings. If the entities did not exist, they could not be foreseen. God can know these things merely by His transcendent intellect. God is not passive in this kind of knowledge, because His intellect is transcendent. Just as according to St. Thomas,¹ "The divine will is . . . outside the order of beings . . . [and] transcends the order of necessity and contingency" so that² "He could produce this mode [contingency] in things even without the use of [contingent] causes as intermediaries," so similarly the divine intellect so far transcends the order of beings that it can know all things that are knowable without passivity.

482. Prevision of the negative determination: Once these effects have been produced in the intellect and will of Mark by grace alone, Mark can resist or not resist, in this first logical moment.

1) *If Mark resists*:

a) *God knows it through His causality*: In the present of eternity, God has already begun by His movement to produce a simple apprehension of good in Mark's intellect, and an initial complacency in his will. Yet, God permits Mark to resist, and by resisting, to remove these effects if Mark so wishes. If Mark resists, God knows that He is no longer causing these effects. God can permit Mark to resist without being passive in the line of causality of His will, as even the Thomists concede (for they say that everyone always resists all sufficient graces, unless an efficacious grace is added). Actually, in resistance there are two elements: the evil specification, which is the falling away from the good specification;³ and the exercise of the act. The evil specification is a mere deficiency: it is non-being in itself. God surely is not passive because man is deficient: there is no efficiency (causality) in deficiency. Neither is God passive in the exercise of the act of resistance: God Himself moves the man to this exercise, if man has first freely been deficient. Therefore, if God is not passive in the line of causality neither is He passive in the line of the knowledge that comes through causality.

b) *God knows through His transcendent intellect*: God's transcendent intellect does not know the negative, the bad

specification, directly, but He knows that the good which had been present is no longer present. Nor is God passive in this knowledge. He was not passive in His knowledge of the good, while it was present, because the divine intellect is transcendent and, of course, He knew that which He was producing. Nor is He passive in knowing the absence of good. For the absence of good is a negative, a non-being. Now there is no ontological truth in a non-being. For ontological good and ontological truth are interchangeable terms. Hence St. Thomas says:⁴ ". . . negations and privations that occur outside the mind do not have any form through which they could imitate the exemplar of the divine art, nor do they bring the knowledge of themselves into the human intellect. . . ." But, if they do not bring truth into the human intellect, much less do they bring truth into the divine intellect. So on this score, the divine intellect is not passive. Nor do negatives produce an image in the divine mind, for they are not represented by images, but by the absence of an image.⁵ However, we need to note that, even though there is no ontological truth in a negation in reality outside the divine mind, yet, there is truth in the proposition about the negation, e.g., "It is true that this good is no longer present in Mark." But yet, as St. Thomas teaches, non-beings are not the cause of the truth of negative propositions:⁶ ". . . non-being is not the cause of the truth of negative propositions, as if it produced them in the intellect; but the mind itself does this, conforming itself to the non-being that is outside the mind; hence, the non-being occurring outside the mind is not the efficient cause of the truth, but it is as it were the exemplary [cause].⁷ The objection [which said that God is not the cause of the truth of negative propositions] proceeded from [the question about] the efficient exemplar. Therefore, since the non-being does not produce the truth of the negative proposition, but rather, the intellect itself makes this truth, it is clear that God is not passive in knowing these negatives.

483. 2) *If Mark does not resist:*

a) *God knows through His causality:* In the present of eternity, God has already begun to produce the effects in the intellect and will of Mark, as we said above. If Mark does not resist in this first moment,⁸ he merely does nothing against these effects. God would have permitted Mark to destroy these effects if Mark had so wished, as we have already explained. But Mark did not do this. Therefore, the effects continue, and they continue not through any act on the part of Mark, but through divine causality: Mark does not move himself at all. Therefore, God knows that He is still producing or sustaining these effects. Surely, He is not passive in this way.

b) *God knows through His transcendent intellect*: The divine intellect still knows the good effects that God is continuing to produce. Mark has not destroyed them. But God is not passive, because the divine intellect is transcendent, and because He Himself is producing these effects: Mark is doing nothing. Further, non-resistance is non-being. Hence, the explanation we gave of the absence of passivity in the knowledge of the evil specification also holds for non-resistance, which is also non-being.

484. Prevision of the positive determinations: If Mark does not resist, God physically moves Mark's will to positive consent, but in such a way that Mark is no longer passive, but is both moved by grace, and moving himself by the power received from the grace. But if Mark resists, God moves him to the exercise of the evil act.

1) God knows through His causality: The motion that is given after non-resistance or after resistance is a physical motion,⁹ and so is infallible. God can certainly know through such a motion.

2) God knows through His transcendent intellect: This way of knowing presupposes the divine motions by which God physically moves to the consent or to the exercise of the evil act. These motions, however, are presupposed and needed not as *means of knowing*, but as *prerequisites for the existence of beings*. Once these beings exist, God can know them merely through His transcendent intellect. Nor is He passive because He is transcendent. And, of course, He Himself is the cause of these beings.

485. No truth is prior to God's knowledge: We note that the negatives (the evil specification in resistance and non-resistance) are logically prior to the knowledge of God, but the positives (the exercise of resistance and the positive consent) are beings and are posterior to His knowledge:

1) It is clear that St. Thomas puts the *negative* determination by the creature logically before the divine knowledge,¹⁰ for he says that futures as futures are unknowable, since they are not yet determined. They become knowable only after the determination. The determination could be made through infrustrable decrees, but, because this is not done regularly within ordinary providence, St. Thomas has recourse to eternity, so that through eternity these futures may become present. In the present, they are determined, in a negative way, by the creature.

2) It is also clear that St. Thomas puts the *positive* determination after God's knowledge, for he says:¹¹ ". . . the knowledge of God is prior to natural things. . . ." Now since negatives are not "natural things"-because they are not things at all, but are non-beings-this statement does not contradict the statement that St. Thomas puts negatives before the knowledge of God.

486. Negative determinations, since they are non-beings, do not have truth in them, nor do they convey truth to the intellect-not even to the human intellect, much less to the divine intellect.¹² Because they do not have truth in themselves nor convey truth into the divine intellect, nor make the truth of negative propositions, it remains true that no truth is prior to the knowledge of God, just as it is also true that no thing or being is prior to the knowledge of God. Non-beings are not things.

487. *The knowledge of God does not grow:* In the explanation that we have given, nothing is added to the knowledge of God during the course of time, because God always possesses all these things, since He is eternal, and all things are present at once to Him.

II. Foreknowledge of futuribles

488. It is clear from Scripture that God knows the futuribles, not only conjecturally, but certainly and infallibly. But the explanation of *how* He does this is not found in Scripture, nor in the Fathers, nor in St. Thomas himself. St. Thomas has not one word about futuribles even though he could hardly fail to know that God knows these, for it is so clear in Scripture that He does know these. It is also so clear in some of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine.¹³

It is obvious that the explanation of the foreknowledge of futuribles cannot be found in the system of the older Thomists. For they say that God knows them since He has made an almost infinite series of decrees deciding in which ways He would or would not move each individual creature in each circumstance conceivable. This explanation is to be rejected not only because it leads to some absurd consequences,¹⁴ but more specially, because it presupposes the older Thomists' system of infrustrable decrees and infallible permissions to sin: but, as we have often seen, this system contradicts both revelation and St. Thomas.¹⁵

489. Therefore, since the foreknowledge of futuribles cannot be explained by decrees of the divine will, it must be explained by the divine intellect. Precisely how the divine intellect knows these, we cannot determine: certainly the explanation must be such as to avoid supposing any predetermination or determinism in man. Therefore we can say only this: The transcendent divine intellect knows what determination a creature would make, even though it would make it entirely freely, and even though there is no determinism within the creature. So, we are merely attributing this knowledge to the transcendent divine intellect, of which St. Albert the Great wrote well:¹⁶ ". . . the light of the divine intelligence, which is of infinite power, penetrates into hidden parts, I mean, hidden in themselves and in [their] cause. . . . from [His] infinite power of foreseeing whithersoever that which is mutable may turn itself."

490. *The validity of the Aristotelian principle of the unknowability of future contingents:* As we have seen, St. Thomas

holds that a future contingent, as future, is altogether unknowable, since, he says, as future it is not determined. As we also know, St. Thomas took this principle from Aristotle, not from revelation. Now if we follow out the implications of this statement in regard to the futuribles, we arrive at this: Futuribles as such are not yet determined by the creature: they only express what that creature *would* determine if placed in these circumstances with these graces. Nor are they determined by God, in the first logical moment in which He knows their negative determinations. For it is only in the system of the older Thomists that He would determine them before the negative determination by the creature: but we have proved that their system is not true. Therefore, since the futuribles do not yet have any actual determination from a creature, nor from God, according to the Aristotelian principle they should be metaphysically unknowable, even to God. (Nor would it help to have recourse to eternity, for eternity makes present only the things that actually will be). So, we would have to conclude, on the basis of the Aristotelian principle, that God does not know the futuribles or that He would know them only conjecturally.

491. But we are not permitted to conclude that God does not know the futuribles: it is revealed that He does know them. Nor are we permitted to conclude that He has only a conjectural knowledge of them: that would be an imperfection. Hence, we are forced to at least doubt the validity of the Aristotelian principle. Actually, many theologians today, influenced by this sort of reasoning, deny the Aristotelian principle and say: If Mark is now doing this thing, it was true also in the year 100 B.C. that Mark was going to do this, even though in 100 B.C. Mark had not yet determined it, nor had God determined it. If it was true, then the transcendent intellect of God was able to know it, and did know it. Similarly about the futuribles, if this statement is true: "In such circumstances, with such graces, Mark would do this,"-then the transcendent intellect of God can know the truth of this proposition, and can know what determination Mark would make, even though there is no determinism within Mark. From the fact that we do not know the *how*, we must not deny the *fact*. Rather, we must merely say with Scripture:¹⁷ "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain it."

492. So we can at least suspect now why St. Thomas said nothing about the futuribles: He did not hold the system of infrustrable decrees; he saw that according to the Aristotelian principle, the knowledge of futuribles would be impossible even for God. He did not like to deny the Aristotelian principle, and he could not deny the revealed truth that God knows the futuribles. Therefore, not knowing how to reconcile the two points, he humbly kept silence.

493. So let us at least imitate St. Thomas in this humility, and say that God certainly knows the futuribles. We know He does not know them through the system of infrustrable decrees. We do not know the real

explanation. So let us simply attribute this foreknowledge to the transcendence of the divine intellect.

494. *The relations of the futuribles to divine causality:* The futuribles presuppose a hypothetic divine causality, not as a means of knowledge, but for the existence of the beings that are presupposed before the hypothetical negative determination. We do not say that God *actually* exercised this causality. We say only that it would not be true that Mark, in these circumstances, with this grace, would make this negative determination, unless on the supposition that God had first created and conserved Mark, and put him in these circumstances, and had begun to move him with this grace. On these presuppositions, it can be true that Mark would make a *negative* determination (by the evil specification in resistance, or by non-resistance).¹⁸ After the evil specification, God would move him to the exercise of resistance. After non-resistance, God would move him to positive consent.

Scholion on recourse to eternity

495. As we have seen, some witnesses of tradition, beginning with Boethius, have recourse to eternity to explain foreknowledge. They do this precisely because they think, following the Aristotelian principle, that future contingents as future are not yet determined by the creature, and are not yet determined by God. Hence, they say that it is necessary that these become present to God through eternity, so that they may be knowable, for they are determined only in the present.

However, there is strong reason, as we have seen,¹⁹ for at least doubting the validity of the Aristotelian principle. For it seems to prove that God cannot have certain knowledge of the futuribles. But, he who proves too much, proves nothing. God certainly does have certain knowledge of the futuribles, as we know from Scripture. So the argument given by Aristotle does not seem valid. Furthermore, as we have noted above, if Mark is now doing this, it was equally true in the year 100 B.C. that Mark was going to do this, even though at that time Mark had not yet made the determination, nor had God made a determination through an infrustrable decree.

496. Now if it is not true that future contingents are unknowable as future, then it is not necessary to have recourse to eternity to explain how God knows the future. It will be enough to say that His transcendent divine intellect knows all the determinations that creatures will make or would make.

497. Of course, we do not say that these things could be true before they happen without a divine mind in which they can be true, nor without a First Cause to decree the prerequisites for the existence of beings. But the precise reason because of which these propositions can be true is not that the divine mind is eternal, but that there is a divine mind (prescinding from eternity). For eternity is not required in order that they may be true.

498. If we wish to explain foreknowable only by causality exercised in a frustrable way, prescinding from the transcendent intellect, then, precisely because the frustrable exercise of causality is not transcendent, it will be necessary to have recourse to eternity. As we saw earlier in this chapter, frustrable causality together with eternity can explain foreknowledge.

499. Objection 1: There is a dilemma: Either God by causal knowledge determines man, or the knowledge of God is determined by man. There is no third possibility.

Answer: As we saw in chapter 23, God can foresee in two ways, namely, through His transcendent intellect and through frustrable causality within eternity. In neither way is He passive.

