The End of the Journey

by Robert Farrer Capon

The rest of our journey, once we have passed through that door in the bottom of the world, is predictably unpredictable. The Miller’s Third Son following the cocked hat in the gloom has no idea where he is going or what will happen next. Everyone who reads the story, however, knows that, whatever happens, he will make home safely. Mystery may never stop being mystery; but the happy ending comes on willy-nilly.

It can be argued that the whole business is just an elaborate game of wishing-will-make-it-so. There are answers to that. The first is the old anti-reductionist one-two punch: How do you know that this elaborate game of wishing-will-make-it-so is not the divine device for clueing us in on what, in fact, really is so?

The second is to trot out Pascal’s “wager”: No matter what happens, we are going to have to wander around down here in the dark of badness as long as we live; why not take a chance on the invisible guide? If he’s for real, you win hands down; if not, you only lose what you had to lose anyway. It is a proposition no betting man would refuse: The worst you can do is break even.

The third answer goes one step further: Even if the invisible guide turns out to be the little man that wasn’t there, he sounds nicer than the Crown Prince of the Salamanders. If the whispered love of the Word is a lie, it is at least more appealing than all the ghastly truths we have to put up with.

In the long run though, who really cares about smart answers? On both sides of the fence, everyone who has his head threaded on straight knows that there is no possibility of proving or disproving these things. What we think of them is always decided on the basis of taste. If you find something fetching about the idea of the Word making love to creation in the midst of its passion, you take to it; if not, you call a spade a spade and brand the whole thing as a cop-out, a fool’s promise to do everything someday by doing nothing now.

But what you do about it all is another question. The world commonly assumes that the faithful are uniformly delighted, everywhere and always, by the faith. That is partly because they have never paid proper attention to the Book of Job, and partly because the faithful are sometimes a bunch of fakers who refuse to admit their doubts. There are days when any honest Christian will admit that he thinks the promises of the Gospel are just so much incredible bologna. Even when he tries to catch the last handhold—the fact of the resurrection of Jesus—it gives way and he sees it only as the delusion of a handful of peasants, inflated to cosmic proportions by a tentmaker with excess intellectual energy.

But what he thinks has nothing to do with what he does.

Ah, you say. Intellectual dishonesty!

No. Or yes. It doesn’t matter. You forget what kind of proposition we are dealing with. There is no harm in thinking I am on the wrong bus when, in fact, I am on the right one—as long as I don’t talk myself into getting off the bus. We have been offered a guide who says he can bring us home; either he can, or he can’t. But what I think about him has nothing to do with his competence. I may believe in him with all my heart: if he is a fraud, it gets me nowhere. Or I may doubt him absolutely: if he really knows the way, I can still get home by following him.

You have failed to distinguish between faith, which is a decision to act as if you trusted somebody, and confidence, which is what you have if, at any given moment, you feel good about your decision. It is probably not possible to have confidence without faith; but it certainly is possible to act in faith when you haven’t a shred of confidence left. Intellectual honesty is a legitimate hint for your own mental housekeeping; it has no effect whatsoever on things that already are what they are. I suggest, therefore, that we stop this bickering and think about something more pleasant. We still have a long way to go. Have the last piece of venison pie while I tell you a classroom story.

When I teach dogmatic theology, I try to set up the faith on the same framework I have used in this book: the Trinity creating the world out of sheer fun; the Word romancing creation into being, and becoming incarnate to bring it home; Jesus as the sacrament of the Word; and the Church as the sacrament of Jesus. Having done that, I then ask the crucial question: How does the story actually end?

Invariably, I get all the correct but dull answers: The Word triumphs; creation is glorified; the peaceable kingdom comes in. And I say, Yes, yes; but how does the story actually end? The class looks at me for a while as if I were out of my mind, and then offers some more of the same: The Father’s good pleasure is served; man is taken up into the exchanges of the Trinity. And I say again, Yes; but how does the story end in fact? No answer. I try another tack: Where does the story end? Still no answer. All right, I say, I’ll give you a hint: Where can you read the end of the story? And eventually someone says: In the Book of Revelation—but who understands that? I’m not asking you to understand it, I say. I just want to know what you read there. What is the last thing that happens?

And, slowly and painfully, it finally comes out: The New Jerusalem comes down from heaven to be the Bride of the Lamb.

They never see it till they fall over it! It’s the oldest story on earth: Boy meets girl; boy loses girl; boy gets girl! He marries her and takes her home to Daddy. The Word romances creation till he wins her; You are beautiful, O my love, as Tirzah, comely as Jerusalem, terrible as an army with banners. By his eternal flattery, he makes new heavens and a new earth; the once groaning and travailing world becomes Jerusalem, the bride without spot or wrinkle. And finally, as she stands young and lovely before him, he sets her about with jewels, and she begins the banter of an endless love: Jasper, sapphire, a chalcedony, an emerald; Behold, you are fair my love. Sardonyx, sardius, chrysolyte, beryl; You are fair, my love; you have doves’ eyes. A topaz, a chrysoprasus, a jacinth, an amethyst: You are fair, my beloved, and pleasant: also our bed is green. Let us get up early to the vineyards; let us see if the vine flourish, whether the tender grape appear, and the pomegranates bud forth: There I will give you my loves. The mandrakes give a smell, and at our gates are all manner of pleasant fruits, new and old, which I have laid up for you, O my beloved.

