Eternal God and the World That Need Not Be

As I write this article, I am sitting on my deck with my two Collies, Tiriel and Fëanor. They are keeping vigilant watch. The clouds are gathering. The thunder is getting closer. With each peal they scramble around the deck, barking vigorously. I try to explain that it’s only thunder, a natural phenomenon that occurs when specific meteorological conditions obtain. They are not impressed. “No,” they reply, “a god is coming.”

At the moment the Church stepped out of her Jewish cocoon and began preaching the gospel to Gentiles, she took up the task of carefully distinguishing her God from both the many gods of paganism and the monistic divinity of the Hellenistic philosophers. She knew that the one God of Sinai, whom she confessed to be the Father of Jesus Christ, was very different from the deities of the Gentiles; yet how to state that difference?

  • How to explain that the Maker of heaven and earth is not a Platonic demiurge?
  • How to explain that the Nazarene is not a demigod?

By the conclusion of the second century, Christian bishops and apologists had come to realize that an answer to the second required and presupposed an answer to the first. And this first answer was revolutionary: the world need not be. It doesn’t sound revolutionary today, but only because the Church has so long taught us that God’s creation of the cosmos is a gratuitous and free act—creatio ex nihilo. God was not compelled by any force exterior or interior to himself to speak the world into being. He freely chose to do so. We need not, however, imagine this divine choosing anthropomorphically, as if the transcendent Trinity sits around contemplating the multitude of possibilities and alternatives its unique existence poses.

“Why should I create anything since I am perfectly content—indeed deliriously happy—in my eternal Trinitarian communion?”

“Why should I create this world instead of another? So many choices! How’s a God to choose?”

Nor should we think that the transcendent Divinity is trapped in the freedom–necessity dilemma that contemporary analytic philosophers like to advance against the orthodox doctrine of creation (the modal collapse objection). As David Bentley Hart writes:

God is not a finite being in whom the distinction of freedom from necessity has any meaning. Perfect freedom is the unhindered realization of a nature in its proper end; and God’s infinite freedom is the eternal fulfillment of the divine nature in the divine life. Needless to say, for any finite rational being, since its essence is not identical with its existence, any movement toward the realization of its nature is attended by the shadows of unrealized possibilities, and entails deliberative liberty with regard to proximate ends. This, though, is a condition not of freedom as such, but only of finitude. Every decision of the finite will is a collapse of indeterminate potentiality into determinate actuality, and therefore the reduction of limitless possibilities to the bare singularity of one reality. Yet that prior realm of possibility exists only because there is an inexhaustible wellspring of more original and transcendent actuality sustaining it. God, by contrast, simply is that actuality, in all its supereminent fullness: infinite Being, the source of every act of being. As such, he is infinitely free precisely because nothing can inhibit or limit the perfect realization of his nature, and thus, as Maximus says, he possesses no gnomic will; for God, deliberative liberty—any “could have been otherwise,” any arbitrary decision among opposed possibilities—would be an impossible defect of his freedom. God does not require the indeterminacy of the possible in order to be free because he is not some particular determination of Being, some finite reduction of potency to act; he is instead that infinite actuality upon which all ontic possibility depends. And in the calculus of the infinite, any tension between freedom and necessity simply disappears; there is no problem to be resolved because, in regard to the transcendent and infinite fullness of all Being, the distinction is meaningless. God is not a being choosing his nature from among a range of options; he simply is reality as such. And it is only insofar as God is not a being defined by possibility, and is hence infinitely free, that creation inevitably follows from who he is. This in no way alters the truth that creation, in itself, “might not have been,” so long as this claim is understood as a modal definition, a statement of ontological contingency, a recognition that creation receives its being from beyond itself and so has no necessity intrinsic to itself.1

Or as I suggested a few years ago, the positing of the freedom–necessity dilemma represents a category mistake.2

Even so, the Church Fathers found it necessary to assert the gratuity of divine creation over against Hellenistic construals of the ontological inseparability of world and deity.3 With the preaching of the gospel, in other words, human beings became free to think transcendent Creator without the world—God by himself, alone in the infinite plenitude of his divine being. Robert Sokolowski explains the extraordinariness of this moment:

It seems to be obvious that men should observe the contingency of the world and ask themselves why there is something rather than nothing. But such issues do not arise automatically wherever there are men, even if the men are thoughtful. If we examine pagan thinking about the divine, we do not find the issue of creation raised in the way it is raised in Christianity, nor do we find the understanding of God that is maintained by Christians. In Greek and Roman religions, and in Greek and Roman philosophies, god or the gods are appreciated as the most powerful, most independent and self-sufficient, most unchanging beings in the world, but they are accepted within the context of being. Although god or the gods are conceived as the steadiest and most complete beings, the possibility that they could be even though everything that is not divine were not, is not a possibility that occurs to anyone. The being of pagan gods is to be a part, though the most important part, of what is; no matter how independent they are, the pagan gods must be with things that are not divine.4

In pagan religion and philosophy, the world exists necessarily, as does the divine. Neither can be thought apart from the other. Divinity is comprehended within the matrix of being, alongside all other beings. But with the gospel came a revolutionary interpretation of divine creation—the world might not have been.That which had been inconceivable becomes meaningful, thinkable, imaginable, ponderable. Whereas Plato and Aristotle thought of individual beings as existing or not existing within the continuum of existence, Pascha introduced the possibility of thinking of beings as a whole over against their sheer nonexistence. Why something rather than nothing? Sokolowski calls this the Christian distinction:

In Christian belief we understand the world as that which might not have been, and correlatively we understand God as capable of existing, in undiminished goodness and greatness, even if the world had not been. We know there is a world, so we appreciate the world as in fact created, but we acknowledge that it is meaningful to say that God could have been all that there is. Such a “solitary” existence of God is counterfactual, but it is meaningful, whereas it would not be meaningful for the pagan sense of the divine. To use terms similar to those of Anselm, such an idea of God can exist in our minds; we can understand God in this way. Our understanding of God is that he would be “the same” in greatness and goodness whether he creates or does not create, and whether he creates or does not create depends only on his freedom. When God does create, there may be “more” but there is no “greater” or “better.” And the world must be understood appropriately, as that which might not have been. The world and everything in it is appreciated as a gift brought about by a generosity that has no parallel in what we experience in the world. The existence of the world now prompts our gratitude, whereas the being of the world prompts our wonder.5

If not an ordinary movement of human reason, may we not then speak of revelation?

In the world things are identified by their otherness and difference, by not being that from which they are distinguished and to which they are related. We speak of natures and types, of genus and species. We specify the properties of an entity and compare them to the properties of other entities. A rock is not a table is not a hippopotamus is not a god. Within the horizon of being such distinctions are fundamental. “But in the Christian distinction,” Sokolowski notes, “God is understood as ‘being’ God entirely apart from any relation of otherness to the world or to the whole. God could and would be God even if there were no world. Thus the Christian distinction is appreciated as a distinction that did not have to be, even though it in fact is. . . . God is more fundamental than the distinction itself.”6 In creating the world, God permits the distinction to arise, but he is not constituted by it. To be who and what he is, the Creator does not need to be distinguished from the world. God is God, existing beyond contrast with all he has made. Hence the Christian distinction is “capable of being obliterated, because one of the terms of the distinction, the world, does not have to be.”7 The Church now speaks of divine aseity and creaturely contingency. She speaks of a world freely created from out of nothing. She speaks of the one God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Footnotes

[1] David Bentley Hart, You Are Gods (2022), pp. 115-116.

[2] See “Transcending Freedom and Necessity“and “Divine Knowledge, Creation, and Modal Collapse“; also “The Absolute Freedom of the Simple Life.”

[3] See Georges Florovsky, “St. Athanasius’ Concept of Creation.”

[4] Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason (1995), p. 12.

[5] Ibid., p. 19.

[6] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[7] Ibid., p. 33.

(6 June 2016; rev.)

(Go to “God Differs Differently”)

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17 Responses to Eternal God and the World That Need Not Be

  1. Fr Aidan Kimel says:

    I was wondering if the long citation on divine freedom from David Hart’s You Are Gods would draw any comments. It’s a difficult and challenging passage. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays I find it utterly compelling. On Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays I find it completely obscure and incomprehensible. On Sundays, well, I’m usually watching the Washington Commanders lose badly in what is turning out to be yet another losing season. Sigh.

    This morning Catholic philosopher Fr James Dominic Rooney posted the following on Facebook:

    Fr James Domnic Rooney, OP

    I think DB Hart’s doctrine of creation illustrates what I take to be the significant differences I would have with his doctrine of freedom, and it impacts his account of God’s nature.