In foreknowledge, without the use of causality as a means of knowing, God is not passive because His divine intellect is transcendent and because, by the will of God, all things are conditioned through negatives (the evil specification in resistance, and non-resistance). These negatives are non-beings. In non-beings, there is no ontological truth, nor do negatives convey truth into even a created mind, not to say a divine mind. Further, the truth of a proposition about these negatives, even when it is known by a creature, is not received from the negative, but is made in the mind in which it is known, as St. Thomas himself explains:²⁰ ". . . non-being is not the cause of the truth of negative propositions, as if it produced them in the intellect, but the mind itself does this. . . ." Therefore, the truth is made by God, and God does not receive the truth from creatures. Now, if He does not receive the truth, but rather He himself makes it, He is not determined by creatures, nor is He passive. But neither does God determine the negative conditions: He permits them to be determined by creatures. Hence, the dilemma rests on a question that is not well put, and on an incomplete disjunction: Neither does God determine the creature, nor does the creature determine God. Rather God permits the creature to make a negative determination, but God Himself *produces the truth and determines Himself* to move or not to move the creature to the positive determination, according to the resistance or non-resistance of the creature.

When one explains foreknowledge through causality, the difficult question is not about passivity in foreknowledge, but about passivity in permissive causality. For if God can, without passivity, permit a creature to frustrate the effect of a frustrable decree, then, obviously, He can know, within eternity, that He is acting or not acting. If God is not passive in the line of the causality of the decree, neither is He passive in the knowledge that comes through this causality. But, as we have already shown,²¹ God can permit a frustrable decree to be frustrated without His being passive. Therefore, He can know through this causality, without passivity.

It is good to add this: Even if we were unable to give any explanation for this point, it would not follow that we would have to say that everything is controlled through infrustrable decrees. For we cannot accept that system simply because, as we have shown many times, it contradicts revelation. Nothing that contradicts revelation can be true. Nor should we pay more attention to human reasonings than to divine revelation. Therefore, even if we had no explanation to the difficulty proposed in the objection, we would still have to say: A thousand difficulties do not add up to one doubt. Just as a Catholic who encounters an objection against the faith that he cannot solve, is not logically obliged to give up his faith or to call it into doubt-actually, he is strictly obliged not to do so-similarly, even if we were not able to give any solution to the objection, we would still be obliged to say that the system of the decrees is false, because it contradicts revelation.

500. Objection 2: Nothing will be present in eternity without divine causality. Therefore, God knows all through causality.

Answer: The objection rests on forgetfulness of the distinction between positive things, beings, and negatives, non-beings. God is not the cause of non-being. Non-beings presuppose that God has made and conserved a creature and, in the case of human actions, that He has begun to move the creature. But presupposing these, whether or not there will be a deficiency or an absence of resistance depends on the creature.

Return to the objection: Garrigou-Lagrange says:²² "Most certainly, if this future contingent were present in eternity independently of the determination of the divine will, it would be something necessary and not contingent."

Reply: The statement implies that all must be determined either by God or by the nature of things. But the disjunction is incomplete: for some things can be *negatively* determined by man, as we have explained in chapters 18 and 23. Nor is it true to say, even when a creature determines something negatively, that it is present in eternity "independently of the determination of the divine will." Before the creature can make a negative determination, God creates, conserves, and begins to move the creature. Only after this can the creature either be deficient, in the evil specification of resistance, or do nothing, i.e., non-resist. The positive determination is made by God, according to these negative determinations which He wills to permit.²³ As we have seen,²⁴ there is no ontological truth before this positive determination, and the logical truth of negative propositions is made by the divine mind.

501. Objection 3: St. Thomas says:²⁵ "[God's idea] of the things that are, or will be, or were to be produced is determined according to the decision of the divine will. . . ." Therefore, all things are determined by the First Cause before they happen, and through these determinations, God has these ideas.

Answer: God has ideas only of positive things, of beings. God is the cause of all beings. Hence, the divine ideas of these beings are really determined by the divine will. But God is not the cause of negatives, of non-beings nor does He have an *idea* of negatives, as we have already explained,²⁶ though of course, He does know the negatives. Because He does not have ideas of negatives, therefore the words cited from St. Thomas do not apply to negatives. But, as we have seen, according to the free decision of God, all free acts of man are conditioned by negatives, that is, God, within ordinary providence, does not will to move a man as far as positive consent except on condition of the man's non-resistance, nor does he will to move the man to the exercise of resistance except on condition of the evil specification. So God does have ideas of positive things, and these ideas are determined according to the decision of the divine will. But He does not move as far as these positives except on the negative conditions, and He does not have an idea of negatives. (Cf. also other texts of St. Thomas on foreknowledge, in objection 1 of chapter 7).²⁷

END NOTES

1 Cf. n. 41 on Chapter 22.

2 De veritate 23.5.c.

3 Cf. § 345.

4 De veritate 1.8.c.

5 Ibid., 2.15 ad 1.

6 Ibid., 1.8 ad 7.

7 It is to be noted that in the passage cited above, St. Thomas says that the non-being is "as it were the exemplary [cause]." By this he does not imply that the human mind is passive-still less, the divine mind. For he explicitly denies any efficient causality to this "as it were exemplary [cause]." It remains true that the mind itself acts, and produces the logical truth.

8 Cf. §§ 82, 346-348.

9 Cf. § 353.

10 Cf. § 470.

11 ST I. 14.8 ad 3.

12 Cf. § 482.1.b.

13 Cf. § 429, 4 and 6

14 Cf. § 395.2. We note also that many of the older theologians who held the system of decrees denied that God had certain knowledge of the futuribles, because of the consequences of this theory. E.g., cf. P. de Ledesma, De divinae gratiae auxiliis, a.18.

15 Cf. §§ 118-122 and chapter 18.

16 Cf. texts 5 and 6 of St. Albert the Great, in § 455.

17 Ps 138:6.

18 Cf. §§ 482-83.

19 § 490.

20 § 483.

21 §§ 144, 482.1.a.

22 De Deo uno, Desclee de Brouwer, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1938, p. 356.

23 Cf. §§ 482-84.

24 §§ 485-86.

25 De veritate 3.6.c.

"Pt. 5: Synthesis of the conclusions of the entire investigation - Ch. 24"

502. In order to see the harmony of the results of our entire investigation, it will be worthwhile to make a synthesis in which we shall include the chief conclusions we have arrived at and also add a few elements, partly from revelation, partly from conjectures, that agree well with these. Theological notes for each assertion can be seen in the previous chapters.

1) In the beginning, God willed to create creatures. He did this solely out of supreme generosity, for He created not to acquire anything for Himself, but to give. He cannot acquire anything, since He does not lack anything. Nevertheless, creatures, by their very nature, are bound to glorify Him, even though He gains nothing from it. Further, God Himself cannot be indifferent to this glory:

a) He is not indifferent to objective goodness and justice: but objective goodness and justice require that creatures honour their God and Creator and Father.

b) God wants creatures to honour Him for their own sake, so they will be disposed to receive His generous favours. As St. Thomas says, He seeks His glory not for His sake, but for our sake.

So the first Vatican Council taught that God has bound together His own glory and the good of man: God will never seek His glory without our good.

2) In that same generosity and goodness, He loves His creatures. He loves men so much that He was not content to give them a merely human happiness: He planned a really divine happiness for them. That is, God wills all men to be saved, and to enjoy the vision of the divine essence. This will is sincere: were it not, the love of God would not be sincere, for this will is the chief part of that love. The salvific will is not only sincere, but most vehement: we can gauge its force by noting that it was so intense that the Father sent His only Son to the death of the cross for men. By this means, the Father wanted to establish infinite objective titles to graces for each individual man, so that He would owe it to Himself to grant graces according to those titles. He wanted to do this, as a means of proving His love and moving men, and also, out of a love of objective goodness. For objective goodness suggested, without demanding, that the damaged objective moral order be restored. The damage done to the moral order could have been infinitely restored by the incarnation in a palace, with redemption accomplished by the mere prayer, "Father, forgive them," even without the death of the incarnate Son. This would have been worth enough also to establish infinite titles for each man, both because of the

infinite dignity of the Redeemer, and because the Father had bound Himself by at least an implicit contract, in sending His Son on this mission, as if He said: "If you do this I will grant an infinite treasury for men, your brothers." But this method would not have been sufficient for the purpose the Father intended. For He not only wanted to provide infinite titles for each man, but also wanted to move men by the richest possible means, so that they would not reject the offered graces. Hence St. Thomas says:¹ "From the beginning of His conception, Christ merited eternal salvation for us; but on our part, there were certain impediments by which we were impeded from obtaining the effects of these early merits; to remove those impediments, 'it was necessary that Christ should suffer.' . . ."

Because infinite objective titles were established for each individual man, it is evident that the Father sets no limits that He will not pass to save a man. However, some are not saved, because men set limits. For by their repeated sins, they make themselves either physically incurable (incapable of perceiving ordinary graces because of their hardness) or morally incurable (so that they freely do not really change their course of life but, instead, are almost always in the state of sin). (It is true, one mortal sin has a sort of infinity about it. Still, the meritorious and satisfactory value of the Passion, which was offered for each individual, far surpasses even the collective gravity of all sins of the whole world taken together). Nevertheless no one can be safe in presuming: for even though God does not reprobate except for foreseen persistent and grave resistance to grace, yet He can, out of mercy, permit death to come to a man, after one or a few mortal sins, if that man is foreseen as going to be incurable if he lives.

Out of so great a salvific will, God offers to all even the grace with which they can persevere. Some actually persevere through this grace and are saved. Others however fall into sin in spite of it. Special providential care is required so that death does not catch such men while they are in sin. God actually does provide this care-for the salvific will has its measure in infinite objective titles for each individual-for all who do not make themselves incurable by persistent resistance. All who do not resist to that extent are predestined.

503. 3) By the power of His transcendent divine will, God is always able, when He so wishes, to move a man in such a way that that man freely but infallibly does that which God has decided upon. God is capable of moving men this way both within the internal economy (in matters that of themselves determine the salvation or perdition of men) and in the external economy (in which there is question of what external place a man will have, that is, whether a man will be a physician, or a shoemaker, or a politician, or even, whether a man will have full membership in the chosen people of the Old or New Covenant.

But God wanted the determination in each act to depend on man himself. Now man cannot of himself make the positive determination, i.e., the positive consent, or the exercise of the act of resistance. This is metaphysically impossible for him. But man can condition the whole process through negative conditions. For after grace (and a natural movement from God in the natural order) has made the beginning, by making the mind of man see the good that is proposed, and making his will take an initial complacency in it so that the man is moved by grace but does not yet move himself, man is able to resist. (That is, he can voluntarily cease from the act of complacency in his will: this is the beginning of the removal of the good specification. After that, God moves his will to order his intellect to cease attending to the moral goodness. Then, God moves him to the exercise of the act of resistance). Man is also able to non-resist. For since these two effects in his intellect and will continue by the power of the grace, without anything being required of him so that they may continue, man can non-resist by merely doing nothing. This non-resistance does not involve any positive act, or even a decision to do nothing, in this first moment of the process of the granting of a grace. If man does not resist, then the divine motion continues its course, and moves him to positive consent, in such a way, however, that in this second phase man is both being moved by grace and moving himself by the power received from grace. But the divine motion is not versatile: it is specified in itself; and it moves physically, not just morally. Yet, autonomous liberty remains, because in ordinary providence, God does not move as far as positive consent except after the condition of non-resistance. God made man free in autonomous freedom, because a man without autonomous freedom would not be a man, and because He wanted man to decide his salvation freely (for a man having only secondary, not autonomous freedom, would not have the power to "distinguish himself" as regards reprobation or non-reprobation). Having made man such, God will not contradict Himself by regularly using infrustrable movements, which take away autonomous freedom, but leave secondary freedom. But God can, by way of exception, in extraordinary providence, use infrustrable movements.

4) God assigned each man to his place in the external economy. He did this in two categories of things:

a) He assigned the external vocation or occupation of each man. He did this by giving varied talents to varied men, and by moving men's wills so that this man freely desires to be a shoemaker, that man, to be a physician, and so on. It is necessary that He make such assignments for a variety of roles is needed so that the world may function. However, frustrable movements suffice to bring a sufficient number into each occupation, for men are easily moved by natural objects, and towards the things for which they have natural talents.

b) He also assigned men to their place in the external mixed economy, that is, to some He gave the role of full membership in the Church, to others, a place in which they would have some, but not all the sacraments, and to still others, a place without any sacraments. St. Paul has revealed that God does not make these assignments because of the merits of men. But He certainly does act according to His Wisdom. There are not enough places in which all would have full membership, since (unless God were to multiply miracles to an immense degree) it is inevitable that there be heresies, etc., so that many will be born in places with few or no sacraments. So God seems to have assigned places according to the needs and foreseen resistance of individuals. That is, He gave places with the fullest external means of grace to those with the greatest need. Others, less needy, He put in places with lesser external means or with no external means. Some, who would perish in any place, He put in places with few or no external means, so as to leave the more favourable places open for those who need and will profit by them. This is an act of mercy to those who are thus put into unfavourable places, for, having less responsibilities as a result of a less favourable place, their ruin, inevitable in any place, is less.

