
In Book 13 of the Analects, Tsze-lu asks Confucius, what is the first thing to be done in the administration of government. The master replies, “What is necessary is to rectify names.” A curious answer, I would think, and so apparently thought Tsze-lu. Confucius then goes to to explain: “If names are not correct, language will not be in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.” To rule wisely, a ruler must be able to name reality rightly.
Two millennia later, Juliet Capulet would ask, “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” Her lover Romeo immediately replies, “I take thee at thy word. Call me but love, and I’ll be new baptized; Henceforth I never will be Romeo.”
Three centuries later, Alice would step through a mirror into Looking-Glass Land. She eventually wanders into the Nameless Forest and finds she cannot remember the names of anything, including her own. She no longer knows herself. Alice comes across a fawn, who asks her, “What do you call yourself?” “I wish I knew,” Alice replies. She then asks the fawn its name. But it too does not remember. Both nameless, Alice and the fawn meander through the forest, her arms clasped lovingly round the soft neck of the Fawn, till they come out into another open field. Here the Fawn gives a sudden bound into the air, and shakes itself free from Alice’s arms. “I’m a Fawn!” it cries out in a voice of delight, “and, dear me! you’re a human child!” A sudden look of alarm comes into its beautiful brown eyes, and in another moment it darts away. Remembering both who and what it is and what Alice is, the fawn knows that the human being is a possible predator. They can no longer be companions.
Names, both nominal and proper, give us the power to grasp and understand the world as it is and to respond accordingly. Yet as Juliet and Romeo discovered, names can also be dangerous. A name both discloses and delimits identity.
But what of God?
The Nameless God
The transcendent Creator, declares the Areopagite, is beyond our apprehension, beyond our comprehension, beyond our naming. How can we name the “beyond-beingly being,” who transcends all boundaries and categories, even thought itself?
It is cause of all;
but itself: nothing
as beyond-beingly apart from all. (DN I.5)
God is nothing—no thing—and therefore no name can comprehend him. Dionysius continues:
To none of those who are lovers of the truth beyond every truth is it permissible to celebrate the thearchic-beyond-beingness, whatever is the beyond-source beyond goodness, as logos, power, intellect, life, or being. For it is preeminently removed from everything whatsoever that is be-ing: from every habit, motion, life, imagination, opinion, name, logos, thinking, intellection, being, rest, foundation, unity, limit, and non-limit. (DN I.5)
And so, Dionysius asks, “For is not this truly the most wondrous name: the nameless beyond all names, which is placed beyond every name which is named ‘either in this age or in the future’?” (DN I.6). Christian Schäfer captures this paradox of the Nameless and Polynymous God:
Since we are unable to state anything about God’s essence…, He is the Nameless, ἀνώνυμος (anōnymos). Yet, since all reality is His manifold theophany, He is the Polynymous (πολυώνυμος, polyōnymos). Paul, whose disciple Dionysius claims to be, says in 1 Cor 15:28 that the Creator is all things in all, τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι (cf. DN 596A and 596C). He is everything and nothing (πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων: 596C). He should be named simultaneously as nameless and polynymous (DN 596D), with a ‘nameless name’ (DN 596A) …, or with a ‘Name beyond any name’ (DN 596A). As far as the ontology is concerned we could say that God is hidden beyond being (DN 588A), yet reveals Himself through being, which is also an unmistakable sign of His ‘gnoseological’ Goodness. ( The Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 68)
Yet how can we worship and invoke the God who surpasses every name? How do we name the Nameless?
The Providential Processions
Dionysius is a Neoplatonist, which means that he teaches a metaphysics of participation. As David Schindler puts it, “To speak of metaphysical participation is to say that one thing has what it is with and indeed after and in pursuit of, another: it has its reality, in other words, by virtue of something other than itself” (“What’s the Difference?,” The Saint Anselm Journal 3 [2005]: 1). This well describes the basic logic of Dionysian participation. A creature possesses its being and its characteristic perfections genuinely, yet derivatively: it participates in the causal gifts that proceed from the One. Participation thus expresses both the creature’s real possession of its perfection and its radical dependence upon the divine source from which that perfection proceeds. For the Areopagite, created beings participate in God and thus receive their reality, yet God does not participate in finite beings and therefore remains unchanged. Divinity is “unparticipatedly participated” (DN II. 5)—between Creator and created there exists a relationship of asymmetrical dependence.