The Third Peacock, chap. 7

(Return to chap. 1)

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38 Responses to The End of the Journey

  1. If “all this is a matter of taste,” I choose what makes me “happiest” — whose definition seems equally up to me — and reading this isn’t that. If my hypthetical self-interest moves me to belief or doubt, I choose to worship myself, which Christian faith and divine command seem to forbid. I fully recognize the appeals to self-interest built into my faith, the worst of which is the inescapable lure and threat of the afterlife, though there are many others. To dangle faith as aesthetic option rather than moral imperative makes the sale more likely… provided I like the product. Otherwise, it’s on to the next shopping item on my list.

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    • Tom says:

      Hi Stephen. I could be wrong. I’m a hack at theology, but my sense is that all morality is a formal expression of aesthetics. If you have DBH’s BOI, go through his treatment of Nietzsche (pp 93-127). You’ll see it. Hart describes the sense in which it is in the end all about taste. Just a thought.

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      • Tom,
        I would like to hear more about your view of your core claim: all morality is about taste.

        I’ve always thought the problem with Nietzsche’s view of Christianity is that he took Christ’s example more seriously than the three theologians who most thoroughly formalized that faith, than Christians in his day or ours have. To live as Christ is a performative act in our present moral condition, I think, but then it was even more so for Christ, which is Nietzsche’s core presumption and reason for negation. But to claim any generational progress in an imitation of Christ must admit that the “narrative” of his example has exerted some moral gravity. Perhaps the drama is having some marginal impact on its audience. That cheers me.

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        • Tom says:

          I took the trouble a few years back to reproduce Hart’s extended engagement with FN. One of my favorite parts of BOI. Pardon the link, but if you don’t have a copy of BOI handy, you can find this section of it here:

          Being Hart on Nietzsche—Part 1

          If I’m following Hart’s point and don’t mangle it too badly, ‘morality reduces to aesthetics’ (my phrase, not his, but I think he’d agree) in the sense that morality involves a certain stepping away from the immediacy of the encounter with Beauty (with Christ), while the experience of Beauty is immediate and irreducible to secondary formulation (moral or otherwise). Beauty is transcendental. Morality as such is not. Morality is at best an attempt to decline that immediacy into codes and stipulations devised to manage behavior comprehended outside that immediacy itself. Morality is the best we can come up with this side of the consummate, shared immediacy of Christ’s beauty. Morality will pass away. Beauty will abide. That’s part of what I think Capon had in mind – he sees that in the end it does amount to taste (our sense of, or taste for, the true, the good, the beautiful).

          SK would agree, no? i.e., to be in ‘the Ethical’ is to be in a certain despairing relation to Love, which is not a product of any dialectic exchange between good and evil.

          And ultimately we become free from morality as such (1Tim 1.9 “We realize that the law is not for the righteous but for lawbreakers and rebels….”)

          Sorry if I garbled that. Where’s DBH when you want him to chime in? ;o)

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    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      Stephen, I’ve been perusing your website. Given your strong understanding of warrant, I have to ask, Are you a church-going Christian? If yes, why?

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  2. Aiden,

    Thanks for asking. I enjoy your postings and thank you for them.

    Yes, I am a Christian, but it has been a life’s slog to get there. I am working on putting the “why” into terms congenial to warrant now. I can only commit to a belief, not to knowledge, so my reasons are biased by my desire as beliefs must be. That opens space for commitments of permissibility and entailment rather than the higher standard of knowledge I might wish to assert. I presume almost no knowledge of God, but find First Cause in ST I sufficient to claim as knowing by preponderance of evidence. The ontological argument seems defeasible to me.

    I can frame two arguments as beliefs entailed to knowledge: from human felt preferential freedom in a contigently determinist reality, which is a generic argument for theism, and from refinements of categorical (deontological) moral goods in using that freedom as a specific endowment of grace in Christian practice. My theory of grace derives from Aquinas, Wesley’s three stages as interpreted by Albert Outler, Heidegger’s early concept of being, and, most essentially, the late Karl Rahner.

    I find two arguments permissible to belief, which is a lower standard: from divine hiddenness relative to the problem of evil conducing to a kind of Jamesian will to believe and by standards of quality as applied positively to virtue ethics, and duty ethics and negatively to Mill’s consequentialism. I am still working on the standards of quality argument. Not entirely sure that will pan out.

    I haven’t gotten to work these into entries on my web site yet. Working on a longer analysis now to make sure I can make an integrated and intelligible argument before breaking it up into discrete entries. I apologize if anything here seems cryptic or confusing.

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    • Tom says:

      Stephen, just a hunch, but I think you might enjoy Christian Wiman’s ‘My Bright Abyss’ (Amazon).