504. 5) In predestining men to eternal life, God merely carried out that which He had wanted from the start. That is, God first willed, most sincerely and vehemently, that all men be saved. But then He saw that some would gravely and persistently resist grace, while others would not. He decreed to reprobate those who resist gravely and persistently, after foreseeing these demerits, and because of these demerits. He decreed to predestine and save the others, but not after foreseeing merits, nor because of foreseen merits. For at this point He had not yet looked at their merits: He had seen only their resistance or absence of resistance. He predestined them because of His goodness, in which from the beginning He had wanted to save them, and now predestined all in whom He did not find the bad condition, even though He did not yet see the good condition in them. For just as no condition was required from man so that God would begin to love him, so similarly, His purely spontaneous and generous love continues by its own force, without the need of any positive condition from man. And in its course, this love will predestine: for it always wanted to save; but salvation is impossible without predestination. So no condition was required from man so that God would predestine, precisely because His love moves in its course by its own power but a truly evil condition would be required so that God would not predestine, but would instead reprobate. Resistance would have to be persistent, since it would have to counterbalance the effects of a love and salvific will so powerful that it willed, through the supreme difficulty of the passion, to establish

infinite objective titles for each individual man. Of course, God could have made merits a requirement for predestination by positive law. But just as a good human father, to whom God compares himself, does not do that, so neither does God the Father. Of course, merits will be present at the end of a man's course, and God, as the Just Judge, who loves and rewards all moral goodness, will give the crown of justice for merits. But merits still will be merely reasons of propriety in the order of execution-not a cause in the order of intention that led God to begin to love and to continue to love, and, in the course of that love, to predestine.

He saves even some of those who resist gravely and persistently. He does this by extraordinary, infrustrable graces. But God cannot save all men this way, for Wisdom does not allow the extraordinary to be ordinary, and Justice wants such men to be saved only by way of exception, or in consideration of the special merits of other members of Christ, who fill up those things that are wanting to the sufferings of Christ in their flesh, for His body, which is the Church.

505. 6) God foresees all these things through His transcendent intellect, which is not passive because it is transcendent and because the determinations that men make, which condition the outcome, are all negatives. But there is no ontological truth in negatives, nor does the divine intellect receive logical truth from those negatives, which have no form in themselves.

God foresees through His transcendent intellect without the need of decrees of His will as means of knowledge, but not without those decrees as prerequisites for the existence of the *beings* that are foreseen. However, divine causality is not required for the non-beings as such. So the foreknowledge of human consent and of resistance presuppose the causality of God by which He creates, conserves, and begins to move the man, causing a simple apprehension of good in man's mind and an initial complacency in his will. But when this is done, nothing more is prerequired in order that man may be able to have negative conditions in him, i.e., that man may be able to non-resist in the first phase, for in so doing, he merely does nothing; nor is anything more required from God in order that man may be able to cease from complacency in the good proposed, and so begin the evil specification, after which God will move the man further in the line of exercise. So non-resistance and the evil specification are logically prior to the divine knowledge of them. Yet, since these are non-beings, no truth is prior to God's knowledge. For in negatives, there is no ontological truth, nor do they make logical truth in the divine mind; the divine mind itself makes the logical truth of the proposition that says: "In this creature there is no resistance," or: "there is not a good specification."

God can also foresee what He produces in moving creatures by His causality, in the present of eternity. He can foresee in this way, in the

present of eternity, even through frustrable decrees. Through infrustrable decrees, when He uses them, He can foresee even without the need of the presentiality of eternity.

506. 7) Within the divine nature, there is no *real* distinction between the various attributes, among which are mercy and justice. Very often, in His works done outside the divine nature, God acts in such a way that one and the same thing is both given and due on the basis of mercy and justice simultaneously. Thus there results a sort of fusion of mercy and justice, which imitates the relation of mercy and justice within the divine nature. From the extremely numerous examples of this way of acting, it seems at least highly probable that God has freely chosen to always act this way, in His works done outside the divine nature, except where the resistance of man freely impedes. Here are the principal examples:

a) God arranged a trial for our first parents: obedience to an easy divine command. If they had obeyed, the reward would have been given out of both mercy and justice, for God had promised a reward under this condition of obedience, and also, He had given a great intrinsic dignity to their works by making them adoptive sons, endowed with grace, and sharers in the divine nature.

b) In the objective redemption, the acquisition of the infinite treasury of pardon and grace, the Father willed to establish infinite objective titles for each individual man through the new covenant and the sacrifice of Calvary. So the Father gave this treasury into the hands of Christ not only out of mercy, but also out of justice, because (1) All the works of Christ are of infinite value, since He is a divine Person; (2) Christ fulfilled His part in a Covenant or at least implicit contract between Himself and the Father, for the Father, in sending Him on this mission, at least implicitly said: If you obey, I will give into your hands an infinite treasury of pardon and grace.

Further, out of supreme generosity and love of objective goodness and of men, the Father willed that the same treasury should also be owed in justice (though in a less rigorous way) as a result of the cooperation of the New Eve, whom He sent as the associate to the New Adam. The works of Mary were in themselves of lesser value. Still: (1) Because she was the Mother of God, His adopted daughter by grace, and a sharer in the divine nature through the fulness of grace, her works had a very great intrinsic dignity; (2) The Father also promised (even as He promises to reward our good works) to give the reward for her works. For, as Pope Pius XII taught:² ". . . by the will of God, she was associated with Jesus Christ, the principle of salvation itself. . . ." Now Mary was both extrinsically (from her divine mission as the New Eve) and intrinsically fitted for meriting for

us. For her grace was both eminent and social, because Mary, being full of grace, and the Mother of our Head, by the very nature of things had to be also the Mother of the members of that same Head. As Mother, she is intrinsically fitted to obtain and transmit life to her children.

c) But the Father also willed that the second phase, the subjective redemption or distribution of all graces, should also be carried out in mercy-justice. Hence, His Son instituted the Mass, and joined to Himself a Mystical Body.

Now in the Mass, the new Covenant is renewed and the same infinite price is presented again as the objective title for the dispensation of all graces "for our salvation and that of the whole world," as the text of the Mass itself expresses it. Therefore, having renewed this Covenant and accepted this price, the Father cannot within justice (for He owes it to Himself to give grace) refuse abundant graces to any man. Man can resist; but if he does not resist, the Father cannot refuse any grace of ordinary providence. Therefore, no one will perish except through his own persistent resistance.

The Father also willed that men should participate in the renewal of the Covenant and share by their actions in the objective titles established by Christ and Mary. (This is what merit means: to participate with Christ). Grace is offered in abundance to all, that they may become members of Christ. As members, they can (after the first grace, given through no merits of theirs, though its offering is owed to the merits of Christ and Mary) earn an objective title to grace in two ways: (1) Their works, as works of members of Christ, adopted children of the Father, and sharers in the divine nature, have a truly great intrinsic dignity; (2) The Father has bound Himself by the renewal of the Covenant and by Promises made through Christ to grant a reward to their works. Thus their works analogically imitate the two kinds of titles that Christ and Mary established, become part of the Covenant condition or price offered in the Mass, for in the Mass there is an offering of the whole Christ.³ Hence, although predestination is given without any merits on the part of men, still the actual conferring of the reward in the order of execution will be done out of both mercy (which is the foundation of the whole process) and justice.

In addition, the Father, through Christ, has promised to hear the prayers of men. Therefore the things that are given through prayer are given out of mercy, but also out of justice, for, as St. Augustine notes well (speaking to God):⁴ "For you deign, since your mercy is forever, to become even a debtor by your promises to those to whom you forgive all debts."

- d) But among the members of Christ there are, and can be, evil men, dead members, who resist grace persistently. In the order of intention, these who are foreseen as going to resist persistently, are reprobated. In the order of execution, as a result of this persistent resistance, they are or will become physically or morally incurable. Thus they will fall short of even the minimum requisite conformity with Christ and participation with Him. To keep such men from becoming incurable, or to cure them in spite of their incurability (which arises through persistent resistance and hardening), there is need of a grace that can forestall or even cancel out resistance: an extraordinary grace. Yet, as we have seen, some of these can be saved, especially if other members fill up what is wanting to the sufferings of Christ for these members of His body. In this way a sufficient title in mercy-justice can be provided for these, so that God will grant even extraordinary graces to move them to good, freely but infallibly. However, these supplied titles need to be really great, so as to be proportioned to the *extraordinary* graces that are needed to move men who resist persistently.
- e) In good men, the power of seeing spiritual truth is increased as they advance in the spiritual life. For if they act according to their faith, they become positively more fit to perceive the inspirations of light and, of course, have less impediments in them too. But the reverse happens in evil men: their power of seeing truth gradually diminishes and is obscured, since they act contrary to their faith, which becomes weakened. Further, their power of evaluative cognition (which is needed for grave sin) is gradually diminished. Thus there is mercy-justice. In the good, God mercifully increases the power of seeing and the power of merit: the increase is given out of mercy, but also out of justice for their good works deserve this. In the evil, mercy diminishes the power of seeing, so that they become less culpable when they sin. So the subtraction of light is a work of mercy, but it is also justice: for it is earned by their evil deeds.
- f) Similarly, the obscurity of Scripture is penetrated by the good, who earn this, but it blinds the wicked, lest they be more culpable: and at the same time, it is a penalty of their malice.
- g) Even death is an example of mercy-justice. God does not send death to men out of an attitude of vengeance. But by the mercy of God, if men accept death as He wills, they can acquire a greater title to reward. Therefore death, which is due in justice to sin, also becomes, if man does not resist grace, an instrument of mercy and a means of earning reward in justice.
- 8) Even the obscurity which God has permitted about the question of predestination is an indication of His goodness. To most men, the theory of some theologians about reprobation before foreseen

demerits is entirely unknown. The faithful do not even suspect such a thing: so they suffer no difficulty from it. But to the relatively few who know it, and yet do not know the true solution, it is an occasion calling for great faith, and even of hope against hope. The theory of negative reprobation before foreseen demerits can even serve, providentially, as an instrument of passive purification in what St. John of the Cross calls the Dark Night.

9) In the great Encyclical on the Mystical Body, Pope Pius XII wrote:⁵

"Mysteries revealed by God cannot be harmful to men, nor should they remain without fruit, like a treasure hidden in a field; rather, they were divinely given precisely in order to contribute to the spiritual progress of those who devoutly contemplate them."

It is clear, then, that we should not fear to preach the mysteries of God to the faithful. The explanation we have proposed is such that no one need fear to explain it even to the unlettered. On the contrary, the theory of reprobation before foreseen demerits is such that even many of its backers, such as Garrigou-Lagrange, expressly warn priests not to preach on it. And experience shows that many souls who come to learn of it from reading or classes, are struck with terror, so that it seems impossible for them to trust in God. They say in themselves: "How can I know whether perhaps God wants to desert me, and give me only such grace that it would be metaphysically inconceivable for me to be saved, so as to punish me, so as to show vindictive justice by my eternal misery."

But if our explanation is presented, men are enkindled with greater love for our most loving Father. And it is so simple that even untrained persons can understand it. For we could say, even to a child: "God is our most loving Father. He made you out of pure generosity, even though He could not gain anything from you. In most intense love He wants to bring you and all His children to heaven. Even before we were born, in His infinite knowledge, He looked ahead, and made plans for us. He foresaw that some of His children would be persistent in resisting the rich abundance of graces He offers them. As a father in a human family, whose son is extremely and persistently wicked can be finally compelled, though sadly, to disinherit his son, so also our Father in heaven sadly disinherits those whom He sees will persist in throwing His graces away. But as for all others, He planned to give all graces, to care for them, and so to manage everything that they will most certainly arrive safely in heaven. He does this not because these children are good, but because He, our Father, is good. Of course, we can and should merit. And, if we do not resist grace, we will have merits. God will reward them, as a just judge. But these merits are not the reason why He began to love us, and continued to love us, and planned to arrange everything so that we would come to heaven-He does all this out of His love, if only we do not resist it too much. Really, all the good we do when we merit is His gift to us. He gave part of that

gift when He made us, and gave us our abilities, and kept them in existence. The rest He gives at the very time when we do good. So, adding the two together, all the good comes from Him: all our good is His gift. So, when He crowns our merits, He is really crowning His own gifts.-And that is all we mean by predestination.

END NOTES

1 ST III.48.1 ad 2.

2 Ad Caeli Reginam. AAS 46. 634.

3 Cf. Pius XII, Menti nostrae, AAS 42. 666: "For Christ offers Himself to the Eternal Father . . . since, however, He Himself, the priest and victim, acts as the Head of the Church, He offers and immolates not only Himself, but all Christians. . . ."

4 Confessions 5.9.17.PL 32.714.

5 AAS 35. 197.

"Epilogue"

507. Perhaps someone may object: "Is it not presumptuous for an ordinary man to think he can see the solution that was obscure or unknown to the great Saints and Doctors of the Church?"

The answer is: No. For many reasons.

1) Because of the progressive clarification of revelation, according to the providential plan, it is to be expected that men in later ages will be able to see more than those in earlier ages. Even a child can see farther than a giant, if he stands on the shoulders of the giant. We see this verified under our eyes today in the natural sciences. Many boys in high school know far more about the natural sciences than did the giants of earlier centuries.

2) Actually, the main elements of our solution are found elsewhere, especially in St. Thomas and St. Francis de Sales, even though some points were still obscure from certain difficulties which divine providence permitted, according to the plan of the gradual clarification of revelation.