    (Strap yourselves in, folks, this one’s a doozy):

    “Every decision of the finite will is a collapse of indeterminate potentiality into determinate actuality, and therefore the reduction of limitless possibilities to the bare singularity of one reality. Yet that prior realm of possibility exists only because there is an inexhaustible wellspring of more original and transcendent actuality sustaining it. God, by contrast, simply is that actuality, in all its supereminent fullness: infinite Being, the source of every act of being. As such, he is infinitely free precisely because nothing can inhibit or limit the perfect realization of his nature, and thus, as Maximus says, he possesses no gnomic will; for God, deliberative liberty—any “could have been otherwise,” any arbitrary decision among opposed possibilities—would be an impossible defect of his freedom. God does not require the indeterminacy of the possible in order to be free because he is not some particular determination of Being, some finite reduction of potency to act; he is instead that infinite actuality upon which all ontic possibility depends. And in the calculus of the infinite, any tension between freedom and necessity simply disappears; there is no problem to be resolved because, in regard to the transcendent and infinite fullness of all Being, the distinction is meaningless. God is not a being choosing his nature from among a range of options; he simply is reality as such. And it is only insofar as God is not a being defined by possibility, and is hence infinitely free, that creation inevitably follows from who he is. This in no way alters the truth that creation, in itself, “might not have been,” so long as this claim is understood as a modal definition, a statement of ontological contingency, a recognition that creation receives its being from beyond itself and so has no necessity intrinsic to itself” (David Bentley Hart, You Are Gods 2022,115-116).

    What Hart seems to be saying is unclear in many respects, but he seems to draw a false conclusion from mostly true premises.

    First, it is true that human will involves change from potency to act. God’s doesn’t. God has no ‘passive’ potentiality that gets actualized when He makes a choice.
    Second, God has no ‘gnomic’ will, that is, God’s choices are not premised on deliberative practical reasoning. God does not deliberate. He knows what He wants without change and wills it from eternity.

    BUT neither of these facts implies that God’s choices could not “have been otherwise,” and this claim that God’s decisions are necessary is SERIOUSLY WRONG. It implies that God’s decisions are necessitated by His reasons (which is not incidentally what DBH seems to think about human beings as well). For DBH, then, God always does exactly what He has best reason to do, and the facts about His reasons appear equally eternal and necessary.

    The claim that God’s choices would be “arbitrary decision among opposed possibilities” if He was not so necessitated is a false dilemma. God’s decisions to do otherwise would have reasons, but being free involves being such that one can act on other reasons. There is nothing in what DBH has proposed that entails his heretical conclusions. God still has infinite active power – different alternative states He could have actualized – and there is nothing in His reasons that necessitate that He act any one way. His acts are entirely free because none of them needs to be. God acts in light of His own goodness, and there is nothing that is required for God’s goodness – nothing can increase or decrease it, because God is the Good prior to any choice He makes. Otherwise, you make God dependent on His choices and the reasons He acts for. This is why necessitating God’s choices is problematic: it makes God *dependent*.

    Thus, DBH draws a clearly heretical conclusion that “creation inevitably follows from who [God] is.” It has always been heretical that God creates the world necessarily, for orthodox Christians. The claim that the world “has no necessity intrinsic to itself” and so is consequently metaphysically contingent is not what is necessary for our doctrine about God’s free choice. What is necessary is that God could have done otherwise, which is precisely what DBH rules out.

    I have said before that the universalist doctrines of DB Hart are tied to a picture of God that required heretical beliefs about God’s lack of freedom, and what I’ve seen of his new book appears to vindicate that conclusion.

    Universalism is bad news all around. It requires heretical presuppositions about important doctrines about human or divine freedom.

    Two questions for readers to ponders: (1) Do you understand DBH’s argument? (2) Do you find it compelling? Why or why not?