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    • Robert F says:

      Most of it is confusing to me, but I’ve not done the reading you refer to nor am I conversant with the theological and philosophical language and shorthand you use. That’s my problem. But what is evident from what you say is that you have patched together, and are patching together, a Christian faith from numerous sources that you found in a many places, and connected yourself. As sociologist Peter Berger said, in his numerous books dealing with the character of religious belief in the modern era, faith for those exposed to the relativizing influence of pluralistic modernity must necessarily be a work of bricolage.

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      • Robert,
        Yes, it is a struggle to justify faith without surrendering entirely to desire. Your use of “bricolage” reminds me of an irrelevancy. We moved an 1845 house in Louisiana. During the restoration, we found bousillage, a French colonial insulation of Spanish moss, clay, horsehair, and cow manure. I’m trying to do without the manure in seeking permissible faith.

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        • Robert F says:

          But, on the off chance that you misstep and mistakenly include manure, thinking it something else, in seeking permissible faith, if desire gets the best of you at some point or points, let’s hope, for your sake as well as the rest of ours, that divine love and grace are loving and grace-filled enough quite apart from any of your or our missteps, and that the “wideness in God’s mercy” will not be averted by the stink.

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    • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

      Stephen, the question of philosophical warrant for Christian believing is interesting, but not one I worry about at this point in my life. I do not believe that Christians can ever meet the modern philosophical standards of “knowledge.” And yet . . . I still believe. I can offer reasons for this believing, but the fact remains that my commitment to Christ far exceeds what empirical data and philosophical reasoning permits. The gospel summons Christians to an unconditional discipleship–to take up our cross and follow Christ, even to the point of death and martyrdom. Neither opinion nor probabilistic knowing can justify this commitment. Yet here I am. I have staked (at least I hope I have) my life on Christ Jesus and his promises. If it turns out that I was wrong to do so, then, as C. S. Lewis once remarked to Sheldon Vanauken, “I will have paid the universe a compliment it doesn’t deserve.”

      My approach here resembles that of the great Anglican philosopher Austin Farrer. In his book Faith and Speculation, he describes an imaginary conversation between a philosopher and a simple person of faith. At one point the Christian replies to the philosopher:

      What you urge sounds very convincing and I don’t know how to answer it direct. But then I do not think along the sort of lines you seem to follow and so I find it difficult to come to grips with you. I dare say the way I do think will seem to you extremely silly, but what is the use of my being bashful about it? Well then—the Christian faith was preached to me as a gospel of salvation. Perhaps—though I do not know—the credal propositions it contains might be verified along various other and more scientific lines, but I cannot claim to have tried any line but one—the line directly suggested by the claim of the gospel to be a gospel. It offers to me the blessing of a union of will with the primal Will. I follow the way of union which it prescribes and I find that the blessing blesses. There is the fundamental blessing of finding oneself where one belongs and there are the consequent blessings such as those we were listing just now. The gospel offers God to me as good, not simply as fact. In embracing the good I am convinced of the fact.

      For the Christian there is a kind of knowing that cannot be slotted into philosophical epistemology. Our believing enjoys a certitude that is both stronger and weaker than ordinary knowledge claims. I know that Jesus Christ died on the cross for the sins of mankind. I know that he rose from the dead, thereby securing for humanity eternal salvation in the divine life of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Yet if challenged by a philosopher, I would have to concede that I do not know this to be the case, at least not according to accepted epistemic criteria. With the simple Christian, all I can say in response is, “The gospel offers God to me as good, not simply as fact. In embracing the good I am convinced of the fact.” And that is sufficient. In the famous words of Pascal: “The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of.”

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      • Aidan,
        Thank you for such a sincere reply. I want to reply, but before doing that, could you answer this question: if I pointed out a clear logical fallacy in your creedal position that you found compelling, would you consider changing it? I am not at all saying that, but I am curious about what you’d do.

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        • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

          Stephen, can you concoct a possible logical fallacy for me to consider?

          If, for example, the skeleton of Jesus of Nazareth was to be discovered one day, I would conclude that Christianity is false.

          If you are thinking about a central dogmatic assertion of the Orthodox faith, say, the doctrine of the Trinity or the Chalcedonian affirmation of the two natures of Christ, I honestly do not know how they can be demonstrated as logically incoherent. Paradoxical, yes–but paradox is inevitable when speaking of the infinite transcendent God and its interaction and union with finite reality.

          But it’s hard for me to answer your question in general terms. What logical fallacies do you see in the orthodox creedal faith?

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          • Aidan,

            I posed the question of consistency to you because your answer was so powerfully affirmative. I have nothing so grand as a dogmatic contradiction to assert. I wish to open up some options that I think your response closes. Yes, these concern your assertion that “there is a kind of knowing that cannot be slotted into philosophical epistemology. Our believing enjoys a certitude that is both stronger and weaker than ordinary knowledge claims. I know….” I think your inconsistency lies in trying to make sense of knowledge that is both stronger and weaker than the other kind. I think you are wrong on that. I think you may see the problem because you also make a kind of confession in an earlier comment that this one denies. You say early in your response this: “I do not believe that Christians can ever meet the philosophical standards of ‘knowledge.’ And yet…I still believe.” The logical inconsistency I wish to argue lies in the tension between those two views of knowing and your using the word “believe” in relation to them.