3) But especially: Whatever good there may be in this work came from our good Father through the hands of our Spiritual Mother, the Blessed Virgin Mary. For God, as St. Paul tells us, often likes to use worthless, contemptible instruments. Also, the divine decision as to who should find the answer to this problem (and other problems) is a matter of the external economy. But in the external economy, God assigns His gifts not according to human merits, but in other ways. Whatever is deficient in this work is entirely mine.

Finally, we readily submit all these things to the judgment of the Church, being ready to modify it not only according to solemn definitions, but also according to the teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the Church.

However, even after this, at least one thing will always remain true-for we have received that from the Church herself: Whatever be the truth

about the distribution of graces, it must always, in each individual case, be such as to be fully pleasing to the most loving heart of Mary, our Spiritual Mother, who is also the Mediatrix of all graces.¹ Most hearty thanks, then to our good Father, whose inexpressible love has given us such a Mother: for He *is* love.

END NOTES

1 Cf. note 7 on chapter 6.

"Appendix I: The order of the universe"

508. The problem of two series of texts: St. Thomas wrote about the order of the universe in many passages. These texts seem to fall chiefly into two series:

In the first series: He appears to hold this concept of the universe: God wanted to produce a great image of Himself. Since no creature alone could express the infinite and simple perfection of God, it was necessary¹ to create many and varied creatures, and to have all grades of goodness in them. An individual man is as it were part of an immense mechanism. That which God cares for is not the individual man, but the whole order.

In the second series: We seem to find a different concept: The greatest perfection in created things is found in the eternal salvation of men. For men are directly sought in the universe: all other things are for the sake of them. In the beatitude of man, the universe attains the greatest likeness of God, since man, by his intellect, is capable of becoming all things. So all perfections are contained in this perfection.

Here are the chief examples of each series:

509. 1) First series: "That which is the greatest good in the things that are caused [by God] is the good of the order of the universe. . . . So the good of the order of things . . . is that which is chiefly willed and caused by God."² "After the divine goodness . . . the principal good existing in things themselves is the perfection of the universe, which would not exist, if all grades of being were not found in things."³ ". . . He wants man to be for this reason: so that there may be a completion of the universe. . . ." ⁴ "It remains [to conclude], then, that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills each particular good in the universe."⁵ ". . . the good of the order of the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, since the individual parts are ordered to the good of the order that is in the whole as to [their] end, as is evident from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics XII*."⁶ ". . . the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality in things, so that all grades of goodness may be filled."⁷ ". . . God . . . does that which is better in the whole, but not that which is better in each part, except in order towards the whole. . . . Now the whole itself . . . is better and more perfect, if there are in it certain things that can fall away from good, which at times do fall away, since God does not

impede this . . . many goods would be removed if God permitted no evil to be. For the life of the lion . . . would not be conserved if the ass were not killed; nor would the justice of the avenger and the patience of the sufferer be praised if there were no iniquity."⁸ ". . . any part is found to be for the sake of the whole to which it belongs. Therefore that which God cares for most greatly in created things is the order of the universe."⁹

510. 2) *Second series:* "In created things nothing can be greater than the salvation of a rational creature, which consists in the fruition of the divine goodness itself . . ."¹⁰ "If some whole is not the ultimate end, but is ordered to a further end, the ultimate end of a part is not the whole itself, but something else. . . . Hence the good of the universe is not the ultimate end of man, but God Himself [is the ultimate end of man]."¹¹ "In the good of the universe there is contained *as a principle* the rational nature, which is capable of beatitude, to which all other creatures are ordered; and *in this respect* it is proper both to God and to us to love the good of the universe most greatly, in charity."¹² ". . . individual creatures are for the perfection of the whole universe. But further, the whole universe, with its individual parts, is ordered to God as to the end, in as much as in them, through a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented . . . although rational creatures *above this* have God in a special way as their end, whom they can attain in their operation, knowing and loving."¹³ "Only an intellectual creature attains to the very ultimate end of the universe, in its operation, namely, in knowing and loving God; but the other creatures cannot attain to the ultimate end except through *some sort of* participation in this similitude itself."¹⁴ "And this is also the *most perfect* way of attaining the divine likeness, namely, that we know Him in that way in which He knows Himself. . . ."¹⁵ "The intellectual creature is most greatly assimilated to God from the fact that it is intellectual: for it has this likeness more than other creatures, and this *includes all other [likenesses]*."¹⁶ "There is providence *even for individual men* for their own sake."¹⁷ "the good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if both be understood in the same class. But the good of one grace is greater than the good of nature of the whole universe."¹⁸

511. The apparent clash between the two series is quite great. For on the one hand it is said: "That which is the greatest good in the things that are caused [by God] is the good of the order of the universe." But on the other hand we read equally: "In created things nothing can be greater than the salvation of a rational creature." Again, on the one side: ". . . He wants man to be for this reason, so that there may be a completion of the universe," and, "the good of the universe is the reason why God wills each particular good in the universe." But on the other side we read: ". . . the good of the universe is not the ultimate

end of man, but God Himself [is]," and "There is providence even for *individual men* for their *own sake*."

How can we account for such a discrepancy? There are chiefly two factors: (1) St. Thomas wrote under the influence of different sources, and did not make a synthesis of his teaching on this matter, (2) He had several distinctions in mind. We shall consider each of these items separately.

512. St. Thomas' sources: Chiefly two sources underlie his statements. He was influenced by the *teaching of Aristotle*, especially in *Metaphysics XII*, and by *Christian teaching on the finality of man*. (In addition, in some passages he was replying to various errors: in reading such passages it is always necessary to keep in mind the nature of the errors he was refuting. We shall take up these passages separately in the replies to objections).

1) *The influence of Aristotle*: This influence is very evident, e.g., in CG 1.70 he cites the very passage of Aristotle: ". . . the good of the order of the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, since the individual parts are ordered to the good of the order that is in the whole, as to [their] end, as is evident from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics XII*." In general, most texts of the first series were written under Aristotelian influence. Now Aristotle was completely ignorant of Christian finality. Further, he not only did not know, but even explicitly denied the possibility of love between God and men, saying¹⁹ that if one is very remote, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases.

However, since the Aristotelian expressions do not precisely deny the true end of man, but merely pass it by, St. Thomas was able to use such forms of expression in some passages, and to explain his meaning more fully in other passages. As we shall soon see, he did this. Further, as we shall also see, even in Aristotle himself he found a very useful point for reconciling the above mentioned texts with Christian finality.²⁰

2) *The influence of the general Christian doctrine on the finality of man*: In the second series we find many texts written under this influence. We shall see later how to reconcile them with the first series. But first, we need to see some very important distinctions that often underlie the words of St. Thomas, and sometimes are made explicit.

513. St. Thomas' distinctions:

1) *The class of good*: St. Thomas explains this first distinction as follows:²¹ ". . . the good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if both be understood in the same class. But the good of one grace is greater than the good of nature of the whole universe."

In what class does the order of the universe belong? In some texts, St. Thomas seems to consider it as a "good of nature." E.g., he speaks of the perfection of the order, which,²² "consists in the essential parts of the universe and the various species." In the same sense he also says:²³ "The universe, supposing [that] these things [are its

components], cannot be better, because of the most fitting order attributed to these things by God, *in which the good of the universe consists*. If one of these were better, the proportion of the order would be corrupted, just as if one string were made too long, the melody of the cithara would be corrupted." Similarly:²⁴ "The arrangement of natural beings is the best it can be. And we see this in each individual, that each is of the best arrangement in its own nature. Hence all the more we must judge this of the whole universe."

Of course, it is evident that the universe contains not only perfections of the *physical* kind, but also *moral* perfections, which represents the various aspects of the perfection of God Himself. St. Thomas does not deny this: he merely prescind from this fact, in the texts just cited, and in many others in which he describes the perfection which "consists in the essential parts of the universe and the various species."

From this we gather an important point: *We must always note in what way and sense St. Thomas is speaking, lest someone wish to apply to moral matters and to salvation, passages in which St. Thomas is prescinding from them.*

514. 2) *The first and the ultimate perfections:* St. Thomas also distinguishes between²⁵ "the first perfection of the universe, which consists in the essential parts of the universe and the various species," and "the ultimate . . . perfection, which will [come] from the consummation of the order of the blessed." So in some texts he is speaking about the first perfection; but in others, he is speaking of the ultimate perfection.

a) The first perfection is of a physical and static kind, and consists in the order and the degrees of physical perfection in various beings, among which are men and angels. The description of this order prescind from moral perfections, as we have seen. All grades of perfection are found. If, among the varied beings even one were more perfect in the physical order,²⁶ "the proportion of the order would be corrupted; just as if one string were made too long, the melody of the cithara would be corrupted." Hence St. Thomas also says:²⁷ "At its beginning, the universe was perfect in regard to the species."²⁸

Therefore, in referring to this first perfection, St. Thomas can say, without denying Christian finality that God²⁹ ". . . wants man to be for this reason: so that there may be a completion of the universe," and also³⁰ ". . . the good of the order of the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, since the individual parts are ordered to the good of the order that is in the whole, as to [their] end, as is evident from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics XII*."

b) The ultimate perfection is of both a physical and a moral kind:³¹ "The ultimate perfection, which is the end of the whole

universe, is the *perfect beatitude* of the Saints, which will be at the consummation of the world. But the first perfection, which is in the integrity of the universe, was in the first institution of things."

Therefore, although he had said that God wanted man "so that there may be a completion of the universe", as if he were a mere part of a giant mechanism, and although he had said that "the individual parts [not excluding man] are ordered to the good of the order that is in the whole," nevertheless, making the distinction between the first perfection and the ultimate perfection, he can say, referring to the ultimate perfection:³²

"individual creatures are for the perfection of the whole universe [in the first perfection]. But further, the whole universe, with its individual parts, is ordered to God as to the end in as much as in them, through a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented . . . although rational creatures *above this* have God in a special way as their end whom they can attain in their operation, knowing and loving." For:³³ "Only an intellectual creature attains to the very ultimate end of the universe, in its operation, namely, in knowing and loving God." And even:³⁴ "This is the most perfect way of attaining the divine likeness, namely, that we know Him in that way in which He knows Himself. . . ." Therefore:³⁵ "This [likeness] includes all other [likenesses] ."

515. 3) *Extensive and diffusive, or intensive and collective likeness:* St. Thomas also adds another distinction:³⁶ "The universe is more perfect in goodness than an intellectual creature extensively and diffusively. But intensively and collectively, the likeness of divine perfection is found more in an intellectual creature, which is capable of the supreme good." Elsewhere, St. Thomas himself explains this distinction:³⁷ "A thing can be said to be greater in two ways. In one way, intensively, e.g., whiteness is greater which is more intense. . . . In the other way, something is greater extensively, e.g., whiteness is said to be greater which is over a greater area."

516. Synthesis: With the help of these distinctions, it is not difficult to construct a synthesis in such a way that all texts of both series will find fitting places. But before going ahead, we need to recall that the order of the universe comes under the purpose of creation, that is, the order of the universe is a representation of the perfections of God, which is ordered to the glory of God. Now³⁸ ". . . glory is nothing but clear knowledge, with praise. . . ." But there will be no praise unless the representation is intelligible, so that there may be clear knowledge. Further, the representation needs to be intelligible precisely in that way in which it will be most apt to be understood by those who are to praise.

517. Therefore, in the first perfection of the universe, in order that the representation might be intelligible to men³⁹ ". . . [God] produced many

and diverse creatures, because [the perfections of God] could not be sufficiently represented through one creature." So, to effectively teach men about God, there was need of an extensive and diffusive representation, for at the time of the first perfection, men can know God only⁴⁰ "through a mirror in an obscure manner," as St. Paul says. That is, they do not yet directly see God as He is in Himself, but instead, learn of His varied perfections through many varied creatures. In learning about God, men are not only able to glorify Him more, but they also become more like to Him, for as we have seen,⁴¹ God has decreed that His glory and the good of man be inseparable. This process in turn prepares the way for a greater glorification of God and a greater likeness to God in men in the ultimate perfection in which⁴² "the intellectual creature is most greatly assimilated to God" in the likeness which⁴³ "includes all other [likenesses]", from which will come greater external glory of God.

In the first perfection that intensive likeness which⁴⁴ "is found more in an intellectual creature, which is capable of the supreme good" is not yet full and perfect. Therefore, this likeness is to be perfected and supplied in the ultimate perfection.

518. The ultimate perfection of the universe⁴⁵ "which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints, which will be at the consummation of the world." As we have said, in this ultimate perfection, the deficiency in the intensive and collective representation which is not yet perfect in the first perfection of the universe, will be made up. It will be made up or supplied in the following way.

In the ultimate perfection, there will again be present a manifestation of all the perfections of God, and again, it will be present in such a way that the creatures that are to praise may understand in the best way. In the first perfection of the universe, the extensive and diffusive representation was strictly necessary, since then creatures understood God only through the mirror of creatures. But in the ultimate perfection, there will be a *twofold* manifestation, namely: an uncreated manifestation, and a created likeness.

There will be an *uncreated manifestation*, for the blessed will no longer see through the mirror of creatures, but will see God directly as He is, without any created image. Really, no image or created representation would be adequate to perfectly manifest and represent God. But in the beatific vision as St. Thomas says, since⁴⁶ "by whatsoever other form our intellect would be informed, it could not be led by [that form] into [adequate knowledge of] the divine essence . . . the divine essence will be related to the intellect as form to matter!"⁴⁷ In other words, the divine essence itself will perform the function of the image, since no image could suffice. It is obvious that a more perfect manifestation could not be conceived.