    Liked by 2 people

    • Joe says:

      It seems to me that a nice and “quick” reply to Fr. Rooney’s objection is available for (Catholic) supporters of DBH’s conclusion. The argument is the following (apologies in advance for the 5th and 6th premise, but I tried to be careful on the relation between language and God’s simplicity):

      1. Insofar as God creates the world, God creates the world ex nihilo;

      2. God is simple and metaphysically fundamental.

      But, because of 2,

      3. Nothing intrinsic to God can be properly understood in terms of something distinct from God.

      Moreover, assuming God’s act of creation is something proper to God/something intrinsic to God Himself, it follows still because of 2,

      4. God’s creating act is identical to God itself

      Now notice that,

      5. For an x and y (where x and y are anything whatsoever that can be named) and any “R” (where “R” is a two-place predicate whatsoever that at least in some cases might be correctly employed to describe x and y when applied to x and y in order to produce the sentence “x R y”), x is contingently related with y by means of R iff,for two pw w1 and w2, at w1, “R” can be correctly employed to describe x and y, if applied to x and y in order to produce the sentence “x R y”, whereas at w2 “R” cannot be correctly employed to describe x and y if applied to x and y in order to produce the sentence “x R y”;

      And, because of 5,

      6. God contigently creates the world iff, for two pw w1 ans w2, at w1, “creating” is a predicate that can be correctly employed to describe God and the world, if applied to God and the world in order to produce the sentence “God creates the world”, whereas “creating” is a predicate that cannot be correctly employed to describe God and the world, if applied to God and the world in order to produce the sentence “God creates the world”.

      In conclusion, one should notice that, given that God could have done otherwise and given the truth of premises (1)-(6), one needs to understand the notion of world (or of possible world) priorly and in order to understand God’s creative act. But being God’s creative act something intrinsic to God, this amounts to rejecting (3). But I take 1 and 2 to be dogmatic for Catholics.

      I think that for who wants to uphold DBH’s conclusion and/or argument, the solution is that it is a categorical mistake on behalf of anyone to apply modal concepts when trying to describe God properly.

      Hence, neither one can say that God could have done otherwise, nor that God could not have done otherwise, in the same way that neither it makes sense to say that an abstract object such as the number 2 is yellow, nor that 2 is not yellow. God as such is or He is not simpliciter, He does something or He does not do something, but neither it can be said that God could be otherwise, nor that God could not be otherwise, nor that He did something, nor that He did not do something, neither that He may do something, nor that He may not do it, etc.

      If my solution works, it follows that Hart did not violate any of the grammar Fr. Rooney accuses him of violating. Friends of DBH’s argument and/or conclusion need not accept that “God creates the world necessarily”.

      P. S. : I take DBH’s own argument to be much more interesting, but much more difficult and it seems to me that it takes a lot more time to fully flesh it out.

      P. P. S. : it is very probable that the technicalities still need some refinement, but, nonetheless, it seems to me that the gist of the argument is understandable in this sketch

      Liked by 3 people

      • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

        David B. Hart asked me to post this response to Joe’s comment above:

        Yeah, that’s formally correct. I try to avoid the analytic style, since I always feel like I’m talking to a circle of six when I do use it, but that’s more or less the way to put it.

        Moreover, Rooney should be able to grasp that the world can be non-necessary modally—it adds nothing to God, God suffers from no intrinsic deficiency or extrinsic coercion—while also saying that God’s infinite freedom and infinite resource means that whatever he does he does as the true and indefectible expression of his nature. Because God is infinitely free, God did not need the world. Because God is infinitely free, there was a zero-percent possibility of the world not being created. If Rooney does not see this, he’s either a) a “monopolytheist” who thinks God is a god making choices from a range of options outside himself, or b) an incompetent logician.

        Anyway, Rooney is simply wrong. There’s no debate here.

        By the way, here in nuce is also the refutation of Peter Van Inwagen’s denial of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But that’s another story.

        Liked by 1 person

        • David says:

          Yes there is a ‘zero-percent possibility of the world not being created’ – but is there also a zero-percent possibility of the Fall not occurring? Or a zero-percent possibility of all the individual contingent sins of history not occurring? Is the fall and all our individual sins – i.e. not just the creation of the world, but the creation of *this* world, with all its sinful contingencies -the true and indefectible expression of God’s nature?

          I assume the answer is obviously not. But if so aren’t God’s actions – both ‘God ontologically upholds the state that the fall and all my contingent sins occur’ and also the intrinsic state ‘God knows the fall and contingent sin X occurs (which genuinely may not have occurred) within God’s infinite act of consciousness’ – are *they* at least not contingent? Doesn’t this risk introducing contingency into the divine Being?

          Does Joe’s logic and DBH’s thinking – that God is in some way beyond necessity and contingency – resolve this problem adequately too? Or do we need to combine those insights with ‘extrinsic denomination’ and argue that God’s intrinsic state is identical whatever happens to be known? Or are there other options?