            It will not surprise you that my project’s emphasis on warranting knowledge is my point. First, let me agree completely with your comment that Christianity or any similar religion can meet the philosophical standards of “knowing.” Your profession of belief is undamentally different from claiming knowledge (with or without the scare quotes). Contemporary standards of knowing are all we have because the kind of knowledge you claim in your other reference is not knowing at all, as you confess by saying “and yet…I still believe.” What warrants real knowledge is real warrant: empirical methods, expertise, competence, ordinary experience or authority. What warrants the kind of knowledge you claim in opposition to this is certainty alone. You are most emphatic to make clear that you are certain of your faith. You claim to know it because of your certainty. The inconsistency I charge in your credo is that you can’t know that at all regardless of your certainty. You can only believe. The difference is crucial. Belief from its beginnings always has a whiff of desire. Consider this sentence: “I once believed I was in love, but now I know different.” Or consider this one: “I believe I locked the car, but I really don’t know if I did.”

            Philosophic standards of knowing in the modern sense were necessitated by confusing belief and knowing. I don’t know why religious believers fail to see that real and skeptical standards of knowledge were made necessary precisely to oppose the kind and degree of certainty you profess. Each was employed in service to different truth and goodness claims. Perhaps all religions and all of the thousands of variations of Christianity that all believers so passionately assert do contain some fragment of a divine reality. We can know almost none of it. Claims to religious “knowledge” (my scare quotes are intentional) cost 20 million lives in the Reformation and has cost I don’t know how many since then. It still does. The problem, as you know all too well, is that there is only one truth in the numinous and ineffable reality of the divine. And certain or not. We don’t know it. I have to think you agree with this based on how much you have written on mysticism and apophatic realities.

            I think you feel squeezed by a too-severe understanding of knowledge and a too-hasty constriction of the possibilities of warranting beliefs. Knowledge is not only empirical. If it were, every goodness claim would be left hanging in air, including law and custom. I mentioned expertise and competence. I don’t have space here to discuss authority, but I cover that quite a bit on my website. All of these are sources of knowledge, not only of truth, but also of beauty. They warrant universal knowledge, not certain but by a preponderance of evidence. They are disputable and repairable, except for authority, for trust has to be transferred rather than repaired. Even ordinary, everyday experience is a form of knowing when warranted, though it is not very strong. If you want to say you have an undistilled knowledge of the truth of Orthodoxy, I could buy that because it gives us room to talk about your faith and mine in terms reason can grasp. As an aside, you have taught me to deeply value aspects of the Orthodox faith, for which I am grateful. But that is all belief, personal, moved by my desire as well as my hopes. I can’t get at your certainty. Nor can I get at the certainty of the Second Crusaders who attacked the seat of your faith. That being said, you can still defend your beliefs. Not all are equal, but all are equally inferior to knowledge because they cannot be universally warranted.

            I can argue for a defense of multiple and conflicting beliefs if they all are entailed to knowledge. The question of whether UFO’s have visited earth isn’t such a belief, but the likelihood of alien life is: not known but believed with very good reason based on the knowledge of the multiplicity of planets. Entailed beliefs are pretty likely true. Less likely beliefs are also open to commitment, though with a very large range of doubt. Lots of religious beliefs fall into that category. Your certainty in faith is admirable, but the way you phrase it, any faith substantially disagreeing with yours has to be in error. I think that is wrong both logically and morally. So you are entitled to say you are certain your faith is true but not entitled to believe you are certain mine or any other equally permissible belief is wrong. Let’s sort out the devil worshipers.

            I’ve been arguing only from the point of view of religious truth but the whole issue of goodness and beauty can be handled similarly. Goodness is even more in doubt, so the ranges of knowledge and belief are even broader and more open, meaning the level of certainty is far less. Beauty even more in the realm of doubt.

            I’ve gone on too long. But there is so much more. I want to end with this very strong caveat. I could be wrong on everything I say. I think it all aligns, but if it is wrong, I want you or anyone else show me how. Modern philosophical standards of knowledge always place what we know in doubt, and we can’t improve the reliability of knowledge – beliefs too – if we are so certain we are right that we slam shut our reason. So have at it and give me a reason to change my mind that is better than the one I just gave you. I’d be thankful for it.

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          • Fr Aidan Kimel says:

            Thank you, Stephen, for your comment. I lack the competence to discuss the questions your raise in any depth. I’m a blogger, dammit, not a philosopher! 😁

            I do resist, however, your general epistemological approach, as it seems constructed to rule out the knowledge claims of the Christian Church (and presumably all other religious communities), reducing them to nonrational “beliefs” that express … what precisely?

            The Church confesses that there is one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth. Is this a knowledge claim or just a private opinion? I would think the former. The question then becomes, with what epistemic warrant do we make such a claim?