519. But there is also another respect in which this uncreated manifestation is most perfect. For in this vision not only are all the

perfections of God seen, but they are seen *precisely in the way in which they are in God*. This is true not only in as much as they are seen without the use of any created image as intermediary, but because the very unity of the divine perfections is most perfectly shown. For, within the divine essence, there is no real distinction between the various perfections, but only some logical distinctions. So the perfections that seem to us almost opposed are really so united that there is no real distinction between them. Mercy and justice seem to us especially opposed, but in beatitude, God manifests and exercises simultaneously, in one and the same act, both mercy and justice: mercy, in as much as mercy is the foundation of the whole process of creation, redemption, and grant of grace; justice, in as much as God has freely decreed that men should merit (in the order of execution) their beatitude, so that the beatitude itself is a⁴⁸ "crown of justice." Hence, in beatitude, all perfections are manifested in the most perfect way, because they are manifested not only in their specific nature, but even *according to the very mode in which they are in God*.

520. It is obvious how far this manifestation surpasses every representation made in a diffusive and extensive way. For a diffusive and extensive representation is made through creatures: this manifestation is made without any created image, because the divine essence itself takes the place of an image. A diffusive and extensive representation is inaccurate in that it shows the perfections as if they were not only really distinct, but even in regard to some, as if they were almost opposites; but this manifestation through the beatific vision shows all perfections precisely according to the way in which they really are in God.

521. There is also the most perfect *created representation*, since the blessed creature itself becomes so like to God that a greater created likeness of the divine perfections is inconceivable. As St. John the Apostle says:⁴⁹ "We shall be like to him, for we shall see him just as he is." St. Thomas explains this well:⁵⁰ ". . . in *De anima* III it is said that the soul is in a certain way all things, because it is born to know all things. And in this way it is possible that *in one thing, the perfection of the whole universe should exist*." That is:⁵¹ ". . . each and every intellectual substance is in a certain way all things, in as much as it can comprehend all being in its intellect. . . ." Now in the vision of God, it really does take in all things, for all things are contained in that vision. Hence⁵² ". . . this [likeness] includes all other [likenesses]," because⁵³ "in one thing [the blessed soul] the perfection of the whole universe . . . exist[s]." Now these things are true in regard to the likeness by way of the intellect. The situation is similar in regard to the will. For everyone who loves, becomes like the one he loves. Therefore, since the blessed man is joined in most intimate love to the Supreme Good, in this way he becomes also most like to the Supreme Good.

Therefore in both ways, both in regard to the intellect and in regard to the will, the greatest and most perfect created representation of the Supreme Good will be the blessed one. We can recall too, that inasmuch as his very blessedness is an effect of both mercy and justice simultaneously, he most perfectly represents these attributes as they are in God, instead of representing them as if they were not only really distinct but opposed (as happens in an extensive and diffusive representation). Further, this representation through the blessed soul is such as to be most intelligible to those who will praise God, namely, the other blessed.

St. Thomas is quite right, then, in saying:⁵⁴ ". . . as far as its most noble participations are concerned, the likeness of the divine goodness results in the universe only by reason of its most noble parts, which are intellectual natures: *neither, in itself, can that be said of the whole . . . which does not belong to it by reason of all [its] parts . . . and so the universe cannot be called the image of God, but the intellectual nature [can].*" For:⁵⁵ "Only an intellectual creature attains to the very ultimate end of the universe, in its operation, namely, in knowing and loving God; but the other creatures cannot attain to the ultimate end except through *some sort of* participation in this similitude. . . ."

522. At the same time, the extensive and diffusive representation that was had in the first perfection⁵⁶ "which is in the integrity of the universe" by which⁵⁷ "at its beginning the universe was perfect in regard to the species,"-this extensive and diffusive representation will be present in the ultimate perfection, in a better way. For in the ultimate perfection, the whole world will be cleansed and liberated,⁵⁸ "because creation itself also will be delivered from its slavery to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the sons of God."

Further, there will be an extensive and diffusive representation in the very order of the blessed. For, even though the condition according to which God decides to reprobate or save is found in individuals, yet all the blessed are saved not precisely as independent individuals, but as members of the Mystical Body of Christ, who attain salvation in as much as they belong to that Head and are conformed to Him. And, just as in other bodies, there will be a diversity, in two respects:

1) According to the varied function that each has fulfilled in the external economy, while he was on the way to beatitude, e.g., the glory of apostles will be different from that of doctors, and from that of martyrs, and from that of confessors, etc.

2) According to diversities in the internal economy:

a) In the degree of sanctity that each attained.

b) In the kinds of virtues that each cultivated more specially. For even though all Saints must have all virtues, yet, some have specialized, as it were, in certain virtues, e.g. St. Francis of Assisi

specially loved poverty, St. Thomas, sacred knowledge, St. Francis de Sales, mildness, etc.

523. The "necessity" of reprobates for the order of the universe: Some Thomists say that it is necessary that God should desert some, so that He may have some to punish, so that He may manifest vindicative justice. Above, in chapters 3 and 5,⁵⁹ we showed from revelation and from the teaching of St. Thomas that God does not reprobate for the sake of the order of the universe. These proofs are entirely valid in themselves, and suffice abundantly without the need of further explanations. However, it will still be worthwhile to show how the same conclusion follows also from our synthesis of the texts of St. Thomas.

524. But first it is good to recall that these Thomists are using the word "necessary" only in the sense of an hypothetical necessity. They do not deny this. That is, they mean that reprobates are required in the hypothesis that God wills to manifest justice; and they suppose that it cannot be fully manifested unless God shows that He is just by inflicting eternal punishment. But actually, even if we suppose that God wills to manifest Himself fully, not all forms of manifestation will be necessary. For as St. Thomas says:⁶⁰ "Since the divine goodness is infinite, there is an infinite [variety and number of] ways of participating in it. . . . So, if, from the very fact that He wills His own goodness, He had to will [every different creature] that [could] participate in it, He would have to will an infinite [number and variety] of creatures, participating in His goodness in an infinite [variety] of ways. This is obviously false." Therefore, not all forms of representation are necessary: if they were, we would have to say that the institution of the supernatural order would be necessary, so that God could manifest Himself *directly*. So these Thomists need to prove not only that a special manifestation of vindicative justice is necessary but also that it must be had through eternal reprobation, and further, through reprobation before foreseen demerits. But they have not proved these things.

525. To return to the question, we need to inquire what God will prefer: (1) That representation of justice which can be had from the damnation of a certain man, e.g., of Mark, who is totally incapable of "distinguishing himself" in regard to reprobation; and, along with this, the clear knowledge with praise that would come from other creatures because of such a reprobation; or (2) The representation of justice as it is in itself that would be had in Mark if he is saved (for then he would be like to God in the likeness which "includes all other [likenesses]", a likeness which represents justice as it really is within the divine essence, instead of representing it as if it were opposed to mercy) and, along with this representation, the praises of other rational creatures because of this, and the praises of Mark himself.

526. To decide this question, we need to compare three things: the manifestation itself, the clear knowledge coming from it, and the resultant praises, which would come from the reprobation of Mark, with the same three things as they would come from the salvation of Mark. These three are called the glory of God, or, more accurately, the created representation is called objective glory, and the clear knowledge with praise is called formal glory. The objective glory is ordered to the formal glory, so much so that St. Thomas himself preferred to say simply, as we have seen, that "glory is nothing but clear knowledge with praise."

For the sake of clarity, we shall consider each of the three separately.

527. 1) *The created representation itself:*

a) *From the reprobation of Mark:* There would be a diffusive and extensive representation of vindicative justice. This representation truly shows the vindicative justice of God (this is true *outside* the system of the older Thomists. For within their system, as we have already shown,⁶¹ God Himself would be the author of sin). But it shows justice as if it were not only really distinct from mercy, but as if it were practically opposed to mercy. Inasmuch as it does this, the representation is imperfect, almost distorted, because within the divine essence, justice and mercy are not really distinct, nor are they opposite.⁶² But we must not forget that Mark is not alone: For the older Thomists, in general, hold that God reprobates the greater part of the human race. Therefore, the representation will be still more imperfect, because it will make it seem that vindicative justice is a greater virtue in God than mercy, while actually, mercy is the greatest virtue in Him. As St. Thomas says:⁶³ "In itself indeed, mercy is the greatest. . . . Hence it is said that to have mercy is proper to God; and in this His omnipotence is said to be most greatly manifested."

b) *From the salvation of Mark:* There would be a twofold manifestation of divine justice, namely, the *uncreated manifestation*, in the beatific vision, in which the divine essence itself is manifested and justice itself is shown as it is in that essence, without any created image as intermediary; and the *created manifestation* in Mark himself is that ultimate perfection in which⁶⁴ "the intellectual creature is most greatly assimilated to God" in that likeness which⁶⁵ "includes all other [likenesses]," because⁶⁶ "in one thing [the blessed soul] the perfection of the whole universe [can] exist," to such an extent that it is true to say that⁶⁷ "the universe cannot be called the image of God, but the intellectual nature [can]." For the ultimate perfection of the universe,⁶⁸ "which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints." In this created likeness, mercy and justice are represented not as though they were opposite or

really distinct, but precisely as they really are in God, because, as we have said above,⁶⁹ Mark himself is an example of the fusion of mercy and justice, because his salvation is an exercise of mercy and justice, simultaneously, in one and the same act. The older Thomists want to say that the representation through reprobation is imperfect only in one respect, and that it is necessary to have an extensive and diffusive⁷⁰ representation so that the representation may be perfect. But even though the representation by reprobation would be imperfect only in one respect, the representation that is imperfect in no respect is better: it manifests mercy and justice in the manner in which they really are in God, in that likeness which "includes all other [likenesses]." For justice in itself is really the virtue by which there is present a *disposition* to render to each his own. If it is manifested that God is just, and that He renders to each his own, by that very fact it is manifested that He is disposed to render penalty if anyone earns penalty. But justice in itself would still be most fully justice and could be fully known, even if no one sinned, so that there would never be an exercise of punishment. Furthermore, if the glory of God absolutely required to be able to exercise a penalty, then sin itself would be necessary, for it would be a condition *sine qua non* for manifesting or for exercising justice, so that *the glory of God would depend on sin!* And-even though one would say that God merely permits sin-nevertheless, in desiring such glory absolutely, before the decision of a creature to sin, God would not be able not to desire the sin itself implicitly, in as much as such glory would be entirely impossible without sin. (For it is one thing to rejoice in a good effect that happens to come through an evil, *after* the evil has come in a way quite independent of him who rejoices-quite a different thing to desire this good effect *in advance* when it is impossible to have it unless sin precedes. He who desires the end, must implicitly desire the means. Nor could the difficulty be avoided by saying that sin is not strictly a *means* to glory: at least it would be a prerequisite *conditio sine qua non*. Nor could God, as it were, say: "Men are going to sin anyway: so I will permit sin for my glory"-Because in the older Thomists' system, it is not true that men would sin "anyway."-it is only through an infallible permission from God that they will sin. In fact, God would have to have the same attitude as the ridiculous person in the comic opera, "The Mikado," in which Koko, who is the Lord High Executioner, most fervently hopes that someone will commit a capital crime so that he, Koko, can show his skill in beheading men.

528. 2) *The clear knowledge:* We must distinguish between the knowledge that could be had in this life, and that which will be in the future life.

a) *In this life:* Those men who have Holy Scripture, can learn about the justice of God both from the penalties that God gave visibly to men in ancient times, and from the threats of eternal punishment that God expresses in Scripture. We must notice that in this life, men do not perceive the execution of eternal punishment, but only the threats of it. So in this life, the knowledge of God's justice would not be any clearer from the execution of that penalty than from the threats. Hence, as far as the clear knowledge in the present life goes, it is not necessary that there be reprobates, for, as we have seen, the knowledge will not be less if God merely makes sincere threats, but has no one on whom to carry them out, than if God actually has some to punish eternally. In this life we could not perceive the difference. Out of those who do not have Sacred Scripture, some also know that God punishes in the future life, but others do not know of future retribution. Some see that God sometimes punishes visibly in this life. For all of these, the outcome will be the same as for those who do have Sacred Scripture. The actual execution of eternal punishment would not be perceived anyway, and so would not make their knowledge of His justice clearer.

b) *In the future life:*

1) *The reprobates themselves:* They have a clear knowledge of vindicative justice, but they hardly know the other virtues of God, for they know Him only in a distorted way. They hate Him.

2) *The blessed:* They have clear knowledge of all the virtues of God. They have this both from the uncreated manifestation (the beatific vision) and from the likeness or created representation that shines forth in each and every one of the blessed, for as we have seen, they themselves are that representation or likeness which "includes all other [likenesses]." Would their knowledge of God's justice be less if they did not see that some men had actually, in spite of the graces and threats of God, come to eternal punishment? Not at all. For the knowledge that they have of God both from the vision of the divine essence and from the created likeness in the blessed is so clear that no created image-especially, not the imperfect image provided by the damned-could make it clearer.