Dionysius is also a Christian, which means that he rejects subordinate divine causal principles—hence the challenge of the Dionysian project. Missing from his writings are the Plotinian hypostases of Intellect and Soul. Missing also are the henads of Proclus, intermediate divinities that mediate between absolute unity and the multiplicities of the cosmos. To invoke the immortal words of the Highlander, there can be only One—one source, one cause, one transcendent ground. Dionysius decisively separates himself from polytheistic henology:
The absolute being underlying individual manifestations of being as their cause is not a divine or an angelic being, for only transcendent being itself can be the source, the being, and the cause of the being of beings. Nor have we to do with some other life-producing divinity distinct from that supra-divine life which is the originating Cause of all living beings and of life itself… What I am trying to express is something quite different. “Being itself,” “life itself,” “divinity itself,” are names signifying source, divinity, and cause, and these are applied to the one transcendent cause and source beyond source of all things. But we use the same terms in a derivative fashion and we apply them to the provident acts of power which come forth from that God in whom nothing at all participates. I am talking here of being itself, of life itself, of divinity itself which shapes things in a way that each creature, according to capacity, has his share of these. From the fact of such sharing come the qualities and the names “existing,” “living,” “possessed by divinity,” and suchlike. (DN XI.6)
In his “good-formed processions [πρόοδοι] and manifestations of the godhead” (DN II.4), the One “goes forth to all things while yet remaining within himself” (DN XII.1). “It overflows in one unceasing, identical, over-flowing, and undiminished supply, thereby perfecting the perfect and filling all things with its own perfection” (DN XIII.1). The processions are therefore more than created effects and more than human descriptions of God. They are the differentiated ways in which the indivisible One gives himself as the cause of the perfections of creatures. The divine names designate God according to these emanations of his goodness. Creatures participate in them according to their capacities, thereby receiving their own finite perfections.
John Jones expatiates upon the dialectic of procession and differentiation:
The genesis of what is caused from its causes is the procession of what is caused out of its causes. This procession is a multiplication or differentiation of the cause. In proceeding out of its causes, what is caused is let be, both as distinct from the cause and as other than it. Or, more accurately, the cause proceeds out of itself and multiplies itself in what it causes; that is, the cause is let be or manifests itself as other than itself. Nonetheless, what causes abides apart from what it causes. For although it is wholly differenced in what it causes, it abides as the unity which it is. Moreover, what is caused abides in what causes it and, as such, is not other than it. (Introduction to The Divine Names and Mystical Theology, 43.)
Dionysius speaks of the “divine difference” (DN II.5), the differentiation of the one Holy Trinity through its ecstatic extroversion toward creation. The Trinity remains perfect and ineffable unity in its “thearchic beyond-beingness” (DN II.5), yet in its “good-showing processions” (DN II.11) the One “makes itself many and multiplies itself, beyond every way of unity, by its goodness” (DN II.5). The world thus becomes theophany. Its perfections image the manifold self-communications of the One, yet no image can exhaust the divine cause it manifests. As Dionysius comments: “What is caused has achieved an image of its causes, and the causes themselves are both apart from and founded beyond what they cause according to the logos of their own proper source” (DN II.8).1
In the act of creation, the infinite, simple, and immutable Deity communicates himself in the modality of finitude. From soup to nuts, all of creation is theophany, icon, manifestation, presentation, appearance, revelation, and sacrament of the one eternal Creator. This is what it means to be a creature in the Dionysian vision. “In Dionysios,” writes Perl, “to be is to be a symbol” (“Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 39 (1994): 320).2 Schafer explicitly ties together theophany and the divine names:
For, as God’s theophany, reality reflects the dynamics of the threefold One of which it is its extroversion. Strangely enough, Dionysius inverts this picture completely in his presentation of the Divine Names; God is the unknowable, and whatever we know of Him comes from talking about His Creation, which is not God Himself, but rather His theophany. Yet, Creation is only explainable by turning to God and by combining ontology and theology. (Schafer, 60)
The Divine Names
We name and hymn God from his processions as witnessed in Holy Scripture and manifested in creation. Out with the gods and in with the divine names—or more specifically, in with the intelligible divine names. The names denote Deity in its active determination of created beings. They are not, as Timothy Knepper remarks, “arbitrary signifiers that arbitrarily denote some arbitrary signified” (Negating Negation, p. 1). They are given in Scripture and constitute the metaphysical structure of the created order; they apply primarily to God as transcendent cause and secondarily to creatures:
They are divine processions that source and sustain the basic properties of the cosmos… Thus it is only because divine names are firstly and primarily causes of properties that those properties can be attributed to or denied of those beings that do or do not participate in them. (Knepper, p. 1)
God is being for he creates being and beings; God is life for he bestows life on specific classes of beings; God is powerfor he gives the capacity to act; and so on. The created properties which the intelligible names source are precontained within God in his inexpressible simplicity:
Thus, both nameless and all the names of beings befit the cause of all, be-ing beyond all, precisely so that it would be king of all and all would be about it—being raised to it as cause, source, and limit—and so that it would be”all in all” as the writings say. Thus, we truly celebrate it to be the support, source of guidance, connection, completion, protection and hearth of all, and as reverting [all] to itself. [It accomplishes] these in a unified, immeasurable, and excellent way. For it is not only the cause of connection, of life, or of completion such that the goodness beyond name would be named from one or another of its providences. Rather, it has anticipated the all simply and infinitely in itself: the all complete goodness of its one and all causing providence. Thus, it is to he harmoniously celebrated and named in terms of all things. (DN I.7)
The divine names must ultimately be negated because what they signify is precontained in God by way of ineffable excess and undifferentiated concentration. The finite perfections signified by these theonyms properly characterize creatures; in God they subsist according to their transcendent causal mode. The transcendent Deity exists beyond finitude, beyond goods and perfections, and therefore beyond intelligibility and nomination. Yet he is intelligibly and properly named by his self-revelation in divine creation. The divine names signify powers, but powers of the One; processions and activities, but always of the One.