            Here the spirits divide. Some will bring out the Five Ways or other arguments. But while I do not want to discount such arguments, my faith in God does not rest upon them. Here I agree with Alvin Plantinga that belief in the existence of God is properly basic. Now it’s been decades since I read Plantinga on this, so I am unable to defend the position. All I can do is direct you to his writings, which you have no doubt already read. That belief in God is basic, does not, of course, mean that it is groundless. I can offer reasons and arguments to support my belief; but the basicality of belief in God does not rest upon them. It therefore functions as a fundamental axiom in my reflection upon and reasoning about reality.

            Because I hold that belief in God is basic, I am therefore open to the possibility that he has revealed himself in history, but let’s leave that to the side for the moment. At this point let me just ask you, When I affirm the proposition “God exists” or when I declare “I know God exists,” am I making a knowledge claim or am I merely expressing an opinion lacking epistemic warrant?

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          • Aidan,

            I must not have expressed myself well.

            In answer to your question, to say “I know that God exists” has to be a knowledge claim, ” since “to know” literally denotes having knowledge. I think existence may be about the only thing we can know of God simply because contingent determinsm needs a causal stop. Should you say, “God is good,” that would not be knowledge. But it need not be an opinion either. There is a vast space for conceptual clarity between knowledge and opinion. That was my point earlier.

            In my reply, I took care to try to pry open “knowing” beyond the falsifiable and the empirical, else concepts could not be known. Knowing goes from the empirical to the common experiences of everyday life, but with decreasing verifiability. So that opens knowledge way up, particularly when you have a low bar of “by a preponderance of evidence” with a corresponding openness to revision. But your beliefs and my beliefs and Alvin Plantinga’s religious beliefs are not knowledge, though he says they are.

            That is not a handicap so long as you are willing to concede that no belief rises to knowledge. Like knowledge, beliefs also cover a range of epistemic confidence: entailment signals they are suggested by knowledge and are more likely true than not and permissibility that they are possibly true among many other equal possibilities. In my schema, opinions are empty expressions. Tom in his comment above thought it odd that I didn’t speak of my personal faith. That would take way more time and accomplish way less than simply footnoting my justifications in the hope that someone might wish to investigate further. How do I investigate your certainty?

            Without a warrant, my opinion of who won the 202o election is worthless. Faith without warrant may be similarly binding to the believer but not to another person regardless of certainty. I get that what makes faith most full to me may mean nothing to you (absent respect or personal relationship) and vice versa but there it is.

            Your certainty or my certainty or Plantinga’s certainty adds nothing to this range of possibilities but conflict or tolerance. You have every right to reject my schema, of course, but to do so requires you to explain why your certainty of Orthodoxy is more true, more knowledge, more applicable to God, than Alvin Plantinga’s certainty that his Calvinism is, something he has claimed as a product of his sensus divinitas. I doubt you’d have the same sense. This was the cause of the Reformation, of all religious war. Certainty is personally binding. It is persuasive to one who wishes to be persuaded. It is not a reason for another to believe. I summarized some reasons to believe that I think have some force in my first response.

            I reiterate what I think is my strongest point. The constriction of knowledge was made necessary by eight generations of believers certain that their religious convictions were true with no means of resolution. The only solution to that kind of certainty is to constrict what knowledge is and make belief a private engagement of faith. I think that constriction has gone too far since the 1880’s because now the only means of knowing that is generally respected is natural science.

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          • Robert F says:

            Stephen, is my confidence that my wife loves me knowledge?

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  3. Robert F says:

    Pascal’s wager takes place in a world where the choice is thought to be only between Christianity and unbelief. For those living in our modern world, conscious of having to make a choice among dozens of religious alternatives in a pluralistic setting, such a wager takes place among dozens of competitors, significantly reducing the odds of getting lucky.

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    • Not a fan of the Wager. It is the consummate commitment of hypothetical utility, a cynical calculation of self-interest in hope of profit. Is it reconcilable with an aesthetic preference?

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    • Robert,

      Just noticed your wonderful question about your wife’s love. Don’t want to be cheeky here, but I can’t say it is knowledge since I don’t have any idea how she treats you. Were you to claim that she loves you while we were drinking coffee, I’d ask why you think that she does. I’d have to hear a whole lot to say whether she does or doesn’t and even then it would only be hearsay. If I knew you to be honest and astute, I’d probably say I know it because I know you have good judgment and generally are honest. But it would not be a very strong knowledge claim. You’d be in a better position to judge.

      But that brings up a whole other issue of concept and nonconceptual knowledge. Not really relevant here. For this discussion, I’ll just say everything you and I could say about our faith would have to be conceptual, but we can’t say everything we believe. It may be that one can know things we cannot say, like the depth of your wife’s love, but if I think of myself and that issue, I realize I not only can’t conceptualize it. I also don’t know what it is as a …. again no words suffice. Lots of spiritual implications to this problem, but you can’t really get at them without concept. Did I mention I am a Kantian? My spiritual mentor is Karl Rahner, who also struggles with concept at “the receding horizon of the divine.”