529. 3) *The praise of God:*

a) *In this life:* Because the knowledge of God's justice would not be clearer in this life from the execution of the punishment than from the threats, it is evident that the praise of God would not be

greater from the execution of the punishment than from the threats. Therefore, even if no one actually were reprobated, the glory and praise of God given by men in this life would not be less.

b) *In the future life:*

1) *The reprobates:* Not only do they not praise God more because there are reprobates: they do not praise Him at all. Instead, in most bitter and distorted hatred they loathe Him, and for endless ages they will always curse Him in the same way.

2) *The blessed:* They do not praise God more because there actually are reprobates than they would otherwise praise Him. For, on the one hand, the blessed praise God as much as they are able to praise; on the other hand, the exterior act of a virtue is not more praiseworthy than the disposition or internal intention, since the exterior act does not increase the merit or demerit that flows from the interior decision of the will. So the blessed would not have reason to praise God more from seeing the exterior act of vindicative justice than from merely seeing His disposition to exercise that act if needed.

530. Conclusion on the "necessity" of reprobates: We have considered the effect of the actual existence of reprobates in regard to the created representation, in regard to clear knowledge, and in regard to the praise of God. We have seen that the created representation of God's perfections does not become better through an imperfect image provided by the existence of reprobates, nor does the knowledge become clearer. But the praise of God is diminished, since the reprobates themselves not only do not praise God, but in bitter hatred curse Him, and always will curse Him.

So reprobates are not required for the glory of God—rather, the formal glory of God is diminished by their existence. And, if the older Thomists are right in saying that more are reprobated than saved (we do not agree with them in that), very much would be taken away from the formal glory of God by the reprobates.

But, even if someone would still wish to say that the created representation is better as a result of the actual punishment of the reprobate, certainly the increase in formal glory would be a better thing and of greater weight than a small improvement of a mere image. For the image is ordered to the formal glory, so much so that St. Thomas says simply:⁷¹ "glory is nothing but clear knowledge with praise." Hence we should not greatly prize an added image that would detract from formal glory. *And, most certainly, a representation which does not make knowledge clearer, but which instead makes praise and formal glory less can hardly be called NECESSARY. Furthermore, as we have seen,⁷² If God in an absolute way, before prevision of sin, desired*

glory that could not be had except through sin as a conditio sine qua non, He would implicitly desire sin.

We must add this: Really, what kind of glory would God receive if He were to reprobate men who were totally incapable of "distinguishing themselves" in regard to reprobation, and in regard to doing or not doing evil? The praise for such justice would not be great! And if we add that in the system of the older Thomists, God would be truly the author of sin⁷³- then God would receive no praise at all.

However, if someone still does not concede that the glory of God does not require reprobates, at least let him believe the many words of St. Thomas himself that we have cited not only in this appendix but in chapter 3, especially:⁷⁴ "There are certain evils such that if they did not exist, *the universe* would be more perfect . . . as is chiefly the case in moral faults," and similarly:⁷⁵ "In created things, *nothing* can be greater than the salvation of a rational creature," so that we must say⁷⁶ "the universe cannot be called the image of God, but the intellectual nature [can]" in that likeness which⁷⁷ "Includes all other [likenesses]."

Finally, it is not permitted not to believe divine revelation. As we saw in chapters 3 and 5,⁷⁸ it entirely excludes reprobation on account of the order of the universe.

531. Objection 1: St. Thomas says:⁷⁹ "There is . . . diversity and inequality in created things, not from chance, nor from diversity of matter, *nor because any causes or merits intervene, but properly from the divine intention* which wants to give to the creature such perfection as it is possible for it to have." He says explicitly that differences do not come from secondary causes or merits. Therefore, even in moral things, all differences are predetermined by God, without consideration of what creatures do.

Answer: The solution is very easy. In this passage, St. Thomas is giving a summary of his conclusions from the previous chapters, 39-44. In chapters 39-44 he is writing against some ancient errors. He teaches: Physical differences do not come from chance (chapter 39), nor from differences in the matter itself (chapter 40), nor from the acts of secondary causes (chapters 41-43), nor from merits and demerits *according to the theory of Origen* who said that all souls were once equal but that by sins *in a previous life* they merited to have various forms, in *this life*, so that some are angels, others are men, etc. Thus the context shows he is not speaking of moral differences in this life, but of physical differences coming from moral or other causes in a previous life.⁸⁰

532. Objection 2: St. Thomas explicitly says:⁸¹ "Now it is necessary that the divine goodness . . . be represented in a manifold way in things . . . various grades of things are needed. . . . God wishes, then, to represent His goodness by way of mercy, by sparing, in some men, whom He predestines; but by way of justice in others, by punishing.

And this is the reason why God chooses some, and reprobates others." Therefore, it is necessary that there be reprobates.

Answer: We have already given the answer in chapter 14.⁸² These words can be interpreted in three ways.

533. Objection 3: St. Thomas also says:⁸³ "Now the whole itself . . . is better and more perfect, if there are in it certain things that can fall away from good, which at times do fall away, since God does not impede this, both because 'it pertains to providence not to destroy, but to conserve nature' . . . but the nature of things is such that the things that can fail sometimes do fail; and because as Augustine says . . . 'God is so powerful that He can even bring good out of evils.' Hence many goods would be removed if God permitted no evil to be. For the life of the lion . . . would not be conserved if the ass were not killed; nor would the justice of the avenger and the patience of the sufferer be praised if there were no iniquity." Therefore, it is necessary to have reprobates.

Answer: In interpreting these words, it is necessary to employ several distinctions. Fortunately, St. Thomas himself supplies them all, in another passage in which he treats the same subject:⁸⁴ ". . . in regard to all evils in general, it is true that if [none of them] were permitted to be, *the universe* would be more imperfect, because there would not exist those natures that are such that they can fail-and if these were taken away, the universe would be more imperfect, for not all degrees of goodness would be present. But there are some evils that are such that if they did not exist, *the universe* would be more imperfect, namely, those evils upon which follow a greater perfection than the perfection that is taken away, such as [is the case with] the corruption of elements, which is followed by mixture and the nobler forms of mixed elements. *However there are certain evils such that if they did not exist, the universe would be more perfect* namely, those evils by which greater perfections are taken away than are acquired in another, as is chiefly the case in moral faults, which take from one grace and glory, and give to another the good of [seeming better by] comparison, or some characteristic of perfection [such that] *even without it, the ultimate perfection could be had*; just as one can come to eternal life without the act of patience in persecutions. Wherefore if no man had sinned, the whole human race would be better; because even though directly the salvation of one is occasioned by the fault of another, nevertheless, he could attain salvation without the fault [of the other]. Yet, neither the one nor the other [class of] evils, of themselves, make for the *perfection of the universe*: because they are not causes of perfections, but occasions."

So St. Thomas explicitly says that without sins-and therefore without reprobates-not only individuals would be better, but "*the universe* would be more perfect."

Why then does God still will to permit sins? Because He considers not only the perfections that one acquires on the occasion of another's sin, for "God is so powerful that He can even bring good out of evils," but also because He considers the good coming from the very existence of created freedom, which makes sins possible. God could impede all sins only by *always* using infrustrable graces. But that would be to withdraw autonomous freedom which, as we have shown, is natural to man.⁸⁵ God will not do that, for, as St. Thomas says in the passage cited in the objection: "it pertains to providence not to destroy but to conserve nature." Also, infrustrable graces are, as we have shown,⁸⁶ extraordinary by nature: it would be *contrary to good order* and contrary to Wisdom to make the extraordinary ordinary. Hence St. Thomas says elsewhere:⁸⁷ "The power of the divine incarnation is indeed sufficient for the salvation of all. The fact that some are not saved thereby comes from their indisposition, because they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the incarnation within themselves. . . . For freedom of will, by which he can adhere or not adhere to the incarnate God, was not to be taken away from man, lest the good of man be forced, and so be rendered meritless and unpraiseworthy."

So, it is true that "the whole itself . . . is better and more perfect, if there are in it certain things that can fall away from good"-that is, irrational creatures that are material and therefore are defectible (lack of them would remove many degrees of goodness); and rational creatures that are free, and can fail precisely because they are free. For the universe would be much more imperfect if it did not include rational free creatures.⁸⁸ On the *occasion* of sins-which God in no way wills, not even as occasions of virtue-certain virtues are exercised: There would be no occasion for the exercise of patience, if there were no iniquity.

534. Objection 4: St. Thomas explicitly teaches the necessity of reprobates, in these words:⁸⁹ "Another way [in which God is said to hate] is from the fact that God wills some greater good which would not exist without the privation of a lesser good. And so He is said to hate though this is rather to love. For thus, in as much as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe which cannot be without the punishment or the corruption of some, he is said to hate those whose punishment He wills, or [whose] corruption He wills. . . ."

Answer: St. Thomas is merely saying that which we saw above in the reply to the third objection. He mentions two things that God can will, namely, the good of justice and the good of the order of the universe. We need to notice that two means correspond, *respectively* to these two things. The two means are: punishment, and corruption. That is: The good of *justice* can require that God *punish*, if someone actually sins. But he does not say that it is required that God should desert some so as to have some to punish. And the good of the *order of the*

universe requires that there be *corruptible* beings: if they did not exist, many grades of ontological good would be missing, and the first perfection of the universe which⁹⁰ "consists in the essential parts of the universe and the various species," would be impossible. So it does not follow from this text that St. Thomas thinks God deserts some so as to be able to punish. Furthermore, if St. Thomas did mean this, he would contradict the many other passages that we have seen from him. And, as we have seen,⁹¹ such a desire would necessarily include an implicit desire of sin itself.⁹²

535. Objection 5: God does all things for His own glory. Therefore, He permits sins for His glory, so as to have glory from vindicative justice.

Answer: The first and most fundamental permission to sin is not decreed directly and in itself, but merely follows inevitably from the gift of autonomous freedom.⁹³ That is, God made man for His glory. The decision to make man necessarily entailed and implied the gift of autonomous liberty, because without it, a man would not be a man. Once this freedom is given, man has permission to sin, and he can even resist grace, unless God should send an infrustrable grace. But God would contradict Himself if He sent infrustrable graces *regularly*, as we have seen.⁹⁴ For an infrustrable grace is by nature extraordinary. There is also another, secondary way in which God can be said to permit sin: If he does not impede sin through other creatures, especially, through men in authority. But even in this way, God often will not be able to impede sin *within good order*, i.e., without contradicting Himself. This occurs either because the men who could impede do not will to do so (unless, of course, God moves them infrustrably, which is extraordinary); or because these men cannot impede. But even when God can, within good order, impede sin through other men, He sometimes decrees not to impede. He does this not to gain glory by punishing, but lest a graver sin be committed.⁹⁵ Therefore, the permission to sin is not given to gain glory through the manifestation of justice in punishing. If it were, then, as we have already shown,⁹⁶ God would necessarily implicitly desire sin itself.

END NOTES

1 On the sense of the word "necessity" cf. §§ 34, 524.

2 CG 3.64.

3 ST I 22.4.

4 CG 1.86.

5 CG 1.86.

6 CG 1.70.

7 ST I 48.2.c.

8 ST I 48.2 ad 3.

9 CG 3.64. Cf. also ST I. 49.2; CG 1.70; 2.42; 3. 64; De substantiis separatis 10.

10 CG 4.55.

11 ST I-II 2.8 ad 2.

- 12 De caritate 7 ad 5.
- 13 ST I 65.2.c.
- 14 CG 3.111.
- 15 Compendium theologiae 106.
- 16 CG 3.25.
- 17 De veritate 5.6.
- 18 ST I-II 113.9. ad. 2.
- 19 Eth. Nich. 8.7.4. 1159a.
- 20 Cf. the citation given below (§ 521 and note 50) from De veritate 2.2.c.
- 21 ST I-II 113.9. ad 2.
- 22 De potentia 5.5 ad 13.
- 23 ST I 25.6 ad 3.
- 24 In XII Metaph. 12.12 § 2662.
- 25 De potentia 5.5 ad 13.
- 26 ST I 25.6 ad 3.
- 27 De potentia 3.10 ad 2.
- 28 Modern science by the theory of evolution raises a question about this perfection as to species in the beginning. However, St. Thomas could not know these things because of the weakness of natural science in his time. Hence he also said (Quodlibet VI. q. 11): ". . . if the empyrean heaven did not affect the lower bodies, the empyrean heaven would not be contained within the unity of the universe: and this is unsuitable."
- 29 Note in Context:
Cf. note 4 above.
- 30 Note in Context:
Cf. note 6 above.
- 31 Note in Context:
ST I 73.1.c.
- 32 Cf. note 13 above.
- 33 Cf. note 14 above.
- 34 Cf. n. 15 above.
- 35 Cf. n. 16 above.
- 36 ST I 93.2 ad 3.
- 37 ST III 1.4.c.
- 38 ST I-II 2.3.c. Cf. § 526.
- 39 ST I 47.1.c.
- 40 1 Cor 13:12.
- 41 In chapter 3. Cf. ST I 47.1.c.
- 42 CG 3.25.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Cf. note 36 above.
- 45 ST I 73.1.
- 46 ST Suppl. 92.1.c.

47 Cf. *ibid*: "This, indeed, should not be understood as though the divine essence were the true form of our intellect . . . but because the proportion of the divine essence to our intellect is like the proportion of form to matter."