For the truth is that everything divine and even everything revealed to us is known only by way of whatever share of them is granted. Their actual nature, what they are ultimately in their own source and ground, is beyond all intellect and all being and all knowledge. When, for instance, we give the name of “God” to that transcendent hiddenness, when we call it “life” or “being” or “light” or “Word,” what our minds lay hold of is in fact nothing other than certain activities apparent to us, activities which deify, cause being, bear life, and give wisdom. (DN II.7)
The divine names identify the metaphysical principles that inform the cosmos yet preexist in the triadic Deity who is “beyond be-ing beyond-beingly before all” (DN V.8). They designate the One in a pluralized form. We might think of the intelligible names as verbs rather than proper nouns, for they name God according to his movement out of himself into the world. “Both the divine names and the properties they source,” Knepper explains, “are pre-contained in god in a hyper-unifed and hyper-existent manner; thus there are important respects in which the divine names are true even of the transcendent god” (Knepper, p. 4).
The foundational theonym for Dionysius is the Good, for all the other divine names proceed from and express it. In his treatise Dionysius then presents a hierarchical triad of the divine names: the first comprises those divine perfections that define basic types of beings, the second those that empower the proper hierarchical ordering and functioning of those beings, and the third those that enable the enactment of unificatory ends by those beings.

Why then is the Good absent from the category of the “Divine Names of Ontological Procession”? Because the Good stands before and encompasses the ontological series as the name of God’s universal providence. Dionysius tells us that the name Good “manifests the whole processions of the cause of all,” extending even to “all that is and all that is not” (DN V.1). Being, Life, and Wisdom name increasingly determinate ways in which God diffuses his Goodness into creation. Being extends to everything that exists; Life to everything that lives; Wisdom to beings capable of intellect, reason, and sensation. The movement is therefore one of progressive differentiation: every being participates in Being, and every intelligent being participates in both Life and Being, while the converse does not hold. Being, Life, and Wisdom thus articulate the ontological structure assumed by the procession of the Good as creatures receive the divine gifts according to their capacities. The Good names God’s unbounded generosity that comprehends his processions; Being, Life, and Wisdom name the fundamental modes in which his generosity constitutes the ordered multiplicity of creation.
Conclusion
We return to the question with which we began. How can we name the God who lives in the Nameless Forest? We may do so because he has given himself to be known. Every creature bears the impress of the divine goodness from which it proceeds. The world is theophany, a manifestation of the hidden God, and its many perfections become names by which we praise their transcendent source. Yet every name finally points beyond itself. Goodness, Being, Life, Wisdom, Beauty—each opens upon the inexhaustible mystery of the One who gives himself without ceasing to transcend every gift. Here lies the wonder of Dionysius’s vision: the nameless God has filled creation with his names.
I close with Alexander Golitzin’s summary: “The intelligible names are not things, no longer have reference to objectively and independently existing entities, but are instead windows opening onto the sense—and reality—of God present in his powers or energies… They direct us to, and participate in, the greater sacrament, μυστήριον [mystery], of God’s self-giving love” (Mystagogy, p. 100).
Footnotes
1 “In the procession of things from God, differentiation must be considered along with union; differentiation because God seems to distribute Himself, that is, His likeness, into many images, just as the sun disperses its light into a multitude of rays, and one face close to a mirror renders its likeness into many images.” Marsilio Ficino, De divinis nominibus XLIV, in On Dionysius the Areopagite, I:207. Ficino was a Catholic philosopher and priest who lived in the 15th century.
2 “When, through a certain ineffable descent into the things that are, it [i.e., the transcendent Good] is perceived by the sight of the mind in those things that are, it alone is found to be in all things… Indeed, beginning to appear in its theophanies, it is said to proceed as though from nothing into something. What is properly judged [to be] above all essence is also known properly in every essence, and for this reason every visible and invisible creature can be called a theophany, that is, a divine appearance.” John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon 681A.