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      • Robert F says:

        Thanks for your reply. I realized after I asked the question that what I really wanted to ask was, “If it is true that she does love me, is my confidence that my wife loves me a form of knowledge?”, but your response encompassed both questions anyway. In the matter of what is the most important aspect of human life, love, we have to rely on mysticism and poetry, knowing that they can easily lapse into illusory sentimentality and greeting card verse. But, the morning after, both lover and mystic must have recourse to reasonable reflection, because, as Al-Ghazali said, “reason is God’s scale on earth.”

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        • I’ve used that very line from Al Ghazali as the conclusion on a piece denying religious knowledge on my webpage. It does defend reason as the source of defensible beliefs about the entire issue.

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          • Robert F says:

            I know it not directly from the source, but from its quotation in Peter Berger’s book, A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity (in the book Berger typifies our times not as an age of unbelief, but of credulity).

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  4. Tom says:

    My guess is Stephen’s question to Fr Aidan about how the latter might handle discoveries that contradict core aspects of the Christian story are about the underlying epistemology, i.e., falsifiability. It’s a fair question, though I don’t think it’s about any specific imagined fact of the matter that would provoke the conclusion, it’s how we integrate (or not) the idea that there might be anything that could falsify the Christian story.

    It is real vulnerability to admit that there are things that would falsify the story. I mean, DBH admits that if eternal hell were an necessary part of the story, ‘Christianity’ would be false, and he’d be morally obliged to reject it. On the other hand, he admits that philosophically speaking, there is no conceivable way materialist naturalism is true; there must be some Transcendent origin and end to things. Christianity’s historical claims don’t need to be true for this much (philosophically) to be true.

    Jordan Wood has a new (first) episode of a podcast out in which they take Maurice Blondel as a springboard for chatting about some of these questions. I don’t know if we’re allowed to share links to other resources, but here’s the link:

    https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/history-and-dogma/id1702741919?i=1000624553846

    I do find it interesting, Stephen, that when Fr Aidan asked you if you were a practicing Christian, you answered ‘yes’ but then unpacked that in terms of abstract philosophical moves and theories, this or that ‘proposition’. I don’t want to criticize. I share a lot of those interests, but in recent years life has corralled me into a more ‘mystical’ frame of mind/experience. Today, I would never answer the question ‘Are you a Christian?’ by pointing to any belief proposition or creedal statement, since all those can be held as true and one not be a Christian (imo; see 1Cor 13).

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  5. Tom, Thanks for the link. I’ll check it out.

    Check, check, and check on your comments.

    I find mysticism, particularly of the Orthodox variety, really helpful to remind me of my limitations. On that score, I have been very moved by The Cloud of Unknowing and the first half of Otto’s The Idea of the Holy, though I think the second half shows how hard it is to do what the first half advises.

    I want to stress that my project involves opening up knowledge well beyond Popper, though I think he’s right on true science as a check on the human sciences. More, I think belief is not an either/or, nor is it equal to opinion. There is a range of possible and defensible beliefs. This is where religions can be differentiated. I think we have a moral duty to do more than desire God but to sincerly seek. As there is only one God the plurality of our beliefs must yield to toleration, and the certainty we so desire that is the very seal of belief to our acceptance of mystery, just as you say.

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    • Mercifullayman says:

      Stephen,

      Based on what you’ve said and who your influences are, I think you would feel more at home with the likes of S.L. Frank (The Unknowable), anything just about by Berdyaev (No one is more neo-Kantian and wrestling with ontic grounds via Baader, etc than He) and Bulgakov (particularly Bride of the Lamb) to expand and wrestle with views that actually merge quite well with your epistemic limits. Wanting to find a ground in an inherently dualistic world is going to be where your tension always lies. I’d even recommend Eric Perl’s Theophany for a way to relate ontology and epistemology via Pseudo-Dionysus to you too.

      We also have to have a huge epistemic qualification. One must remember that St. Paul tells us that all “knowledge” of the cross is going to be considered foolish in the realm of the philosophical tradition. Yet, if we are to take fools seriously, one must remember that the insights parse beyond the immanent or “rationally verified” into the knowledge of the truth of things as the Truth posits the ground of what I feel is the ultimate transcendental, Beauty. It isn’t an aesthetic judgment, but a truly epistemic one. Plato, Plotinus, and others aren’t that far off when they suggest an anamnesis. One’s knowing may be more of a remembering than a true becoming, and even if it is, as Bulgakov points out, all becoming is bound up in creaturely freedom that the Divine Sophia grounds in its creation of the nothingness that we encounter, and contains all of what can be within its grasp as God’s very nature itself. This is the created fount of ex nihilo all great minds eventually run into… Ouk on, to Me on, and so forth.

      And, to further push the point, it is Schelling, who carries, I think, Kant past Kant more than Hegel, to realize the ground of all knowledge is the understanding prior to reason. Reason’s reification is a misplaced focus on the true nature of things. It’s an exchange of kind. It is also, deeply eastern, more so than say Rahner et al. who want to take the Heideggarian dive, and yet still hang onto western views/Thomistic utilization. Maybe check out some Christos Yannaras/Michel Henry to get a different take on Heidegger and it’s uses toward epistemic certainty as well, that move around the onto-theological issue, which I think ultimately, for you, is what your questions are truly about.