48 2 Tm 4:8.

49 1 Jn 3:2.

50 De veritate 2.2.c.

51 CG 3.112.

52 CG 3.25.

53 De veritate 2.2.c.

54 2 Sent. d. 16, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3.

55 CG 3.111.

56 ST I.73.1.

57 De potentia 3.10 ad 2.

58 Rom 8:21.

59 Cf. §§ 32-35, 39 and 55.2.

60 CG 1.81.

61 §§ 310-321.

62 Cf. § 506.

63 ST II-II 30.4.c.

64 CG 3.25.

65 *Ibid.* and De veritate 2.2.c.

66 Cf. note 53 above.

67 Cf. note 54 above.

68 Cf. note 31 above.

69 Cf. §§ 519, 521.

70 Cf. §§ 514.a and 517. Some Thomists cite texts of St. Thomas that refer to the first perfection of the universe and forget that he is speaking of this first perfection. As a result, they think they have proved the necessity of reprobates.

71 Cf. note 38 above.

72 § 527.

73 §§ 310-322.

74 1 Sent. d. 46, q 1, a. 3 ad 6.

75 Cf. note 10 above

76 Cf. note 54 above

77 Cf. note 16 above

78 Cf. §§ 32-34 and 55.2.

79 CG 2.45.

80 A similar explanation holds for De potentia 3.1 ad 9 and ST I.15.2.

81 ST I. 23. 5 ad 3.

82 Cf. §§ 237-239 and 215.

83 ST I 48.2 ad 3.

84 Cf. note 74 above.

85 Cf. § 120.

86 §§ 118 and 120-122.

87 CG 4.55. Cf. the explanation of this passage, in § 121 above.

88 Cf. 1 Sent. d. 44, q. 1, a. 2.

89 CG 1.96.

90 Cf. note 25 above.

91 § 527.

92 Cf. the reply to objection 3 above and also § 304.

93 Cf. § 120.

94 § 120.

95 Cf. § 324.

96 § 527.

"Appendix II: The universal salvific will and subjective redemption"

Now that we have discussed the central issues of our topic, it will be helpful to examine some of the ways in which God's universal salvific will works itself out in the subjective redemption of individual men. First, we will answer Objection 5 from Chapter 5, on the plight of the pagans. Then we will examine some of the ways which individual culpability for sin can be reduced.

I. If God really wants all men to be saved, what are we to say of the salvation of so many pagans?

535a. As we said in the reply to objection 4 of Chapter 5, we must not forget again that even if we had no reply, we would not be permitted to deny the sincerity or force of the salvific will. For that is revealed. Actually, we can see a large part of the solution to the problem.

First of all, we know that even to these pagans God sends down "a rich abundance of graces" as we saw from the words of Pius XII.¹ And we can add the words of Pius XI on precisely the pagan situation:² "May the most holy Queen of the Apostles, Mary, kindly smile on and favour our common undertakings, who, since all men were entrusted to her motherly soul, on Calvary, does not cherish and love less those who do not know they have been redeemed by Christ Jesus, than those who happily enjoy the benefits of the redemption." Pope Pius XII spoke similarly of the care of Mary for all men:³ "She does not cease to pour out over all the peoples of the earth and over all social classes, the abundance of her graces." Likewise, the words of the Gospel, cited above,⁴ apply also to pagans, namely, that all the hairs of their heads are numbered, and similar other statements.

But let us consider the problem in more detail. There are three categories of minimum requirements for salvation: (1) At least a minimum faith,⁵ (2) Some connection with the Church, (3) Observance of the moral law, insofar as one knows it. We shall see that the second requirement will be fulfilled if the first and third are.

536. The more difficult question is to know how the pagans can have the needed minimum of faith. Many good conjectures have been made which it would be long to review. However, we do have official teaching of two Popes which sheds much light on the matter. St. Pius V

condemned the following error of Baius:⁶ "Merely negative lack of faith in men to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin." And, much more clearly in the words of Pius IX:⁷ "... God ... in His supreme goodness and clemency, by no means allows anyone to be punished with eternal punishment who does not have the guilt of voluntary fault." Similarly, Vatican II tells us: "They who without their own fault do not know of the Gospel of Christ and His Church, but yet seek God with sincere heart, and try, under the influence of grace, to carry out His will in practice, known to them through the dictate of conscience, can attain eternal salvation."⁸ So, from official teaching, it is clear that if any pagan observes the moral law, so far as he knows it, God will certainly not permit that man to perish. Therefore, God certainly will provide the means of faith.

537. Membership in the Church: In his encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi*, Pope Pius XII wrote (MC 103: AAS 35.243) that no one can be saved unless he is joined to the Catholic Church at least by an implicit wish or desire. It is appropriate to speculate as to how this can take place.

Pope John Paul II, in his Encyclical on Missions #10 said: "Since salvation is offered to all, it must be made concretely available to all. . . . Many do not have an opportunity to come to know or accept the Gospel or to enter the Church. . . . For such people salvation in Christ is accessible by virtue of a grace which, while having a mysterious relationship to the Church, does not make them *formally* members of the Church." We emphasize the word *formally*, since it implies that some lesser kind of membership, we might call it substantial, can suffice.

We can try to fill in on what these documents imply even though they do not speak explicitly. St. Justin the Martyr, writing c. 145, writes in his *Apology*⁹ that some in the past who were thought to be atheists, were really Christians, since they followed the divine Logos, the Word. He adds¹⁰ that the Logos is in each person. Now a spirit is present where it causes an effect. St. Paul tells us what this effect is:¹¹ "The gentiles who do have the law, do by nature the things of the law. They show the work of the law written on their hearts." And according to their response, they are saved, or not.

It is the Spirit of Christ (or of God, or the Holy Spirit-all are the same) who writes the law, that is, makes known to them interiorly what morality requires. Justin had said that Socrates was one who did this. So Socrates (1) read what the Spirit wrote on his heart and believed it. (2) He had confidence in it. (3) He obeyed, carrying out the "obedience of faith" of which St. Paul speaks.¹² Now those three things are a definition of faith as St. Paul means it. So Socrates was justified by faith. We add: St. Paul also says¹³ that if one has and follows the Spirit of Christ, he *belongs to Christ*. But that phrase means to be a member

of Christ, which means to be a member of the Church, His Mystical Body. So Socrates did have a substantial, not a formal membership.¹⁴ Origen¹⁵ went even further: "Since God wants grace to abound . . . He is present not to the [pagan] sacrifices, but to the one who comes to meet Him, and there He gives His Word.¹⁶" According to this text, God does not use pagan false worship as a means of salvation, but He can and gladly does use the good will found in those who in ignorance try to worship Him in such ways.

So we conclude that although those who are not baptized are at least not *formal* members of the Church, still they can still belong to Her in some lesser degree, by receiving the Spirit of Christ.

538. What if a person who is justified by faith in this way later commits a mortal sin? Of course, perfect contrition will clear it. But we may *speculate* that there is a different way of doing it. In Ezekiel 18.21 God says: "If a wicked man turns from all his sins . . . and keeps all my statutes and does what is lawful and right, he shall surely live." No perfect contrition is addressed to God who is goodness itself; but the change of heart in the wicked man, of which Ezekiel speaks, is addressed to God's justice: the man sees what he has done is wrong, resolves to do it no more. But just as God is identified with love, so also He is identified with His other attributes, including justice. Hence we may speculate that this will explain what Ezekiel says, that a person might recover the state of grace in that way. Such is God's goodness, who wants all to reach eternal happiness, and gladly accepts whatever good will He finds.

The fact of God's love is certain; it is only the how that remains unclear. But it is not strictly necessary that we know the how: it is enough to know the fact.

539. It is helpful to note the following facts about the moral condition of pagans: They lack the ready external means of pardon that the Sacraments provide, but there is a certain compensation in that they have lesser difficulties in avoiding sin, in many ways:

1) Experimental anthropology has shown that pagans on the whole do know the moral law. However, there is partial ignorance, especially in the matter of fraternal charity, and in the matter of chastity. For they commonly feel bound to love their own tribe, people; nation etc., but they feel that far less is required of them towards outsiders. Again, in the matter of chastity, many do not know that purely internal violations against chastity, in thought and desire, are prohibited. As a result, if they indulge in these, they do not contract formal guilt. Similarly, many pagans do not know that solitary external sins are forbidden: again, they are free from a large danger of formal sin. Furthermore, in many primitive people, marriage takes place at an earlier age, so that many a danger is avoided. Besides, they often do not consider divorce or contraception wrong. So, they are free from some very great dangers

of formal sin, and precisely in the area in which so very many mortal sins are committed by those who know the moral law on these points.

2) It is also clear from anthropology that in many peoples, the relation between religion and morality is only partly known. That is, they think that violations of the moral code in many matters do not offend any god whatsoever. For example, the ancient Greeks and Romans¹⁷ thought they were offending Jupiter and were liable to be punished by him, if they did not honour the gods or their parents, if they did not take care of guests etc. But in the greater part of the moral law, they did not think they were offending any god if they did something against the moral code. In fact, Jupiter himself "the greatest and the best" was thought to like to commit adultery, and, according to their mythology he did much of it! So they did not think the gods were offended by or punished offences against chastity, thefts, lies, and even murders.¹⁸ They thought vaguely that in some way these things were prohibited. They said they were against "mores" or "ta ethe"-but these words basically mean merely customs. Did the Greeks and Romans perceive anything more than this? Did they perceive at least obscurely that these things were an offence against some greater God? At least, there is no evidence to show that they did. But even if they had some vague perception, at least, their sin would be proportionately reduced in gravity.

540. But we must add that such a vague perception would hardly suffice for mortal sin.¹⁹ For moral theology today recognizes the need of evaluative cognition. That is, it is not sufficient that a man be able to answer in reply to a question that this act is evil; but it is required that in some way he be able to perceive the true value of the action. Hence civil laws commonly provide that young children, before a certain age, are incapable of validly signing a contract. A child might be able, for example, to say "Yes, I do know that if I sign this sheet of paper, you will give me a new bicycle, and I will give you an apartment building." But, because a young child is incapable of rightly rating the values involved, the law invalidates his signature. Hence also the decision of the Sacred Roman Rota invalidating a marriage of a certain man who lacked the ability of evaluative cognition.²⁰

So we must ask: To what extent can the pagans, who see in many ethical violations no offence against any god whatsoever-to what extent can they contract formal moral guilt on such matters? It is difficult to judge, and best to leave the decision to the judgment of God. But at least we can say, in the light of these facts, that the case of the pagans proves nothing against the true force of the universal salvific will.

It is also useful to add the following observation of St. Thomas:²¹ ". . . angels and men love God more and more principally than themselves by a natural love. Otherwise, if naturally they loved themselves more than God, it would follow that the natural love would be perverse; and

then it [the natural love] would not be perfected by [supernatural] charity, but would be destroyed." But, grace perfects nature.

541. It is helpful to indulge in a bit of speculation on the providential distribution of places.

As a result of human frailty, it is inevitable that there be errors and heresies. For, even though the originators of such errors may have been in bad faith or culpable at least in some way, yet the later generations who are born into families holding that error, can easily be in good faith and completely inculpable. Similarly, many are born in pagan places, where there are no sacraments. God could obviate all these errors-but only by an immense multiplication of miracles. That would be contrary to Wisdom, for it would mean making the extraordinary ordinary. So, without such a multiplication, it is inevitable that many are born in places with few or no sacraments.

How does God distribute humans among the various types of places? Because God has not given us a full and explicit revelation of His plan in this regard, we must have recourse to speculation. But we can discover at least one way in which a most loving Father can wisely and lovingly provide for all His children. Perhaps God has a still better way than that we are about to suggest.

God is a most loving Father, a most powerful and wise Father. He can know what His children will do if He puts them in various types of places. He knows that, unless He were to multiply miracles to an immense extent, it is necessary to assign some to places with few or no sacraments. In other words, it is as if He viewed the whole world, throughout all centuries, as an immense checkerboard, containing places of various qualities. He wants to so assign His children to these positions as to save all who will not, of their own free will, block His generosity.

Perhaps He acts, in general, in this way:

1) He sees that there are some men who will persistently resist grace, no matter what the place in which He puts them. (We know from history that there are many who became very wicked even in the most favourable type of places, e.g., in some past centuries, even Popes and Bishops have been wicked-of course, we do not know if they were eternally lost). Probably God will place many of these in the less favourable places: in this way, the more favourable places will be left free for those who will not resist grace so persistently. Further, it is an act of mercy to assign a man to an unfavourable place if he would perish even in a more favourable place: for he is less culpable in the unfavourable place, since he has less opportunities.

2) God sees that others will not resist grace so persistently. There are chiefly two categories of these persons:

a) Some of these can be saved even in places with few or no sacraments. This does not happen because they are of themselves better, but because they, freely, will resist grace

less. (It is clear that there are such men, since history shows that many pagans and Protestants have been and are very good men). Probably God will put many of these in places with few or no sacraments so as to leave the more favourable places open for those who would perish without them. (We should recall also the compensations which, as we saw above,²² are to be found in the less favourable places).

b) Some can be saved only in places in which they will have all the sacraments, since they resist grace so much. Probably therefore God will assign many if not all of these to places in which they can be members of the Church in the full sense.