          Liked by 1 person

          • DBH says:

            You’re thinking of the act of creation as God choosing one possible world (in all its specificities) out of an infinite gallery of such worlds. That’s the same error I was rejecting, seen from another angle. Creation may be the result of the bonum diffusivum sui, but that does not entail an absolute determinism. It does entail an inevitable final state of things.

            Liked by 1 person

      • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

        Alright, Joe, now that we have your argument correctly laid out, would you please restate premises #4 and #5 in ordinary language for us philosophically challenged folk. Thanks!  

        Liked by 1 person

        • Joe says:

          The contents of this blog cry against the idea that you folks are philosophically challenged!

          But putting my compliments (and deeply felt personal gratitude) aside, in ordinary language the idea is roughly the following:

          premise 5:
          for anything that can be named (I tried to avoid talking of entities or things or beings since God is involved), if you take two of these (call them Jimmy and Kim) then, say, it will be true that Jimmy likes Kim contingently if and only if it is both possibly the case Jimmy likes Kim (there is a possible world (p.w.) w1 such that at w1 it is true that Jimmy likes Kim) and that it is possibly not the case that Jimmy likes Kim (there is another possible world w2 such that at w2 it is not true that Jimmy likes Kim).

          Premise 6 follows from premise 5 since it is just an istance of the universal generalization I assumed in premise 5.

          So, a paraphrase of premise 6 in ordinary language would be something like:
          God creates the world contingently if and only if it is both possibly the case God creates the world (there is a possible world at which it is true that God creates the world) and possibly not the case God creates the world.

          Lastly, for what regards premise 4, since God is simple, it follows that, at least according to the way Catholics seem to me to understand divine simplicity, God cannot properly be said to be complex in any way whatsoever. So, if it is the case that the world exists because of God and one thinks God creates the world “by means of” an act of His, then, given divine simplicity, since God’s act of creating the world cannot be distinct from God, that act is identical to God.

          In my opinion, if Fr. Rooney accepts the way in which modern logicians analyze modal notions (i.e. in terms of possible worlds), there is a bit of irony in seeing how that would lead him to safeguards the priority and indepence of God with respect to the world by means of saying that it is not possible to properly understand God’s act (i.e. God’s nature) without having priorly understood what is the world. Which I take it to be tantamount to say that God’s essence is grounded in/dependent on the essence of the world, not viceversa. Hence, that God is less fundamental than the world (which in turn implies that God’s nature is complex and, so, that He is not simple).

          Liked by 1 person

    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      Here is my FB response to Rooney’s post. I welcome criticisms and suggestions.

      Your critique, Fr Rooney, doesn’t substantively address David’s key point: “And in the calculus of the infinite, any tension between freedom and necessity simply disappears; there is no problem to be resolved because, in regard to the transcendent and infinite fullness of all Being, the distinction is meaningless.”

      Now David may be wrong–that has to be philosophically demonstrated–but it’s insufficient to simply declare that your Church infallibly teaches God’s libertarian freedom (whatever that might mean for God). Surely you can do better than that! If I were Roman Catholic, I would point out that you need to show that the Magisterium has authoritatively condemned the specific assertion that the divine transcendence precludes the application of the freedom-necessity distinction to God. The Church can’t condemn what it has never truly examined and considered.

      Moreover, by insisting upon God’s libertarian freedom, you leave yourself open to the modal collapse objection. David’s view at least renders that objection moot: namely, the objection is based on a category mistake. But perhaps you have a compelling solution to that too …

      Liked by 1 person

    • David says:

      It’s Rooney’s objections I don’t understand. Yes, ‘creating’ vs ‘not-creating’ are different intrinsic states, and divine simplicity means that God cannot vary intrinsically no matter what contingencies happen to pertain. But this is only a problem if we think God faces a genuine ‘libertarian’ choice to create – but not if we see infinite Being as necessarily self-diffusive and creative. I do not see why DBH should accept Rooney’s claim that this makes God ‘dependent’ on anything – except, perhaps, that God is dependent on Himself, in the trivially true-sense that God needs to exist in order for God to exist.

      (God ‘would be’ intrinsically different if he did not create – in the sense that his being would be finite rather than infinite – and therefore not God!)

      I do think, however, that a harder problem arises re: God’s so-called ‘contingent knowledge’.