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      • MLM,

        Thank you for that very coherent thread. I am obviously searching and find God more in that seeking than in what it discovers. Your bread crumb trail leads in a direction I cannot follow very far because I find intimations insufficiently directive, or perhaps they are for me too expansive to direct my particular search for the divine. In regard to the apophatic, I am enough of an absolutist to doubt my own desire to ascend except through practices. I feel bound by Kantian conceptualism to abstain from Platonic idealism. I use his exploration of awe in the Third Critique as my model. Phenomena are about as wide as my mind will open. But every Kant does have his Hegel, or Schelling if you prefer. For me Heidegger represents the failure of bridging that divide, stranding me on the side of concepts I can grab with both hands or mystics whose humility seems profound to me and indicative without definition. I will respectfully differ on your view of Plotinus and Schelling, both of whom seem to me to have degenerated and obscured the work of their antecedents. But perhaps I am dazzled by the light. I am content working with concepts while trying to put some waypoints between certain knowledge and pure faith.

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        • Logan(mercifullayman) says:

          I typed a response but for some reason, it got axed by the interwebs….must not have been good enough lol.

          I’d simply say this instead. I think that there are a huge amount of pre-suppositions and biases that go into Schelling and Plotinus. Schelling, even in his beginnings kind of takes Kant to task, but that devotion to him in many says still suffices. As newer translations are coming out of him, people are finding that maybe he was more misunderstood. Jason Werth’s “Meditations on Life” about him is an incredible work in this regard, and one would be hard pressed as an absolutist to disagree with his Naturphilosophie, especially in the light of modern science. Plotinus has more teeth than I originally thought. Stephen R. L. Clark convinced me of this.

          And I think a good counter to Heidegger who also swims in those same seas but with I think, more exactitude, is Karl Jaspers. His notions of being etc seem to align more easily with the tension of knowledge and faith.

          I too struggle with the balance of the robustly philosophical and speculative to the theological, and yet, even in maybe where I land, I am reminded of the Nyssen in the Life of Moses. It isn’t the end that is the point, but the progress and journey through the wilderness of knowledge that is the point. The perfection is found in the struggle, in the constant eye opening of new truth upon truth as we find paths that lead to new ends, and whose final end is the God who both grounds being, and yet is not being. Oddly, it was a dualist like Berdyaev who taught me that, even if I don’t travel that Kantian road with him fully.

          You’ll eventually find what you’re seeking. Christ says that. I’d take the Word at His word.

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          • Logan,

            Thank you for your (second) compassionate reply. My dissatisfaction at this late stage of life is not with the faith I have found but with my ground for believing it, continuing the project that began with seeking reliable knowledge beyond the empirical. That search has brought me to Christian belief. I think I am closing in on some permissible reasons for professing it now.

            I’ve not read secondary sources on any of the writers you reference with the exception of Heidegger, whom I have studied. One reads a major work by someone on the other side of the epistemic chasm and then moves on to place him in a tradition.

            As you seem devout, may I ask you one further and simple question: what does John 3:16 mean to you in terms of atonement? I’m juggling moral chainsaws on this one. Thanks much!

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          • Logan(mercifullayman) says:

            I think along similar lines to most here, and especially the likes of the long tradition of “miserecordie” that has existed within Christianity. I view that text in the light of George MacDonald’s great unspoken sermon, “Justice.” It moves me to tears every time I read it. If you haven’t, there, I’d suggest you find the answer to John 3:16.

            To balance the ethical tension it can only be seen in light of how you view the ontic nature of reality, it’s purpose, what love really is, how Christ is found to be believed, when, and how to maintain an intellectually sound perspective that both balances God’s Justice and his Mercy in one cosmic act that then ripples through all of creation, and dare I even suggest is from the beginning, and in a way, the Cross concretizes time bi-directionally. It gives reality its very ground “from a hill far away on an old rugged cross.”

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          • Logan,

            Thank you for recommending Macdonald’s unspoken sermon on Justice. Reconciling God’s justice and God’s mercy has always challenged me, but my disquiet was dispelled by Lewis’s remark that we only get God’s justice when we reject God’s mercy: that justice is our loss of divination. I had read some Macdonald years ago when I saw he had been a formative influence on the Inklings. In looking at his influence this time, I also saw he affected L. Frank Baum.

            I am pleased he moves you. He is certainly passionate and definitive in his assertions about God and man. I do like his line that concepts about Jesus are just that, whereas the Christian’s duty is to obey him. I can’t quite figure out how we know what obedience consists of without conceptualizing the duty Christianity imposes.

            For me the ontic necessarily precedes the ontological. Thank you for recommending the sermon.