It does not follow, of course that all who are members of the Church in the full sense are such: for probably the number of favourable places available is greater than the number needed.

542. As we said, we have proposed the above distribution on a conjectural basis. Yet, the conjecture does follow closely every revealed fact. St. Paul says to the Corinthians, in regard to the call to the Church:²³ ". . . think on your own call, brethren; that there are not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble. But the foolish things of the world has God chosen to put to shame the 'wise,' and the weak things of the world has God chosen to put to shame the strong. . . ." Similarly, we know from Scripture itself that the ancient Hebrews, the chosen people, were so hard of heart that God said to Ezechiel:²⁴ "Not to a people with difficult speech and unknown language am I sending you, nor to many peoples whose words you cannot understand. If I were to send you to these, they would listen to you; but the house of Israel will not listen to you, since . . . the whole house of Israel is stubborn of brow and of obstinate heart." Again, the book of Jonah represents the Assyrians (the worst of people, to the Jewish mind) as quickly listening to the prophet-though the chosen people was normally recalcitrant to prophets.

Again, of the ten lepers healed in the Gospel, no one from the chosen people returned to give thanks, but only one Samaritan. Likewise, in the parable about the traveller who fell among robbers, all members of the chosen race who saw him passed by, and only a Samaritan had true charity towards his neighbour.

Furthermore, our entire conjecture comes down to this: God assigns places according to the needs of each one.

St. Thomas also seems to suppose that God acts according to such a principle. For he says that God became man, and did not become an angel, not because He loved human nature more, but because man was more needy:²⁵ "God did not assume human nature because He loved man absolutely more; but because he [man] was more needy, just as a good father of a family gives something very precious to a sick slave which he does not give to a healthy son."

In a similar way, St. Paul, in explaining by a comparison the assignment of functions within the Church, says:²⁶ ". . . those that we think the less honourable members of the body, we surround with more abundant honour, and our uncomely parts have a more abundant comeliness, whereas our comely parts have no need of it. But God has so tempered the body together as to give more abundant honour where it was lacking. . . ."

II. Reduction of culpability for sin.

543. Within the general framework explained in the course of this book, God in His marvelous Wisdom has found ways to make use of every possible opportunity to save souls. Many of these souls might seem to us beyond help. But His Wisdom knows how to say, in varying measures: "They know not what they do."

1) Somatic resonance.

The chemical makeup of a person's body can impede his ability to choose the good. To start with an extreme example, there are people called *sociopaths*, who seem almost unable to grasp any moral principles. Is there any hope for them? Definitely yes, in His marvelous plans to reduce responsibility in accord with variations in human conditions.

First of all, there is such a thing as *somatic resonance*-a term from modern psychology. Since man is a single substance composed of both material and spiritual principles, it follows that for a condition in a person's body, there should be a parallel condition, called a resonance, in the soul, and vice-versa. For example, a person in deep depression sometimes thinks he is losing or has lost his faith. But the bad chemistry of his disease can interfere with the biochemistry that should serve as the somatic resonance to his faith. This does not expel faith, but can keep it from functioning normally, so that the person thinks he has lost it or is losing it.²⁷

There are numerous applications of this principle. For instance, different conditions in the brain can serve as the somatic resonance to different conditions. For instance, Louis Gottschalk, a neuro-psychiatrist at U of C at Irvine took hair samples of 193 rapists, murderers, armed robbers and other violent criminals, as well as from normal persons. Results showed that "on the average violent criminals have almost five times more manganese in their hair."²⁸

Other test results have shown that men who had committed murder without clear premeditation had the lowest levels of the breakdown product of serotonin known as 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid, or 5-HIAA.²⁹ Again, PET scans of persons with autism showed that normal persons have a cooler anterior singulate compared to the active anterior singulate of the withdrawn person. The brain portions involved seem to be exhibiting` somatic resonance to the mental conditions.³⁰ And there are numerous other instances.³¹

These things do not deny free will. But they show that a person may be much inclined in an unfortunate direction by abnormal chemistry. God who so greatly wills all to be saved, surely makes full allowance for these things.

2) *Culpable ignorance.*

Furthermore, there are *two marvelous spiral processes* or patterns that show how God's mercy and justice can be identified in practice in these processes. The bad spiral appears when a soul sins much over a period of time. It grows less and less able to perceive spiritual truths. Suppose we think of a man who has never been drunk before, but tonight he becomes very drunk. The next morning he will have guilt feelings-for this was the first time. There will be a clash between his beliefs and his actions. Something will give in time. If he continues getting drunk, his beliefs will be pulled to match his actions, so that a confirmed drunk can hardly understand there is anything wrong with it. Further moral truths may be dimmed in this way.

Now we can see *both mercy and justice* here. The fact that the man is losing light is justice, he has earned that. But at the same time, what he does not understand *at the time of acting* can lower his culpability. He may lose even the ability to see some doctrinal truths. Yes, there is a *responsibility taken on at the start of the decline*, when and if the person sees himself declining, and consents to it. But at the later times of acting, responsibility may be diminished.

The good spiral takes place when a person leading an upright life gradually comes to a greater and greater knowledge of the good, and thus can progress even farther towards God.

3) *Preconceived ideas or mental frameworks.*

We should notice also the reduced responsibility that comes from the fact that people may have mental frameworks, sets of ideas already in their minds. It can be very difficult for a person to accept as true something that does not fit with their established mental framework.

For example, Galen, a second century Greek anatomist, wrote a description of all parts of the body without having fully dissected one. Centuries later, Fabricius, the anatomy professor of William Harvey, who discovered the circulation of the blood, in dissecting found some things contrary to Galen-he refused to believe his own eyes, and held instead to Galen.

Teilhard de Chardin, SJ, called variously a theologian or a paleontologist, not only believed in evolution of the human body, but also of intelligence and morality, so that just before the return of Christ at the end, he said most of our race would be joined in a unity like that of a totalitarian state, by love. Compare Luke 18:8: "When the Son of Man comes, do you think He will find faith on the earth"? Or Matthew 24:12: "Because sin will reach its peak, the love of most people will grow cold." Or 2 Timothy 3 which at the start of the chapter gives a

dreadful list of what people will be like then. And there is more in Scripture, which did not penetrate at all into De Chardin.

Then there is Ignaz Semmelweis, MD, one of the discoverers of germs. He told other doctors to use antiseptic precautions. They decided that he was insane, and put him in a madhouse for the rest of his life.

Again, the Apostles had a firm idea that Jesus was going to restore the kingship to Israel-just before the ascension they asked when He would do that!³² That is why they did not understand His predictions of His death and resurrection-such things could not fit with their notion of what sort of Messiah He was. Similarly, the Old Testament predictions, as we shall see fully later, of the gentiles streaming to Jerusalem were easily understood to mean that all gentiles would become Jews-and not that they would be accepted by God as gentiles and become part of the people of God.³³ As a result, Peter and others were painfully slow to understand the command of Matthew 28 to go and teach all nations. So Jewish Christians in Acts 10 were shocked that Peter would even speak to gentiles-though Jesus had ordered precisely that.

So we see that here too is much room for much reduced responsibility.

4) *Scripture.*

God's arrangements in Sacred Scripture are similarly marvelous. Scripture is a great gift to us, but in its very difficulty and obscurity we see the workings of God's wisdom in still another way. God wills *some obscurity in Scripture*, to mercifully be able to say: "They know not what they do." How much responsibility is dimmed in a given case, only He can judge.

We can notice the principle working out especially in the case of the *parables*. Early in His public life, if we follow the chronology of St. Mark, Jesus turned to teaching by means of parables. He said to His disciples, "To you has been given the secret of the kingdom of God, but for those outside everything is in parables; so that they may indeed see but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not understand."

Now of course He did not deliberately blind them-if He had done that, He would not have wept over Jerusalem later. Rather, His words mean that parables are a divinely established means for dividing people into two groups. One group, by living vigorously according to what faith says, that the things of this world are worth little compared to eternity, will get a little light at first, and then more and more light. The other group will become more and more blind-we are speaking again of the two spirals, mentioned above, in two directions.

But it is not only parables that cause this effect: *God wills that Scripture in general be difficult*. If we make allowance for differences in language, culture, literary genre etc. in understanding, after all that there is still a lot of difficulty not accounted for. That part is willed by God. St. Augustine thought God wants it that way, to get us to work harder, and so get more. Pius XII agreed.³⁴ So again, God has a means

of mercifully allowing a person to become less responsible as he loses light.

Such lack of comprehension fits, as we said above, with the words of Our Lord Himself. "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do."

END NOTES

1 Chapter 5, n. 47.

2 *Rerum Ecclesiae*. AAS 18. 83 (emphasis mine).

3 *Le testimonianze*. AAS 46.664.

4 §48.

5 The minimum requirement is supernatural faith in God as a rewarder and punisher. However it seems that it is not necessary by necessity of means to believe that God rewards in the future life, for the Jews, who lived under a most special providence, seem to have had at least no clear notion of a future life and its rewards until about the middle of the second century BC. On the problem of how non-believers can have faith, R. Lombardi, SJ, *The Salvation of the Unbeliever* (tr. by D. M. White), Westminster, 1956; M. Emynan, *The Theology of Salvation*, Boston, 1960; M. Séckler, "Das Heil der Nichteangelisierten in Thomister Sicht" in: *Theologische Quartalschrift* 140 (1960) pp. 38-39; and Y. M. J. Congar, OP, "Au sujet du salut des non-Catholiques" in *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 32 (1958) pp. 53-65. Some theologians think that faith is somehow contained in the response that a man makes, under the motion to grace, to the moral mandate in which God is actually perceived, as He gives a command in regard to the ultimate end which is, actually, supernatural. However, we must note that even if this explanation is valid it does not follow that the sin of a man who does not obey a mandate perceived only in this way is necessarily mortal. For mortal sin requires sufficient evaluative cognition, as we shall see below (§67). Such a dim perception of the relation to God probably would not provide enough evaluative cognition for mortal sin. This is particularly the case in the first moral decision of a child just emerging into the light of reason (and doing so gradually): civil law generally invalidates contracts signed by such children, for lack of evaluative cognition. They would hardly have enough evaluative cognition for mortal sin, though they could easily have enough for venial sin.

Cf. also the discussion (in §48) of the case of those who lack full membership in the Church.

6 DS 1968 (DB 1068).

7 DS 2865 (DB 1677).

8 On the Church II.16.

9 Apology 1.46

10 Apology 2.10

11 Rom 2:14-16

12 Rom 1:5

13 Rom 8:9

14 Cf. Vatican II, On the Church, VII, 49.

15 Homily on Numbers, 16.1

16 Origen seems to mean the Logos, in the sense given by Justin.

17 Cf. J. Cooper, "The Relation between Religion and Morality in Primitive Culture" in: *Primitive Man* 4 (1931) ppi 3348 (all of vol. 4 is on this general topic); and Charles Fay, "Natural Moral Law in the Light of Cultural Relativism and Evolutionism" in: *Anthropological Quarterly* 34 (1961) pp. 177-191.

18 Although Jupiter and the great gods of Greece and Rome were not thought to punish murder, yet the Eumenides (the Furies) were believed to do so.

19 It is interesting to compare the thought of St. Thomas, in his commentary on Romans (Cap. VII, Lect. II. 536): ". . . the Apostle here seems to speak of the old law [revealed law-not merely natural law, as the context shows] . . . for without the law,

sin could be known inasmuch as it is against honestum, that is, against reason: but not inasmuch as it involves an offense against God, since only by a law divinely given is it manifested to man that human sins displease God, since He prohibits them and commands that they be punished."

20 Cf. *Sacrae Romanae Rotae decisiones*, vol. 33, decisio 15; *Nullitas Matrimonii coram Wynen*, 25 Feb. 1941, Romae, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950, pp. 144-168: cited in: J. C. Ford, SJ, and Gerald Kelly, SJ, *Contemporary Moral Theology*, Newman, Westminster, 1958, I, p. 273. Cf. pp. 270-276. Cf. also J. Duhamel, SJ, and J. Hayden, OSB, "Theological and Psychiatric Aspects of Habitual Sin" in: *The Catholic Theological Society of America: Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention*, 1956, pp. 135- 138.

21 ST I 60.5.c.

22 §§538-540. We note also that a pagan in the state of grace can follow the "law of the Spirit": cf. Rom 8:2 and §48 above.

23 1 Cor 1:26-27.

24 Ez 3:5-8.

25 ST I 20.4 ad 2.

26 1 Cor 12:23-24.

27 See c. 18, n. 140.

28 *Discover*, August, 1992, pp. 11-12. Cf. *Science News*, Aug. 20, 1983, pp. 122-125 for similar results.

29 *Science News*, Oct. 14, 1989, p. 250.

30 *Science News*, Apr. 16, 1994, pp. 248-249.

31 Cf. *Discover*, Oct., 1993, pp. 30-31; *Science News* Oct 9, 1971, p. 249; July 16, 1983 pp. 45-46; Oct. 14, 1989, p. 246; *Scientific American*, Feb. 1974, pp. 84-91; *US News & World Report*, Nov 8, 1993, pp. 76-79.

32 Acts 1:6.

33 Cf. Ephesians 3:3-6, where that fact is revealed for the first time by Paul.

34 (EB 563)