      That’s because ‘knowing David sinned today’ vs ‘knowing David didn’t sin today’ also sound like different intrinsic states – analogous to creating vs. not-creating. But unlike creation we can’t say ‘don’t worry, the divine nature necessitates what happens to be the case re: God’s knowledge of David sinning’. This is because humans are genuinely autonomous, evil (both ‘fallenness’ and individual sins) is totally non-necessary and (most importantly) God cannot be dependent on evil.

      I believe DBH holds that this kind of ‘modal collapse’ objection is not a strong one. I’d love to know what his solution is. I assume it would be some variation of the idea that ‘knowing X ‘vs. ‘knowing not-X’ are in fact the same ‘intrinsic’ state for God – omniscience is omniscience whatever happens to be known. I still find this theory of knowledge tricky to be get my head around – although Thomas Cothran’s writings on this blog has helped me understand this position better – but would be interesting to know whether something like this is DBH’s solution or whether he considers this issue from a different perspective.

      Liked by 1 person

      • DBH says:

        That would be a dilemma if God were some finite substance acquiring knowledge through passions, rather than infinite act knowing all by his creative outpouring in creatures.

        But that’s a long argument.

        Liked by 1 person

        • David says:

          Thank you for this and your other reply.

          I freely confess I may be inadvertently smuggling in such a picture, but I do try to avoid it! My worry is simply that – for example – thinking ‘the ball is red’ appears to be an intrinsically different state to thinking ‘the ball is green’. This intrinsic mental difference seems to me to be wholly independent of concerns regarding determinism and modality and passions etc.

          That is, I know the ball is red. Whether I know it’s red *because* I determined it to be so, or whether I just happen to know it is red, the knowledge state is still intrinsically different from knowing it to be green.

          Likewise, whether I know the ball is red because I was acted on it and had a separate mental act of abstracting its essence – or whether I know it is red because it is a necessary truth of my nature that I know the colour of all balls – it still seems to me that this knowledge state is intrinsically different from knowing it to be green.

          That’s why I reckon it’s probably my theory of knowledge in general that is the problem and/or not grasping how God’s mode of knowing enables him to know things by ‘extrinsic denomination’.

          Liked by 1 person

        • David says:

          Thinking it out a little further (not usually good for me!) I suppose the fact that God by definition knows *everything* means that God’s omniscience – combined with the reality of everything else that exists – is sufficient to account for God’s knowledge, in the sense that there is no additional ‘definition’ that needs to be added to God to account for his knowledge, once we accept the facts of the world and the fact he is omniscient.

          Whereas for a finite nature – even a finite nature that was such that it knew 99% of all things, and even if they didn’t ‘find this out’ via distinct information-gathering acts – would still need an intrinsic state defining *which* things were actually known. That is, while there is only one way to know 100% of all things, there are myriad of ways to know 99% – therefore, for any given ‘state of affairs’, even a 99%-knowing finite being would need further definition to flesh out what was actually known.

          Liked by 1 person

  2. Fr Aidan Kimel says:

    This long Twitter comment by Jordan Wood is germane to our discussion of divine freedom and necessity:

    https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1578428509747556352.html

    Liked by 1 person

  3. Stranger says:

    I have little to contribute here on the philosophical or theological level. I do find the discussions helpful in the way that certain points within them, certain expressions, certain ideas, give me hope; alert me to possibilities; provide some stepping stones on which I can plant a foot as I attempt to move through this life and potentially toward faith.

    Halting progress at best but the “greatest hits” from the process itself are all the many ways I’ve found the “Great Hope,” as I understand it, in something of an inchoate form perhaps but nonetheless, to give me actual hope, to give me grounds to turn to God (the existence, care, and patience of whom I can sincerely, deeply, and bitterly doubt from time to time). Most surprising to me are all the ways this faltering hope make me want to be a different person, a better person, kinder, concerned, empathetic, giving. Such qualities are not typically “on my radar” or virtues toward which I strive, but the Hope (I find) is that big. I barely grasp it and yet it wants to move with me and beyond and extend its hope and goodness into others lives as well. It seems to want even me to be something of its instrument in this regard and equips me to care enough to try.

    All the same, half the time I’m on this blog reading, I’m simply looking for scraps, as it were, to strengthen what little faith I have and to pray. I’m in a difficult position in life, presently, and I take help and sustenance wherever I can find them

    And so, as has happened before, as I scavenge here I come across a controversy, debate, or disagreement on the blog. Fair enough. Some seemingly fine, fine, fine points under discussion. Also fair enough. This side, that side, etc. Read and re-read the post, the DBH quote. Think I’ve understood enough to continue reading.