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          • Mercifullayman says:

            SLD,

            As a Kantian, you know how that works out. Even the categorical imperative is a demand that resides a priori to anything else and implies its own moral ground precisely as Duty itself. Even Hegel, as much as one may say “mehh” to some of his thought, implies the same thing as Kant. Philosophy and the philosophical, in the end, are ethical. The duty, as duty, holds its own ontic weight. Christ, as Christ, is all the ground that is needed, hence GMAC’s point that it was what you do, obey, is all that is required. So one’s ability to truly be, and with that to truly be free, is in the act of obeying, not thinking or knowing, but in the doing. It’s an a poseteriori event that is also, in a way, to steal from Berdyaev, Bulgakov, and no less Plato, a remembering.

            FWIW in a sense, MacDonald’s rejoinder to Lewis would actually be that God’s justice/mercy are what one finds in gaining divination, precisely because the act of deification precludes the notion of both justice/mercy as the corrective for our intended aim/purpose as created beings. It’s also why I see “God beyond ‘God’ ” because to equate being as God, would place the ontological prior to the ontic. There are ways to maintain the in-ness of creation without equating it to the divine in toto.

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  6. Robert F says:

    Fr Kimel, your response to Stephen regarding what proof might alienate you from Christian faith was interesting. For my part, I think that even if Jesus’ corpse were found, I could maintain faith in him, and faith in his resurrection. If conclusive evidence were discovered that he was an evil sob, however, I could not.

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  7. Fr Aidan Kimel says:

    Stephen, I’m afraid I must invoke my incompetence yet once again and bow out of our conversation. You have a fully developed epistemology, and further discussion would require me to spend months working through your books and blog articles to get a handle on your position. I take solace in the fact that irreconcilable epistemologies abound in modern philosophy. I also take solace in the fact that philosophers abound, both Christian and non-Christian, who would find your system too rigorous and inflexible.

    I conclude, therefore, that I have permission to sit lightly regarding theories of epistemic warrant. I don’t think I’m being irrational in saying this. Life is too short. I’m now 71. My faith in the Holy Trinity is hard-won. It has somehow survived through tragedy, suffering, loss, and aging, as well at the temptation to agnosticism. Several years ago I found myself in another crisis of faith. Finally, I went outside and told God that I no longer believed in him. Eventually I broke into laughter. If I didn’t believe in him, why was I talking to him? The crisis passed. I knew at the moment that I would remain a Christian for the rest of my life. May it be so. As Puddleglum replies to the Green Witch in The Last Battle after her anti-Aslan tirade:

    I won’t deny any of what you said. But there’s one more thing to be said, even so. Suppose we have only dreamed, or made up, all those things-trees and grass and sun and moon and stars and Aslan himself. Suppose we have. Then all I can say is that, in that case, the made-up things seem a good deal more important than the real ones. Suppose this black pit of a kingdom of yours is the only world. Well, it strikes me as a pretty poor one. And that’s a funny thing, when you come to think of it. We’re just babies making up a game, if you’re right. But four babies playing a game can make a play-world which licks your real world hollow. That’s why I’m going to stand by the play world. I’m on Aslan’s side even if there isn’t any Aslan to lead it.

    Many of my theological views have evolved and changed over the decades. I like to think that I can offer good reasons for my religious knowledge claims, but it appears that they would not pass muster according to your well-thought out epistemological position. Hence your response to my earlier statement that the religious person can “know” certain propositions to be true that one or more nontheist epistemologists would question or challenge. That’s fine. I don’t worry about disagreements. If I find objections to my views well-considered, I try to take them seriously. This is one reason why I try to maintain a level of modesty regarding my own philosophical commitments. (The same holds for my non-central theological commitments. I am unabashedly eclectic.) In recent years, for example, I have developed an interest in Neoplatonism, particularly as expounded by St Dionysius and his interpreters Eric Perl and David Bentley Hart. But my tiny brain will not allow me to identify myself as a Neoplatonist. There’s always a Thomist around to challenge me. My ignorance grows exponentially every day. All I can do is hold on to the central truths that guide and shape my life. Life is too short, and mine gets shorter ever second.

    My one concern for you is whether you have built such a strong philosophical edifice that effectively limits you from hearing God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ as declared in the gospel. Here is the priest talking. The risen Christ is always exploding our philosophical and theological systems and idols. We need to make sure that we leave open enough windows to allow the Truth to shine into our minds and hearts. If we don’t, we will find ourselves trapped in ideology and that way is death.

    I am not cutting off future conversations between us. Quite the contrary. But you are playing in a philosophical ball field that is not my own. But you and I share a commitment to truth, and that is to our mutual good. I do hope that one day you will visit my ball field. You may find it interesting, perhaps even helpful. 😎

    Thank you for the stimulating conversation! Now back to my reading and prayers.

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  8. Aidan,

    We are the same age. Your pastoral fear of my openness to the Good News is very well-founded, as reading scripture for me is like riding a pogo stick in a broom closet. I study it, but other than the Gospels, it’s castor oil to me (a flavor you might remember). I have a love/hate relationship with Paul and his avatars. Please pray for me as I shall for you.

    Message received on the epistemic disagreement and applause on our mutual desire for truth and goodness of every species. So thank you for the conversation and for the education I so frequently receive from your efforts in this space. I stay away from the universalist pieces because I don’t want to be tempted, but if there is an afterlife, I can’t see how it could be in any other form.

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