    I get to the quoted facebook post. Also think I understand what I’m reading. Until I stumble (in all senses of the word) across the Fr. Rooney’s labelling of DBH’s conclusions as “heretical.”

    “Wait, what?” I think, wishing someone had warned me rough road surface was coming. I continue on until I stumble, yet again, over the second apprearance in Fr. Rooney’s post of the word “heretical.”

    Simply put, I can appreciate and understand that vast varieties of opinions on some of these questions exist. I can also appreciate and understand that passions can run high; that advocates for a given position often believe strongly that a lot is at stake in a particular question or issue.

    But as an outsider (“username checks out” as they say), those who fling around such condemnations and labels simply take themselves out of the sphere of useful discussion and debate when they do so. Were we all on a massive highway (massive apologies in advance for this awful analogy), and some of us in the slow lane (me), others cruising along in the other lanes (everyone else here), but all of us (hopefully) going somewhere, the judgers/labelers/determiners-of-heresy are the people who are swerving in and out yelling and gesticulating vehemently: intellectual and philosophical road ragers.

    I, puttering along in the slow lane, simply think “b
    Best to avoid that person, dont want to end up in a wreck.” I truly fail to see what good that level of discussion does.

    And after those two instances of “heretical” in the post jump out at me, I wonder “What is this person getting at? Why the sudden vehemence?” Until I read “Universalism is bad news all around.” Now I get it.

    I’m not saying that comfort with the idea of a God who willingly tortures (tortures! See the excellent Jack Bauer post from a few days ago) his creatures – for eternity, relentlessly, on an on and on for centuries, millenia, eternities, while those victims remain, by design, fully awake and aware of their state of unmitigated, active suffering – in itself directly leads to a coarsening of a person’s character. I’m new to this, the data is not yet in, as it were.

    What I am saying is that the warmth and generosity generated by the Great Hope seems to be, as reflected in the many posts, book reviews, tweets, and comments I’ve read, remarkably consistent.

    In contrast (and only thus far! Will keep an open mind when it comes to ECT!) I truly do not find the tone of those supporting the eternal conscious torment or annihilation viewpoints to be very welcoming.

    Commentary on tone in discussions may seem completely inapposite to the point of this blog or even this discussion. I am mentioning it because the consistently of the dynamic is becoming un-ignorable to me.

    I mention it also because, given where I’m at in life, what I need, and the challenging dynamics prompting me to read theological discussions at all, I wish to thank all of you here who manage to discuss your points without feeling a need to send a bunch of other people to hell. Were we truly to have that authority, I am afraid I would appear on many people’s lists. It is nice to be among people who by all appearances eschew drawing up lists of heretics, sinners, and those who may otherwise be slow to grasp the truth. Your approach is part of what keeps me coming back. And every time I do, I find more reason to hope, to change, and to believe.

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    • DBH says:

      I have no idea what connection Rooney is drawing between the passage he quotes and my arguments for universalism. I don’t really care, since he’s wrong on both topics; but it’s worth noting that the connection is entirely in his imagination.

      As for the accusation of heresy, I’m not sure which defined doctrine my remarks supposedly violates. But, if I am guilty of heresy on this score, so were Maximus, Nazianzen, Denys—among others.

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  4. Logan(mercifullayman) says:

    When we posit the creation of the world as ex nihilo (which I think Maximus, Eriugena, and DBH/Wood have all demonstrated really means ex Deo) we have to always remember that the “Nihil” here is the illimitable foundry of unlimited potential that resides within the Godhead itself. The nothingness is not really a Void, but the very fullness that exists as the edge of a limit we can know. I think people mistake the terms, and they need to be defined more definitively to know what one is talking about. All possibilities that then come flying forth into the pure act that is are grounded there. So an indeterminate decision, or freely supposed creative moment, would then become precisely a determined actualization because it now simply is. It is being that becoming brings forth but is grounded in the Being (or as some would call the actus purus) of existence itself (although I think this sometimes turns Being into an objective thing), but does’t have a necessarily presupposed moment. It moves into the necessary as it becomes, well, a part of the Real. I’m a novice and understand that. I don’t see why this is complicated for Rooney to see? It’s no different than centuries of discourse on the bringing forth of something from nothing/one and the many.

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